Auto-deploy from GitHub

requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/space/requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/space/space/requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/space/space/space/requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/space/space/space/space/requirements.txt

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ uvicorn==0.34.0
 gliner==0.2.17
 pygraphviz==1.14
 graphviz==0.20.3
-spacy==3.7.6
+spacy==3.7.6
+https://github.com/explosion/spacy-models/releases/download/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1/en_core_web_sm-3.7.1-py3-none-any.whl

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10003-10041.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# 104-10003-10041 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+☐ UNCLASSIFIED 
+☐ INTERNAL ONLY 
+☐ CONFI**I**NTIAL 
+☑ SECRET
+
+## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+
+SUBJECT: (Optional)
+
+Clipping of article "The Kennedy Murder and the Secret Services of the USA"
+
+FROM:
+
+WE/4/INT Arthur P. Iorio 
+
+EXTENSION NO. 
+
+DATE: 26 March 1964
+
+TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
+-----|------|-------|-----
+1. CI Staff Birch O'Neil Room 2603 | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | The attached article, which may be of interest to you, appeared in the 7 March issue of the Italian Communist Party weekly Rinascita. The writer, Gianfranco Corsini, has been on and off US correspondent for the Italian Communist press. Note that in the section pencille in red rumors are referred which suggest that kind it was the Agency to organize the murder of President Kennedy.
+2. | | | 
+3. | | |
+4. | | |
+5. | | |
+6. | | |
+7. | | |
+8. | | |
+9. | | |
+10. | | |
+11. | | |
+12. | | |
+13. | | |
+14. | | |
+15. | | 18 |
+
+FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 3-62
+
+☑ SECRET 
+☐ CONFIDENTIAL 
+☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY 
+☐ UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Clipping not retained

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10004-10143 (C06932208).md

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+104-10004-10143
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+Date: 05/08/96
+Page: 1
+
+JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
+IDENTIFICATION FORM
+
+AGENCY INFORMATION
+
+AGENCY : CIA
+RECORD NUMBER : 104-10004-10143
+RECORD SERIES : JFK
+AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 201-289248
+
+DOCUMENT INFORMATION
+
+ORIGINATOR : CIA
+FROM :
+TO :
+TITLE : DISCUSSION BETWEEN MEMBER SR DIVISION CONCERNING
+OSWALD'S STAY IN HELSINKI.
+DATE : 06/01/64
+PAGES : 2
+SUBJECTS : HELSINKI TRIP
+USSR CONSULATE
+
+DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
+CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
+RESTRICTIONS : 1B
+CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
+DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/12/93
+OPENING CRITERIA :
+COMMENTS : OSW10:V43 1993.06.12.10:33:55:150000:
+
+[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
+NW 64937 Docld:32106269 Page 1
+
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+CO DENTIAL
+SECRET
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+
+SUBJECT: (Optional)
+
+FROM: CIRA/PS
+2823
+
+TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
+building)
+DATE
+SX-25605
+1 June 64
+
+OFFICER'S
+INITIALS
+COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
+to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
+RECEIVED
+FORWARDED
+1.
+IPIAN
+5 MAR 1975
+Phoe assign
+SX # and
+clamefs to
+2.
+3.
+4.
+5.
+IP JEDI
+6.
+201-289248
+7.
+8.
+IPIFILES
+Document Number 716-838
+for FOIA Review on JUN 1976
+
+Ath Pori, Millen
+10.
+11.
+12.
+13.
+14.
+15.
+FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
+NW-64937 DocId 32906269 Page 2
+CONFIDENTIAL
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+MEMO FOR THE RECORD
+1 June 1964.
+SX-25605
+Discussion betroen MOMBOR SR. Divisiong
+and CoS Helsinki CONCERNING timetable
+OF OSWALD'S stay in and Holsinki
+
+1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
+returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning
+the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
+his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission
+letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)
+
+2. Friberg gave me the following information:
+
+a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
+downtown Helsinki;
+
+b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
+reach the Soviet consulate;
+
+C. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local
+time on Saturdays in 1959;
+
+d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in
+Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
+Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
+the time.
+
+e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
+Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.
+
+3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable che
+Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
+suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.
+
+Lee H. Wigren
+C/SR/CI/R
+
+Document Number
+for FOIA Review on.
+716-838
+JUN 1976
+SAME AS RELEASED
+DOC
+340
+
+RECORD COPY
+1
+1 Jun 64
+201-289248
+NW 64937 Docld:32106269 Page 3

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10004-10143.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+10.00000
+104-10004-10143 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+13-00000
+
+MEMO FOR THE RECORD 1 June 1964
+Sx-25605
+
+DISCUSSION between members SR Division,
+and CoS Helsinki concerning timetable
+OF OSWALD'S stay in Finland and Helsinki
+
+1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
+returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inguiry concerninge.
+the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
+his contact with the Soviet Consulate therer. (Copy of the Commission
+letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May, 64, attached.)
+
+2. Friberg gave me the following information:
+
+a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
+Helsinki.
+
+b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
+reach the Soviet consulate;
+
+c. Consulate in Helsinki was open Saturdays in 1959;
+
+d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the Helsinki airports of
+Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
+Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
+the time.
+
+e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
+Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.
+
+3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the
+Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
+suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.
+
+Lee H. Wigren
+C/SR/CI/R
+TRAVEL PROGRAM
+IP/EDI ABSTRACTA
+INDEX
+IP/FIS
+IP/PH
+PREPARE FOR FICKING
+FILM
+CODE NO. (2,3,4)
+RYBAT REST CODE
+ISO/DCU
+CABLE IDEN (11)
+NTD (8)
+IP/FILES
+FOR FILING
+
+Document Number 716-838
+for FOIA Review on JUN 1976
+SAME AS RELEASED
+DOC -340
+
+RECORD COPY
+
+1. Jun 64
+201-289248
+
+Box 8

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10004-10156.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+10.00000
+104-10004-10156
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+Box 8
+
+13-00000
+
+1 June 1964
+
+MEMO FOR THE RECORD
+
+1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
+returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning
+the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
+his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission
+letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)
+
+2. Friberg gave me the following information:
+
+a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
+downtown Helsinki;
+
+b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
+reach the Soviet consulate;
+
+c. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local
+time on Saturdays in 1959;
+
+d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in
+Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
+Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
+the time.
+
+e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
+Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.
+
+3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the
+Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
+suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.
+
+Document Number 780-340
+
+FAIA Review on JUN 1976
+
+SAME AS 716-838
+
+ZONET
+
+13-00000
+
+See Sanitized File
+Number 335
+For steril
+H

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10004-10213.md

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+104-10004-10213 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+YF2-27221
+9 July 1964
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
+SUBJECT : Discussion with Warren Commission Staff Member
+REFERENCE: Letter from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the
+President's Commission, to Mr. Richard Helms
+dated 3 July 1964
+
+>O SRICE DISCUSSION with SLAUSEN & Tily on .girations.
+Svitt felicy towards design woats HALETICONS ANd
+CUINT Visa Puccedures,
+1. With the approval of C/SR and the DDP, I met with Mr. W.
+David Slawson of the staff of the President's Commission on the
+Assassination of President Kennedy at 1400 hours on this date in
+the Commission's offices at 200 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington,
+D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss apparent inconsistencies
+in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of
+State which were called to our attention in a letter from the General
+Counsel of the Commission to Mr. Helms, dated 3 July 1964.
+
+2. By way of introduction, Mr. Slawson said that in the portion of the
+Commission's report that he was writing, he would have to deal with the
+question of whether or not the OSWALDs' departure from the USSR - and
+the circumstances (i.e. timing) of that departare were unusual or
+suspicious in any way. He expressed his belief that they probably were
+not and cited Soviet relaxation in such matters in the post-Stalin era.
+However, he wanted to be sure in his own mind that our information was
+not in conflict with that which the Commission had received from State
+since all of that information would remain in the records of the
+Commission.
+
+3. After stating my belief that there was no real disagreement or
+inconsistency between the information from CLA and that from State, I
+expressed the view that the matter resolved itself into three questions:
+
+Document Number 767-864
+for FOIA Review on
+/a. Do the Soviet
+JUN 1976
+
+CS COPY
+
+SECRET
+
+a. Do the Soviet authorities normally permit Soviet
+citizens married to foreign nationals to emigrate from the
+Soviet Union to the homelands of their spouses?
+
+b. Do they normally permit such Soviet citizens to
+accompany (i.e. depart simultaneously with) their spouses
+from the Soviet Union?
+
+c. How long does it take such Soviet citizens to get
+Soviet exit visas for such a purpose (time lapse from application
+to granting of visas)?
+
+4. Concerning the first two questions (3a and 3b above) I pointed out.
+that we had addressed ourselves mainly to the question of Sovie: citizens
+being allowed to accompany their spouses abroad while State dealt only
+with the larger question of Soviets married to foreigners being allowed
+to emigrate without reference to whether or not they left simultaneously
+with or at another time from their spouses. Mr. Slawson commented
+that this explanation was most helpful and he reread what both we and
+State had said in that light.
+
+5. By way of further explanation, I said that the statements in
+paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 concerning Soviets being
+permitted to accompany their foreign spouses abroad were based on a
+review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans. In only four of
+these cases did a Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her foreign
+husband; in 14 of the cases the foreign spouse departed alone; and in the
+remaining seven cases insufficient details are known to permit us to
+categorize them. I added that although State's information began by
+citing the issuance of 724 quota and non-quota immigrant visas by the
+American Embassy in Moscow during the period FY 1954 to December
+1963, it did not indicate how many of these visas were for Soviet citizens
+who had married U.S. nationals. Actually State provided detailed
+information for only sixteen cases and did not indicate in many of these
+whether or not the Soviet was permitted to accompany the foreign spouse.
+16. In response to
+
+-2-
+
+6. In response to a question from Mr. Slawson I stated that most
+of the 26 cases upon which we based our statements involved foreign
+students, exchange teachers and other relatively transient persons,
+and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear
+little similarity to the OSWALD case in that none involved a defector who
+married prior to repatriating. I noted that paragraph 6 of our 6 April
+1964 memorandum to the Commission had pointed this out. Mr. Slawson
+indicated that he was now satisfied on this matter.
+
+7. Concerning the length of time taken by Soviet authorities to
+process exit visas for Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals
+(question 3c above), I stated that, in my opinion, the information
+provided by State (in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter)
+substantially corresponded to the views expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7
+of our memorandum to the Commission dated 6 April 1964. Mr. Slawson
+asked if it would be possible to elaborate paragraph 7 of our memorandum
+of 6 April by providing a statistical breakdown of the cases on which our
+statements were based. I indicated that this could be done.
+
+8. At this point Mr. Slawson stated that as a result of our discussion
+he felt that the question of possible inconsistencies bad been resolved.
+However, he asked that we send a brief written reply to the Commission's
+letter of 3 July 1964 embodying the substance of what I had said concerning
+the basis for statements included in our 6 April 1964 memorandum. (This
+would include the gist of the draft reply to the Commission which I showed
+to C/SR on 8 July plus an elaboration of our statements concerning Soviet
+visa applications.]
+
+9. Mr. Slawson indicated that he would be sending parts of his report
+dealing with the Soviet intelligence services to CIA for checking as to
+their accuracy. He did not say when this would occur.
+
+10. After concluding the meeting with Mr. Slawson, I read Volume 52
+of the transcript of testimony before the Commission. This included the
+reinterview of Marina OSWALD.
+
+-3-
+
+Lee H. Wigren
+C/SR/CI/Research
+
+@Do. sors normally permit Sov. cityens married to for
+natla to engrate pom Sll to homeland of sprise ?
+• State says you - cites 724 visa applicationم
+(perbably minority Spouse's; mij
+belatives ite ast mijint)
+- We cite absence of law; do not say.
+
+2 arimally
+② Do Sros permit sou. cits menit to fon marks to
+accompany (ie depont simultanernely co.) spouses
+from Sele to homelandes of spouses
+- State does not say
+se cite evidence that they do not
+We ليه
+
+③ How long does it take Soveits to gel. Sevivians
+at to homelan Ss of fou Spouses?
+to junge at
+-Our #7 and State's inse
+فه
+Cases inhuid. it ikurus ajrec
+
+Notes, Hedin
+Co
+CS-COPY
+
+dil Ite XAA2-27221
+
+Le 7
+with) friin sprστασις
+Based on in de la 26 Cail
+fre till out c/ SU.
+(10 US)
+
+-Safe left line oftenband - 4
+ -
+-
+-
+-
+- 7- !
+
+② Irifi in fu 47
+1-2 fine taken by for allite
+bisa apple of Sor Spencer of fin
+substant illy agrees is lite o infe
+نر
+4. on Juice taken by Sri-st. poreias veda
+aggelies of Sou woofcitis (1)
+
+Gust of State is w
+life cancion y bar, tibi of tense to her bij de citthoritie
+1.
+bun cits in Sel
+life in the poor
+/
+740
+li inquest for norme of all 1152
+ت
+:/ cits vitus ricerit'd in Cast
+2: 10 quo cesta Collis len, the of
+fine betinien intrs of aggler. l. He apport
+by God auth
+2 יני
+
+Aun cat
+0063
+>
+
+② Date of appplectenfor os doit reser
+Ion dedures, in 14
+12
+
+"
+[10dayo-194]
+Promplit all itthees
+-10 line to 14 yeю
+- Cant till bord

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10005-10321.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
+
+SECRETARTDAT
+
+30 September 64 FILE NO. 201-4524
+
+BONN, FRANKFURT, BERLIN, COPENHAGEN,
+REYKJAVIK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM
+DIRECTOR THE HAGUE BRUSSELS
+
+nue, stess, cluez, VR, FILE
+
+UN, FRAN, BRLN, COPENJO GMNY
+E. PARI, STOC, muda, Hagu, Beas
+
+AT/KUDESK/TPMURILLO / CATIJA
+
+KIGREST TRACES JOACHIM JOESTER DPOB 29 JUL 07 COLOGNE.
+
+ENTER ENTIRE ADULT CAREER AND AUTHOR CA 30 BOOKS AND NUMEROUS
+SPAPER ARTICLES. POST WWII WORKS VERY ANTI-KUBARK, LAST
+OK TITLE - OSWALD: ASSASSIN OR FALL GUY? HAS WRITTEN UNDER
+UE NAME AND UNDER PSEUDONYMS: FRANZ VON NESSELRODE; H.F.
+LIKIN; WALTER KELL; PAUL DELATHUIS.
+
+2. ACCORDING CAPTURED GESTAPO DOCS HE JOINED GERM CP ON
+MAY 32 AND HAD MEMBERSHIP NO. 532315. OWNED LENDING LIBRARY
+LN AND SOME TIME AFTER MAY 32 WENT USSR WHERE REMAINED UNTIL
+
+33. DURING ABSENCE HIS LIBRARY MANAGED BY FIANCEE ANNA
+SCHINSKY. LAST RESIDENCE GERMANY BRLN LUETZOWSTRASSE 40
+BEI HESS.
+
+Document Number 888-906
+for FOIA Review on JUL 1976
+
+CONTINUED
+
+COORDINATING OFFICERS
+GROUP 1
+Excluded from automatic
+downgrading and
+declassification
+AUTHENTICAT
+OFFICER
+
+SECRET/RYB
+REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
+
+3. IN MAY 33 FLED TO FRANCE, WAS IN COPE 36-37 BUT EXPELLED
+(OR LEFT) EDCAUSE HIS ANTI-DAHISK GOVT WAITINGS. LEFT DENMARK
+FOR FRANCE VIA ICELAND. IN 40 IN SWEDEN, MARRIED MAY NILSSON,
+CAME US VIA USSR IN 41 AND NATURALIZED CITIZEN SINCE 48
+
+4. WOULD APPRECIATE AS FULL A CHECK AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING
+LOCAL SERVICES AND AVAILABLE OVERT LOCAL PRE-WWL REFERENCES
+(PRESS, BOOKS, ETC.) ON JOESTEN AND FIANCEE.
+
+5. FOR BAIN: PLS ALSO CHECK DDC AND REQUEST PHOTOSTATS
+ANY DOCS, CAN ADDRESS AND NAME HESS BE CHECKED? ANY CHANCE
+LOCATE FIANCEE?
+
+6. ALL ADDRESSERS PLS HANDLE AEQUEST URGENTLY AS MATTER
+ALSO OF INTEREST TO WARREN COMMISSION. CABLE SUMMARY RESULTS
+AND POUCH DETAILS INCLUDING ALL COPIES AVAILABLE JOESTEN PRE
+WWI WRITINGS.
+
+CONTINUED
+
+SEGRET/RVRAT
+
+MIC PARASI THROUGK 3 AECVI IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, AUS
+FILE
+END OF MESSAGE
+
+C/EE/06
+C/WE/L
+CAVELS
+
+SEGRET/RVRAT

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10006-10247.md

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+104-10006-10247
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+SECRET
+FROM: (Requesters name)
+BRANCH
+ROOM
+BADGE NO.
+NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST
+EXTENSION
+DATE
+RID CONTROL NO.
+TO
+TUBE
+ROOM
+DATE
+INITIALS
+RID/INDEX
+DT-5
+REQUESTER
+RID/FILES
+DT-6
+REQUESTER
+RID/ANALYSIS GT-7
+RID/201
+DW-6
+RID/MIS
+GT-6
+RID/INDEX
+DT-5
+
+SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED
+SURNAME
+(All spellings)
+D'EDKOV, Roman Fedorovich er Vilasa Nikolaevna
+SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED
+AKA, ALIASES
+OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership,
+I. S. affiliations, etc.)
+Poss. at soo. Eulest. Ind
+RESIDENCE
+New Delhi, Ind
+SEX DATE OF BIRTH
+PLACE OF BIRTH
+CITIZENSHIP
+USSR
+Minse USSR
+
+RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK
+COMMENTS
+NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
+CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED
+
+INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS
+IN ALL CASES
+1. Use gummed label; type or print all
+entries.
+2. Upon receipt of index card reproductions
+draw a green diagonal line across the
+items you do not want.
+3. Edit (use green) the reproduced index
+cards to indicate:
+(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with
+green D and note reason for destruction)
+Examples: document destroyed; duplicate
+or less informative than retained in-
+formation; information of no CS value.
+
+(b) corrections and additions, inclu-
+ding infinity symbol ∞ when card in-
+cludes all facts contained in the
+document.
+
+Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG
+are in RID/ARD, and those that meet
+indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-l are
+carded in the CS Main Index. If you
+believe there could be additional in-
+formation of value in these records,
+you must request an Archives Index
+search.
+201 CONSOLIDATION
+1. Return this form with the card repro-
+ductions, also return pertinent documents,
+aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on
+the subject exists.
+2. For each document to be included in the
+consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference
+to be placed in the 201 file), green D the
+corresponding card and check (a) or (b)
+below:
+
+(a) Consolidate into
+201-
+(b) Open 201 file on subject.
+
+RESTRICTION (If any)
+CRYPTONYM
+OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS
+ASSIGNED
+YES
+NO
+FILE TO
+BE KEPT
+RID
+DESK
+Note 2. Information concerning foreign
+public personalities (except mili-
+tary) may be available in BR/OCR
+x7997.
+DATE
+SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER
+
+13-00000
+
+One Roman Fedorovich DEDKOV, born 28 March 1927 in Ariansk, USSR,
+
+and his wife Vilasa Nikolayevna DEDKOV, born 31 December 1930 in Minsk,
+USSR, applied for were listed as applicants for entry visas to Indiad
+sometime prior to April 1962. DEDKOV, who was issued Soviet passport
+number 207461 on 17 September 1960, was scheduled to arrive in New Delhi
+for two years as an English language teacher at the Soviet Embassy.
+
+It is not known whether or not DEDKOV actually arrived in New Delhi.
+
+Not at sent because it shows lioman to Indonians, aaring
+"Home List" nut classified.
+SCAT
+10 AUG 1964
+
+13-00000
+
+INDIA 1
+
+DEDKOV, Roman Fedorovich
+
+Subj scheduled to arrive New Delhi for two years as an
+English teacher at the Soviet Embassy; Ppt 207461 iss
+17 Sept 60 (Mos Comment: Subj is presumed to have arr
+sometime after sept 60). NBDA-8509, 24 Apr 62
+
+Wife: Vilasa Nikolayevna (DPOB: 31 Dec 1930; Minsk)
+
+201-756978
+
+DPOB: 28 Mar 1927; Ariansk

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10007-10345.md

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+
+SUBJECT: Document Number 988-927 BD
+
+for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
+
+FROM: Chief, CI/R&A
+2 C 17
+
+TO: Chief, AF
+7 C 32
+
+Chief, EE
+3 D 31 07
+
+Chief, FE
+5 D 31 07
+
+Chief, NE
+6 D 31 07
+
+Chief, WE
+4 B 44 05
+
+Chief, WH
+3 B 44 03
+
+DDP
+3 C 20 16
+
+CI/R&A
+2 C 17
+
+PSD
+
+RID
+
+DATE 27-865
+24 December 1964
+
+For Coordination
+
+DEFERRED
+
+RID PROUESTING STOPPED
+PLEASE INDICATE HANDLING
+
+NOTE: This Document of the CA R
+of the CS Decur
+Desired Handling
+For Signature and Release
+BY HAND
+PLEASE CALL
+
+Easy Printing 201-289248
+
+DISPATCH
+
+Chiefs of all Stations
+
+Chief, KUDOVE
+
+Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts
+
+FYI
+
+1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of
+President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem.
+involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is
+our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every
+support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory
+responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President
+travels abroad,
+
+2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission
+produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem
+of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation,
+which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These
+include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation,
+coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be
+interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren
+Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent
+Fortions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading
+by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and
+overseas.
+
+Document Number 988-927 BD.
+
+for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
+
+FLETCHER M. KNIGHT
+201-289245
+
+Book Dispatch No. 4726
+
+100-300-12
+
+Raymond G. Rocca gwh
+
+HQ COPY
+DISPATCH
+
+Distribution For
+Book Dispatch No. 4726
+
+AF Division
+Abidjan
+Accra
+Addis Ababa 
+Algiers 
+Bamako
+Brazzaville
+Bujumbura
+Conakry
+Dakar
+Dar-es-Salaam
+Freetown
+Kampala
+Khartoum
+Lagos
+Leopoldville 
+Lome
+Lusaka
+Mogadiscio
+Monrovia
+Nairobi
+Pretoria
+Rabat
+Salisbury
+Tananarive 
+Tripoli
+Tunis
+Yaounde
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the AF Division.
+
+dw
+
+EE Division
+Athens
+Bern
+Frankfurt 
+Nicosia
+Vienna
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the EE Division.
+
+FE Division
+Bangkok
+Djakarta
+Hong Kong
+Honolulur
+Kuala Lumpur
+Manila
+Melbourne
+Okinawa
+Phnom Penh
+Rangoon
+Saigon
+Seoul
+Taipei
+Tokyo
+Vientiane
+Wellington
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the FE Division.
+
+себ
+
+Distribution For
+Book Dispatch No. 4726
+
+NE Division
+Aden
+Amman
+Ankara
+Baghdad
+Beirut
+Cairo
+Colombo
+Damascus
+Jidda
+Kabul
+Karachi
+Kathmandu
+Kuwait
+New Delhi
+Tehran
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the NE Division.
+
+WE Division
+Brussels
+Copenhagen
+The Hague
+Helsinki
+Lisbon
+London
+Luxembourg
+Madrid
+Oslo
+Ottawa
+Paris
+Paris/LCPIPIT
+Reykjavik
+Rome
+Stockholm
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the WE Division.
+
+-2-
+
+Distribution For
+Book Dispatch No. 4726
+
+WH Division
+Asuncion
+Bogota
+Buenos Aires
+Caracas
+Georgetown
+Guatemala City
+Kingston
+La Paz
+Lima
+Managua
+Mexico City
+Montevideo
+Panama City
+Paramaribo
+Port-au-Prince
+Port of Spain
+Quito
+Rio de Janeiro
+San Jose
+San Juan
+San Salvador
+Santiago
+Santo Domingo
+Tegucigalpa
+
+The above listing has been
+reviewed in the WH Division.
+
+-3-
+
+Headquarters Distribution for
+Book Dispatch No. 4726
+
+2 DDP
+1 ADDP
+1 C/OPSER
+1 C/TSD
+1 C/CA
+1 C/CCS
+1 C/SOD
+1 C/CI
+1 C/FI
+
+2 C/AF
+1 C/AF/1
+1 C/AF/2
+1 C/AF/3
+1 C/AF/4
+1 C/AF/5
+1 C/AF/6
+
+2 C/EE
+1 C/EE/G
+1 C/EE/K
+1 C/EE/SA
+
+2 C/FE
+1 C/FE/CH
+1 C/FE/HULA
+1 C/FE/JKO
+1 C/FE/PMI
+1 C/FE/TBL
+1 C/FE/VNC
+
+2 C/NE
+1 C/NE/1
+1 DC/NE/AA
+1 C/NE/4
+1 C/NE/5
+1 C/NE/6
+
+2 C/WE
+1 C/WE/1
+1 C/WE/2
+1 C/WE/3
+1 C/WE/4
+1 C/WE/5
+1 C/WE/BC
+
+2 C/WH
+1 C/WH/1
+1 C/WH/2
+1 C/WH/3
+1 C/WH/4
+1 C/WH/5
+1 WH/COPS
+1 WH/POA
+1 WH/POB
+1 WH/Plans
+
+2 CI/R&A
+1 CI/LIA
+1 CI/OPS/AF
+1 CI/OPS/EE
+1 CI/OPS/FE
+1 CI/OPS/NE
+1 CI/OPS/SS
+1 CI/OPS/WE
+1 CI/OPS/WH
+
+1 RID
+
+Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10009-10021.md

