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CYBER SECURITY BLOG Here is a detailed guide on domain hijacking which is the act of domain name theft. Learn different tips in this article to protect yourself. Traffic bots are non-human traffic (automated) visits to your website. Learn in detail about Bot traffic in this article. In cyber security, threat hunting is the act of proactively searching and monitoring networks, systems, endpoints, datasets etc. to identify any malicious behaviours.
Cristian Hesselman (Manager SIDN Labs), Benoît Ampeau (Director Partnerships & Innovations, Afnic Labs) and Maciej Korczyński (Associate Professor) SIDN Labs, Afnic Labs, and Grenoble Alps University started a new research project called “Classification of compromised versus maliciously registered domains” (COMAR) on 1 October 2018. The Franco-Dutch project will address the problem of automatically distinguishing between domain names registered by cybercriminals for the purpose of malicious activities, and domain names exploited through vulnerable web applications. The project is designed to help intermediaries such as registrars and ccTLD registries further optimize their anti-abuse processes. Domain name abuse Domain names are easy to use shorthands for IP addresses that help us navigate the many online services that we use in our daily lives. While the vast majority of domain name registration and use is benign, there are cybercriminals who unfortunately misuse them, for instance to launch large-scale phishing attacks, drive-by-downloads, and spam campaigns. Security organizations such as the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and Stop Badware collect information about these misused domain names and make it available to their customers (e.g., hosting providers and domain name registries) in the form of URL blacklists. Compromised vs. maliciously registered Both the operational and research communities distinguish two types of domain name abuse: legitimate domains that criminals have compromised and new domain names that have been specifically registered for malicious purposes. An example of a compromised domain name is studentflats.gr, which is a legitimate site that ran a WordPress installation and that cybercriminals hacked to host a banking-related phishing site. This is visible in the blacklisted URL (http://studentflats.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/.co.nz/login/personal-banking/login/auth_security.php), which has an illegally installed banking script (/uploads/…/auth_security.php) underneath the WordPress directory (/wp-content). An example of a maliciously registered domain name is continue-details.com, which was used for a Paypal phishing site. This is visible in the blacklisted URL (http://paypal.com.login.continue-details.com/), which does not explicitly contain a malicious program such as a PHP script, but instead refers to a site specifically set up for the phish using a 5th level domain name (continue-details.com being the first and second levels and paypal.com.login. adding three more levels). The distinction between these two groups is critical because they require different mitigation actions by different intermediaries. For example, hosting providers together with webmasters typically concentrate on cleaning up the content of compromised websites , whereas domain registries (e.g., SIDN and Afnic) and registrars tend to focus on handling malicious domain name registrations. From an operational point of view, intermediaries typically use URL blacklists in their security systems to automatically block malicious content. However, a compromised domain name requires a more fine-grained level of mitigation. For example, if an intermediary simply blocks studentflats.gr, then it will also block the legitimate part of the site (the content the WordPress installation is serving to visitors). So instead what is needed for a security engineer is to look at the site’s WordPress installation and specifically (or automatically) remove the malicious PHP script from the hosting platform. This example illustrates that it is crucial to unambiguously label domains of blacklisted URLs as compromised or maliciously registered so they can be reliably used by security systems. The ultimate goal of COMAR is to develop a machine learning-based classifier that labels blacklisted domains as compromised or maliciously registered, then extensively evaluate its accuracy, and implement it for a production-level environment. We also plan to study the attackers’ profit-maximizing behavior and their business models. We shall apply our classifier to unlabeled domain names of URL blacklists, for example, to answer the following question: do attackers prefer to register malicious domains, compromise vulnerable websites, or misuse domains of legitimate services such as cloud-based file-sharing services in their criminal activities? Partner capabilities and interests All three COMAR partners have extensive experience in the analysis of large heterogeneous datasets and in engineering the underlying platforms. Grenoble Alps University will concentrate on the statistical analysis of large-scale Internet measurement and incident data and publishing scientific papers, whereas both registry Labs will focus on advancing the COMAR classifier for operational environments (e.g., at SIDN and Afnic) and making it available to their stakeholders such as .nl and .fr registrars. The complementary approach of this partnership is in line with the need for registries to continuously reinforce their capacities and capabilities to increase the security levels of their Top-level Domains (TLDs) and ultimately provide enhanced levels of trust for end-users. Sourena Maroofi, a Ph.D. student at Grenoble Alps University, will develop and evaluate the COMAR classifier under the supervision of Maciej Korczyński, COMAR’s Principal Investigator. COMAR, funded by SIDN and Afnic, will start in October 2018 and will last for three years. The steering committee of the project consists of Cristian Hesselman (SIDN Labs), Benoît Ampeau (Afnic Labs), and Maciej Korczyński (Drakkar team, Grenoble INP, Grenoble Alps University). About COMAR partners COMAR is a joint project of SIDN Labs, Afnic Labs, and Grenoble Alps University. - SIDN Labs is the research team of SIDN, the registry of the .nl Top-Level Domain (TLD) in the Domain Name System (DNS). SIDN Labs’ goal is to