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+FIELD DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847
+
+AF DIVISION
+Johannesburg
+Lagos
+Nairobi
+Pretoria
+Rabat
+Salisbury
+
+EUR DIVISION
+Barcelona
+Berlin
+Bern
+Bonn
+Brussels
+Copenhagen
+Geneva
+The Hague
+Hamburg
+Helsinki
+Lisbon
+London
+Madrid
+Milan
+Munich Liaison Base
+Munich Ops. Base (Laurion)
+Oslo
+Ottawa
+Paris
+LCPIPIT
+Rome
+Salzburg
+Stockholm
+Vienna
+Zurich
+
+NB DIVISION
+Ankara
+Athens
+Beirut
+Calcutta
+Colombo
+Istanbul
+New Delhi
+Rawalpindi
+Teheren
+
+FE DIVISION
+Bangkok
+Djakarta
+Hong Kong
+Honolulu
+Kuala Lumpur
+Kuching
+Manila
+Medan
+Melbourne
+Okinawa
+Rangoon
+Saigon
+Seoul
+Singapore
+Taipei
+Tokyo
+Vientiane
+Surabaya
+Wellington
+
+WH DIVISION
+Asuncion
+Bogota
+Brasilia
+Buenos Aires
+Caracas
+Georgetown
+Guatemala City
+Guayaquil
+JMWAVE
+Kingston
+La Paz
+Lima
+Managua
+Mexico City
+Monterrey
+Montevideo
+Norfolk (REPLANT)
+Panama City
+Port au Prince
+Porto Alegre
+Quito
+Recife
+Rio de Janerio
+San Jose
+San Salvador
+Santiago
+Santiago de los Caballeros
+Santo Domingo
+Sao Paulo
+Tegucigalpa
+
+SECRET
+
+HQS DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847
+
+CA STAFF
+DC/CA
+CA/COPS
+CA/PROP
+CA/LO
+CA/B1
+CA/B2
+CA/B3
+CA/B4
+CA/B5
+
+AF/COPS/CA
+AF/1
+AF/2
+AF/3
+AF/4
+AF/5
+AF/6
+
+FE/CA 14
+C/CO/CA
+
+SB/CA
+
+DO/CA 3
+
+CI/R&A 10
+
+EUR DIVISION
+E/CA
+E/SC
+E/BNL
+E/F
+E/I
+E/IB
+E/G
+E/AS
+E/BC
+
+NE DIVISION
+NE/COPS
+NE/GTI/G
+NE/GTI/T
+NE/GTI/I
+NEAA/I
+NEAA/AP
+NEAA/S&L
+NESA/RE
+NESA/C&N
+NESA/I
+NESA/P
+
+WH DIVISION
+WH/CA
+WH/C
+WH/C/CA
+WH/1
+WH/1/Mexico
+WH/2
+WH/2/G
+WH/2/P
+WH/H/S
+WH/2/CR/N
+WH/3
+WH/3/B
+WH/3/CO
+WH/3/E
+WH/3/P
+WH/3/V
+WH/4
+WH/4/AR
+WH/4/CH
+WH/4/P/U
+WH/5
+WH/5/Brasil
+WH/6
+WH/7
+WH/7/HT
+WH/7/GU
+WH/7/DR
+WH/7/JTS
+
+SECRET

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10009-10222.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+104-10009-10222
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+DD/P8:4635/1
+
+26 NOV 1968
+
+Sir Charles C. F. Spry
+Director General
+Australian Security Intelligence Organization
+G. P. O. Box 510583
+Melbourne
+
+Dear Charles,
+
+Thank you for your letter of 15 October
+recommending against the declassification of
+Warren Commission document CD-971. I might
+mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968)
+was in anticipation of further pressure for the
+release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure
+which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is
+not, at the present time, any intention to release
+CD-971.
+
+Should the question be raised at some future
+time, the points made by you in your letter provide
+every reason to keep the document out of the
+public domain.
+
+With kindest regards,
+
+Sincerely,
+/s/ Richard Helms
+
+Richard Helms
+Director
+
+Document Number 1042-947c
+for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
+
+cc: DDCI
+
+Signature Recommended:
+
+Deputy Director for Plans
+DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
+5681
+
+Distribution:
+Orig - Addee
+1 - ADDP  2 - DCI
+1 - CPE 1 - DDCI
+1 - PMI 2 - DDP
+1 - PMI/AN
+21 NOV 1968
+Date
+
+SECRET
+
+CORRES
+RELATING TO
+THIS-
+INCLUDING
+NAVYS OK
+OF 27 June
+
+FILE
+MAIN
+FILE

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10022.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+21 MAY
+1982
+US/82/71
+
+Dear Anthony,
+
+Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our
+records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov
+traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba
+during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned
+permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and
+served there until August 1965. He was variously
+described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache.
+During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S.
+Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico
+City.
+
+In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald
+approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt
+to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR.
+Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa
+request. We have no information which indicates any
+relationship between these individuals other than for the
+purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.
+
+Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of
+duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned
+to the consular section and was a second secretary. It
+appeared that he was tasked with following the activities
+of the Central American communist parties and left-wing
+groups, and he met often with members of these groups,
+reportedly providing them with funds and technical
+guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual
+TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family
+remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip
+to Havana.
+
+Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in
+September 1971. Our information indicated that he was
+not due to leave for another three to four months, and at
+the time of his departure, there was some speculation that
+the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that
+he was known to Lyalin.
+
+CROSS FILE COPY FOR
+201-289248
+DO NOT DESTROY
+
+RECORD COPY
+
+SECRET
+
+XAE09222
+21MAY 82
+100-2-95
+
+While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the
+most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in
+Mexico. He has been described as being without morals,
+education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in
+Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of
+prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with
+some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his
+position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it
+received a good deal of press coverage.
+
+We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in
+June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there
+now.
+
+Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have
+been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action)
+(Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to
+confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB
+has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+/s/ David
+
+David H. Blee
+
+Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere
+
+PHOTO ATTACHED
+
+DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+Orig & 1 - Adse
+1 - CI/RA Chrono
+1 - 100-2-95
+1 - Reading Board
+1 - Paxson
+
+SECRET
+
+100-2-95

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10024.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+104-10012-10024 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+6/705
+10 May 1982
+
+Dear David,
+
+VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV
+
+1. Please refer to our conversation of 6 May. KOSTIKOV, born 17 March 1933, Moscow, was posted to Beirut in 1978 as 1st Secretary and may still be there. He is identified KGB and served in Mexico City from 1961-71. There is a reference to him on page 307 of BARRON's KGB which suggests that he may have been Department V. We do not appear to have asked LYALIN about him, and are now doing so.
+
+2. We also note that EPSTEIN in "Legend" claims that according to a CIA telecheck KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey OSWALD'S KGB case officer in Mexico City. According to BARRON (page 335) OSWALD was in Mexico between September and November 1963 and was seeking to obtain a Soviet visa. There was certainly a KGB interest in OSWALD, although according to NOSENKO this was defensive.
+
+3. The reason for our current interest in KOSTIKOV will be obvious. As you are aware, our Embassy in Beirut, in common with other Western Missions, has been subject to threats and violence in recent months, and in view of earlier hostile attentions from the KGB, we have been reviewing our records of KGB staff in the area who might have been involved in promoting strong-arm tactics.
+
+4. We would be grateful for your views as to whether the KGB are likely to be behind any of the recent incidents (possibly through the Syrians) and for any information on KOSTIKOV and his activities in Mexico and in Beirut. In particular, what are your comments on the OSWALD story; can you confirm that KOSTIKOV is still in Beirut; is there anyone else in Beirut or Damascus whose trace record suggests an Active Measures role, or worse?
+
+5. We should be grateful for an early reply and as I said on 6 May will treat anything you can tell us on a strictly Service to Service basis.
+
+CROSS FILE COPY FOR
+201-289248
+
+DO NOT DESTROY
+
+Yours ever
+
+A C M de Vere
+
+Form 547a Processed

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10035.md

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+1 UNCLASSIFIED
+INTERNAL USE ONLY
+CONFIDENTIAL
+SECRET
+
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+
+SUBJECT: (Optional)
+
+FROM: E/BC
+4C 20 Hqs?
+
+EXTENSION NO
+1413
+7220
+
+DATE
+5 APR 1978
+
+TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)
+
+DATE
+OFFICER'S INITIALS
+RECEIVED
+FORWARDED
+COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column, after each comment.)
+
+1. CilRTA
+2. Hausman APR 1978 ch
+3. Rum Holmes
+4. 3D57
+5.
+6.
+7.
+8.
+9.
+10.
+This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on from MI-6 in Washington.
+
+Another copy is being held in E/BC.
+
+Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.
+
+Processing by IP is to be determined by
+
+Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO.
+
+NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document... See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976.
+
+RBH
+11.
+12.
+13.
+14.
+15.
+
+FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
+SECRET
+CONFIDENTIAL
+INTERNAL USE ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+Our ref: GEN 1
+
+Dear Art,
+
+30 March 1978
+
+Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.
+
+2.  I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.
+
+Mr A H Stimson
+
+Enc.
+
+DH Jones for GML Blackburne-Kan
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+SERGYJ. CZORNONOH
+1106-11TH STREET
+SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
+95814
+
+M. Wall
+
+TO BRITISH EMBASSY
+3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W.
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
+REGISTERED NO.257254
+
+SERGYJ CZORNONDH
+1106-11TH STREET
+SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814
+
+MARCH 15, 1978.
+
+TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
+BRITISH EMBASSY
+3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W.
+WASHINGTON, DC.
+
+DEAR SIR.
+
+I WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER I ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.
+
+ON JULY 18, 1963 I WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175 I HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF US.S.R. SAY YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, I SAID I HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, I SAID HIS NAME SOHT ONTO TIME WAS PUBLISHED ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID
+
+I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN BRITISH POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND BRA IMMIGRATION, JASKING YOUR EMBASSY TO HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I ASK YOUR GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD My RECORD CE JULY 181 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND SENATOR DANIEL K. NOUYE CHAM 21. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN 11 GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS Copy LETTER TO ALSO I ENCLOSE you copy LETTER I JANT ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AMMASSA YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE APPLIA MY INCOMING MAIL iS CONTROL BY FIBI AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL IDENT GET NOT FORWARD TO ME FIBI, Suppress My INFORMATION AND TORTURE MED DRUG RESPECTFULLY YOURS "21.S. PASSPORT NO, DO 2.7000 Sergyj
+
+copy. 10
+BRITISH AMBASSADOR
+
+Sergyj Czornonoh
+1106- 11th Street
+Sacramento, California 95814
+
+To Russian Ambassador
+Embassy of U.S.S.R.
+1125 - 16th Street
+Washington, D. C.
+
+Dear Sir:
+
+This is retyped letter from hand written
+
+Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.
+
+On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.
+
+At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan). Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.
+
+I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+U.S House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.
+
+Sergyj Czornonoh
+Regis Hotel
+1106 11th Street
+Sacramento, CA 95814
+
+GITY MANAGEAS
+ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
+BRITISH EMBASSY
+
+February 6, 1978
+
+Mr. John M. Price
+District Attorney
+Sacramento, California
+
+Dear Mr. Price:
+
+This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry, Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do... supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager door use certain people, to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.
+
+In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone – 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak, In this letter I ask you to give re- strain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy mid- night June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.
+
+Please respond to me. Thank you.
+
+Very truly yours
+
+Sergyj. Czornonoh
+
+Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.
+
+Legal Center
+For The Disabled
+
+1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
+Telephone: 446-4851
+
+March, 1978
+
+Sergyj Czornonoh
+1106 11th Street
+Sacramento, CA 95814
+
+Dear Mr. Czornonoh:
+
+This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.
+
+In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.
+
+If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+LESLIE KAY
+Paralegal
+
+CATHERINE HUGHES
+Staff Attorney
+LK: ab
+
+REGISTERED NO 2.51067
+FROM 1106801124 95814
+TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
+SF Wen la OFFICE OF MINISTRY
+LONDON ENGLAND

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10076.md

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+13-00000
+
+FIELD DISTRIBUTION
+
+A Division
+WH Division
+NE Division
+DISTRIBUTION TO BD -
+r
+Abidjan
+Asuncion
+Amman
+Accra
+Fagota
+Ankara 2
+Addis Ababa
+Erasilia
+Athens 5
+Апиете
+Fenos Aires
+Beirut 3
+Bangal
+Cazucas 2
+Bombay
+toncu
+Georgetown
+Calcutta
+Dakar
+Guatemala
+Colombo
+Ier at Salava
+Quayaquil
+Dacca
+Kaipals
+Kingstoc
+Istanbul
+Freetown
+La Paz
+Jerusalem
+Khartoum
+Lima
+Jidda
+Kiastasa
+Keduaa
+Mexico City 2
+Kabul
+Mutevideo
+Karachi
+Lagos
+Рапяка
+Katmandu
+Lusaka
+Forte Alegre
+Kirwait
+Mogadiscio
+Av Spain
+Lahore
+Moarovia
+Madras
+CI/ICG
+Nairobi
+Recife
+New Delhi
+Rabat
+Rio de Janeiro 2
+Nicosia
+Tripoli
+San Jose
+Rawalpindi
+Yamade
+Sau Salvador
+Teheran
+Santiago 2
+
+Sento Domiαει
+EUR Division
+Ses Paulc
+Berlin 3
+Tegucigalpa
+Bern
+Madrid 2
+Bona 5
+Preseis
+Copenhagen
+Frankfurt
+FE Divisi
+
+Do agirak 3
+karta
+3
+AF/2
+Heleinkta
+2
+4
+karta 2
+Matid
+2
+TALA Lumpur
+Munich betria) 3
+Mars la
+2
+Me ibaurtu
+Peru
+kizawa
+Pame
+2
+כם
+stockholm
+Sat 2
+Sen
+ogue 2
+Singapora
+Vine
+Suracaye
+Zurich
+Taipei 2
+Tokyo
+2
+Vientians
+Wellington
+BD 6614?
+SB/Division
+C/SB
+SB/CA
+SB/BR
+SB/C
+SB/YA
+SB/P
+SB/CI
+
+WH/C/CA/PROP 2
+WH/CA
+
+WH/1,2,3,4,5
+WH/7/JTS, CU
+
+1-D/RR
+2-DOCA
+CI/FA
+
+FBID/Weisa
+VTR/SIC
+OTR/Isolation Library
+FL/8PG
+MPS/PSC
+
+CS Special Group Offic
+INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
+AP/COP/CA
+AP/1
+C/CA - DC/CA
+C/CA/PEG
+AP/L
+CA/EL 3
+AF/5
+08/53 3
+CA/DA
+AF/6-Ethiopia
+40/80
+C/EUR
+E/ONE/CA
+CA/FROF
+E/G
+8/A8
+B/SC
+E/BNE
+E/BC
+E/F
+ق
+1/2
+E/LB
+
+FE/CA 16
+
+
+NE/SA/A
+NE/GTA!!
+NE/GES T
+NF 'COPS
+NEGA/I

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10078.md

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+104-10012-10078
+QUNCLASSIFIED
+ONLY
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+ENTIAL
+SECRET
+SUBJECT: (Optional)
+FROM:
+Chief Far East Division
+TO: (Officerdesignation, room number, and.
+building)
+EXTENSION NO.
+FORWARDED
+OFFICER'S
+INITIALS:
+DATE
+20 Nov.68
+COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
+to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
+DATE
+RECEIVED
+Chief CI Staff 27 NOV 1968
+CIRA
+Mr. Dooley
+27 NOV 1968
+boo
+for file
+Document Number
+येद
+1128-988
+for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
+201-289248
+FORM
+3-62
+610
+USE PREVIOUS
+EDITIONS
+SECRET
+CONFIDENTIAL
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+UNCLASSIFIEDERAL CO DENTIAL
+SUBJECT: (Optional)
+FROM: CIRAIRS
+2323
+TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
+building)
+1.
+IP/AN
+2.
+3.
+4.
+5.
+JP/EDI
+6.
+7.
+8.
+9.
+10.
+Document Number
+for FOIA Review on
+28/Flas
+HP/RMS
+12.
+13.
+ONLY
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+EXTENSION NO.
+DATE
+OFFICER'S
+INITIALS
+RECEIVED
+FORWARDED
+DATE
+26 που. 68
+XAAZ-35926
+26 NOU 68-
+SECRET
+COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
+to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
+@ Please asijo
+XAAZ # and
+os pay & Of
+1128-988
+SEP 1976
+MAY
+1978
+clamifs to
+201-289748
+26.
+Date: 2 NOV 68)
+Salgent
+Covesperelerce Cotisan
+0%
+CIA and ASIO.
+Re: release
+of exftinatun ly
+Woven Commessen
+14.
+15.
+FORM
+3-62
+D
+610
+USE PREVIOUS
+EDITIONS
+SECRET
+CONFIDENTIAL
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+SECRET
+20 NOV 1968
+KEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
+VIA
+SUBJECT
+Deputy Director for Plane
+304635
+Executive Registry
+68-516011
+XAAZ-
+35926
+Letter for Direstor from Bir Charles Spry (ASIO)
+1. Attached is a scaled letter fron Sir Charles Spry,
+Director General of the Australian Security Intelligenco
+Organization (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief
+of Station, Heibourne), and a suggested reply for your
+signature.
+2. Bir Charles' letter to you recommends again好家
+doclassification of the Farrea Comaission document CD-971,
+which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone
+calls to the Canberra Babassy before and after the
+amcassination of President Kennedy.
+3. I consider the points made by Bir Charles in his
+letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the
+decisosification of CD-971 in the foreseeable fature
+Staff concurs with this recommendation.
+Document Number 1128-988
+for FOLA Review on SEP 1976
+4. Naison
+William E. Nelson
+of
+K
+P/ERI
+Chief, Far East Division
+Attachments, 5
+130/900
+A.
+Letter from Sir Charles Spry
+PROCARE FOR THAUNG
+575 40. (2.3.4)
+AVGAT REST, CODE
+CABLE ICON (11)
+(4)
+B.
+Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
+P/FRES
+FOR FILING
+C. FAMA 5008, subject: Declassification of Warreh
+Commission Document CD-971-
+D.
+Copy of CD-971
+E. FAMW 3636, subject: Request for Release of Warren
+Commission Document
+20: DOCI
+DDP/FE/PMI/AN: Amos Taylor, Jrl:arc (19) November 1968)
+Distribution
+Orig & 1
+-
+Addressee
+1 DDCI
+-
+2
+-
+1
+DDP
+ADDP
+RECORD COPY
+-
+1
+1
+1
+-
+1
+-
+GEODET
+C/CI Staff
+CFE
+CFE/PMI
+wanatic
+...and
+neslassification
+CFE/PMI/AN
+26 που 68
+201-289248

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10012-10079.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+68-2/60/a
+RD/08-4635/
+
+26 NOV 1968
+
+FILE
+
+Sir Charles C. F. Spry
+Director General
+Australian Security Intelligence Organization
+G. P. O. Box 51058B
+Melbourne
+
+Dear Charles,
+
+Thank you for your letter of 15 October
+recommending against the declassification of
+Warren Commission document CD-071. I might
+mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968)
+was in anticipation of further pressure for the
+release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure
+which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is
+not, at the present time, any intention to release
+CD-971.
+
+Should the question be raised at some future
+time, the points made by you in your letter provide
+every reason to keep the document out of the
+public domain.
+
+With kindest regards,
+
+Sincerely,
+
+/s/ Richard Helms
+
+Richard Helms
+Director
+
+cc: DDCI
+
+Signature Recommended:
+
+Deputy Director for Plans
+
+Distribution:
+Orig - Addee
+1 - ADDP 2 - DCI
+1 - CFE 1 - DDCI
+1 - PMI 2 - DDP
+1 - PMI/AN
+
+Date
+
+DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
+
+201-289248

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10014-10051.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+IMS(FABOSS)
+
+SECRET
+FRP: ,2,
+
+STAFF
+
+ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD RYBAT.(FILE,
+
+OC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)
+
+96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
+TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 (COPB 94608
+SECRET 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF 19-6
+CITE:(COPENHAGEN)94608
+
+TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
+
+FOR: LIMIT EUR/(NOR) INFO DC/EURN) CIC (EU, EUR/LGL)
+
+SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT
+
+SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
+
+REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723
+
+TEXT:
+
+1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.
+
+2. THE FAX (STATION) RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT
+CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN) CABLE STATING "NO
+TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON
+LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)). UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR
+CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON (DENMARK, STATION) CANNOT MAKE A CASE
+AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT
+CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.
+
+3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED
+SO THAT (STATION) MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE
+CHIEFS.
+
+4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1
+
+4....FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV. HUM 4-82.
+
+END OF MESSAGE SECRET
+
+SECRET
+
+DO NOT DESTROY
+CROSS FILE COPY FOR:
+201-0289248