increase the operational security and resilience of end-to-end Internet communications through world-class measurement-based research and technology development. Our research challenges include DNS and Internet security and resilience, and Internet evolution. - Afnic Labs is a key team devoted to the development and future of the Internet at Afnic. Afnic manages the .fr and 5 others French overseas TLDs. Afnic is also the back-end registry for 14 companies and local and regional authorities that have chosen to have their own TLD suffix. Each day Afnic Labs initiates and contributes to projects in line with Afnic’s assignments: an Internet that is secure and stable, open to innovation and in which the French internet community plays a key role. Just as with other partnerships in which Afnic is involved, Afnic Labs believes in the added value of collaborative research work to ultimately provide a very high-valuable, mature, state-of-the-art classifier. - Grenoble Alps University aims to establish a leading center in cybersecurity research in the Rhône-Alpes region in France with a particular focus on active and passive measurements for cybersecurity. The members of the Drakkar team have been involved in collaborative projects with law enforcement agencies, security and Internet policy organizations devoted to fighting cybercrime. Our focus is on the statistical analysis of large-scale Internet measurement and incident data to identify how cybercriminals [D1] misuse domain names and how providers of Internet services deal with security risks and incidents. The COMAR project is at the heart of these issues. - Project website: https://comar-project.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/ - “Cybercrime After the Sunrise: A Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in New gTLDs”, Maciej Korczynski, Maarten Wullink, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Giovane C.M. Moura, Arman Noroozian, Drew Bagley, Cristian Hesselman, in Proc. of ACM AsiaCCS, Korea, June 2018 - “Global Phishing Survey: Trends and Domain Name Use in 2016”, Greg Aaron and Rod Rasmussen”: Available at: http://docs.apwg.org/reports/APWG_Global_ Phishing_Report_2015-2016.pdf, 2017 - “Herding Vulnerable Cats: A Statistical Approach to Disentangle Joint Responsibility for Web Security in Shared Hosting”, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Tom van Goethem, Maciej Korczyński, Arman Noroozian, Rainer Bohme, Tyler Moore, Wouter Joosen, Michel van Eeten, in Proc. of ACM CCS, October 2017
Using Behavior-based Correlation Threats are often distributed over multiple traffic flows and use various angles of attack. To detect possible threats, the correlation engine of Threat Defender correlates current flows with historical information from previous flows. It expands the policy language to track communication events. This means correlation takes place inline, inside the policy engine. Data is correlated in real time, i.e. the moment it is generated. Reactions are immediate and applied to the packet that triggered them. The following examples illustrate the possible usage of the correlation engine in a network environment. - Detecting ARP Spoofing Attacks - Restricting Access to Certain Websites - Time-based Baselining - Adaptive Behavior-based Graylisting
Skip to Main Content The failure detection and identification (FDI) process is viewed as consisting of two stages: residual generation and decision making. It is argued that a robust FDI system can be achieved by designing a robust residual generation process. Analytical redundancy, the basis for residual generation, is characterized in terms of a parity space. Using the concept of parity relations, residuals can be generated in a number of ways and the design of a robust residual generation process can be formulated as a minimax optimization problem. An example is included to illustrate this design methodology.
In today’s digital workplace, we use the internet constantly. It allows us to find information in seconds that otherwise could take weeks of research to procure, and has opened up a world of virtual communication, allowing remote or hybrid teams to perform as effectively as collocated teams. But our reliance on the internet also makes us vulnerable to web-based threats such as malware, phishing, and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. Web security should be a priority for any business, and particularly those with remote workers who communicate over an internet connection. When one connection is compromised, it can take minutes for bad actors to spread malware through a company’s network. We’ve explored the most effective types of web security, and found that the best solutions fall into two categories: web filtering and browser isolation. There are two main types of web filtering: cloud-based and DNS. Cloud web filtering platforms, or “Secure Web Gateways” (SWGs), filter harmful websites and block web-based viruses and malware from being downloaded to the user’s machine. They scan for malicious website code, filter harmful URLs, and prevent data loss. DNS web filtering platforms sort internet traffic based on DNS lookups. Every webpage has a unique IP address, which browsers connect to the domain name to be able to load the page. DNS filters sit between the browser and domain so that browsers can’t load malicious sites. Many DNS filtering platforms come with a pre-configured blacklist of harmful domains that can’t be accessed on protected networks. The second type of web security we’ve explored is browser isolation. Browser isolation platforms isolate users’ online browsing activity in a safe environment that’s detached from the local network. The best browser isolation solutions are cloud-based and execute web-based commands in a secure server, or “remote desktop”. When using this remote desktop, the user experiences totally normal browsing, but it takes place independent of their local machine. This means that malicious webpages and attachments are contained or sandboxed within the virtual environment and never reach the user’s local system. In this article, we’ll explore the top ten web security solutions, including a range of cloud-based and DNS filtering solutions as well as browser isolation platforms. We’ll give you some background information on the provider and the key features of each solution, as well as the type of customer that they are most suitable for.
Session 1: Forensic Lexicology - How to Quantify Words - 1.5 CPE After this session you will never observe, talk with, or listen to anyone the same way. Likewise, you will never read financial (or other) information in the same way. You will learn how spoken and written words permit you to assess veracity – financial or otherwise. Participants will leave the session armed with specific tools and techniques immediately applicable to their assignments. Forensic lexicology is the study of words and vocabulary and how they are used. The techniques exploit humans’ natural tendency to speak and write reflecting one’s “linguistic fingerprint”. The techniques analyze virtually any spoken and/or written discourse including financial statement notes, interviews, emails, depositions, reports, and patterns that assess veracity, authorship, consistency and other attributes and are deployed in civil, criminal and counterterrorism matters. Session 2: Foundational Behavior Detection - 1.5 CPE Behavior Detection is a technique developed by the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) that allows trained professionals to detect people with harmful intentions, such as carrying out a terrorist attack. The techniques are applicable to virtually any forensic assignment involving people. Consequently, forensic operators must gain familiarity with the pertinent tools and techniques. Behavior detection is deployed through a technique known as CICO (Concentric In-Concentric Out). Simply stated, CICO recognizes that behavior detection comprises anything and everything that might represent a cause or effect of a subject’s behavior. The Concentric-In component starts conceptually with a very wide circle encompassing the subject company’s and parties’ business footprint and progressively becomes focused on the site.
Traffic control devices include: all traffic Traffic control devices such as signs, signals, and markings affect: promote the orderly flow of traffic The purpose of traffic signs, signals, and pavement markings is to: tell drivers what they may or may not do Regulatory signs:How do traffic control systems work? Air Traffic Control System. Air traffic control system is a closed control system where a ‘master’ communicates with ‘locals’; the systems which are connected to the master, through fibre optic cable or wireless systems. Various on-street monitoring devices provide active feedback to the central control system.What is total traffic control? Total Traffic Control. Lightspeed Systems' content filtering, as part of Total Traffic Control (TTC), provides the most complete and cost-effective solution on the market. With TTC's content filter, you can: * Monitor and report all network traffic * Own a huge content filter database * Create different rule sets as needed * Block or limit all types...What is direct traffic control? Direct traffic control (DTC) is a system for authorizing track occupancy used on some railroads instead of or in addition to signals.
As soon as networking is enabled, it opens a system up to a massive array of attacks. In order to help mitigate against many network attacks, it is of paramount importance that the system firewall be configured correctly. Cucumber Linux uses the standard Linux firewall: Iptables. Configuring Iptables can be a very complicated task. This page will cover how to set up reasonable default firewall rules. Every other page that instructs you on how to modify the firewall rules will assume that you are using the firewall rules from this section. Additionally, this section will cover how Iptables is integrated with Cucumber Linux, including how to change the default firewall rules and set Iptables to be active when the system boots. There are two different flavors of Iptables: one for IPv4 and one for IPv6. These two flavors both run at the same time, but are configured independently of each other. The IPv4 version of Iptables is controlled by the iptables command, and the IPv6 version is controlled by the ip6tables command. Other than the difference in the command, the two flavors work much the same. Much of this section will use only the iptables command; however, the instructions can be applied just as easily for IPv6 by replacing the iptables command with the ip6tables command. To list the currently active firewall rules, run the command # iptables -nvL. The -n flag tells Iptables not to resolve numbers to their service names, -v tells it to be verbose and show columns that would otherwise be hidden and -L tells it to list the currently active rules. On a default Cucumber Linux installation, the output of the command should look similar to the following: root@cucumber:~# iptables -nvL iptables -nvL Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination This indicates that there are no firewall rules currently active, as is the default in Cucumber Linux 1. Notice that the output of the command is broken down into different chains. Rules under the INPUT chain will be applied to incoming network traffic, while rules under the OUTPUT will be applied to outbound traffic. The FORWARD chain is used by routers and plays a less significant role on systems that are not routers. Also note the policy for each chain is set to ACCEPT. The policy for a chain is effectively the default rule that will be applied if no other rules on the chain match a packet. In this case, since there are no other rules and the policy (default rule) is ACCEPT, all traffic will be allowed through the firewall. When writing firewall rules, it is considered best practice to block all traffic by default, and then allow only the traffic you need through the firewall. In Iptables, this is accomplished by changing the policy from