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10014-10064.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# SECRET
+
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+OPERATOR: SEEGER, EDWA BADGE: KT283 DATE : 14 SEP 93
+OFFICE : IMS/FABOSS PHONE: 047552 TIME : 15:24
+ROOM : GC520HB PRINTER: T019 PAGE : 001
+REQUESTER: HM877
+DSN: SPET 21162 DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91 MHF#: 91-6320813
+
+//
+
+SECRET FRP:
+STAFF
+
+ACTION: SE/USSR/10-3 (752) INFO: C/ORMS, DOMDS, LIMITO, ODPD, SEDORECORD.
+FILE, DDO-2, SE/RR-3 (9/W)
+
+91 6320813 ASR PAGE 001 IN 6320813
+TOR: 201455Z NOV 91 SPET 21162
+
+SECRET 201454Z NOV 91 STAFF
+
+CITE ST PETERSBURG 21162
+
+TO: MOSCOW INFO DIRECTOR.
+
+FOR: LIMIT SE/USSR/10 INFO SE/RR
+
+SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER
+
+SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL NIKONOV
+
+REF: NONE
+
+TEXT:
+
+1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE.
+
+2. DURING THE WEEK OF 3-9 NOVEMBER 1991, U.S. PROFESSOR
+Ε.Β. ((SMITH)), HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH "SLAVA"
+((NIKONOV)), WHO IS A LONGTIME FRI?ND AND NOW DEPUTY TO KGB
+DIRECTOR ((BAKATIN)). THE PROFESSOR HAS KNOWN NIKONOV WELL
+SINCE 1976. HE CURRENTLY IS INSTRUCTING ON A FULBRIGHT GRANT
+AT ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY UNTIL 22 DECEMBER 1991. SEE
+PARA 7 FOR BIO ON THE PROFESSOR. DCOB STEVEN R. HEIBERG HAS
+BEFRIENDED THE PROFESSOR, WHO WAS DINNER GUEST AT HEIBERG'S
+HOME ON 10 NOVEMBER AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO ON NIKONOV
+AND HIS NEW KGB JOB.
+
+3. NIKONOV IS THE GRANDSON OF FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN
+MINISTER VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV. THE U.S. PROFESSOR TAUGHT NIKONOV
+IN 1976 AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY WHILE A FULBRIGHT
+PROFESSOR. NIKONOV WAS REGARDED AS EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT AND
+CAPABLE BUT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AN IDEOLOGICAL
+HARDLINER. THE PROFESSOR BELIEVED THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO BE A
+RISING STAR IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDED HIM FOR AN
+IREX-SPONSORED VISIT TO THE U.S. AS EXPECTED, NIKONOV'S VIEWS
+AND RHETORIC MODERATED VERY VISIBLY AFTER HIS FIRST DIRECT
+EXPOSURE TO THE U.S. HE HAS HAD AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL
+IREX-SPONSORED TRIP TO THE U.S. AND HAS SPENT PERIODS OF TIME
+AS A PERSONAL GUEST AT THE HOME OF THE U.S. PROFESSOR IN
+MARYLAND.
+
+4. ΝΙΚΟΝNOV CAME TO WORK IN HIS POSITION AT THE KGB AS A
+RESULT OF BEING A CLOSE FRIEND OF BAKATIN. DURING THE AUGUST
+1991 COUP ATTEMPT NIKONOV SAID THAT HE REFUSED TO FOLLOW HIS
+BOSS'S ORDER TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLARED STATE OF
+EMERGENCY. HE WAS DISMISSED BY HIS BOSS (NFI) FROM THIS
+POSITION AND CALLED BAKATIN TO SEEK ADVICE. BAKATIN SAID HE
+WAS ALSO OPPOSING THE COUP AND WOULD LOOK OUT FOR NIKONOV ONCE
+ORDER WAS RESTORED. SOON AFTER THE COUP BAKATIN CALLED HIM TO
+ASK THAT HE ASSIST WITH RESTRUCTURING THE KGB. AFTER IT WAS
+AGREED THAT NIKONOV COULD DECLINE TO ACCEPT TWO-STAR MILITARY
+KGB RANK AND WORK IN THE JOB FOR AN EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN
+COMPENSATION PACKAGE, HE CAME TO THE KGB AS BAKATIN'S DEPUTY.
+NIKONOV SAID HIS FRIENDS WERE DELIGHTED THAT HE HAD DECLINED
+THE KGB COMMISSION.
+
+5. ΝΙΚΟΝOV'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT FROM BAKATIN WAS MAKING
+ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE KGB-CIA LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS NOW
+COME INTO BEING. IN PREPARATION FOR ONE POSSIBLE QUESTION
+
+<<< TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE >>>
+SECRET
+
+# SECRET
+
+OPERATOR: SEEGER, EDWA BADGE: KT283 DATE : 14 SEP 93
+OFFICE : IMS/FABOSS PHONE: 047552 TIME : 15:24
+ROOM : GC520HB PRINTER: T019 PAGE : 002
+REQUESTER: HM877
+DSN: SPET 21162 DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91 MHF#: 31-63208:3
+
+WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED, NIKONOV PERSONALLY REVIEWED KGB FILES TO
+DETERMINE IF LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)) HAD BEEN A KGB AGENT. HE
+REVIEWED FIVE THICK VOLUMES OF FILES ON OSWALD. NIKONOV IS NOW
+CONFIDENT THAT OSWALD WAS AT NO TIME AN AGENT CONTROLLED BY THE
+KGB. FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF OSWALD IN THE FILES HE DOUBTED
+THAT ANYONE COULD CONTROL OSWALD, BUT NOTED THAT THE KBG
+WATCHED HIM CLOSELY AND CONSTANTLY WHILE HE WAS IN THE USSR.
+HE COMMENTED THAT OSWALD HAD A STORMY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS
+SOVIET WIFE, WHO RODE HIM INCESSANTLY. THE FILE ALSO REFLECTED
+THAT OSWALD WAS A POOR SHOT WHEN HE TRIED TARGET FIRING IN THE
+USSR.
+
+6. IN PREPARATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIAISON
+RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SWEDISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NIKONOV
+PERSONALLY PERFORMED AN INQUIRY FOR BAKATIN INTO THE FATE OF
+SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL ((WALLENBERG)). THERE IS STILL PRESSURE
+FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE TO HAVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THIS
+MATTER BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE WALLENBERG
+FAMILY. NIKONOV WAS AMAZED TO FIND OUT THAT THE KG3 HAD NOT
+BEEN ABLE TO PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISH WHETHER WALLENBERG HAD DIED
+AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS ABLE TO FIND PARTIAL
+EVIDENCE FROM FOURTEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES (NF:). NIKONOV NOW
+BELIEVES, BUT FOUND NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT WALLENBERG WAS
+EXECUTED LATE IN 1947. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT WALLENBERG
+WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING CONTACTS WITH OTHERS WHO WERE ACCUSED
+OF PROVIDING FALSE DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO OTHERS
+BEYOND JEWS SAVED FROM THE HOLOCAUST. AMONG THESE WERE NAZI
+WAR CRIMINALS WHO WERE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE. THERE WAS NO PROOF
+OF WALLENBERG'S GUILT IN ANY OF THESE CHARGES.
+
+7. FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR WHO IS NIKONOV'S FORMER PROFESSOR
+AND FRIEND IS:
+NAME: Ε.Β. ((SMITH))
+DOB: C.1920
+CIT: USA
+OCC: PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND,
+RETIRED
+LOC: RESIDES NEAR ANNAPOLIS, MD
+OTHER: FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR FOR WINTER 1991 TERM IN ST
+PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY, USSR, TWO PREVIOUS FULBRIGHT
+ASSIGNMENTS IN MOSCOW AND SEVERAL IN PRC AND GERMANY; HOSTS
+FORMER STUDENTS FROM USSR AND PRC ON U.S. VISITS
+THERE ARE NO BASE TRACES ON SMITH. HE SERVED IN THE
+MILITARY AND IS VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE U.S.
+GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED INFO ON NIKONOV AND OTHER USSR, PRC
+AND GERMAN CONTACTS TO HEIBERG AND CAN PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE 810
+AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON THEM.
+
+8. FILE: 074-005-011, 201-0005925
+DEFER. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
+END OF MESSAGE SECRET
+
+END OF DOCUMENT
+
+<<< TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE >>>

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10016-10021.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+104-10016-10021
+
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
+
+SECRET
+
+ROUTING
+1
+2
+4
+5
+6
+
+DIRECTOR
+RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
+
+MELBOURNE
+The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE
+
+CAMH
+Signed: R. Haufton
+DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR
+R.O. #1 - Unit: CI/RKA
+CS COPY
+
+SECRET 0204222
+Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.
+
+DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)
+2 DEC 63 IN 71187
+AVDAT GPFLOOR
+
+REF DIR 85690
+
+1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:
+
+A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.
+
+B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL N.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, HERMAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 1949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 HOLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE DEROG ON ABOVE.
+
+Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on. MAY 1976
+C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 9591.(IN 68838)
+
+D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.
+
+E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.
+
+D: 200-5-41
+CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
+CS COPY CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1970 1289248
+E IMPDET CL BY 012208
+
+GROUP
+SECRET
+Excluded from ovlomatic downgrading and declassification
+
+REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
+Copy No.
+
+13-00000
+
+CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 71187 PAGE 2
+
+2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TRACE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE REP CNBR.
+
+3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
+
+SECRET
+
+C/S COMMENY: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with the Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.
+
+SECRET

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10023-10087.md

@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
+1400000
+104-10023-10087
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+( SECRET DO NOT REPRODUCE
+RETURN TO CIA
+(
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III
+15 November 1974
+ANNEX B
+THE 201 SYSTEM
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+:
+
+Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
+terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
+information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
+subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
+producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
+tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
+opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
+CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
+zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
+spondence has accumulated.
+
+2. THE 201 SYSTEM
+
+The principal features of the 201 system are:
+
+a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
+individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
+individual.
+
+b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
+831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
+sonal history, current status, and prospects.
+
+c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
+a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
+stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.
+
+d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
+Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
+within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
+erence consolidated..
+
+SECRET
+14-00000
+SECRET
+(
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+い
+0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
+SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
+CIT GERM
+REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
+POB GERM, BERLIN 5
+OCC PHARMACIST 6
+OCC CODE CHEN
+201-0032671*
+ΤΥΡΕ ΝΑΜE T-
+ΟΙ CODES AA XX-10
+RCD DATE 53.
+SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
+CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
+AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
+29 ОСТОВER.
+30 NOV 70
+(3
+Information About Subject
+1. Sequence Number and Name
+2. Sex and Date of Birth
+3. Citizenship
+4. Place of Birth
+5. Occupation
+6. Occupation Code
+7. Text
+Document Reference Data Group
+8. 201 Number
+7
+9. Name Type Indicator
+10. OI Codes
+11. Record Date (year only)
+12. Reference
+ISG Control Information
+13. Date of latest update of the record
+14. STAR Index Record Number
+24
+SECRET
+00833555
+14
+!
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+7
+e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
+sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
+with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
+gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
+suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
+codes for use by components:
+
+(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)
+(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
+or other specific organizations.
+
+À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
+orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
+Officer.
+
+A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
+when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
+paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
+at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.
+
+The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
+personalities by Of codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
+security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
+of that service.
+
+f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
+names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
+exist.
+
+3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER
+
+a. General
+
+The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
+ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
+a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing.
+of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
+opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter If of this
+handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
+will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
+persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
+sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
+persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
+are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
+employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on
+
+25
+SECRET
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+(
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
+and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
+records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
+ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose.
+names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
+dossiers should be opened in the following categories:
+
+(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
+proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
+for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
+tional interest for training purposes only.
+اه
+
+(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.
+
+(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
+denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.
+
+(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.
+
+(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
+or more documents (see DOI 70-20).
+
+(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
+ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).
+
+b. Requesting a 201 File Opening
+
+Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
+a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
+tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
+master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
+ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
+201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
+station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Head-
+quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
+subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
+is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
+placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
+will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
+bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
+201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.
+
+28
+SECRET
+che kind while distribunal raudase andur, sinclarations . indian phính thi song
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER
+
+Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
+his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
+a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
+be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
+procedures.
+?
+Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:
+
+a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).
+
+b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
+handwriting samples.
+1.1
+c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.
+
+d. Operational and other security approvals.
+
+e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.
+
+f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.
+
+g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.
+
+h. Copy of contract and termination papers.
+
+i. Secrecy agreement.
+
+j. Agent Duty Status Report.
+
+k. Training and evaluation.
+
+1. SGSWIRL report.
+
+m. Newspaper clippings.
+
+n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
+subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting:
+:
+
+5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS
+
+The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
+have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
+have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
+on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.
+
+26,1
+عت
+SECRET
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1-4
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+a. Purging
+Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
+discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
+simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
+place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
+periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
+be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:
+
+(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.
+
+(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
+the opening.
+
+(3) All abstract slips.
+
+(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).
+
+(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
+a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
+then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.
+
+(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
+cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.
+
+(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
+contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
+by the Records Officer.
+
+(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
+forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
+in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
+officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
+over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification-
+authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
+at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
+in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
+cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
+of the TS document.
+
+(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).
+
+b. Maintenance Procedures
+
+(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
+In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
+26.2
+SECRET
+14-00000
+SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+7
+dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
+number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.
+
+(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
+to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
+into that 201.
+
+(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
+be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
+should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201..
+
+(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
+employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
+the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
+closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.
+
+(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
+name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.
+
+(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) (201 files no longer of active interest
+should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
+has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
+to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).
+
+(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
+OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
+Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
+to the 201.
+
+(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
+containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
+should be sent to. IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.
+
+(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
+for inclusion in a-201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
+document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.
+
+(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
+remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
+in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
+or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
+automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
+tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
+file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black--- v
+tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).
+
+26.3
+SECRET
+14-00000
+SECRET
+(
+DOHB 70-1-14
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
+handled as restricted dossiers.
+
+(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
+dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
+Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+SUBJECT:
+FROM
+TO O
+1.
+IP/Files
+CC-52
+2
+5.
+7.
+L
+CONFIDENTIAL
+SECRET
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
+DATE
+OFFICERS COMMENTS eru samned to show ham sh
+SHETLALS
+(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1,
+Chapter III, Annex B.)
+Volume(s) of volume(s)
+of 201-
+Restricted Dossier
+(Attach Foru 2021 to
+Dossier)
+Non-Restricted Dossier
+10.
+For Split Charge Dossiers:
+11.
+All documents prior to
+(date)
+12
+12
+14.
+15.
+forvarded to IP/Files. All
+documents after
+retained at
+BIDE
+SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
+PETERMAL
+28.4
+SECRET
+(date)
+desk.
+CL STA
+UNCLASSIFIED
+::
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES
+
+A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
+period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
+officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
+Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
+ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.
+TO:
+HAME
+CONFIDENTIAL
+(Thon gitled in)
+NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
+BADGE
+COMPONENT
+ROOM
+TUDE
+EXT.
+This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
+below has been transferred to you by:
+Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
+Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
+SUBJECT OF REQUEST
+FORM 2377E PREVIOUS COITIONS
+1-73
+DATE
+FILE NO.
+DOC. STHSOL & NUMBER BOC. DATE
+40
+TRANSFER
+CHARGE
+PERM
+OR TENP
+CONFIDENTIAL
+CL BY: 007672
+The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
+Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
+201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
+for his component..
+
+7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS
+
+a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
+desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.
+
+(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
+Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.
+
+26.5
+SECRET
+:
+:
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
+from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
+returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
+2021) must accompany the dossier.)
+
+(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
+mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).
+TO
+IP/FI
+GC-52 TUBE DT-6
+IP/DCU
+GC-40 TUBE HT-4
+ACTION DESK: 1.
+SECTION A
+CONFIDENTIAL
+(When Pilled In)
+INITIALS
+FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
+To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
+necessary).
+2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
+Decessary).
+FILE HUNGER
+RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28)
+RESTRICTED BY:
+COMPONENT:
+Date:
+SECTION B
+REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
+COMPONENT:
+R.O. No.
+Date:
+FORN
+2-23 2021 IONS
+CONFIDENTIAL
+8-2, IMPORT CL BY, CG7122
+7
+b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
+personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
+for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
+held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
+routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
+to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
+desk will notify the requester of a denial.
+
+c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
+dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
+desk by Central Files.
+
+26.6
+SECRET
+14-00000
+( SECRET (
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+?
+8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES
+
+The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
+subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
+requester will be referred to the restricting desk.
+
+IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
+file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
+supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.
+
+`Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
+telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
+information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
+Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
+by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.
+
+9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION
+
+A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
+appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
+destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
+number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
+will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
+(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.
+
+10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS
+
+Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
+and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
+interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
+alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
+the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
+(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
+blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box -14), and indicate
+permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
+201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
+categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.
+
+a. Standard Listings
+
+Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
+interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest
+
+28.7
+SECRET
+14-00000
+
+( (
+SECRET
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+**
+Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
+standard listings available are:
+i
+
+(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;
+
+(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;
+
+(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;
+९.
+i
+
+(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;
+
+(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.
+FUL & CHINA
+201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
+03 ICT
+1973.
+NAPIE
+SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
+C, SH 117185/1343/5030/
+CHEM. SHOU 117115/1343/0001/
+CINE. SHU 1. 17115/1343/0001/
+CHE. SHOU-JFY 16774/1108/0088
+CHEM, SHOU EI
+17JUL14
+BIRTHPLACE
+DA/MO/YR
+CERY GEFY
+CHIN, RHANGTUNG
+4
+24 JANES
+90
+CHIN, AMOY
+04JAN19
+CHIN, FUXIEM, PROV.
+A
+1240V22
+CHIN, HUNムス
+IPMARAS
+CHIN
+C41
+CHIN, CAN ΤΩΝ
+TYPE
+008
+DCC. CIT. 201
+01-101-2. ACT. LOC. (ir.
+MAME
+CRAY
+CIRY CE
+CHINT 0165401
+CHIN HR
+DIPT
+0218859
+CHIN CHIN
+5178653
+CHEY
+f-41G 17109/1343/690
+CHAN. SIEU SHIH 17115/1105/001
+CHFE SHCU-TAN
+CHEY, SH-155467115/1109/1
+CHEN, SHCU 126 /0701/1343/1807
+CHEN, SHC-17115/1109/495
+CHEM, SHU-٩٨١
+CHY. SHAI-CHI4 17115/2005/6930
+CHE: SHIU CINIAM 7115/3219/122
+CHOM, SH-C17115/2535/2
+CNCS. SITU 7115/2055/2797/ דניים
+CHEN, SHU FEM
+A
+R
+0258926 CHIM, LEARNING PRO
+12JAN18
+09 JUN99
+1905619
+02 JUL 30
+:
+19
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+CHIEN SINI-1 2711.5/2925/5030/
+A
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+CHIN, HOPET
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+CHIN
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+CHIN? 0200223
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+CHEY? 0179621
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+CHIN CEY
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+CICM. SU 1217:15/0647/0317 וי/
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+CHEN:
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+CHIR. SHIP 1/7115/2845/5341
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+アレった。ベリー
+COUNT. SIN 7115/2579/3842/ ניז/
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+CHIN, RUENGTING
+CHIN
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+CHIN, PEIPING
+CHINT 0107306
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+CHIM? 0179624
+CHIN CHIN
+0200130
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+CHIN, SHANGHAS
+04 SEP28
+CHIS. SIECINAN
+CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HIJN ARMY-CHAT 0349624
+171FM38 CHIN. CHER LANG
+SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
+82 INPORS CL BY 056979
+CHIN? 44010
+CHIN? 0144758
+CHIN TAIN
+INT
+0111410
+CHIN DEUX
+CHIN
+CHIM TAEw
+PAGE
+150
+26.8
+SECRET
+14-00000
+::
+( (
+SECRET
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
+upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
+sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.
+
+b. Non-Standard Listings
+?
+:
+Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
+
+(1) Country of location
+
+(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
+
+(3) Citizenship
+;
+
+(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
+
+(5) Occupation.
+
+These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
+a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
+OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10048-10124.md