ACCEPT to DENY for the INPUT and FORWARD chains. This is accomplished by running the following commands (warning: this will temporarly block all your network traffic). root@cucumber:~# iptables -P INPUT DROP root@cucumber:~# iptables -P FORWARD DROP It is generally considered permissible practice to allow all outbound traffic since attackers are usually trying to break in from the outside, not the other way around. Now, we will allow incoming traffic that is related to connection that is already established. What this means is that if the local system starts a conversation with a remote system the remote system will be allowed to reply, but a remote system will be unable to start a new conversation with the local system. This is accomplished by running the following command: root@cucumber:~# iptables -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT As you may have noticed, there are a lot of different flags that can be used with Iptables. Explaining them all is beyond the scope of this guide; however, they are all very well documented in the Iptables manual. This manual can be accessed by running the command man iptables. If you run iptables -nvL now, you will see the new firewall rules shown below. root@cucumber:~# iptables -nvL iptables -nvL Chain INPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination 0 0 ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination While not complete for every setup, this is a good set of firewall rules to start with if in doubt. These rules should work well on a desktop system. It is for server systems that they will require additional modification. The exact setup required for each server will be unique and will be covered in detail in chapter four. By default, Iptables does not save any modifications to the firewall rules across reboots. To address this, Cucumber Linux provides a script for saving and restoring Iptables rules at /etc/init.d/iptables. This single script controls both the IPv4 and IPv6 flavors of Iptables and allows for one of the following five arguments: \|save\|\|Saves the current firewall rules (IPv4 & IPv6), making the new default.\| \|panic\|\|Puts the system firewall into a “panic” state, temporarily blocking all network traffic.\| \|clear\|\|Clears the current firewall rules, allowing for all traffic to pass in and out.\| \|stop\|\|Same as clear.\| \|start\|\|Loads the default rules (IPv4 & IPv6), making them the currently active firewall rules.\| So to save the current rules, run: root@cucumber:init.d# /etc/init.d/iptables save Even after doing this; however, the firewall rules will still not get loaded when the system boots. In order to have the default firewall rules go into effect when the system boots, it is necessary to enable the iptables service on boot (it is disabled by default). Instructions for doing this can be found in the service management page.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue? Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks to the Web Server Byungha Choi1 and Kyungsan Cho2 Graduate School, Dankook University Yongin, Gyeonggi, Korea [email protected] 2 Corresponding Author Dept. of Software Science, Dankook University Yongin, Gyeonggi, Korea [email protected] Abstract. In this paper, we propose an improved detection scheme to protect a Web server from detoured attacks, which disclose conﬁdential/private information or disseminate malware codes through outbound trafﬁc. Our scheme has a two-step hierarchy, whose detection methods are complementary to each other. The ﬁrst step is a signature-based detector that uses Snort and detects the marks of disseminating malware, XSS, URL Spooﬁng and information leakage from the Web server. The second step is an anomaly-based detector which detects attacks by using the probability evaluation in HMM, driven by both payload and trafﬁc characteristics of outbound packets. Through the veriﬁcation analysis under the attacked Web server environment, we show that our proposed scheme improves the False Positive rate and detection efﬁciency for detecting detoured attacks to a Web server. Keywords: detection scheme, two-step detection, detoured attack, signaturebased, anomaly-based, outbound trafﬁc Attacks to information systems have evolved steadily over a long time, and more Web-based attacks have replaced traditional attacks. Nowadays, more systems are reliant upon the Web server to get and exchange information through the Internet and the security shifts from lower layers of network protocol to the application layer. Thus, Web-based attacks focused on applications have become one of the most serious topics in the security ﬁeld. That is, Web-based attacks focus on an application itself and functions on layer 7 of the OSI. Application vulnerabilities could provide the means for malicious end users to break a system’s protection mechanisms in order to take advantage of or gain access to private information or system resources. The most common Webbased attack types are SQL Injection, XSS (Cross-Site Scripting), buffer overﬂow, password cracking, spooﬁng, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and evaluation of privileges[12,13]. Byungha Choi and Kyungsan Cho Web-based attacks expose the weakness and vulnerability of the victim system. Traditionally. there are e-mails with attached malware to insiders. we extend rules in the signature-based detection. and these harms could be detected by inspecting the outbound trafﬁc. In Section 4. there are detoured attacks which bypass the traditional Webbased intrusion path. Even though outsider attacks are constantly evolving and increasing. or analyzing a user’s proﬁling and activity. 