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+DISPATCH
+
+CIA SPECIAL COLLECTION
+RELEASE AS SANITIZED
+
+Chief, Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with ANCARBON-1
+
+ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
+REFERENCES
+A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
+B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
+C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962,
+D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
+E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964
+
+1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review
+of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review
+indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that
+action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security
+breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was
+being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the
+establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT
+South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some
+way, related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARDON-2
+stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis
+situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the
+Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain.
+As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made
+that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida
+news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news
+media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity
+spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might
+come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established
+with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE
+might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of
+achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3,
+which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations
+and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for
+surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to
+
+Attachments: USC
+A - Five Newspaper Clippings
+B- Identities
+
+Distribution:
+3-Chief, SAS, w/atts.
+19 March 64
+APR 2 1984
+
+UFGA-14781
+
+SECRET
+201-
+
+COS
+Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp
+251
+
+Ri Chrono
+1 - 201 file (O/COS
+1- COS Chrono
+
+DUDLEY R. WILLINGS
+
+ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
+(40) MAR 3 1 1964
+
+December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3
+was handled via AMCARDON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARPON-2
+made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARDON-1
+in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that
+AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as
+REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN
+agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARDON-2
+hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the
+Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced
+AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on
+12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with
+AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes
+to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of
+this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the
+nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the
+period December. 1962 to March 1964.
+
+2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JAWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARDON-1
+When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARCON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARLON-2
+reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating
+with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's
+benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of
+reference, which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN.
+In this review, AMCAREON-2 pointed out that it was the policy
+of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would
+purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As
+a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations
+in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this
+material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention.
+AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be
+discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2
+made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1
+should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly
+embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it
+would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would
+not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3.
+In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought
+a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and
+remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within
+a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free
+to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed
+out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3,
+REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by
+telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1
+and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in
+Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this
+arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain
+any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also
+made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of
+classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips
+which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories.
+AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference
+which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference
+has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCAREON-1
+during the period December 1962 to March 1964....
+
+3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally
+started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk,
+and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment
+which entailed covering major political developments in Florida.
+At a later date, ANCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the
+Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made
+the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant
+
+promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by
+the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert
+on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area
+and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a
+long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned
+about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded
+in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has
+a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American
+affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse
+of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin
+American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1
+has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting
+to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that
+AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist,
+and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact
+who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing
+in mind that he does have long-term potential.
+
+4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the
+traditional pattern of source protection which is common to
+newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers,
+AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his
+sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified
+some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations
+could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to
+KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications
+of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with
+AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include
+the following persons:
+
+a. Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary 'general
+of the DRE.
+
+b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE,
+
+c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct
+Havana Times.
+
+d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437).
+
+e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA
+
+f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1
+regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view
+of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of
+Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.
+
+g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and
+adventurer.
+
+h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.
+
+1. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.
+
+J. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of
+the Dominican Republic.
+
+k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.
+
+l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of
+USIA in Miami. ANCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY
+is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this
+does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a
+source of information.
+
+5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used
+to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances,
+ANCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action
+within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The
+use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to
+harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several
+oxamples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support
+tasks are outlined below:
+
+a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO
+Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived
+in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this
+processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After
+being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and
+a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE
+tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive,
+thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate
+ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for
+details.
+
+b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group.
+In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that
+JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carios BANDIN Cruz (201-309611)
+of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims
+relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in
+discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's
+irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1.
+As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had
+a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which
+AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less
+than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba.
+In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want
+to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction
+might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN'S
+comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would
+ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited
+with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other
+newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result
+of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage
+in South Florida since September 1963.
+
+6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963
+to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational
+intelligence as outlined below:
+
+a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1
+reported that AMBEND-l was back in Miami and was the object of
+a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from
+a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would
+probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the
+UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in
+terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent
+developments revealed that AMCAREON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1,
+and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the
+publicity stir that was initially anticipated.
+
+b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1
+reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full
+feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this
+article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical
+situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was
+
+thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON,
+residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the
+Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were
+of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would
+soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCAREON-1 that
+he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the
+opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt
+of this operational intelligence enabled JNWAVE to brief CARLSON
+on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had
+played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,
+enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting
+with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this
+Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story
+was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish
+his research.
+
+c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised
+JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the
+Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting
+to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic
+missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled
+JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles
+which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.
+
+d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1
+gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with
+AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This
+information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1
+was telling the press.
+
+e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
+reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with
+AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence
+was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's
+representatives were telling the outside world about their
+operational activities.
+
+f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
+informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were
+being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK
+vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This
+information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was
+going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn-
+ing, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity
+repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.
+
+g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1
+reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from
+Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one
+Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE,
+Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed
+that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no
+real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore
+the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant
+operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.
+
+h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1
+advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls
+indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected
+from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously
+been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same
+time, AMCARDON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought
+that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona
+fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who
+was being used as a means of creating an incident which would
+embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating
+
+United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN a.ised AMCARDON-1
+that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation
+against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that
+it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result
+of this conversation, arrangements were made for JAMWAVE to check
+out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time,
+ANCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might
+lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a
+plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.
+
+7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully,
+during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet
+through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in
+the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed
+in this field are outlined below:
+
+a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally
+surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de
+las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo.
+The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information
+relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario
+de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers
+in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series
+of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1
+was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt
+they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions
+of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1
+was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an
+opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a
+JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1
+wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article
+in the series received front page headline play. The series of
+articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an
+excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other
+propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up
+by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America.
+The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated
+14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174,
+dated 21 October 1963.
+
+b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964
+JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba
+to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that
+select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over
+to them. It was believed that this information would make a good
+human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC
+propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items
+from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States
+territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was
+given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in
+Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out,
+and an article outlining the points which were of interest to
+JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the
+Identity 3.
+
+c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago,
+Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida
+newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March
+1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the
+Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering
+tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC
+to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was
+subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3
+
+(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
+c above are attached for Headquarters information.)
+
+8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to
+obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during
+the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally
+unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of
+contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile
+intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing
+in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of in
+inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently,
+he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a
+matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive
+intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely
+to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political
+scene, It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome
+this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for
+the collection of positive intelligence.
+
+9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARDON-1
+has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest,
+cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our
+relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter
+of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this,
+JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner
+that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela-
+tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our
+operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relation-
+ship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have diffi-
+culties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a
+result of our continuing relationship with ANCARBON-1, a special
+activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.
+
+10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1
+and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.
+
+END OF DISPATCH
+
+Identities - 1 - The Miami News
+2 - Sunland Training Center for
+Retarded Children
+3 - The Miami Herald
+4-Latin American Editor
+5 The LEDA
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+3 - Chief, SAS
+1- RI Chrono
+1- AMCARBON-1 201
+1 - COS Chrono

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10048-10252.md

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+104-10048-10252
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECURITY INFORMATION
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+From: BOGOTA
+Report No: TLB-1684 Local File No:
+No. of Pages:
+No. of Enclosures: Memo
+
+Report Made By: George S. Vinoops/Unt
+Approved By:
+
+Distribution:
+Orally to:
+By copy to:
+Washington - 3
+Caracas - 1
+Guatemala City - 1
+Havana - 1
+Quito - 1
+Maracaibo - 1
+Guayaquil - 1
+Files - 2
+
+Source Cryptonym: See below
+References: None
+
+Source, Operational Data, and Comments:
+The information in this report was obtained from a local detective who
+works for the National Police. An informant of the Police in Paris
+provided a report to the latter concerning activities of the Colombian
+delegation, and he added names of delegates of certain other countries.
+This informant is studying in Paris and he accompanied the delegates
+to Berlin. It is likely that the interested stations have this infor-
+mation, but it is thought it might serve to confirm, or possibly add a
+bit to, the material already on hand.
+
+30-77991
+
+IR COPY
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+SECURITY INFORMATION
+
+APERTURE CAND MEPRODUCTIO
+13-00000
+
+SECURITY INFORMATION
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+Subject: Delegates to Youth Festival
+in Berlin
+
+Report No: TLB-1684
+Place Acquired: Colombia, Bogota
+Date of Information: August-September 1961
+Evaluation: B-2
+Date Acquired: January 1962
+Source: Local Detective
+Date of Report: 29 January 1962
+
+1. Bouree reports that an informant in Paris has submitted information to the
+local Police concerning delegates of certain other countries to the III
+Festival Mundial de la Juventud held in Berlin in August and September 1961.
+Those names together with the camments of the informant are included in
+the following paragraphs.
+
+2. The delegation of Guatemala consisted of the followings
+Edelberto TORRES Rivas, Novena Ave. 8. No. 110
+Octavio REYES ortiz, 17 c. o. No. 76
+Hugo BARRIOS K100, 12 Calle Oriente No. 58.
+José Victor PONZALEZ, 8 Ave. Bur No. 11
+
+3. The following is a list of the Veneauelan delegates!
+Juvenel HERRERA, estudiante do derecho
+Francisco MIERKS, peligroso
+Cordova ARMANDO, estudiante de derecho in Cumaná
+Micolas CURIEL Acosta, escritor de teatro
+Juan Pedro ROJAS, pintor
+Yolanda Steffens de ROJAB, casada con el anterior
+
+4. The Bouadoran delegates are as followes
+Enrique Gil Gilbert, escritor
+Enrique QUINIBERO.
+Patricic CUEVAS, estudiante de medicina da Praga
+
+5. The delegation of Cuba consisted of the followings
+
+Nicolas GUILLEN, poeta y escritor
+Santiago GRAJALES, obrero
+Antonio NUNZZ-Jimenes,/profesor)de, Podagogía y "responsable de la
+delegación de Cuba". Es peligroso y cuando hubo necesidad
+de retratarlo en Paris no se dejó.
+Francisco GARCIA Benites, comerciante de Holguin
+Jose CANETTI, comerciante en Santiago de Cuba
+
+Classification CONFIDENTIAL
+
+SECURITY INOPAMA
+
+02316

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10049-10362.md

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+# SECRET
+
+20 October 1959
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
+
+SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October
+
+1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UMMA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban Journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.
+
+2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleutorio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organized in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized - Habana and Matanzas.
+
+3. The Cuban said his group needed two things - moral backing and moneys he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO, but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.
+
+# SECRET
+
+4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him - would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".
+
+# SECRET
+
+Martha Tharpe
+WH/III/CARIB

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10049-10375.md

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+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+AIR
+(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)
+
+MICROFILMED
+JUL 1 1983
+
+DOC: SECRET
+CLASSIFICATION
+
+DISPATCH NO
+HDCA-1382
+
+TO : Chief, WHD DATE: 12 June 1958
+FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo
+SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational
+
+SPECIFIC PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic
+ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.
+
+1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William
+D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded
+for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort
+town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km
+east of Ciudad Trujillo.
+
+2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the
+concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all
+new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by
+Edward P. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican
+post office building.
+D. Pawley
+
+3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in para-
+graph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY
+in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a
+very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.
+
+Edward F. Stove
+EDWARD F. STONESET
+
+10 June 1958
+Distribution:
+3 - Hqs.
+
+INDEX
+
+CS COPY
+
+CS COPY
+SECRET
+CLASSIFICATION
+
+12 June 58
+201-77378
+
+D00708

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10051-10106.md

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+# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
+Memorandum
+
+**TO**: Files
+**DATE**: 29 January 1954
+
+**FROM**: M. D. Stevens
+
+**SUBJECT**: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164
+
+1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Sammuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.
+
+2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.
+
+3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.
+
+4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.
+
+5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:
+
+"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."
+
+Document Number 1271-1029
+
+for FOIA Review on FED 1977
+
+-2-
+
+6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department
+"[DAVIS case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]"
+
+7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.
+
+8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.
+
+9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.
+
+M. D. Stevens

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10051-10170.md

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+104-10051-10170
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+ANNEX B
+THE 201 SYSTEM
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III
+15 November 1974
+
+Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
+terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
+information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
+subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
+producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
+tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
+opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
+CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
+zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
+spondence has accumulated.
+
+2. THE 201 SYSTEM
+
+The principal features of the 201 system are:
+
+a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
+individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
+individual.
+
+b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
+831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
+sonal history, current status, and prospects.
+
+c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
+a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
+stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.
+
+d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
+Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
+within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
+erence consolidated.
+
+23
+
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+① 0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
+② SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
+③ CIT GERM
+④ POB GERM, BERLIN ⑤
+⑤ OCC PHARMACIST
+⑥ OCC CODE CHEM
+⑦ REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
+SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
+⑦ CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
+AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
+29 OCTOBER.
+⑧ 201-0032671*
+⑨ TYPE NAME T-
+⑩ OI CODES AA XX-10
+⑪ RCD DATE 53
+
+⑬ 30 NOV 70
+⑭ 00833555
+
+Information About Subject
+1. Sequence Number and Name
+2. Sex and Date of Birth
+3. Citizenship
+4. Place of Birth
+5. Occupation
+6. Occupation Code
+7. Text
+
+Document Reference Data Group
+8. 201 Number
+9. Name Type Indicator
+10. OI Codes
+11. Record Date (year only)
+12. Reference
+
+ISG Control Information
+13. Date of latest update of the record
+14. STAR Index Record Number
+
+24
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
+sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
+with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
+gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
+suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
+codes for use by components:
+
+(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)
+
+(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
+or other specific organizations.
+
+À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
+orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
+Officer.
+
+A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
+when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
+paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
+at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.
+
+The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
+personalities by Ol codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the
+security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
+of that service.
+
+f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
+names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
+exist.
+
+3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER
+
+a. General
+
+The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
+ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
+a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
+of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
+opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
+handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
+will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
+persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
+sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
+persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
+are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
+employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on
+
+25
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
+and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
+records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
+ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
+names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
+dossiers should be opened in the following categories:
+
+(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
+proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
+for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
+tional interest for training purposes only.
+
+(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.
+
+(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
+denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.
+
+(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.
+
+(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
+or more documents (see-DOI 70-20). -
+
+(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
+ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).
+
+b. Requesting a 201 File Opening
+
+Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
+a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
+tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
+master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
+ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
+201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
+station may request the opening of a 201. file by writing 201- in the Head-
+quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
+subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
+is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
+placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
+will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
+bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
+201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.
+
+26
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER
+
+Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
+his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
+a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
+be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
+procedures.
+
+Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:
+
+a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).
+
+b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
+handwriting samples.
+
+c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.
+
+d. Operational and other security approvals.
+
+e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.
+
+f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.
+
+g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.
+
+h. Copy of contract and termination papers.
+
+i. Secrecy agreement.
+
+j. Agent Duty Status Report.
+
+k. Training and evaluation.
+
+1. SGSWIRL report.
+
+m. Newspaper clippings.
+
+n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
+subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.
+
+5. ΜΑΙΝΤΕΝANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS
+
+The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
+have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
+have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articlės
+on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.
+
+26.1
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+a. Purging
+Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
+discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
+simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
+place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
+periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
+be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:
+
+(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.
+
+(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
+the opening.
+
+(3) All abstract slips.
+
+(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884)..
+
+(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
+a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
+then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.
+
+(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
+cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.
+
+(7) Record copy-doeuments which only repeat-substantive information
+contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
+by the Records Officer.
+
+(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
+forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
+in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
+officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
+over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
+authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
+at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
+in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
+cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
+of the TS document.
+
+(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).
+
+b. Maintenance Procedures
+
+(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
+In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
+
+26.2
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
+number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.
+
+(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
+to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
+into that 201.
+
+(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
+be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
+should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201..
+
+(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
+employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
+the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
+closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.
+
+(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
+name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.
+
+(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
+should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
+has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
+to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).
+
+(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
+OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
+Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
+to the 201.
+
+(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
+containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
+should be sent to. IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.
+
+(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
+for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
+document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.
+
+(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
+remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
+in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
+or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
+automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
+tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
+file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
+tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).
+
+26.3
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
+handled as restricted dossiers.
+
+(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
+dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
+Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+CONFIDENTIAL
+SECRET
+
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
+
+FROM
+SUBJECT:
+TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
+TO
+DATE
+BUILDING
+
+BUILDING
+
+NO
+DATE
+
+building)
+
+OFFICER'S
+INITIALS
+COMMENTS (Humber cach comment to show from whos
+who Draw a line avess amater auch comment
+BECOMA PORWARDED
+1.
+IP/Files
+GC-52
+(For guidance see CSAB 70-1-1,
+Chapter III, Annex В.)
+
+2
+3.
+Volume(s) of
+volume(s)
+of 201-
+7.
+10.
+Restricted Dossier
+(Attach Form 2021 to
+Dossier)
+
+Non-Restricted Dossier
+For Split Charge Dossiers:
+11.
+All documents prior to
+
+:
+(date)
+12.
+forwarded to IP/Files. All
+13.
+14.
+15.
+documents after
+
+(date)
+
+retained at
+desk.
+
+CL, BY: 007622
+FORM
+8-74
+BIOE
+SECRET
+CONFIDENTIAL
+INTERNAL
+USE ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+26.4
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES
+
+A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
+period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
+officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
+Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
+ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.
+
+TO:
+NAME
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+(When yilled In)
+NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
+BADGE
+COMPONENT
+ROOM
+TUBE
+EXT.
+
+This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
+below has been transferred to you by:
+
+DANE
+BADSE
+COMPONENT
+Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
+Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
+
+SUBJECT-OF REQUEST
+PORN 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
+1-73
+FILE NO
+DOC. SYMBOL & NUNBER DOC. DATE
+CONFIDENTIAL
+DATE
+OF
+TRANSFER
+CHARGE
+PERM
+OR TENP
+REG.NO.
+CL. BY: 007622
+
+The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
+Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
+201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
+for his component.
+
+7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS
+
+a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
+desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.
+
+(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
+Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.
+
+26.5
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
+from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
+returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
+2021) must accompany the dossier.)
+
+(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
+mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+(When Filled In)
+
+TO
+DATE
+INITIALS
+
+IP/FI
+GC-52 TUBE DT-6
+
+FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
+IP/DCU
+GC-40 TUBE HT-4
+
+ACTION DESK: 1.
+To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
+necessary).
+2.
+To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
+necessary).
+
+SECTION A
+FILE NUMBER
+RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28).
+RESTRICTED BY:
+COMPONENT:
+(Name)
+Date:
+
+SECTION B
+REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
+R.O. No.
+COMPONENT:
+Date:
+
+FORM
+2-73 2021 EDITIONS
+
+USE PREVIOUS
+CONFIDENTIAL
+8-2, IMPOET CL BY: 067622
+(13)
+
+... b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
+personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
+for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
+held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
+routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
+to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
+desk will notify the requester of a denial.
+
+c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
+dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
+desk by Central Files.
+
+26.6
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES
+
+The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
+subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
+requester will be referred to the restricting desk.
+
+IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
+file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
+supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.
+
+Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
+telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
+information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
+Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
+by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.
+
+9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION
+
+A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
+appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
+destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
+number from-machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
+will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
+(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.
+
+10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS
+
+Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
+and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
+interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
+alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
+the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
+(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
+blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
+permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
+201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
+categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.
+
+a. Standard Listings
+
+Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
+interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest
+
+26.7
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
+15 November 1974
+
+Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
+standard listings available are:
+
+(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;
+
+(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;
+
+(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;
+
+(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;
+
+(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.
+
+201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
+03 ICT 1973
+
+SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
+CHEN, SHAI-1 7115/1343/9030/
+CHEN, SHOU-1 7115/1343/0001/
+CIPAN, SHIU 1. /7115/1343/0001/
+CHEN, SHCU-JFN 16774/1108/0038
+CHEN, SHOU MET
+NAME
+
+TYPE DOR
+CHEN, SU MING 17109/1343/690
+CHEN SHE SHEH /7115/1103/001
+CHEN, SHCU-145
+CHFY, SHE-15G 7115/1109/1
+CHEN SHCU 126 /0701/1343/LPOT
+CHEN, ST-VES 77115/1103/495
+CN, SPC
+CHEY, SHU-GA
+CIFY. SHU-CHEY 17115/2895/6930
+CIPE SHY CHPAN 7115/3219/122
+CILIEN, SHU-CHUAN 7115/2995/2
+CHEN, SHU CO/7115/2985/2797
+COFA, SHU FEA
+CHEY, SHII HA 17115/2885/3185/
+CHF, SHJ HSIANG /7115/2579/74
+CFY, SH-51047115/2995/7
+CHEN, SHU HS/7115/2895/8133-
+CHI. SHU-HA
+CFRND, SHII-1 47115/2205/5030/
+CHEN, SHU KUET /7115/2295/2710
+CHEN SHU LAV
+CHEN, SHPI LIANG 77115/0547/009
+CHER. STAI LI 17115/2579/2651/
+CHIEN, SH-LING 17109/2973/010
+CIF, SHU-1
+CHEN, SHU 7115/2883/0589/
+CHEPI. SHU-PAD 7115/?579/0202/
+CHEN, SHU-SE/7115/2899/2773/
+CHIEY, SH-50A/7115/2579/091
+CHEN, SHU-TE 17115/2495/1795/
+CHEN, SHU TEH /475/
+1.1. SHI5/0647/6639
+CIPC75
+CHPT, SL T21/7115/0647/0317/
+CHPEN, SH-7115/2695/1031
+CHPEN, SHU-YIN
+CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/5391/
+CHIN SHI-474 /7115/2579/6992/
+LEE MARIT
+YR
+17JUL15
+24 JAN11
+04JAN19
+210CT08
+12 NOV22
+18MAR45
+C41
+BIRTHPLACE
+CTRY CITY
+CHIN, KWANGTUNG
+CHIN, ANYOY
+CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.
+CHIN, PANCIUPIA, PORT ARTH
+CHIN, HUMAN
+CUTIE CANTOY
+OZSEP26 - CHIH, LIACAL PRO
+12JAN18
+Hite FERIEN
+CHIN, CANTON
+CHTH, KLANGTHING PROV
+OCC. CIT.
+CHINT 0165401
+20101-1 01-2 ACT. LOC. ENT.
+CECY CIRY CIRY
+CHIN HX
+DIPT 0230059
+0178653
+CHIN CHIN
+CHIN
+BUSP CCOMP 0043751-
+CHIN HK
+CHIN? 0234629
+CHAT
+CHIN CUBA
+0179620
+CHIN CHEN
+CNAT 0069796
+CHIN
+RIPT CCON 0905390
+CHEN MALT
+ENGE CAAT 0832855
+CHIK
+GILK HK
+CHINT 0130415
+CHIR TAM
+09 JUN99
+PROF CHINT 0040298
+CHIN USA
+1905619
+CNAF7 0052638
+CHIN HWAL
+02 JUL 30
+CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.
+ARMY CHAT 0329328
+CHIR TAIN
+19
+NDV30
+CIRC22
+CHIN, MIJAN TANG TS
+CHIN.PFILIU
+CHIN? 0124438
+TSEA CNAT
+0797335
+CHIN MX
+CHINT 0200223
+CHEN
+0488577
+CHIN ETH
+CHIN, KHANGTUNG
+CHIN? 0179621
+CHIM CHIN
+10
+23FEROT
+OSMAYLA
+30M4326
+CHIN, FUKIEN
+CHIN, KHANGTUNG
+CHIN, FOCCHCH
+CHIN? 0015759
+CHIN
+CCOM? 0073195
+CHIN
+CHIN? 0179622
+CHIN CHIN
+DIPT CCCM 0223161
+CHIN CEY
+OSFER 10
+CHIN, HOPET
+DIPT CHAT 083-150
+CHIN USA
+27NOV23
+CHIN, FANG CHANG
+PROF CHIN? 0179673
+CHEN CHIN
+CHIN SHU LAV
+R
+CHIN
+CIRCZE
+CHEN
+CCOM 0221072
+DIPT CHIN? 0223162
+CHEN CHIN
+CHIM CHÍN
+25NDV20
+CHIN, FERGSHUN
+CHIN? 0179624
+CHIN TAIW
+01 JUL 29
+CHIN, KIANGSU
+MILA CCON 0854450
+CHIN LACS
+205620
+CHIN, NSCAM-HSIEN, KIANGSU
+CHAT 0096747
+CHEY US
+15APR 30
+CHIN.CHANGHAI
+CMMO CHIN? 0179625
+CH
+CHIN CHIN
+१९०६८19
+CHIM, KHANGELING PROV.
+CNAT? 0052638
+CHEN HWAΣ
+10DEC26
+CHEN, KHANGTUIG
+CHIN? 0005119
+CHER TAIW
+27JAN25
+CHIP, FUXIEN PROV
+CHIN? O103289-
+CHIN CHIN
+210EC37
+CHIN, SHANGHAI
+GEOL CHIN? 076316
+CHIN BU
+27MAP 20
+CHIN, CHANG SHU
+0013991
+CHIN
+CHEN CHIN
+CHEN CHA 19 7115/257/3842 ני ١١ ٢٠٠١٦/
+
+CHINT
+FIN
+05APR17
+CHIN, PEIPING
+15JUNOG CHIN, FARG CILEN KW
+0200130
+CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN ARMY
+17/F439
+CHEN. CIF BANG
+INT
+0313010
+21APP 21
+CHIN. SPΑΝΔΡΑΣ
+CHINT G044010
+V
+045+P2P
+CHIN, 3/1CHWAN
+CHIN? 0153927
+CCOM 0767442
+CC047 0093176
+CHINT 0107336
+CHIN? 0179626
+ENAT 0347529
+CHIN CHIN
+CHIN UK
+
+CHEN 7115/2579/2737/
+CHEN, SH SH 129 /7115/0647/0317/
+CHEN, SH-7115/2695/1031
+CHEN, SHU-YIN
+CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/5391/
+CHIN SHI-474 /7115/2579/6992/
+AZFEROS
+110V00
+CHIN, KARIGTING
+V
+CHINT 0144758
+CHIN TAIN
+
+CHIN, KHANG CICH
+
+V
+CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/3842/
+
+0191320
+CHEN
+CHIN
+CHIN CHE او
+CHIN
+
+SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE DILY
+EZ IMPORT CL BY 05477)
+CHIN TAIN
+PAGE
+150
+
+26.8
+SECRET
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+DOHB 70-1-1
+CHAPTER III, ANNEX В
+15 November 1974
+
+All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
+upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
+sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.
+
+b. Non-Standard Listings
+Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
+(1) Country of location
+(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
+(3) Citizenship
+(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
+(

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10052-10130.md

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+DISPATCH
+
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+
+TO
+Chief, WHD
+
+INFO:
+Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE
+
+FROM
+Chief of Station, Mexico City
+
+SUBJECT
+Contact Report/ITAMII-9
+
+Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LI TAMIL-9
+on 17 and 29 July 1963.
+
+Willard C CURTIS
+
+Attachment:
+Contact Report
+
+Distribution:
+2 - C/WHD w/2/att
+2 - C/SAS w/a/att
+2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
+3 - Filos
+
+DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
+HMMA 21849
+
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+
+DATE
+31 July 1963
+
+HOS FILE NUMBER
+201-330173
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE
+FROM
+SUBJECT :
+Lame
+Meen 11-23 17 July 1963
+
+1. An unexpected meeting was held with LAME on 17
+July -- Barker has a scheduled meeting with AMSAL-1 the Comercio
+Ejercicio Nacional and/or Campo at 2100 hours was the plan --
+Barker arrived at 2103 hours and just as --was about to enter
+stopped by the corner of Gutenberg and Thiers -- he just drove up --
+to make a call to
+at a pay phone.
+was supposed to meet
+--stopped out of the broad
+--but as B's car sailed --
+said, in English, "Here I am."
+- got in the car and drove away
+--explained that he had called B's home --
+understood the mystery was because --
+3's wife, he said
+about 2030 hours and --
+probably be back in about half an hour--LAME came to see who might be
+(from the pay phone at Gutenberg
+--saw Barker pass- Later spotted the car pull up by the corner in the
+vicinity of Thiers usual purp
+-later spotted the car pull up by the corner in the
+Thiers usual purpose.
+time, Barker had spoken with his -- His wife, be assumed
+the word that the AME
+-explained his presente
+better pick up point -- LAME
+the end
+(partly true) --
+was only co -- for
+soon was made of another scheduled meeting with AMSEL at the
+hotel --
+Hotel where he had been supposed to keep
+meeting, with AMSEL -- where he had been supposed to keep off at 2325 hours
+that might reveal something about source of the story
+
+(with Alan Culbertson in the vicinity of the Dawn Hotel) --
+embassy and cultural sections are such sharp people, hence when -s. LAME
+plotted clandestine correction -- that would seem
+the dangerous. LAME explained his presence--at the --
+and warning and saw his previous meetings were explained
+3. reporti
+Cuban Engravings
+(4) He reports
+scheduled and non scheduled developments
+(a) A big celebration of the 5th of July--is being planned to take place
+in (Hampico). Dida celebration -- will take place in the
+Club Circulo Tampiconense. (Primary), the principal particip-
+are RICO, and stink boat or
+is ready for these events
+(b)
+
+was introduced to two new people - and asked if LAME had
+seen them -- LAME had
+
+She was introduced to the First Lady by (Inu) BARRIOS --
+of the first Lady (Chronic).
+(c) The first Lady, the now Consul Colonel, that,
+because he has done quite well in his Cuban relations.
+
+(d) APALCIO also reported that the passing PUCHU LA CUBA is
+trying to obtain certain airprints.
+
+(e) APALCIO said that when he was in Prague he had trouble
+with the climate and he asked to be sent to some other Europe
+country - was surprised at the suddenness of his transfer
+to Mexico.
+
+(f) response to a question as to the should be the who
+as, as, in his
+told B that
+belief, would be easiest to recruit among the Embassy staff, said
+that he knows about JOBAIN Loyalty to the Castro regime
+felt might be recruitable but would never activate him in
+he might want a
+such a risky venture.goes window shopping along
+San Juan de Letran often - might be approachable there.
+
+(g) Only two Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's
+Residence on Bastille Day. Ambassador is becoming
+more openly pro-Castro in appearance, but B behaved normal
+to him at a cocktail party a short while ago. French cul
+(and I don't know what their
+-at the Embassy who introduced the Ambassador to
+to the French
+Attachee to which he introduced the Cuban Attache.
+is a close friend of that of
+stayed at his side during the celebration on
+14th At this array , B only gave him a superficial man and
+it became clear that there is a Cuban in the distinction
+1 suggested he would be to give them an impression
+of another young woman
+to give
+the impression they
+did, the Americans
+
+(h) of
+reported on recent meetings with two Ecuadoreans with Escala
+for the Embassy.
+A few days ago APALCIO saw in a group of
+immigrant Ecuadoreans in Ecuador
+to to Cuba
+(i) About an embassy employee is involved with
+transactions with Mexican individuals -
+restrictio
+and that it is
+that he may have to work in a more clandestine fashion to avoid
+his personal friction -- in this connection
+
+(j) At the the Embassy some underligation by - that the
+
+(k) turned over to (for potential) a handbill put out
+by the Escuela Normal Rural de Santa Therobe Coahuila
+dated 10 June 1963, explaining that schools invitation
+to Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1958-1963
+graduating class. Copy attached.
+
+(1) turned out a pornographic cartoon (for return) dis-
+tributed by pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy not
+attached.
+
+(m) Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that
+Luisa CALDERON has a sister residing in Reynosa, Tem,
+married to an American of Mexican descent. Luisa may
+come up to the border to visit her sister soon -or her
+mother may make the trip -- details not clear.
+
+seems to respect him highly and to admire him for his. He is also
+getting along very nicely with his new boss, APARICIO. His information
+gathering method is still to keep his eyes and ears open and ask no questions
+-thus he often gets only fragments -- while questions or discreet elicitati
+might fill in detail. He is extremely wary lest he arouse any suspicion.
+
+6. While he suggested that
+he suggested that
+on the 20th in
+Madara -he was also concerned lest any disruption might
+get him in trouble since he is the principal organizer of both affairs
+felt that the Mexican government might think the disruption was engineered
+by the Castro Cubans, themselves, to throw suspicion ca the anti-Castros.
+
+is to protect him. He loves talking about
+--and needs constant encouragement and shoring-up.
+He lo inclined to wax himself on the back quite often and wait
+This characteristic comes out in his conversation with whom B stops and says,
+I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever,
+don't you
+
+pick up Jill standing at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo
+at the prescribed hour and driving slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg
+the street to Melchor Ocampo - Will cruise by in his car and make the pick
+up while L is waiting. details will be worked out at the next
+meeting.

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10059-10099.md

@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+(When Filled In)
+
+27 MAY 1966
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/S-HB
+ATTENTION : Mr. Joseph E. Murphy, Jr. GG 14
+SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
+#789 6567
+08
+
+1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966
+wherein you requested a Covert Security Approval to permit Sub-
+ject's use as First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/
+JBGREED.
+12
+2
+C
+
+2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine
+Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction
+Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of
+the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1,
+above.
+
+3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent
+themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.
+
+4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security
+Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions
+of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later
+date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for
+approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this
+office.
+
+5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's
+services are not utilized within six months of the date of this
+memorandum.
+
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+4/
+
+Lenin (1. Rozt, for
+Victor R. White
+Deputy Director of Security
+
+(IOS)
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Flaproduca
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+(When Filled-In)
+GROUP I
+Excluded from automatic
+downgrading and declas-
+sification.
+
+---
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+27 MAY 1968
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive Officer
+Project HBILKA/JBGREED
+SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
+#789 6567
+8
+
+1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966
+for a Covert Security Approval to permit Subject's use as a First
+Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/JBGREED. Concurrent
+with issuance of the approval, the following is offered for your
+information.
+
+2. Investigation has recently been completed with generally
+favorable results. However, Subject's military file indicated that
+he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and
+had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His
+Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected
+his judgement, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness
+had been discussed to no avail with Subject on several occasions.
+It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indica-
+tion of over-indulgence since his departure from the military on
+October 1964.
+
+3. Additionally, it was developed that Subject's brother
+Bartholomew, aka: Bart PUGH, was the Subject of an FBI investi-
+gation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding
+the loyalty of Subject's brother. Subject's brother was determined
+to have been associated with known Communists and was active in
+Communist matters in the Los Angeles, California area during this
+period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had
+caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not
+in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no
+
+P
+SECRET
+GROUP 1:
+Excluded from autumatic
+dewa rading and
+see Do
+#45
+
+---
+
+C
+14.00000
+
+SECRET
+
+information developed during the course of this investigation which
+indicated any association between Subject and his brother.
+
+4. Dissemination of the above information should be limited
+to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.
+
+P.O'Connell
+Howard J. Osborn
+Director of Security
+Cc: DD/S
+
+SECRET
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+
+---
+/PV
+14-00000
+
+DISPATCH
+
+TO
+Chief of Station, Taipei
+INFO
+FRO
+SUBJECT
+13-6
+
+Chief, Far East
+02
+HEILKA/KUSODA
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+02
+ATTN: Chief, HEILKA
+PROCESSING ACTION
+MARKED FOR INDEXING
+NO INDEXING REQUIRED
+ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
+CAN JUDGE INDEXING
+MICROFILM
+ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
+
+1. A Covert Security Approval was granted IDSil on 27 May 1966 however the
+following information is forwarded for your information.
+
+Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results.
+However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to
+excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the lavy.
+His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment,
+reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail
+with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed
+no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.
+06
+
+Additionally, it was developed that DKS's brother Bartholomew, oka: Bart,
+vas the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve
+allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. IDEM's brother was determined
+to have been associated with known Commmmists and vas active in Comamist matters in
+the Los, Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted
+that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his feadly, who vere
+not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed
+during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between ITEN
+and his brother.
+
+2. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and
+Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.
+
+Attachment:
+IDEN (u/s/c)
+Distribution:
+Orig & 2 - Addressee
+HUGH C. PARDEE
+DOC# 04589
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+
+---
+/PV
+14-00000
+1.  A Covert Security Approval Approva was granted IKH on 27 May 1966 however the
+following information is forwarded for your information.
+
+Investigation has recently been completed with gemerally favorable results.
+However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for for duty due to
+excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the lavy.
+His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment,
+reliability, and personal behavior. This veakness had been discussed to nail
+with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed
+no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.
+
+Additionally, it was developed that IDEN's brother Bartholomew, aka: Bart,
+was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve
+allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. DEW's brother was determined
+to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Commmist matters in
+the Los, Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted
+that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were
+not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed
+during the course of this investigation which indicated any association betusen IIEN
+and his brother.
+است
+
+2.  Dissemination of the above information should be limited to staff and
+Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.
+
+Attachment:
+IDEN (u/s/c)
+Distribution:
+Orig & 2- Addressee
+
+CROSS REFERENCE TO
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+HUGH C. PARURE
+10-19
+DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
+22
+FCTB 8572
+SECRET
+CLASSIFICATION
+DATE 14 JUL 1960
+13 July 1966
+HOS FILE NUMBER
+OFFICE.....
+10/8-3
+OFFICER
+ORIGINATING
+TYPIST
+COORDINATING
+OFFICE SYMBOL
+DATE
+Distribution:
+1-08/D/1
+1- 10/8-13
+08/ID/1
+JETAMI
+28
+3/11/
+FORM 53
+1:03
+USE PREVIOUS EDITION
+OFFICER'S NAME
+7/13/14 2751
+DATE
+(40)
+JUL
+968.
+RELEASIDIG
+OFFICERS SATURE
+EXT.
+6869
+s
+DISPATCH
+
+---
+2/月
+14
+SECRET
+IDENTITY SHEET
+C
+UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHME
+FCIS-8572
+22
+
+FOR.
+03
+MR. ROBERT WEST PUCH
+RYGAT
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+
+---
+14-00000
+
+7/PV
+2
+10/4/66
+108 Chung Shan Road, North, 2nd Section
+Taipei, Taiwan
+REC'D WAS OCT 4 1966
+PND-DP-66/4427
+03
+Mr. R. W. Pugh
+Taipei, Taiwan 13-6
+03
+Dear Fr. Pugh
+27 September 1966
+
+This letter will confirm acceptance of your resigna-
+tion effective 27 September 1966 at the close of business.
+
+A final pay check representing any unpaid salary due
+you less any debits you may have on the Company books will be
+forwarded to your bank:
+
+Bank of America
+4th Street 08
+Santa Rosa, California.
+
+You have given us your forwarding address as:
+
+(756 Baird Road 08
+Santa Rosa, California
+U.S.A
+We thank you for your past service and wish you
+success in the future.
+
+Sincerely yours,
+
+David R. Traylor
+Director of Personnel
+i/cc: Paymaster
+CC
+ssistant for Personnel via HDR, Prasseint
+03
+Fr.... W. Pun P/O TAC, 503 8 February 1966
+03
+Fr. Figh resigned effective 27 September 1966 cob.
+He indicated to us that he wished to quit flying and
+go home.
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+
+---
+14-00000
+SECRET
+REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION
+FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension)
+DD/S-HB J.M.Clark 6862
+NAME SHOWN:193
+
+TO:
+CHIEF
+OS/ID/1
+SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used)
+03
+Pugh, Robert West
+CI/OA NO.
+08
+!
+789656
+DATE OF BIRTH
+Unknown
+REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION
+TRUE
+201 NO.
+PLACE OF BIRTH
+08
+789 656
+PROJECT
+02
+JBGREED
+GENT'S SERVICE RECORD
+IS ATTACHED
+CRYPT
+BILL BE FORWARDED
+Unknown
+
+02
+Subject has resigned his employment with HEILKA.
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+
+DATE
+SIGNATURE
+201-789656
+for Jack U. Clark
+68
+SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA
+SECRET
+FORM 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.
+4591
+(5/円)
+2-56
+
+---
+4-00000円
+
+SECRET
+REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
+(Alwaye handcarry I copy of this form)
+PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK
+APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
+CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
+T
+DATE
+4 January 1966
+TO:
+FROM:
+CI/OPERATIONAL: APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
+
+CHIEF INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION. OFFICE OF SECURITY
+CHIEF PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION. OFF ICE OF SECURITY
+DD/S-HB
+SUBJECT:
+03
+PROJECT
+02
+(True name)
+(PUCH, Robert West
+JEGREED
+CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES
+CI/OA FILE NO.
+XX
+RI 201 FILE NO
+SO FILE NO.
+201-789 656
+1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED
+PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
+OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
+PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
+COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
+CONTRACT TYPE A
+PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
+PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
+COVERT NAME CHECK
+SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation).
+CONTRACT TYPE B
+
+SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
+Far East (General)
+FULL DETAILS OF USE
+
+02
+First Officer, HEILKA.
+Phr
+MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
+DESTROY AFTER USE
+4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER
+A. U.S. GOVERNMENT. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING. INVESTIGATION?
+
+B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?
+
+C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?
+
+D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?
+
+E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT..
+
+F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.
+
+G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST?
+IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA. EXPLAIN FULLY
+
+5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS
+PRO 1. OR EQUIVALENT. IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED
+PRO 11. OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED
+PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED
+YES
+NO
+YES
+NO
+NO RECORD
+NO RECORD
+:
+NO RECORD
+GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:
+6. RI TRACES
+WILL FORWARD
+NON-DEROGATORY.
+DEROGATORY ATTACHED
+7. DIVISION TRACES.
+WILL FORWARD
+:::
+NON-DEROGATORY
+DEROGATORY ATTACHED
+8. FIELD TRACES
+VILL FORWARD
+:
+NO DEROGATORY INFO.
+LIST SOURCES CHECKED
+DEROGATORY ATTACHED
+SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
+NOT INITIATED (Explanation)
+SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER
+EXTENSION
+SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
+JOSKPH E. MURPHY
+6862
+H/P
+FORM
+2-63
+SECRET
+EDITIONS.
+11500

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10059-10188.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+1104-10059-10188 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
+DATE
+29.7.68
+FILE NUMBER
+OSWALD- Nosenko
+
+1. On 26 July Kes. Rocca C/CI/RTA
+called to my attention an aspect
+of Nosenko's information which
+must be definitely examined
+when we attempt to assess
+and analyze Nosenko a story about
+The OSWALD case. Rocca has
+then reading ass The Ratrou
+son re ESWALD and it is
+this impression. There are not only
+gaps in the info from the standpu
+That N Surved moto more bec
+also some aspects which don't
+ring true.
+
+2. Recently Rocca received form
+that he
+Information aball the
+activities of IRINA SHURAKOVA
+who has both in The U.K. in
+Touch with a British controlled
+source (a gov't clerk) judged
+
+1954
+JE 525-126
+
+14-00000
+
+SUBJECT
+FORM
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
+
+[to be reliable] It is Rocca's
+impression (Thats note
+[examined This case Thoroughly] )
+[that The Sovets have criticised]
+to try to make SHURALOVA
+look [Clean i.e., that she has
+resh had a KOB note and
+Tis only an Intourist interpretas-
+to support N's Thesis. This
+is questionable on its resence
+[at any rate The [controlled
+British source and SHARAVOJA
+visited here Tossad's Wax works
+wuzeum Where SHURAKOVA
+had a visibles reaction where
+seeing OSWALD display, altanista
+This vivirs was entirely cun occur
+[on The part of the source?]
+[British]. it was not
+dove deliberately SHURACOVAR
+reaction indicated suspicious
+that This was a movodation
+
+1954
+OFFICE AND TITLE
+SIGNATURE
+GROUP

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10061-10053.md

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+TO:
+Chief of Station, Paris
+
+INFO.
+
+FROM:
+Chief, MB
+
+SUBJECT: Liaison/UNION
+Report on Antonio RODRIGUES Echanabal
+
+ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES:
+REF: DIR 39176, 1 February 1962
+
+1.  As stated in reference, attached for passage to UNION are two copies
+of a report on Antonio RODRIGUES Ecbasabal, the original of this report was
+given to UNION/11 on 6 Fobaruary 1962.
+
+2.  The last paragraph of attachment contains our request for the results
+of the debriefing of Subject.
+
+Attachments:
+Report (2 es u.s.c.)
+
+Distribution:
+3 - Paris
+
+MORIDER F. BINGHAM
+
+2- WE/3 w/att
+1 - RI w/att
+
+DATE TYPED: 7 1962
+DATE D: 12
+DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: 8776-38716
+HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-244916
+CROSS REFERENCE TO
+
+CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
+
+OFFICE: WE/3
+OFFICER: Anne Silbert
+ORIGINATING TYPIST: nes
+COORDINATING OFFICER'S NAME:
+OFFICE SYMBOL: DATE
+
+5 Fev.uary 1962.
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR: M. de Vosjell
+SUBJECT: Report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal
+
+Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal was born in Cuba on 17 August 1913.
+He has a master's degree in agriculture, professedly has no religion but
+is a Mason. RODRIGUEZ is married to Edith JONES, who was born in
+Cuba on 10 March 1917; she is, however, of Haitian origin, being the
+daughter of a former Haitian Ambassador to Belgium, and she is a devout
+Episcopalian. The couple is known to have three children: a son who was
+last reported to be in Havana, Cuba; a daughter married to a man of
+German birth who was employed in the Castro land-reform organization
+until his departure for Germany in December 1961; and a son, Antonio
+RODRIGUEZ Jones, bora 24 August 1943 at Havana, who was studying at
+the Ecole Francaise Internationale in Washington, D. C. in 1961. This son
+has been reported to be anti-U.S. and to have requested permission of his
+father to go to Cuba or to another "socialist" country to continue his
+education.
+
+Antonio RODRIGUEZ Jones resided in Washington, D. C. with Yvonne
+JONES, his aunt and sister of the wife of Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal.
+Miss JONES was born 10 April 1910 at Antwerp, Belgium; she was unmarri
+and was a secretary at the Pan American Health Organization. She became
+a U.8. citizen in 1959. Since the Castro zegime has come to power,
+Miss JONES is said to have spoken quite openly for Castro and against the
+U.S. Government.
+
+RODRIGUEZ lived in Haiti for about eighteen years prior to the
+commencement of his diplomatic career, having been barred by the Batists:
+government from returning to Cuba. He became a Haitian citizen and was
+the owner of a Port-au-Prince meat market called "El Ose Blanco". Wher
+Castro assumed power in Cuba, RODRIGUEZ took over the Cuban Embassy
+in Port-au-Prince in January 1959 after the Batista-appointed officials had
+fled to the Dominican Republic. Soon thereafter he was named Ambassado
+to Haiti.
+
+Following his appointment to the diplomatic post, RODRIGUEZ continu
+to maintain contact with persons in opposition to President Duvalier of Hal:
+Citizen of Cuba
+
+In late July 1959, Haiti was invaded by a small group of Cubans, supposedly
+as a prelude to an invasion of the neighboring Dominican Republic. The
+incursion was successfully repelled by the Haitian Government, which
+publicly charged RODRIGUEZ with complicity in the raid. RODRIGUEZ ther
+closed the Cuban Embassy and returned to Cuba after selling his private
+property in Haiti.
+
+While RODRIGUEZ was still in Haiti, two attempts were made on his
+life. He accused the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic and,
+indirectly, the Haitian Government of complicity in those attacks.
+
+In November 1959, RODRIGUEZ went to Guatemala as Cuban Ambassado
+There, he appears to have associated freely with pro-Communist groups. I
+March 1960, he was requested by the Guatemalan Goverament to leave the
+country on the ground that he was engaging in activities laimical to the best
+interests of Guatemala.
+
+In November 1960, RODRIGUEZ reported to Karachi, Pakistan, as Cuba
+Ambassador. His wife accompanied him there and served as his chief
+secretary. During the initial months of his tour there, his closest relation
+in the diplomatic colony were with officials of the Belgian Embassy,
+presumably as a result of the fact that Belgium had represented Cuba when
+there was no Cuban representative in Karachi. During 1961, however, his
+social contacts were almost exclusively with Soviet, satellite and Chinese
+Communist diplomatic personnel.
+
+In late 1961, when RODRIGUEZ apparently had decided to defect, he
+confided to an acquaintance in the diplomatic colony that he was finished
+with politics and wanted to devote the rest of his life to agriculture. He he
+at the time to go to the Dominican Republic or to another, unspecified Souti
+American nation. At the time of his departure from Karachi by air for
+Germany in early 1962, RODRIGUEZ reportedly made only a very limited
+statement at the airport regarding his defection. The event apparently
+received very little, if any, press notice in Pakistan.
+
+Insufficient information exists at present to permit a determination as
+the genuineness of RODRIGUEZ', disaffection with the Castro regime. Fo
+reasons which have not as yet been fully reported, the Department of State
+denied a visa to RODRIGUEZ, apparently after he had made the decision te
+resign his post in Pakistan. We understand, however, that, following his
+Citizen of Cuba
+
+arrival in France in January 1962, he received permission from French
+authorities to travel to and reside in Martinique. It appears that he left
+France on 31 January 1962 en route to Martinique.
+
+This service would appreciate having the results of any dobriefing of
+RODRIGUEZ by French authorities, with particular reference to the reasons
+for his resignation and his plans for the future.