2 We evaluate our proposed two-step detection scheme with new datasets in terms of the FP (False Positive) rate. 2. In Section 2. they are well detected and protected with the corresponding technical improvement. No. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and WAF (Web Application Firewall) are provided to cope with the above attacks. Thus. we 634 ComSIS Vol. 10. we review related work on security vulnerabilities of the Web Server and solutions to them. 3 Most ﬁgures and tables are revised. we propose our two-step hierarchical detection scheme. we verify the detection efﬁciency to backdoor attacks which produce abnormal non-HTTP trafﬁc. Many detoured attacks to Web servers disclose conﬁdential/private information. For example. and our proposal is very efﬁcient in detecting abnormal HTTP packets. detection efﬁciency and detection rate. we improve the anomaly-based detection method. This unusual type of detoured attacks (including insider attacks) has become a more serious and common threat. With this extension. instead of inspecting inbound trafﬁc. and has already overtaken Web-based viruses and worm attacks. and they protect the victim system very well. Through veriﬁcation. by adding a scheme detecting abnormal trafﬁc characteristics from non-HTTP packets. or disseminate malware codes to outside of the victim system. In addition. we propose a scheme to inspect and detect abnormal outbound trafﬁc caused by detoured attacks. Layered security systems with ﬁrewall. It is found that insiders show unusual activities or abnormal behaviors when they access system resources for attacking purposes. most works are based on identifying abnormal insider’s behaviors and ﬁnding any signiﬁcant change in insider’s activities. In addition. and disseminate malware to other hosts communicating with the victim system. Thus. we show that two detection methods in our proposal are complementary to each other. they detect external outsider threats by inspecting the trafﬁc towards the system. The followings are major improvements to the earlier version: 1 To extend the scope of our detection. However. April 2013 . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3. and the evaluation results are extended. these attacks should be coped with in other ways. Special Issue. Our proposed scheme is a two-step detection system composed of a signature-based IDS that uses Snort and an anomaly-based IDS that uses probability evaluation in HMM (Hidden Markov Model). or methods that use malicious USB memory or PDA with the aid of insiders and backdoor attacks. This paper is a revised and extended version of our previous work which was submitted to the MIST-2012 workshop. because an insider can directly access the Web server. according to the above revision. In Section 5. Signature-based IDS ﬁnds known patterns of misbehaviors in the message context. 1. to protect against attacks that pass the ﬁrewall in the ﬁrst stage. The WASC threat classiﬁcation v2. IDS also can be classiﬁed according to the location and purpose as NIDS (Network-based ComSIS Vol. The second stage.0 shows proper classiﬁcation of threats into attacks and weaknesses for a static/core view. However. Related Works In 2010. ﬁrewalls cannot prevent previously unknown attack types or insider attacks. No. a layered Web security system is commonly used with ﬁrewall. Special Issue. OWASP announced the updated Top 10 most critical Web application security risks to educate about the consequences of the most important Web application security weaknesses and to provide basic techniques to protect against these high risk problem areas. IDS and Web application ﬁrewall. Application vulnerabilities could provide the means for malicious end users to breach a system’s protection mechanisms. the ﬁrewall. 10. in order to gain access to conﬁdential and private information or system resources. a summary is provided. 2. uses packet ﬁltering and stateful inspection to detect simple intrusions. 2. which ﬁlters the speciﬁc network trafﬁc between the network and the Web server. Fig. with focus on the application layer of the protocol suite.Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks verify our scheme with real datasets collected under the attacked environment. and anomalybased IDS ﬁnds any deviation from the normal context patterns. Traditional Layered Security System for Web server In the ﬁrst stage of a layered security system. Both show the seriousness of Web-based attacks. The security system protects the Web server from external attacks by inspecting the inbound trafﬁc as shown in Figure 1. uses signature-based or anomaly-based techniques. To detect Web-based outsider attacks. IDS. April 2013 635 . Special Issue. From hence. Thus. but the FP rate of anomaly-based IDSs is not negligible. But. In addition to the insider attacks. signaturebased detection or anomaly-based detection. NIDS is used in the second stage of a layered security system.Byungha Choi and Kyungsan Cho IDS) or HIDS (Host-based IDS). and ﬁnding any signiﬁcant change in an insider’s activity. backdoor attack is a kind of detoured attack to be detected in our work. Backdoors can easily be installed on a victim 636 ComSIS Vol. the detection accuracy of signature-based detection is extremely high. A Web application ﬁrewall ﬁlters packets by applying a set of rules. are possible. Most works on inside attacks are based on identifying abnormal insider’s behavior. It ﬁlters packets which have already passed both the ﬁrewall and IDS. and backdoor attacks are detoured attacks. If an e-mail containing a malware is sent to the insider and the insider accepts it. For example. attacks using USB memory/PDA attack with the aid of the insider. this may not be enough to make a conclusion of a malicious act merely from knowing only a user’s activity. anomaly detection module. A backdoor. However. 