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10062-10227.md

@@ -0,0 +1,770 @@
+1104-10062-10227
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+HMYA- 1975 'Thre
+2006- complete
+HMYA 2006 repeated
+NO HMYA 2007
+HMYA- 2008-
+2022 Complete
+NO HMYA 2023
+Incoming Monterey
+
+TRANSMITTAL SLIP
+TO:"
+ROOM NO.
+BUILDING
+2
+
+REMARKS:
+AMYA-2024
+2024
+
+FROM:
+ROOM NO.
+BUILDING
+1 FEB 55
+FORM NO
+-241
+WHICH MAY BE USED.
+REPLACES FORM 36-6
+DATE
+
+EXTENSION
+(47)
+
+14-00000
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+16/06/77
+DOC REF/SECONDARY (2)
+FCH
+DATE
+FSN
+SECONDARY/DOC REF
+CODE ROUTING
+MAYA-01935
+LETTER BY CAMILO CHAVEZ
+AO C/배/3
+:
+MAYA-01936
+LIDATE OPERATIONAL FILE
+AO IP
+HHYA-01937
+LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF A CRAC ADVERTISEMENT
+A8C/N/3
+HMYA-01938
+BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 121 DATED 29 JUL 63
+AD C/WH/3
+HMYA-01939
+LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF AN ANTI-CRAC ARTICLE
+IN C/배/3
+HAYA-01940
+LUIS LAURO ESCAMILLA MARTINEZ
+IN IP
+HMYA-01961
+MHBORIC FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
+A8C/N/3
+HHYA-01942
+REDCAP/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPING
+AC NH3/RE
+HMYA-01943
+TRANSMITTAL OF PRI YOUTH LEAFLET
+A0276413.
+HMYA-01944
+PROJECT LIRULE/PROGRESS REKORT FOR THE PERICO 1 JUN-10 SEP 63
+AO C/배/3
+HHYA-01945
+KAPOK RECD 26 SEP 63
+AO WH/REG
+HMYA-01946
+:
+BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 112 DATED 12 AUG 63
+AO
+C/WM/3
+HMYA-01947
+INTERVIEW WITH AURELIA CAMPOS MORALES
+HMYA-01948
+AO
+C/WH/3
+TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPH-MARTA MALDONADO
+HMYA-01949
+AO179972
+PHOTO IDENTIFICATION
+HMYA-01950
+AO
+C/W/3
+ACTS OF EDELMIRO HALDONADO LEAL BURING PERIOD TO-13 SEF S
+KMYA-01951
+AO
+C/WH/3
+HMYA-01952
+281-0733542
+SUBJ OF REFERENCE A
+A0179972
+HMYA-01953
+:
+PRETEXT INVESTIGATION AT HONE OF SUBJ OR HNYA-1957
+IN IP
+HMYA-01954
+MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
+AC 270873
+HHYA-01955
+ACTS OF EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL
+AOC/WH/3.
+HMYA-01956
+FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES
+HMYA-01957
+:
+BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 123/DATED 26 AUG 63
+AOC/WH/3
+ANYA-01958
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space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10063-10206.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+1400000
+104-10063-10206
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+DISPATCH
+TO: Chief, DO/I
+
+INFO.
+FROM: Chief of Base, Washington Sac
+SUBJECT: WOMUSE
+"Peace" Demonstrations
+ACTION REQUIRED-REFERENCES: DIRECTOR 39871
+
+CLASSIFICATION:
+RET
+PROCESSING ACTION:
+MARKED FOR INDEXING X
+NO INDEXING REQUIRED
+ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
+CAN JUDGE INDEXING
+MICROFILM
+
+1. Enclosed for Headquarters information are copies of literature mailed by the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP) to its members (attachments 1, 2 and 3) concerning "Negotiation Now!"
+
+2. Also enclosed as of possible interest are copies of CAIP materials (attachments 3, 4 and 5) concerning its 40th Annual Conference, scheduled for October 27 - 29, the theme of which is "Selective Conscientious Objection in an Age of Conflict." The conference is to be held at Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, 2935 Upton Street N.W., Washington, D. C.
+
+3. The above items were received by Oliver H. CORBUSTON who had joined the CAIP for cover purposes in the course of a previous assignment. Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded in response to reference.
+
+Attachments: As stated.
+
+Distribution:
+3 - Chief, DO/I w/atts
+1- Chief, DO w/o att
+
+Oliver H. Corlentan
+Oliver H. CORBUSTON
+
+CROSS REFERENCE TO
+CLASSIFICATION REVIEW:
+CONDUCTED ON 13/8/76
+IMPOET CL BYC60595
+
+Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL by authority of 060595 date 13/8/76
+
+DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER:
+UWCA-3510
+CS COPY DATE 16 OCT 1987
+11 October 1967
+CLASSIFICATION:
+CONFIDENTIAL
+HQS FILE NUMBER
+7147

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10064-10012.md

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+DISPATCH
+
+TO
+Chief, Sov Bloc Div; Chief, Far East Division
+Chief, WOMUSE/ICG
+
+FROM
+Chief of Station, Tokyo
+
+SUBJECT
+RYBAT MIPASHA REDTOP - Beheiren and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters
+
+ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES
+TOKYO 7263
+
+As noted in reference, forwarded herewith is a copy of the subject memorandum. Please note that the information in the memorandum Paragraph B. 4. b) is particularly sensitive and should only be given properly restricted dissemination.
+
+Mark J. LIDGERWOOL
+
+ATTACHMENT
+Memo dtd 27 Nov 67
+
+Distribution
+1 - C/SB Div w/l cy attach
+1 - C/FE w/l cy attach
+1 - C/WOMUSE/ICG w/l attach
+
+CS COPY 8603
+
+DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER FJTA-53626
+DATE DEC 6 1967
+HOS FILE NUMBER UNKNOWN
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
+
+SUBJECT: BEHEIREN and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters
+
+A. Origin and Development of BEHEIREN.
+
+1. Founding: BEHEIREN (Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee) was organized in April 1965, nominally as a politically Independent group of intellectuals and cultured persons whose purpose was "to help restore peace in Vietnam." Actually, it is a loosely organized group of ex-JCP members, progressive intellectuals, leftist cultured persons, and leftwing students banded together in the name of opposition to the Vietnam war by two common denominators, dedicated anti-Americanism and refusal to be dominated or controlled by the orthodox Japan Communist Party.
+
+2. Hard-Core Secretariat: The real force behind the organization of BEHEIREN, right from the beginning to the present, has been a brilliant Communist named YOSHIKAWA Yuichi, whose conspiratorial organizational skills have been perhaps the most indispensible ingredients in BEREIREN'S development. YOSHIKAWA was expelled from Tokyo University for his role as a ZENGAKUREN leader in the 1960 U.S./Japan Security Treaty riots. He then went into fulltime JCP mass movement professional work, becoming the Secretariat official in charge of international relations for the Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA broke with the JCP in late 1964, following the rupture in relations between the JCP and CPSU in May that year. The inspiration for BEHEIREN springs in large measure from YOSHIKAWA's personal desire to use his organizational talents in countering the JCP and its Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA, in addition to being a well qualified English linguist himself, years ago surrounded himself with a small following of similarly qualified lieutenants, whom he brought along into BEREIREN to give him the necessary depth and experience to run this new organization. YOSHIKAWA functions as BEHEIREN's Secretary General.
+
+3. Respectable Intellectual Front: Following fundamental Communist principles for mass movement work (better than the JCP itself follows these tenets), the ex-JCP organizers of BEHEIREN kept themselves in the background and lined up a number of prominent Japanese progressive intellectuals and leftist cultured persons to front for BEHEIREN. The choice of ODA Makoto, ex-Fulbrighter and popular young novelist, to be the chief front man - Chairman - was an extremely lucky stroke for BEHEIREN. ODA has taken to this grand-standing, front work like a duck to water. It has given him a chance to give unbridled vent to his own latent anti-American foolings, puffed him up to the extent that he has been dubbed "the emperor" by other BEHEIREN activists, and given him at long last an ideological mission to pursue. YOSHIKAWA has performed magnificently in feeding ODA's ego needs and in infusing and indoctrinating ODA so that his words and actions take on sufficiently virulent anti-American overtones. ODA has served another vital function for BEHEIREN by recruiting a sizeable number of fellow intellectuals to join the ranks of BEREIREN activists. (Attachment 1 is a listing of a number of those Japanese who have been identified as active BEHEIREN supporters or sympathizers.)
+
+4. Organizational Development: In its 2 1/2 year history, BEHEIREN has not appreciably changed its organizational format, although it has moved its office three times and modified its name even oftener. PEHEIREN is not a "mass organization", because it has had no sizeable popular backing to the present time. Its hard core, secretariat organization is run by YOSHIKAWA and his lieutenants. Its public image, intellectual front is led by ODA, and given body by a score of like-minded intellectual friends of ODA and YOSHIKAWA, who form the loose body of BEHEIREN's activist leadership. Under this ΒΕΠΕΙΡΕΝ leadership superstructure lies a paltry base of only several hundred BEHEIREN "rank-and-file" supporters, mostly young Japanese students. Organizationally, EEHEIREN has no formal membership system, so its base of supporters is fluid and not precisely measurable. However, the base support for BEHEIREN has definitely been on the upswing during 1967, and made such notable strides during the past summer that JCP Headquarters officials finally felt constrained to note with concern that BEHEIREN was beginning to drain off a growing number of progressive youth who otherwise would have been absorbed into the JCP's own youth movement. BEREIREN leaders have tried to help this growth along by setting up a youth section, calling it "Young BEHEIREN." BEHEIREN's imaginative actions and publicity-conscious programs have been responsible for its recent growth, and this period of growth seems to be now on
+
+the verge of really picking up speed and momentum. As a result of its role in the case of the four deserting sailors, BEREIREN has reaped bountiful publicity, has succeeded in touching a delicate Japanese public nerve of sympathy and pacifism, opening a floodgate of support for BEHEIREN from all over Japan. When this case fades from the limelight, it is still most likely that a fair percentage of current wave of popular support for BEHEIREN will solidify into permanent mass backing, giving BEHEIREN, for the first time, a meaningful base to support its future activities,
+
+5. Activities and Accomplishments: BEHEIREN has engaged in a number of propaganda actions, and participated in international anti-Vietnam War activities. It has tried to co-operate with certain front activities in Japan controlled by the JCP, most notably the Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam activities, which culminated in the Tokyo Court of last August, but has been soundly and rudely rebuffed by the JCP. In spite of this, BEHEIREN has churned along at its own pace, with a continuing series of anti-Vietnam war actions, most of them related in some way to the American pacifist movement. In this regard, BEHEIREN has succeeded in cornering a virtual monopoly on Japanese contacts with the U.S. pacifist movements, and has effectually capitalized on this to promote its own action program. The case of the four deserting sailors, while an apparent lucky windfall for BEHEIREN, only points up the fact that BEHEIREN, through past organizational work and promotional activities, was "johnny-on-the-spot", ready and capable (unique in Japan in this regard) to take the ball and run with it. BEMEIREN ran all the way in this case and scored its most notable success since it was organized. (Attachment 2 is a listing of BEHEIREN's more notable activities since its founding. Attachment 3 is a partial listing of American and other foreign persons known to have been in contact with or cooperated with BEHEIREN.)
+
+B. The Case of the Four Sailor Deserters and BEHEIREN.
+
+1. How It Started: The consensus of all available overt medin material, with no recorded dissent, indicates that the four sailors voluntarily left their ship, went AWOL, and ended up wallowing around Tokyo's hippie-land. Precisely what personal grievances prompted the four to embark on this mis-adventure is not yet known. But, up to this point, the four could fairly be categorized as misguided youngsters, gone astray in a foreign land, and due to get slapped back in line with traditional Navy justice when they finally decided to stop the fun and go back to the ship. So far, this made their cases far from unique.
+
+2. How It Became an Incident: "But instead of returning to their ship of their own volition or being apprehended by the Shore Patrol, the four made contact with BEHEIREN leaders. Acsin, press reports indicate that this was just a coincidence, that there was no pre-planning by the four to contact EEHEIREN. There are no available overt nor covert reports that indicate otherwise. But, once the BEHEIREN people made contact, they recognized the potential immediately and moved fast for the kill. (Attachment 4 is a Yomiuri Newspaper clipping, 22 November 1967, that is both a representative and comprehensive account of this phase of the case. Even if this article should contain some minor inaccuracies, the basic line seems factual and has not been challenged elsewhere.)
+
+3. BEHEIREN Takes Over: When the four made contact with EEHEIREN, it suddenly became an entirely different ballgame. BEHEIREN had everything needed to capitalize on this: veteran activist leaders who are experienced enough to recognize the windfall that had come their way; an apparatus that could provide hiding places for the four; long standing liaison contacts with Soviet Embassy officials for use in planning exit from Japan; solid contacts with reliable American pacifists with whom the bona fides of the four sailors could be checked; money and organization to capitalize on the propaganda potential (such as preparing a movie film for the initial BEHEIREN press conference announcing the desertion, prepared more likely than not by BEHEIREN stalwart EUEQ Keinosuke, an independent film producer) and English speaking activists capable of sympathizing, encouraging, soothing, or agitating the four young sailors, so that there would be no turning back.
+
+4. The BEHEIREN Apparatus At Work: While many of the small pieces of this puzzle, which would put the whole case in proper detailed chronological order and eliminate speculation on minor points, are still missing, enough is known now, through overt and covert sources, that the picture of BEHEIREN'S adept handling of this case shines through clearly. The following elements, all part of the BEHEIREN apparatus, make up the bulk of the picture:
+
+a) Hide-out: When EEHEIREN got hold of the four on about 26 October, they had to be hiden out for the approximate two week period until their exit from Japan could be arranged. This presented BEHEIREN no great logistical problem. A number of the BEREIREN activist leaders have homes well suited to harboring fugitives. For example, BEHEIREN activist leader FUKASAKU Mitsusada has a villa hidden away in Chigasaki, which was used on the night of 12 September for a meeting of about 20 top BEHEIREN leaders, and which would be highly suitable
+
+for hiding the four deserters. Other private-dwellings, belonging to BEHEIREN leaders and loyal supporters, are scattered throughout both the Kanto and Kansai areas.
+
+b) BELEIREN/Soviet Liaison: EEDEIREN Secretary General YOSHIKAWA has maintained periodic contact with Soviet Embassy officials for years. BEFEIREN Chairman ODA has met Soviet Peace Committee officials in Moscow. The exact means of how this liaison was accomplished in this case is precisely known from a covert phone tap on the Soviet Embassy's line. A full transcript is available of two phone calls made on 30 October, first by Brian Victoria to Chief Press Attache Nikolay V. Vasilyevich, and second by YOSHIKAWA to First Secretary Sergey D. Anisimov, urgently requesting a private meeting later that day to discuss "an extremely important, extremely delicate antter", without doubt the case of the four sailors.
+
+c) BEHEIREN/U.S. Pacifist Liaison: BEHEIREN contacted Dartmouth University professor Ernest P. Young, who flew to Japan on & November, apparently helped BEHEIREN leaders check out the bona fides of the deserters, and returned to the U.S. on 11 November. (Attachment 5 is the translation of a Sankei Shimbun article, dated 21 November, reporting an interview with Young, giving his version of his role in this case.)
+
+5. Escape to Moscow: The four deserters turned up in moscow on 20 November. The press has speculated widely and unanimously that the four left Japan on the Soviet passenger ship Baikal on 11 November. Again, there is no dissenting opinion, overt nor covert. The only mystery concerning this final phase of the Japanese portion of this case concerns the mechanics of how the four boarded the Baikal and who assisted in this maneauver. But with the sailing of the Baikal from Yokohama, BEHEIREN completed its most highly successful and beautifully executed activity in its 2 1/2 year history. Not only did BEHEIREN smear the American Government's image in Japan, not only did BEHEIREN gain a vast amount of priceless publicity that will swell the ranks of its supporters and be invaluable in future activities, but BEHEIREN doubtlessly even made a profit, financially, on this low budget operation - donations are still pouring into BERZIREN Headquarters from all over Japan to "help and protect U.S. deserters".
+
+Attachment No. 1.
+
+Japanese Who Have Been Identified as
+Active DEREIREN Supporters or Sympathizers
+
+1. YOSHIKAWA Yuichi (DEHEIREN Secretary General) - former JCP member.
+
+2. ODA Makoto (BEHEIREN Chairman) - popular novelist.
+
+3. ΚΑΙΚΟ Ken - Akutagawa prize winning novelist.
+
+4. KUBO Keinosuke - film producer and director.
+
+5. TSURUMI Shunsuke - Doshisha University professor.
+
+6. TSURUMI Kazuko - sister of Shunsuke (their father is the late philosopher, Yusuke).
+
+7. FURUYAMA YOZO - high school teacher.
+
+8. MUTO Ichiyo - ex-JCP (tried to travel to U.S. to represent BEHEIREN at October 21 demonstrations this year, but was denied a visa to enter the U.S.)
+
+9. YAMADA Atsushi - ex-JCP.
+
+10. FUKUDA Yoshiyuki - playwriter.
+
+11. TOMINAGA Ichiro - cartoonist.
+
+12. FUKASAKU Mitsusada - professor.
+
+13. AWAZU Kiyoshi - graphic designer.
+
+14. TAKADO Kanane - Christian leader.
+
+15. YOSHIDA Kiju - film director.
+
+16. UMINARA Shun - writer.
+
+17. HASHIMOTO Mineo - Buddhist priest.
+
+18. HOTTA Yoshie - novelist.
+
+19. GOTO Hiroyuki - scientist.
+
+30. KUWABARA Takeo - professor at Kyoto University.
+
+21. SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu - Assistant professor at Tokyo University.
+
+22. HIDAKA Rokuro - professor at Tokyo University.
+
+23. IIDA Momo - writer.
+
+24. TSURUMI Yoshiyuki - employed at International House in Tokyo.
+
+25. TERAN Minako
+
+26. ΑΝΑI Fumihiko
+
+27. NASU Masanao
+
+28. MATSUMOTO Ichiju
+
+29. FUKUTOWI Setsuo
+
+30. KURIHARA Yukio
+
+31. etc: ANDO Jimbei, CHIBA Hido, EGAWA Taku, FUJII Nittatsu,
+HARIYU Ichiro, HOSHINO Yasusaburo, ICHII Saburo, IKEYAMA Juro,
+ISHIDA Takeshi, KANAI Yoshiko, KASAI Seiichi, KATAGIRI Yuzuru,
+KATO Shuichi, KAZAMA Michitaro, MATSUURA Sozo, KIDOKORO Masao,
+KITAKOJI Satoshi, KOBAYASHI Shoichiro, KOMATSU Sakyo,
+KOBAYASEI Tomi, KUNO Osamu (Shu), KURODA Hidetoshi, MARUYAMA
+Masao, MIDORIKAWA Toru, MIZUSAWA Yana, MORITAKI Ichiro,
+KUCHAKU Seikyo, MURAMATSU Hiro, NISHIO Noboru, NOMURA Koichi,
+OGOSEI Teruo, OTSUKOTSU Yoshiko, SERIZAWA Tae, SHIRAI Shimpei,
+SHINMURA Takeshi, SHISHIDO Hiroshi, SUGIURA Mitsuo, SUGIYAMA
+Tatsubaru, SUZUKI Masahira, TAKEUCHI Yoshitomo, WADA Nagahisa,
+YAMADA Munenitsu, YAMADA Toshio, YAMAGUCHI Kosaku, YAMANI SH
+Eiichi, YASUDA Takeshi, YOSHINO Gonzaburo, YOSHIWARA Koichiro,
+OKAMOTO Taro, MATSUMOTO Seicho, EI Rokusuke, IZUMI Taku,
+AWAYA Noriko, KATO Yoshiro, SHIROYAMA Saburo, TAKAHASHI
+Taketomo, ODAGIRI Hideo, OKUMA Minoru, SANO Kenji, SUZUKI
+Michihiko, KUBATA Hanya, SHINOHARA Seiei, MARUYAMA Kunio,
+
+TSURUSHIMA Sotsurei, NURO Kenji, KONAKA Yotaro, SAKAMOTO
+Yoshikazu, SAITO Masahiko, etc.
+
+COMMENT: Although not recorded here, many of the above persons
+are ex-JCP members.
+
+Attachment No. 2
+
+Some BEHEIREN Activities and Accomplishments
+
+1. Regular once-per-month demonstrations at a public park in
+Tokyo, consisting of anti-American speeches and followed by street
+marches.
+
+2. An all night TV "teach-in" with BEHEIREN activist leadors,
+along with special guest, U. S. pacifist Carl Oglesby (Chairman of
+the Students for a Democratic Society.)
+
+3. A full page advertisement in the New York Times (16 November
+1965), followed by another full page ad in the Washington Fost
+(3 April 1967), appealing to Americans to stop the war in Vietnam.
+
+4. A "Meet in Conference of Two Nations for Peace in Vietnam,"
+held in Tokyo in August 1966, and attended by BEHEIREN activists and
+seven U.S. pacifist leaders (including Dave Dellinger), and observers
+from France, England, Canada, the USSR, Pakistan, and Mongolia.
+
+5. A mass meeting in Tokyo in October 1966, guest speakers of
+which were French pacifists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.
+
+6. Nationwide tours of Japan for lectures and peace rallies for
+such anti-Vietnam war pacifists as Professor Howard Zinn and the late
+A. J. Nuste of the United States, Claude Bourdet of France, and Thich
+Nhat Hanh of South Vietnam.
+
+7. A mass meeting in Tokyo in January 1967, sponsored by
+DEHEIREN and featuring U.S. folk singer and pacifist Joan Baez.
+
+8. A continuing program of direct distribution of pamphlets to
+U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and those coning to Japan on warships,
+and for rest or hospitalization from Vietnaz.
+
+9. Participation by two BEREIREN activist leaders (Kyoto
+University professor KUWABARA Takeo and International House staffer
+TSURUMI Yoshikyuki, taking advantage of a trip to the U.S. to attend
+a non-political Japan-America Congress on Cultural Problems) in
+anti-Vietnam war speech rallies and demonstrations at Dartmouth
+University in early May 1967, followed by an unsuccessful attempt
+So invite Cassius Clay to visit Japan on behalf of BEHEIREN.
+
+10. Continuing efforts to bring to Japan for a nationwide
+
+speech tour on behalf of BENEIREN, Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko,
+an effort that has not yet reached fruition but is still pering
+
+11. Participation in the Stockholm July 1967 "World Conference
+on Vietnam," by sending two BENEIREN activist leaders as delegates.
+
+12. Cooperation with the U.S. Quakers, pacifists, and Earle
+Reynolds in sending the yacht "Phoenix" with medical aid, first to
+Haiphong, then on a second trip in the Fall of 1967, secking but
+failing to find landfall to deliver medical aid to either North or
+South Vietnam.
+
+13. Attempted, but failed due to inability to obtain U.S. visa,
+to send a BEHEIREN activist leader (MUTO Ichiyo) to the U.S. to
+participate in the 21 October 1967 anti-Vietnam War demonstrations.
+
+14. Currently carrying out a fund raising campaign to send an
+aid ship to North Vietnam. In this, and other activities, BEHEIREN
+leaders are maintaining ever closer liaison contact with their
+counterparts abroad, such as the French "Conite" Vietnam National."
+In an effort to generate public support for this aid ship fund
+raising campaign, BENEIREN succeeded in issuing a public appeal,
+under the endorsing signatures of Tokyo Governor MINOBE Ryokichi and
+Yokohama Nayor ASUKATA Ichio, as well as the usual intellectuals
+supporting BELEIREN.
+
+15. In October 1967, BEREIREN solicited approval to hold anti-
+Vietnam War demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo,
+expecting to be denied and then intending to make this denial a court
+test case. Instead, SEHEIREN was given this permission, and conducted
+two crderly and well-publicized demonstrations in front of the American
+Embassy, garuering a larger public turn out of participants than in
+any previous BEHEIREN-sponsored demonstration.
+
+16. Assisted and abetted the defection to the USSR of four
+American sailors from the U.S. Navy carrier Intrepid. Following this
+success, BELEIREN's most effective activity to date, BEREIREN leaders
+are organizing a permanent "underground railway" of Japanese intell-
+ectuals who will volunteer their homes as possible "way stops" for
+hiding future U.S. military deserters that BEHEIREN now hopes to
+induce.
+
+Comment: For other details, see Tokyo intelligence reporting:
+FOT-11547, 31 May 1966
+FJT-12046, 14 October 1966
+EJT-12690, 10 May 1967
+EJT-12851, 5 July 1967
+FJT-13081, 8 September 1967
+FJT-13154, 27 September 1967
+FJT-13303, 22 November 1967
+Also, OSS-6790, 11 July 1967
+
+ATTACHMENT 3
+
+Partial Listing of American and Other Foreign
+Persons Known to Have Been in Contact with or
+Cooperated with BEREIREN
+
+Americans.
+
+1. Staughton Lynd (ez-Yale professor)
+
+2. Norman Mailer (novelist)
+
+3. Dave Dellinger (Editor of Liberation)
+
+4. Howard Zinn (Boston U. professor)
+
+5. Donald Keyes (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy)
+
+6. David EcReynolds (Chairman, War Resisters' League)
+
+7. A. J. Huste (now deceased)
+
+8. Karl Meyer
+
+9. William Davidson
+
+10. Bradford Lyttle
+
+11. Charlotte Thurber
+
+12. (Miss) Quentin Bassett (Students for a Democratic Society)
+
+13. Murray Levin (Boston U. professor)
+
+14. Robert Ockene (Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam)
+
+15. Carl Oglesby (Chairman, Students for a Democratic Society)
+
+16. Barbara Deming (Associate editor of Liberation)
+
+17. Joan Baez (folk singer)
+
+18. Ira Morris (Paris expatriate)
+
+19. Otto Naisan (phonetic, New York City peace activist)
+
+20. Barbara and Earle Reynolds (divorced but separately ective long-time residents in Japan)
+
+21. William R. Christensen (an American pacifist drifter, who gave BEREIREN its first experience in the summer of 1966 in exploiting for propaganda in Japan, and then in arranging the onward journey of an American who wanted to defect to the USSR)
+
+22. Brian Victoria (head-shaved pacifist and "converted" Buddhist priest, known to be in regular contact with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo)
+
+23. Mr. Willowby (inu, phonetic, "chief of the Quaker Peace Action movement in the U.S")
+
+24. An unidentified American of Japanese descent, from Hawaii, who is currently a student at Waseda University
+
+25. Kosaku Yamaguchi (reportedly born in U.S., present citizenship status unclear) (formerly was a professor at Momoyama University in Osaka, but has been teaching at the University of California in Berkeley for some time)
+
+B. Other Foreigners.
+
+1. Hikhail Kotov, USSR (Soviet Peace Committee)
+
+2. Claude Bourdet, France (French Committee to Support the Vietnamese People)
+
+3. Peggy Duff, Great Britain (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
+
+4. James Endicott, Canada (World Peace Council)
+
+5. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Pakistan
+
+6. Gabita Muslepov, USSR
+
+7. Mrs. Erdenebat Ojon, Mongolia
+
+8. Konstantin Shugnov, USSR
+
+9. Francis Marcel Kahn, France (Comite Vietnam National)
+
+10. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, France
+
+11. Thích Nhat Hanh, South Vietnam
+
+COMMENT: This is not, by any means, a complete listing, nor does it necessarily list BEHEIREN's most important activist contacts abroad. But this list is re- presentative in showing the breadth of BEHEIREN liaison abroad, particularly with the American "new left".
+
+ATTACHMENT. 4
+THE YOMIURI 22 NOVE
+
+54 US Deseriers Possibly
+Left Japan Aboard Baikal-..
+The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic tele-
+vision appearance Manday in Moscow are believed to have left Japan irregularly
+by the Soviet-liner Baikal which left Yokohama on November 11 for the Far East
+Soviet port of Nakhodko.
+
+YUICHI YOSHIKAWA, secretary-general of the the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), tells a press conference Tuesday that the four deserters of the US warship Intrepid hoped to stay in Japan but the Beheiren could not help them to do so.
+
+SANKEI (Full)
+November 21, 1967
+Prof. YOUNG Says Four American Deserter Seamen Not in Japan Any More
+Went to Tokyo and Tried to Dissuade Them;
+Probably Escaped from Japan on the 12th or the 13th
+(New York, November 20, Correspondent Tadashi ONODERA) Professor
+Ernest P. YOUNG of Dartmouth College in the U.S., consented to an interview
+with this reporter on the question of the four American seamen who deserted
+from the U.S. aircraft carrier Intrepid. At the interview held on the 19th,
+Professor YOUNG clarified that the Peace for Vietnam Association (Beheiren,
+with Makoto ODA acting as its representative) contacted an anti-war organiza-
+tion in the U.S., and at this, Professor YOUNG hurriedly visited Tokyo, and
+meeting the four seamen in a room in an apartment house in Tokyo on the 9th
+and 10th, tried to persuade them to return. In regard to the pres ent where-
+abouts of these four seamen, he made the noteworthy statement that "those
+four were still in Japan, up puntil the night. night of the 11th, when I left I left Japan,
+but they are probably no longer in Japan now
+
+Families Perplexed
+
+The questions and answers exchanged with Professor YOUNG are as follows:
+
+- Why did you go to Japan?
+
+Professor: Beheiren contacted David DERKINGER, a pacifist activist in the U.S., asking him to "send someone to Japan to hear the stories of the four seamen and announce them in the U.S." I have been in Japan twice, and I also once served as special assistant to Ambassador REISCHAUER. During that time, I became friends with Beheiren representative ODA' and other intellectuals in Japan. It was for these reasons that I was given this assignment. I personally have never participated actively in the Of anti-Vietnam war movement so far
+the
+
+-- When did you arrive in Japan, and where did you meet the four seamen?
+
+Professor: I arrived. in Haneda on November 8, and met the four seamen Son the 9th and the 10th... The place of interview was in an apartment house ps in Tokyo, but I cannot say at this time where that apartment house was and awho owned it. However, on both days, I talked fully with these four seamen, ze for more than three hours on each occasion (according to an investigation made by the public security authorities, Professor YOUNG. arrived in Japan toward the evening of the 8th, and stayed at Hotel Tanakanwa in Shiba, s Minato-ku, until the morning of the 11th).
+
+- What were the motives for these four seamen's 'desertion?
+
+Professor: The desertion was completely the decision of these four persons. It seems that the four seamen decided not to return to the ship, when the Intrepid entered Yokosuka Port on October 17, and they were per- ou mitted to go ashore for rest for one week. My impression on meeting these four seamen was that they were definitely not deserting for the purpose of chself-advertisement or that they were giving false reasons. I am convinced that they deserted really out of doubt about the Vietnam war.
+
+-- What were the movements of the four after they deserted?
+
+Professor: On the night of the 23rd, two days before the Intrepid was due to sail, the four went to Shinjuku, and told the people whom they met at a bar they happened to visit, that "we are fed up with war." The Japanese who heard them sympathized with them, and at one time, the four lived with some hippies (according to this paper's investigations; they include Mr. K., a student of Tokyo University's Liberal Arts Department, and vanguard artist A., who gather at Fugetsudo in Shinjuku.) Finally,
+
+they were taken to Beheiren by a student who spoke English (according to this paper's investigation, this was Mr. S., a Waseda University student). After that, they were hidden by Beheiren. I cannot say where they were hidden.
+
+Were the four firmly determined to desert?
+
+Professor: My purpose in visiting Japan was to dissuade the four.
+I explained to them what the results of their desertion would be. I even told them that they would never again be permitted to stand on American soil, their fatherland. At the time I met them, it was still at a stage where they would only receive light punishment, if they reported back immediately, saying that they "had missed their ship.". However, their determination was firm, and my persuasion had no effects.
+
+-- The four seamen's desertion was announced in the form of a press interview given by Beheiren. Were there no facts of their having been forced to desert, during that period?
+
+Professor: I ascertained that point, too. However, they firmly denied any fact of their having been forced, saying that they had voluntarily aconsulted Beheiren as to whether they should publicly announce the "intention to desert, and if so, in what form this should be made.
+
+-- Where are the four seamen.now, and where are they planning to go?
+
+Professor: I am certain that the four of them were still in Japan, up until the lith, the day I left for home. However, they already knew fully well that it was not possible for them to obtain asylum in Japan. They even said that "we will probably have to go to some third nation, which is neutral." (The public security authorities judge that the four seamen left Japan immediately after Mr. YOUNG's persuasion, and consider that they probably were smuggled out of Japan after the 10th, and before the evening of the 13th, when Beheiren announced their désertion at a press conference. However, Mr. YOUNG says that the four seamen were in Japan up until the night of the lith. Therefore, the possibility is strong that they were smuggled out of Japan by ship, between the night of the 11th and the
+
+--The films showing the four seamen were shown publicly in the U.S., by too. What were the reactions in the U.S.?
+
+Professor: When the films were publicly shown, there was big excitement, with rows and rows of television and press cameramen. I thought I would be exposed to persistent questioning by the FBI and the CIA, after I returned home, but so far, I have only been questioned once by the Navy's. Intelligence Section, about the circumstances. It seems that American authorities con- cerned do not want to make too big a fuss over the matter.
+
+What do the parents think of this act of this action taken by their sons?
+
+Professor: A certain television station asked the mother of one of the four men about her son's life... This mother was completely perplexed, saying: "My son is a most average American youth. His school records were quite ordinary, and he liked sports just like any other student. I cannot understand why he acted in such a way!!..