10. they are well detected and protected with the corresponding technical improvement. However. If an outsider connects USB memory or PDA infected malware to a Web server with the aid of any insider. In fact. or a hybrid intrusion detection system (HIDS) is conﬁgured with three sub-modules of misused detection module.15]. and some works on using Snort rules in IDS have been proposed . a statistical model of a system as a Markovian process with hidden states. Lately. insiders show unusual activities or behaviors when they access system resources for attack purpose. For example. Mostly. and signature generation module[2. and need further veriﬁcation. is a hidden method for obtaining remote access to a computer that bypasses the traditional security mechanism. which detects insiders by inspecting insider’s violating ”need to know”. Even though external attacks are constantly evolving and increasing. and HMM. e-mail attacks with attached malware. Security tools incorporating anomalybased detection are proposed. Most current IDSs use only one of the two detection methods. Snort is a widely used IDS which allows pattern search for signature-based detection.10]. it causes detoured attack. Maloof and Stephens developed ELICIT. No. April 2013 . detoured attacks which bypass the traditional security path to the Web server. which often refers to a backdoor program. it causes the victim system to be remotely controlled by the outsider. each has its own limitations. a layered security system pays little attention to what is happening inside the system. hybrid IDSs have been proposed that combine the two approaches into one system. we address detour attacks as including insider attacks. a hybrid IDS is obtained by combining packet header anomaly detection (PHAD) and network trafﬁc anomaly detection (NETAD). by inspecting inbound trafﬁc. 2. Signature-based IDSs cannot detect any unknown attacks whereas anomaly-based IDSs cannot detect any untrained attacks. Thus. It uses a Positive Security Model or Negative Security Model or both. However. has been shown to provide high level performance for detecting intrusions[5. Thus. they detect only external attacks. information about a user’s pattern of behavior and activity could be inspected for detection purposes. The ﬁrst step is signaturebased detection using Snort and the second step is anomaly-based detection using HMM. Proposed Detection Scheme with Two-Step Hierarchy Our proposed scheme has a two-step hierarchy. However. Proposed Two-Step Detection Scheme 638 ComSIS Vol.Byungha Choi and Kyungsan Cho rity reasons have been proposed. could be both HTTP packets and non-HTTP packets. 2. It is shown that many samples use HTTP and continue with non HTTP-based damage functionality. 3. Overview of the proposal Fig.1. For example. and a potential HTTP-based applicationlevel attack exploits the features of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). currently unknown detoured attacks could also be detected by inspecting outbound trafﬁc. Snort also has TCP rules that have a port different from the HTTP port for non-HTTP trafﬁc. information leaks through HTTP were measured and detection of outbound malware trafﬁc was proposed. It is already known that most detoured attacks to a Web server show similar patterns in the HTTP outbound trafﬁc. it could be detected as ”attacked”. Thus. No. Special Issue. 3. We cannot ﬁnd any other hybrid system that combines these two detection approaches to detect detoured attacks. April 2013 . If any deviation from the normal context pattern for the speciﬁc trafﬁc is found in the outbound trafﬁc. the outbound packets generated by detoured attacks. 3. 10. such as backdoor attacks. To protect from detoured attacks which the layered security system cannot detect. protocol. abnormal contents of HTTP packets are transferred outwards through the network or outbound non-HTTP packets show abnormal trafﬁc features. Therefore.Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks Traditional layered security systems detect intrusion. and instead of inspecting inbound packets as done in a traditional security system. 10. 3. Unlike outsider attacks. we proposed a two-step detection scheme. detoured attacks make full use of this point. No. we propose to inspect and detect abnormal outbound trafﬁc caused by the detoured attack as shown in Figure 3. and do not pay attention to what happens after the intrusion. April 2013 639 . and bypass the traditional Web-based intrusion path. 4. as discussed in Section 2. instead of analyzing user’s activities as done in the insider detection system.2. Signature-based Detection Fig. 2. which we implement using Snort which is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system that combines the beneﬁts of signature. ComSIS Vol. Special Issue. Process of signature-based detection The ﬁrst step of our detection scheme is signature-based detection. Detoured attacks show abnormal symptoms when packets are sent through the network. That is. 670 normal HTML documents are randomly requested to the Web server. 2. Table 3 shows the result. it shows no error for 670 documents. 10. Detection rate of each detection scheme normal documents signature-based IDS 100 HTML documents anomaly-based IDS 89% detection rate 73% Table 5.000 To verify the FP rate. and classiﬁes the packet as ”attacked” only if any deﬁned signature equals any part of the payload of the packet. The FP rate of signature-based detection is negligible. Special Issue. Thus.3. No. 4. April 2013 643 . the FP of anomaly-based detection happens because of untrained abnormality caused by programming errors and exceptional payment documents.Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks used to show the efﬁciency in detecting abnormal non-HTTP packets generated by backdoor attacks. Table 4. which means the evaluated result is ”attacked” for the unattacked packet. However. Veriﬁcation The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed in terms of the FP rate. Detection rate of two-step detection scheme altered documents 100 passed documents after 1st step 27 (73 are detected) passed documents after 2nd step 2 (98 are detected) detection rate (%) 98 ComSIS Vol. and detection efﬁciency. The signature-based detector checks each packet in the outbound trafﬁc. the FP rate. must be negligible. Table 3.0044 FPs 0 FP rate (%) 0. detection rate. False Positive rate of each detection scheme normal documents signature-based IDS 670 anomaly-based IDS 3 0. the two detection schemes are tested individually. as shown in Table 5. On the other hand. 10. 9 detections by signature-based IDS alone represent these attacks. we use dataset2 of 100 altered HTML documents. No. and the evaluated result agrees with the proposal that the two detection methods are complementary to each other. 25 detections by anomaly-based IDS alone represent these attacks. In Figure 6. As shown in Table 4. our proposed two-step detection scheme increases the detection rate by detecting both unknown and untrained attacks. The signature-based detector cannot detect any unknown or new attacks. First. Then. or indistinctive tags or normal trafﬁc features but the signature-based detector can detect them if they have special context in the outbound packets. Thus. 2. but the anomaly-based detector can detect them if they have the same abnormalities as the known attacks have. the detection rate of any single scheme is below 90%. the anomaly-based IDS cannot detect any attacks producing untrained abnormality. Fig. we test the same dataset in two steps. Detection of attacks generated by HDSI Stage Signature-based IDS 1st stage none 2nd stage none 3rd stage none 4th stage none 5th stage 30 Anomaly-based IDS 19 14 86 311 90 644 ComSIS Vol. Table 6. Special Issue. 6. The evaluated results show that almost all altered documents generated by the attacks are detected through the two steps and the detection rate is 98%. April 2013 .Byungha Choi and Kyungsan Cho To verify the detection rate. ﬁrst signature-based detection and then anomalybased detection. Venn Diagram of detected attacks Figure 6 shows how two detection methods in our scheme are complimentary to each other. our two-step scheme detects all abnormal non-HTTP ﬂows. On the other hand. However. Then. we need more effective signatures to increase this rate. we use dataset3 generated by inputting various SQL queries as Web parameters in HDSI. we need more efﬁcient trafﬁc features to reduce the FP rate.4th stages and no signatures are found in them. Detection rate of abnormal non-HTTP packets Malicious Outbound ﬂows 443 After 1st step (Detection rate) 22 (4. Thus. 10. Only e-mails disclosed in the 5th stage have predeﬁned signatures. No. we install 10 backdoor programs to remotely access the Web server.9%. the FP rate of signature-based detection is 0%. the untrained trafﬁc features in normal ﬂows cause the FP rate of anomaly-based detection as high as 1. Table 7. the signature-based detector detects the 30 e-mail attacks in the 5th stage only. 2. FP rate of abnormal non-HTTP packets Normal Flows Signature-based IDS 926 Flows Anomaly-based IDS 17 1. in order to get detailed data. From the analysis result. Special Issue. 86 anomalies in the 3rd stage.83 FPs 0 FP rate (%) 0 Table 8. This is because error messages only are generated in the 1st . From the detection rate shown in Table 8. HDSI tries to attack a DB in the Web server through 5 stages.83%. the detection rate of signature-based detection in the ﬁrst step is relatively low at 4. we can ﬁnd the efﬁciency of anomaly-based detection for different anomalies caused by various attacks. 311 anomalies in the 4th stage and ﬁnally 90 anomalies (3 anomalies per each e-mail. April 2013 645 . as shown in Table 6. 30 e-mails) in the 5th stage.9%) After 2nd step (Detection rate) 443 (100%) As shown in Table 7. For the evaluation of the detection of backdoor attacks. This test is performed under the most vulnerable Windows 2000. abnormal trafﬁc patterns in non-HTTP packets generated by the backdoor attacks are inspected. Each stage generates attacks from the Web server. An anomaly-based detector detects abnormal documents in each stage: 19 anomalies in the 1st stage. ComSIS Vol. However. because of the same reason as in Table 3. Thus.Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks As a test of the detection efﬁciency. 14 anomalies in the 2nd stage. USA (2009). 2. 67–77 (2006) 10.: Design of a snort-based hybrid intrusion detection system.X. Artiﬁcial Intelligence. pp. D. Aydn.. doi.. S. rep.. Comput. Jovicic..1109/SP.0. http://www.. SANS Institute (2010).. DC. Desmet. Jimenez.sciencedirect. 3(2). N.org/10.: Anomaly Detection Scheme of Web-based Attacks by applying HMM to HTTP Outbound Trafﬁc. Sci. Zaim. Heidelberg (2009). pp.B. Stolfo. Choi. Cho. Borders.. B. Ding. A.. Padilla.9 4.J. http://www.. http://dx. In: Machine Learning and Cybernetics.org/w/page/13246978/ Threat%20Classification 2. S. 125–132 (2011) 8.H. Berlin. Soft Computing. http://dx. P. 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USA (2009).: Sandnet: network trafﬁc analysis of malicious software. vol. Granger... https://www. S. Special Issue. Bianchi. Sinclair. pp. Luo. 160. In: Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Computational and Information Sciences.1007/978-3-642-21771-5_22 25. Stolfo. 2. 