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10065-10028.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# 1104-10065-10028 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+
+Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Durant
+
+Recruited: March 1955 as member Station unilateral surveillance
+team.
+OA - 28 Feb 1955.
+
+1 Oct 55: Converted to Contract status w/annual salary $3600.
+
+Late:1956: P/A in charge of surveillance team & also was in
+charge of photo surveillance of the Soviet Mission,
+including processing the film. LIEMPTY was
+crypt for the xxx support team targetted against
+the Soviet Embassy. Under LIEMPTY, the 3 basehouses
+were encrypted:
+LIMITED - basehouse across street from
+Soviet Embassy.
+LILYRIC - basehouse across the street from
+Soviet Embassy.
+LICALLA - basehouse xx from which pictures
+taken from garden area of Soviet
+Embassy.
+
+Note: photo of man alleged to be OSWALD was taken
+from the LIMITED basehouse.
+
+12 Dec 58: ALVAREZ married LIEMPTY-19 (Hester ROOS, who assisted
+him during the next 10 years as a part-time support
+asset in as P/A for the LIEMPTY activity,
+surveillance & photo coverage of the Soviet target
+(1958-1968.:
+
+In Oct 1962: In order provide maximum compartmentation between
+the various basehouses, Oliver G. SCANTLING was inserted
+as the cutout to the LIMITED basehouse and its basehouse
+keepers (LIEMPTY-6 & 8), replacing ALVAREZ. ALVAREZ
+continued as cutout for the LIENTRAP (roving van),
+LICALLA and LILYRIC. This gave ALVAREZ more time to
+process raw photo take.
+This continued from October 1962 until 1 Sept 1964
+when ALVAREZ assumed cutout responsibility for
+LIMITED basehouse - again.
+
+In 1969: ALVAREZ separated from LIEMPTY-19 and a waxsage messy
+divorce suit followed. In Dec 1969, he was put on half pay
+& had his ops duties suspended due his full-time
+involvement in legal matters re the divorce. On 26 June 7
+he & LI-19 signed quit claims & secrecy agreements.
+ALVAREZ paid $10,000 as termination bonus
+Last Station contact with ALVAREZ was ex*x**x*** May 71
+when ALVAREZ received the last of his termination bonuses.
+visited
+In 1963 when OSWALD allegedly warkasxints the Soviet Embassy, 05941
+SCANTLING was tek the P/A for the LIMITED basehouseTand LIEMPTY-6
+(Jorge Barcello VILLAGRAn Alvarez ) was the photo tech who took the
+pictures.
+
+# 14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+LIEMPTY-6 was recruited in June 1954 as member of physical
+surveillance team. In Dec. 1955, he and his wife occupied the
+LIMITED basehouse. He took pictures for 13 years & was
+terminated 31 May 1968, signed quit claim & secrecy agreement
+which was witnessed by SER ALVAREZ.
+
+ALVAREZ wax presumably was the individual who developed the photos
+which LIEMPTY-6 took, as well as the photo tech coverage of the
+other 2 basehouses.
+
+SCANTLING's true name is Juan N. FRAIS-RAMIRRZ. (Contract agent)
+
+Soviet Embassy Coverage:
+Project LIEMPTY concerned primarily with photo coverage of the
+Soviet installation. Active from mid-1955
+through 30 June 1972. ar ft It support supported of the
+original 3 basehouses which were:
+LIMITED had been terminated.
+LICALLA (activated in 1957 to provide photo coverage
+the rear (garden, parking lot area) of the Sov.
+Embassy.
+LILYRIC (activated 1956 to provide photo coverage of
+the front entrance of the Soviet Emb. Terminat
+30 June 1972.
+LIMITED (activiated in 1955 to provide photo coverage
+of the front entrance of the Sov. Emb. Terminate
+31 May 1968.

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10066-10010.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+PAGE 1 OF 2
+
+CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
+
+MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
+
+CONF: SLOoto
+
+DATE-TIME GROUP: 161827Z
+
+CITE: DIRECTOR
+
+MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 125981
+
+INFO: FILE ELLR8, IP/AMS, LA&OLC
+
+TO: LISBON INFO LONDON MEXICO CITY. Y
+
+RYBAT UNINTEL RNVIEW Y
+
+1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING, MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. 
+
+2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES.
+
+3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED.
+
+DO NOT REPRODUCE
+RETURN TO CIA
+
+AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: IMPDET
+
+CL BY: 06494
+
+---
+
+PAGE 2 OF 2
+
+CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
+
+MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
+
+CITE: DIRECTOR
+
+MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 125981
+
+4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT STATIONS ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY.
+
+5. STATIONS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING STATION OFFICERS IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR COVER CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT.
+
+ORIG: O/SA/DO/O (SOVERN); COORD: OLC (CUMMINS), DC/LA (CLAUDER), (HAWKING), C/LA/(EX), DX/EUR/BC (SEEMOON), C/EUR/IB (BERGER); AUTH: SA/DO/O (KATROSH); REL: DC/EUR (ESTES).
+
+DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
+
+ORIG: MASOVERN
+
+UNIT: O/SA/DO/
+
+EXT: 1542
+
+DC/EUR
+
+AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: IMPDET

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10066-10076.md

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+1104-10066-10076
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 DI-CR
+3 July '74
+
+MEMO FOR FILE
+
+SUBJECT C : OTS (late TSD) and Jim McCord's Cuban Activities
+
+1. Ben Colling phoned to say that one of the fellows in jail
+is still around, and after he got out he inquired around and got no
+indication that McCord was ever involved. None of the other OTS people
+have any recollection of McCord's involvement.
+
+2. I said that I was sure that the man who was rolled up
+might not have any idea of McCord's involvement, if indeed he was
+involved. If McCord's involvelement was merely headquarters planning
+and no releasing operation was ever undertaken his role might never
+surface. However, we had been told that planning did involve TSD
+people at the time, along with security. For instance, I knew that
+the Security man with TSD at the time had a job of hand-holding with
+the families of the three men; there may be some TSD record of that
+which would lead to someone who would know.
+
+3. Colling was pulled out of a staff meeting to talk to me and
+said he would call back later.
+
+SDB
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+
+6574
+
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+20 September 1960
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
+SUBJECT
+Summary of(STESCALADE - Audio Operation
+Against the New China News Agency in Havana
+
+1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened
+an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied
+partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apart-
+ments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the con
+currence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, en
+Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through
+the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In
+November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD
+technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape
+recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November
+1959.
+
+2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms
+occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and
+were used for conferences. At that time Bryan Mills) FE Division
+case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving
+the operation, He managed to lease an apartment directly over the
+NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space,
+
+3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were
+in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the
+additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE
+Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he,
+together with the technicians, installed probe microphone and tape
+recorder in the apartment obtained by (Mills over the NCNA office.
+About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's
+apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left
+in the wall and plastered over,
+
+6592
+
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe
+haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key
+to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie
+Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was cotained, Mrs. Lennox was
+told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic
+surveillance purposes,
+
+5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time
+and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to
+the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were
+cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was,
+therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to
+permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening
+post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of
+David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias
+Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented
+as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the
+Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to
+the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was
+then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apart-
+ment over the NCNA office.
+
+6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the
+other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep
+a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of
+September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and
+searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At
+1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife-
+were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.
+
+7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban
+authorities, His wife has been released and is still in Havana, Neet
+was released. 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned..
+to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was
+subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she
+is being debriefed, The three TSD technicians remain in confinement,
+They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy
+officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox.
+Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated
+the morning of 15 September. At that time Christ did not appear
+-2-
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+:
+to have been maltreated.
+
+8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three
+technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA
+office and completing the installation of the equipment. The
+press article adds that the key to Mrs, Lennox's apartment was
+found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to
+which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the
+men by alias and have not. identified them as Government or Agency
+employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed
+upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event
+they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ
+indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied.any
+knowledge as to why he was being held,) The sub-lease for the
+apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-
+behind agent with the original lease being in the name of Mills) the
+FE Division Case Officer.
+
+9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would
+be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent
+press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul
+Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September
+was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told
+they were in custody.
+
+10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists. under
+very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in
+New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover
+company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the
+door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an
+Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover
+as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or..
+leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing cardذ
+requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home
+addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will
+indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment
+house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned,
+efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries
+from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view
+-3-
+
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+cf the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.
+
+11. A cleared and wetting law firm in New York has been briefed
+by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries
+received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of
+lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or
+other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situa-
+tion so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them
+appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support
+of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms.in
+Cuba which are associated with them,
+
+12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians.
+is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in Japan)
+His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted
+by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if
+he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same
+token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their inten-
+tions and course of action.
+
+13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what
+has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD
+staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A
+conference with the two wives was held in TSD'on 19 September to go
+over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal
+problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being
+the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a
+trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action
+the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken
+and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals aze released
+to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly
+well.
+
+Distribution:
+DCI - 2
+DDCI - 1
+DD/P - 1
+COPS - 1
+WH 3
+1
+OS
+CI-I
+RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
+Acting Chief, WH
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+14-00000
+
+02
+20 September 1956
+MEMORANDUM RE STESCALADE
+record
+There is a folder of sensitive non-CS/material pertaining to this
+operation, retired under Black Tape wrapping, Job #57-86/78, restricted
+to Offices of DCI, DDCI, DDP, C/WH, C/WH/PL, C/WH/C, C/CI, C/TSD, Director
+of Security and General Counsel. China Operations is not cited as an
+originator, addressee, or info recipient of any of this sensitive
+R
+material..
+WH/RMO
+
+Viviqu
+7334
+SECRET
+
+06593
+
+14-00000
+
+RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLÀN 62-2
+CHART OR MAY REGURENCE:
+
+Sectional wrocautinat darts
+
+TASK ORGANIZATION:
+
+Det. 1, 1045th Operational En.ussion and Iridating Grap Major
+Billy B. Carpbell, Comcenter.
+1.. SIJATION:
+
+Laniel L. Caravell (live), tees H. Fumbras (Aliss) and Fiord
+R. Teransky (Alius) are TD Starployees who were srpretonted by
+Cuben authorities in September 195 and who are bir seving ban year seuta-
+Efforts are being made to sure their release. See their release
+nay cour without advanus nendee e at a variety of ploto, lo. Havaca,
+Minad, Mexico City, Switzerhrd, Smal, ats, it is imperigre that a
+contingenty plas be formlated to sure thesaurе генетсon of these
+epicyees.
+
+The controlling funtar in all
+wes of the stiere proredare is
+that these employees were in Case
+for alive and that during the entire
+pericd since their opture their
+fant over storten opparently
+have been edatscued. Therefore is tusential that there idares b
+caintainai until such fe as thepines here not ic Agency da
+trol and then have these instamper es que se p
+tle.
+
+For pisoning purposes the spelet il es ca, Nordeo
+City or other em".
+2. 135IN:
+
+Tet. 1, 10th Operaxel Elation and Toes wing Ostup provide
+black eir transport
+of my CG0s to the designated sut:
+kret,
+3. EROTICE:
+
+A. alsck menstr
+request of
+sex,
+Spending the alan wal
+greude rater what fler st the
+staten/(5/30s
+sed sport
+
+6594
+
+14-00000
+
+3. Request for black transport should ind is:
+
+1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2 be implemented.
+
+2. Port of entry.
+
+3. Date, Local time, aaa ciršleld desired for pick up,
+
+4. Desired destination.
+
+5. Other requirements, ie,, stretchers or bunks in the event
+subjects are hospital cases.
+
+6. Mane, organization and telephona maber of requesting party.
+
+7. Name and telephone nucber of KUBARK ontents et loating
+and off-ineling points.
+
+C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the
+responsibility of activating hin plan:
+
+1. Major Richard. I. Skaner, C/ASD/DO/P
+Organization: Air Support Division, DD
+Home Phone: JE 3-11:09
+Office Phone: Sterile Numbers MB 8-6235, EX 3-8515
+Extensions 6862,7654,7367
+Red Line 1058
+
+2. Mr. Robert Mrrero
+Organization: Air Support Dizisica, DW/F.
+Home Phone: JA 4-3598
+Office Phone: Same as 1.
+
+3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Comender, Dat. I.
+Organization: Dat. 1, 1045th Cherational Galation and
+Trebbing Crow, Egli Air Force Base, Floridou.
+Home Phone: 662737
+Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Desu, Florida 631590
+
+4. Major Kemeth R. Burton, Ops Offfor, Det. 3.
+Organization: Dat. 1, 1045 Operational. Evaluation and
+Training Group, Egila Air Force Basa, Florida)
+Home Phone: 66245%
+Office Fhone: Eglin Ak Force Beze, Firida 631213
+
+S-E-C-R-3-7
+
+14-00000
+
+S-E-C-R-E-T
+
+-3-
+
+D. Det. 1. furnish 1 6-54 and are cres in stemiby capacity until
+further notice. Staniby capacity is heroin defined as espability t
+position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southvost
+U. S. From Easton to Los Angeles within 15 hours.
+
+E. Assurring the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico
+City, Det, 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from mest
+probeble ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Forca Base,
+
+Distribution:
+Orig. & 1 CI Stelf
+3 OS
+3-
+3-S
+3-C/FE
+3- C/TSD
+3-
+COG
+3-
+3- c/wa
+DDR/מת - 3
+
+RI RICHARD I. SKINNER

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10068-10142.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# 1104-10068-10142
+# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+## CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
+
+*   William Johnson
+*   NTCI/OPS/FB
+*   DATE 26 (
+*   D
+
+TO: STDEY IFO CANBERRA
+
+FROM: DIRECTOR
+
+CONF: C/CI
+
+INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DOP, ADDP, C/FE 6, VR
+
+TO: SYDNEY INFO: CANBERRA
+
+*   ROKETING
+*   Nov 25 21 41 1963
+*   DEFERRED SECT.
+*   ROUTINE
+*   OPIM
+*   CITE DIR 85059
+
+КУВАТ КЛЕЗК ESET OTIM
+
+1.  REFERENCE ALDERA CANBERRA CABLE CED-015 OF 24 HOVERERER WHICH DONGRADED TO SECRET.
+2.  CABLE JETATIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION INCLUDING VERBATIN TANT ERHARKS POSSIBLE COMECTIO: SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH ASSASSINATION.
+3.  CAPIE DETAILS TELEPHONE CALL OF 15 OCTOBER 1962.
+4.  CARL PLANS ANY CUTORK OR LIAISON CONTACT WITH POLISH DRIVER AND RESULTS SUCH CONTACT. NOIR NECID-5 ASSIGNS ELSPONSIBILITY THIS ACTIVITY TO KUBARK.
+5.  AIL ASPECTS ASSASSINATION HAVE TAGATINE AED OPERATIONAL
+
+C/S COMMENT: *Asst. ALUSNA received telephone call on 23 November from person claiming to be Polish driver of Russian vehicle. Information touched on several areas including possible Soviet connection supplvis money to individual in U.S. to assassinate President, possible Soviet implication in U.3.S. Thre her incident, etc.
+
+Ollar
+
+Cilua. J Roman
+
+Chief FE
+COROPINATING OFFICERS
+
+08953
+
+C/CI
+AUTHENTICATING
+OFFIGAR
+
+RERADOTTON SY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED,
+Copy No.

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10068-10164.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# 104-10008-10164 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+3
+CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
+SECRET
+13-6-18-3
+13-17-13-9
+292
+RI/AN, FE 6, 2F 2
+DESIOCEN
+INFO
+CITE DIR
+61320
+AQUATIC IZGROUP
+137
+066707 ( 97957)
+PROLISSTON GRAFEND TRAIN LENROUP-1 AND ISSUE SYSTEM AS REQUESIRD REP.
+END OF MESSAGE
+
+TED COMMENT:"Request permission train) LEGROUP-1 SM Match $23209 and
+Devolopar $22669. Es to train INROUP-6 to use match.
+2
+
+Coordinated by phone with:
+FE/JKO: R. Chin, x5357
+PR/TRLB:. Johu Kemedy, x5934
+
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+
+SEYMOUR FUSSELL
+CHIEF, TSD
+TING OFFERS
+SECRET
+
+REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE SUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED..
+CHABLES J. RYAN
+/AC/ISD/DA
+CIFI
+6961

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10068-10172.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+SECRET
+ROUTING
+
+PANAMA CITY
+CA/O
+DDP, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, SAS 8, WR
+
+SECRET 1222222
+WAVE INFO DIR MEXI CITE PACY 1245
+DIDURIC TPRANSACK
+
+13 Nov 63 IN 59319
+
+1. THE FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE ORGANIZACIONES DE
+PERIODISTAS PROFESIONALES (FIOPP) IS HOLDING ITS SECOND REGIONAL
+SEMINAR IN MEXICO CITY 18-29 NOV. FIOPP IS A KUBARK INFLUENCED
+ORGANIZATION. CONTACT IS MAINTAINED WITH ITS INTERAMERICAN REP
+IN PANAMA AND ITS COCHAIRMAN IN WASHINGTON, BOTH OF WHOM ARE
+COVERT ASSOCIATES
+
+2. ATTENDING THE NEXI SEMINAR FROM THE COLEGIO NACIONAL
+DE PERIODISTAS DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (IN EXILE) ARE:
+A. GUILLERMO GENER RODRIGUEZ
+VICE DECANO DEL CNP
+SOUTH BAN SHONE DRIVE, MIAMI, FLA
+B. SALVADOR DIAZ VERSON
+VICE DECANO DEL ONP
+8773-S.W. 21 ST, MIAMI, FLA
+C. FRANCISCO GOMEZ HECTOR
+DIPUTADO DE LA JUNTA DE GOBIERNO
+
+SECRETS
+MODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFICE IS PROHIBITED
+
+CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
+3332 COLLINS AVE, MIAMI BEACH, FELA
+D. MARIO BARRERA
+DECANO DEL CNP
+967 5.8. 5 ST, MIAMI, FLA.
+
+59319
+3. REQUEST TRACES ON ABOVE. OF SPECIFIC INTEREST IS
+INFO BEARING ON PARTICIPANTS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AT SEMINAR.

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10069-10077.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+1104-10069-10077
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+COELINCOL
+0016)3,244,087
+加人A 3037元
+27 November 1962
+
+Subject: Reported Use of Yacht Potomac by Alpha 66
+
+1. On 20 Nov 62 LAFO received an unsolicited telephone call on the
+listed telephone number. The caller wanted to advise that there was reportedly
+in the harbor at Long Beach a vessel., formerly used by the late Theodore
+Roosevelt, called the Potomac. This vessel, according to the informant, was
+being used by the Alpha 66 organization. She was believed taking on a carge
+of weapons crated as Argentine beef, and destined to leave soon for Seattle.
+He added that a Wes Davis had just signed on as an engineer, and there was
+another character named Cliff Roberts on board. Both were described as bearded
+adventurers.
+
+2. The caller refused to identify himself, claiming that he did not
+know whether contact with the Agency would be approved by his employer, and
+further did not know whether or not the information was valid or of interest.
+LCDR L. Lessing-
+Lessing Long Beach,
+
+3. In response to a call to the Intelligence Officer, UUCG, it was learned
+that ther is a vessel, the Potowac, formerly one of the 155' USCG cutters.
+For some time it had been used by the late F. D. Roosevelt as the presidential
+yacht. Later it had been disposed of to the Maryland (State) Fish and Game
+Commission, and more recently it had been acquired by the Hydra-Capital, Inc.,
+41.0 West Coast Highway, Newport Beach, California (OR 5-1549).
+
+4. USCG advised further that an investigator for the Los Angeles County
+Prosecutor, D. L. Wheeler, had accepted an assignment (taking leave of absence
+to do so) to bring the Potomac from the Barbados to California. The plan,
+supposedly, was to make her a floating museum of some sort. On his arrival
+in Bartados, Wheeler is reported to have found the craft in foul shape, with
+only a single engine operative. He refused the job and returned to Los Angeles.
+The craft later, however, did turn up in San Diego in October and was later
+observed tied up in Cerritos Channel; Los Angeles harbor area; and subsequently,
+she was moved back to San Diego, where it is presently in a shipyard. She
+has since been painted, and appears to be undergoing some modifications to
+her hull.
+us Dept of Juskee - Frd. Beds I 4, Cal
+
+5. The unidentified informant (paragraphs 1 and 2), subsequently identified
+as Asst. US Attorney Bill Spivaky was re-contacted by telephone. It was
+suggested to him that in the event any more information concerning the Potomac
+and the likelihood of her use in any foreign activity came his way, we would
+appreciate another call. On this occasion, Spivak volunteered the statement
+that it was his understanding that the Cliff Roberts he had referred to pre-
+viously had come from Barbados with the vessel. This was Spivak's first
+reference to Barbados.
+
+6. The above is for your information only. The sketchiness of the material
+presented LAFO as well as the circumstances of its origin militate against its
+credibility. As a consequence, no follow-up is anticipated unless requested.
+
+TFW-301100.62
+mss
+
+006 920
+end
+
+680UP 1
+Excludes automatic
+declar
+CONFIDENTIAL WH-765
+RETURN TO A
+Background Lise Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+:

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10069-10112.md

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+#1400000
+# 104-10069-10112
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+## Office Memorandum
+**TO:** Chief, Contact Division
+Support Branch
+**FROM:** Chief, New York Office
+**SUBJECT:** Robert Prachett/ Cuban Counterrevolutionary Group, Alpha-66
+SECK
+ADA(S) 3235549
+BINY 45002
+UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
+DATE: 31 August 1962
+
+1.  We came in contact with a new source who will be a continuing one, known as Robert A. Pratchett, a US citizen with 27 years experience in Cuba who is currently in direct contact with a Cuban counterrevolutionary group in the US known as Alpha-66, and who is also in contact with anti-Castro Cubans wor ing in Havana. He will give us more detailed information during the coming weeks, and represent to us the ambitions, operations and proposed sabotage activities of Alpha-66 so that they can either be controlled, encouraged or discouraged, as the case may be from the viewpoint of those interested in Cuban action groups.
+
+2.  Bio data on Prachett, for any prior clearance or interest in him, based on what he may present to us for consideration, is as follows:
+
+    Date & Place of Birth - Oct 1918, Havana, Cuba (US citizen by birth)
+    Education - University of Pennsylvania, 1940
+    Employment - 1961 - Present H. H. Pike Co., New York and Havana
+                 1958-1960 Brando and Co., Havana
+                 1946-1958 Paramount Pictures International, Havana
+                 1941-1945 US Army (Rank of Major)
+
+    Present Address - 35 Walton Ave., New Providence, New Jersey
+
+3.  Prachett, who appears to be a mature and loyal US citizen, 18 interested in being of the best possible service to the US Government in a non-pay status, in assisting where he can in terms of his detailed knowledge of Cubans, Cuba, and the Spanish language, which he speaks perfectly. Other than observing the plans of the Alpha-66 group as a potentially successful sabotage group, he is not affiliated with any counterrevolutionary group, but is now in business for himself as a private investor in a firm he owns and operates, called/PREFIXT Business Forms Inc., 60 East 42nd St., New York. He indicated that Alpha-66 plans were to blow all the power plants in Cuba.
+
+FIDaniels:ad
+
+DJ. Connor
+JAY B. B. L. REEVES
+
+WH 765
+
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+07427

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10069-10120.md

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+OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
+5010-104
+UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
+Memorandum
+
+TO : Chief, Contact Division
+ATTN: Support Branch (Crowley)
+FROM : Chief, Minneapolis Office
+SUBJECT: Cuban Refugee Group
+DATE: 31 August 1962
+
+1. Enclosed are three names provided by George Hauer
+of Cleveland, Ohio. These apparently are the leaders of the
+Cuban group which you and I have discussed in some detail.
+For the record, Hauer got in touch with me because we had
+some rather extensive debriefing sessions in 1959, and
+apparently he prefers to continue that relationship for the
+present. Headquarters' records will show, however, that
+he was interviewed by Gene Rittenburg in September 1960.
+
+2. The Cubans listed on the enclosure are the leaders
+of a small group which is shuttling back and forth to Cuba
+for the purpose of establishing reception groups, taking in
+medical supplies, ammunition and weapons, and to bring out
+other Cubans who wish to leave the country. As you know
+from our discussions, they are seeking help in the form of
+supplies, etc. (Hauer understands that no help will be given
+without some measure of control by our Agency, and he
+agreed to provide the names for Agency consideration. The
+third man on the list is of urgent consideration. Hauer
+specifically requested that we treat any on-the-street
+investigation with great care.
+
+3. Please expedite any checking you might do and give
+me your expression of interest as soon as possible. Hauer
+is not an exceptionally patient man, and I certainly expect
+to receive an inquiry from him in the near future. I believe
+he is genuinely motivated and quite capable, and in his
+present position of recruiting executive personnel for
+Ernst & Ernst he could be quite useful to the Agency.
+
+VERNON R. SANDO
+
+Enclosure
+
+SECRET SENSITIVE
+
+1. Ernesto Rodrigues y Moreno
+Cities Service Station
+Marathon Shores
+Florida
+Age 35, married, three children, owner of gas station
+
+2. Laureano Batista
+157-SE 12th Street
+Miami, Florida
+gustin Batista
+Son of prominent and reputable Havana banker, Augustin
+
+3 Vic
+Victor Paneque
+Age 42. Former July 20th Commander
+Presently in Cuba.
+
+APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
+CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10069-10132.md

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+:
+1104-10069-10132
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+UNCLASSIFIED
+CONFIDENTIAL
+ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 21 July 63
+RI/ANALYSIS
+ OFFICER'S INITIALS DATE
+NO.
+FUSA-3202
+COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from, to whom. Draw line to comment of each officer.
+PAYELRAD, EDOUARD
+Date 10 July 63
+FR
+Veles
+EF6/4/Sim
+FR/4/C84
+OCT 27 1650
+FOR OUR OF RI ONLY" Do not write below this line
+RI/AN
+11/5
+12.
+13.
+14
+RITY
+RI/FI-1409 L
+EDITIONS
+OP-1410-86
+SECRET
+CONFIDENTIAL
+FOR ACTION OR INFO ONLY
+UNCLASSIFIED
+DATE
+1 JUL 1963
+07483
+REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
+FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED
+14-00000
+
+VIA ALF
+From: Chief of Station, Viet Nam
+Info: Chief, FE
+General: Operational/FU Only
+July 63
+Subject: Specific Information concerning Lam A
+ACTION REQUIRED None
+In answer to request of Gregory G. SAMMAS, the following is a composite
+of information from P. ALE (TOFU) (IFN 1) and VERALL N. ANDREEV
+(IFN 2) concerning Lam A.
+
+1. Description of subject: Between 30 and 40 years old, about 6 feet tall,
+rather bald, well spoken, very strong and vigorous, Mao shirt taste, Jewish.
+Speaks English and French. He is married and has one 9 or 10-year old daughter.
+He has a sister in Nam Khart who is a materialized American citizen. May
+always speak French; some English; has an impressive library; reads continuously
+and paints very well.
+
+2. Early during the war he was deported as a Jew to a German concentration
+camp (tattooed prisoner's identification number on right forearm--0976), there
+he spent several horrible years and survived only by luck. Since 1949 he has
+spent part of his time in Laos and was apparently in intelligence or related
+activities most of the time. (Former reports indicate that former map is located
+1930-1932 connected in Laos by an officer from SDECE to neutralized operations and
+was shortly afterwards declared persona non grata by the French).
+
+3. Subject took part as a civilian in the Atlantic Operation, AO. According
+to one report, was in this work as a means of money to make propaganda, buy off the
+opposition, etc. (Lassa D) and MARKEN (LAM) collaborated in Lam A's
+accomplishment in Central Viet Nam among the few notable achievements in that
+area, particularly in respect to his contribution to the Vietnamese pacification
+program which he coordinated throughout the course of Operation Atlantic.
+
+4. Subject is an old friend of Col. Jean Gardeneral, former chief of UNIS
+at Da Lat (Sam-1999). In one National Security Division, during
+which time he proposed to VILLIEM joint operations--postal resources and experience
+(similar to Banoi proposal, above) but VILLIEM refused, considered proposal pre-
+varication resource.
+
+5. March-April 1954, subject approached Station and USOM/ID for military
+support for program to support smallness of a people's militia (month militia)
+in the Hua Hong area. Information and correspondence on this proposal will be
+sent upon request.
+SECRET
+REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
+FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED
+GALLIWENS CAUTIOUS
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+6. In February-March 1954, subject was sent by the French on a special
+mission to Poland and East Germany to attend a conference.
+
+7. Subject claims that while working for USIS he supervised an operation
+from Saigon, the latter stated that he be removed from Saigon. Subject claimed that
+the USIS wanted to get rid of him for "political" reasons--approximately 15 December
+1954.
+
+8. At present subject is (sometimes addicted to French Film productions)
+at Kamp 7 or of 31 December 1954. He frequently travels to Saigon, and can
+have lost 17 days.
+
+Headquarters
+Vienne, US
+20 June 1955
+
+Distribution:
+Orig & la Addressee
+1: Chief, FE
+4: Station Files
+SECRET
+201-136765
+REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
+FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED
+
+14-00000
+
+SECRET
+
+201-136765
+REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE
+FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

space/space/space/space/space/space/jfk_text/104-10069-10185.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+1104-10069-10185
+2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
+
+DISPATCH
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+PROCESSING
+
+TO: Chief, Task Force W
+FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE
+SUBJECT: Operational/GYROSE
+Agreed Activities
+
+REFERENCE: DIR-14742
+
+1. INTRODUCTION. As a follow up to reference, Maj. Watlington arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an op- portunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes the local ACSI representative, arrangements were made for a lengthy session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a JLWAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington, Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B. WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN. The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are covered in the following paragraph.
+
+2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1963, conversations with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording were discussed.
+
+a. Opa Locka Refugee Referral Procedures. Maj. Watlington made the point that in accordance with the agreements which had been reached between ACSI and KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals from Opa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to mount OB collection operations. Maj. Watlington under- scored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter to run other than OB collection operations. At the came time if any of their operations produced intelli- gence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence would be reported via existing ACSI reports channels. REUTELLAN indicated that JMWAVE, acknowledged the validity of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore willing to cooperate fully in this regard. On the other
+lung vē Hổlieved that it was essential that certain
+
+CS COPY
+
+Distribution:
+3. Chief, TFW
+
+3. JULY 1962
+
+UFGA-4322
+
+SECRET
+RETURN TO CIA
+Background Use Only
+Do Not Reproduce
+
+CONTINUATION OF
+DISPATCH
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+UFGA-4322
+
+safeguards bo built into any Opa Locka referral in order that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication of effort and/or wire crossing. This concept was readily accepted by Maj. Watlington. It did not, however, strike a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrange- ments, REUTENAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register a list of ugent requirements with Opa Locka and that this list could then be used as a basis upon which refugee screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col. Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka through which the referral system could be managed. In this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail identified an individual whom he considered to be pri- marily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this indi- vidual to be referred to Lt. Col. Causes' covert unit. At the same time Col. Kail would make arrangements to pass to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this in- formation KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review revealed that the individual was not of operational interest to JWAVE and his primary access was not in fields other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Maj. Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and stated that he would be prepared to discuss it further once he had an opportunity to personally review the func- tioning of the Opa Locka center.
+201-268277 FR RE USE by ANCTHER US AGENCY. JURNE 61.
+b. Antonio CUESTA Valle. Lorn 13 June 1926. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we could clarify the current status of our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring a bell with any of the JMWAVE representatives, Lt. Col. Causes was asked for further details. This produced the statement that ACSI was interested in Cuesta, and wanted to use him in an infiltration operation. ACSI had allegedly previously traced Cuesta with Station JLWAVE and had re- coived the reply that KUBARK had been in touch with the individual but had terminated him because he was unreliable. In view of this response Lt. Col. Causes wanted to know whether we would recommend the reuse of Cuesta by ACSI. We responded to this by stating that we would review our files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes within the next few days.
+c. RE. 40 by another 45. Agency June 1 Lt. Laureano BATISTA Falla. Born 1 May 1935. Col. Causes asked if we still retained an operational interest in Batista If we did not ACSI was interested in using this individual in an infiltration operation and as a result wanted JLWAVE's opinion as to Batista's capability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes that we would check our files and would forward a written reply relative to Eatista within a matter of a few days.
+201-323424 FR RE USE by ANSTHER SAGENCY. JUNE El
+d. Antonio ORDONEZ Hernandez. Born 24 August 1918. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we were currently in touch with Ordonez. As this name rang a bell with REUTEMAN we reny- sponded by stating that subject tas of interest to us. In this connection we indicated we were willing to reexamine Our relationship with Ordonez in order to determine his full potential or capability, and if his capability was greater in the OC field than in fields which were of interest to us, we would certainly consider relinquishing our interest reexamine 24
+24
+
+CONTINUATION
+(DISPATCH
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+UFGA-4322
+
+Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that he had established his equity in Ordonez through the name trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, there- fore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.
+
+REUTEMAN asked the
+Third Country Diplomats. e. ACSI representatives whether they were currently in touch with any third country diplomats. Liaj. Watlington stated that LACSI had previously tried to harness the 24 capabilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan and Canadian diplomatic pouches. Coordination of these activities with KUBARK had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use of these facilities. As a result Maj. Watlington stated that at the present time ACSI was not in touch with any third country, diplomats. On the other hand, ACSI was interested in pursuing the third country diplomatic channel is a means of establishing communications with inside assets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use the facilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan 24 or Canadian pouches. It was indicated that KURARK under- stood I. Col. Causes' reaction; however, the KUBARK position was based on sound security principles and could not be altered. The additional explanations which were made relative to the security implications which were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and how misuse could affect long standing government to government or service to service agreements between ODYOKE and free world countries did not make any impact on Lt. Col. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to interpret KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use certain 24 diplomatic pouch channels as a clear indication that Fone-of KUBARK's primary responsibilities in the Miami area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity. Once this attitude was identified no further attempts were made to persuade Lt. Col. Causes that our actions had been taken in the best interests of the intelligenco community.
+
+f. Maritime Infiltration of ACSI Agents. A dis- cussion of those support services which KUEATK might render to ACSI operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes was still interested in having JIWAVE infiltrate two of his agents into PBRUMEN. In this connection the point was made by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they would prefer that JMWAVE assume responsibility for the agents in the Miami area and then deliver them through a secure mechanism to liavana. If this were not possible ACSI would reluctantly accept infiltration of their agents into any point in PBRUMEN. Lt. Col. Causes was told in very precise terms that JIWAVE would not undertake to infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiltration of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUMEN. The point was made that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to understand that our maritime capabilities were limited and we were currently committed to the full exploitation of these assets for at least six weeks in advance. As a result any operational plan which he might submit to us should be koyed to the assumption that approximately six to eight weeks would pass before we could realistically consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes agreed to project his operational plans within this frame of reference.
+
+CONTINUATION OF
+DISPATCH
+4
+P
+CLASSIFICATION
+SECRET
+UFGA-4322
+
+6. Documentation. A discussion of the documentation problem relative to agent infiltrations revealed that at the moment ACSI did not have any documentation problems which they felt warranted discussion at this session.
+
+h. Coordination Forms. The discussion of opera- tiopal coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for JLWAVE to coordinate locally those operational proposals which might be received from Lt. Col. Causes. Once this coordination was effected and if there were disagreement, then the operation could be referred to the Washington headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE. Maj. Watlington stated that the forms for effecting coordination in ac- cordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. Watlington suggested that we not initiate the coordination mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.
+
+In
+1. W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in PBRUMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes was interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. view of his he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess, polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought were suitable W/T candidates. It was indicated that we were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases and would render whatever support was required. This then resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed, polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we would be glad to moniter,such transmissions if we were told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a dis- cussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit C/W messages for ACSI agents. Here again, we stated that we would favorably consider any requests for C/W trans- missions providing that we knew the content of the message, the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the agent's location and equipment which he might be using. Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on us in the near future for support in the W/T field.
+
+j. Secret Writing. A discussion of S/W techniques revealed that if a request for the issuance of S/W were recoived from their Miami representative it would be re- viewed, and if ACSI approved the operation KUBARK would be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local coordination that the operation in question required the use of S/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be effected with ACSI. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK Washington would cable to JMWAVE the number of the system which was to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the system to the ACSI representative in Miami.
+
+3. COMMENT. At the conclusion of the above discussion arrange- ments were made for lunch, but Lt. Col. Causes chose not to partici- pate in the luncheon session. During the luncheon conversation Maj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington
+
+CONTINUATION OF
+DICRATCH
+CLASDIFICATION
+SECRET
+UFGA-4322
+
+indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place at the end of September 1962. At the end of the luncheon session ar- rangements were made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a tour of Opa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions vere to be held with Maj. Watlington particularly in regard to the development of procedules for referral of agents to ACSI from the Opa Locka flow.
+
+4.
+OPA LOCKA. Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they had an interview with Col. Kail, the tenor of which was, on the part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI repre- sentative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared ac- cording to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and the ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question. In addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal might be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative being present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given. Col. Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to eliminate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious thought.
+
+5. AGREEMENT. When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to Lt. Col. Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI representatives said that they believed that, for the time being, it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As. Lt. Col. Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was agreed to as a stopgap measure.
+
+END OF DISPATCH