1988). Dankook University. ComSIS Vol.D. 1979). and his Ph. April 2013 649 . He joined Dankook University in March 1990. he served as a senior R&D engineer at Samsung Electronics Company. No. He is currently a Ph. degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering(the University of Texas at Austin. 2012. Special Issue. master degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering(KAIST. of Information and Communication Technology.Two-Step Hierarchical Scheme for Detecting Detoured Attacks Byungha Choi received the MS degree from the Dept. 10. 1981). Accepted: March 11. in Electronics Engineering(Seoul National University. network security and trafﬁc analysis. During 1988-1990. Received: September 8.D. of Computer Science and Engineering at Dankook University. His research interest is Network Security. 2013.Sc. student of Dept. He authored several books in Computer Architecture and Computer Networks and published over 40 academic papers. His research interests include mobile networks. where he is currently a professor in the department of software science. Kyungsan Cho(Corresponding Author) received his B. This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue? We've moved you to where you read on your other device. Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.
Chapter 19. Web Projects In Chapter 18, you learned how to implement many pieces of the puzzle that is web development. Now, you put it all together to build the foundation for a secure public web site. You create a skeleton web site in this chapter, with security that is ready for content. Although you won't be writing any Visual Basic code, you end up with a consistent look and feel and role-based forms authentication. You will be amazed at the ease of creation and the flexibility built into ASP.NET. In this chapter, you will: Have an overview of the two most popular methods of web site security Learn about the Web Site Administration Tool Implement web site security using forms authentication Add rules and roles to a security scheme Create a secure web site with little or no code written Error handling has been omitted from all of the Try It Outs in this chapter to save space. You should always add the appropriate error handling to your code. Review Chapter 9 for error-handling techniques. Web Site Authentication As you design web applications, you need to consider security at an early point in the project. Always understand who will have access to your site and who will not. In many cases, parts of the site will be open to the public and parts will be secure and for members only. This may require multiple methods of security. There are two standard types of web authentication strategies: windows and forms authentication. The simplest type of authentication is windows ...
Wazuh is a security detection, visibility, and compliance open source project. It was born as a fork of OSSEC HIDS, later was integrated with Elastic Stack and OpenSCAP evolving into a more comprehensive solution. Below is a brief description of these tools and what they do: OSSEC HIDS is a Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) used both for security detection, visibility, and compliance monitoring. It’s based on a multi-platform agent that forwards system data (e.g log messages, file hashes, and detected anomalies) to a central manager, where it is further analyzed and processed, resulting in security alerts. Agents convey event data to the central manager via a secure and authenticated channel. Additionally, OSSEC HIDS provide a centralized syslog server and an agentless configuration monitoring system, providing security insight into the events and changes on agentless devices such as firewalls, switches, routers, access points, network appliances, etc. OpenSCAP is an OVAL (Open Vulnerability Assessment Language) and XCCDF (Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format) interpreter used to check system configurations and to detect vulnerable applications. It’s a well-known tool designed to check the security compliance and hardening of the systems using industry standard security baselines for enterprise environments. Elastic Stack is a software suite (Filebeat, Logstash, Elasticsearch, Kibana) used to collect, parse, index, store, search, and present log data. It provides a web frontend useful for gaining a high-level dashboard view of events, as well to realize advanced analytics and data mining deep into your store of event data. Table of Contents This document will help you understand Wazuh components and its architecture, Also, it will show you some common use cases.
How ‘Continuous Security’ Can Solve the Cloud Protection Conundrum GitLab sponsored this post. Cloud security breaches have dominated the news headlines over the last several years. What’s surprising is that almost every one of these breaches were due to a simple cloud setting that was misconfigured or too basic, and usually, avoidable application vulnerabilities. That said, DevOps teams have their work cut out for them. Managing a vast number of policies, roles and interconnections between various cloud objects (EC2, S3, RDS, etc.) and users are, needless to say, a challenge to manage. In addition, these configurations involve interactions from multiple teams within the enterprise creating the potential for even more complexity. Compounding the problem further is how application vulnerability detection poses challenges due to the polyglot nature of today’s applications running in the cloud. Detection is harder across multiple languages and different code libraries due to the rapid rate of updates and hence the introduction of vulnerabilities. Hence, with billions of customer accounts and data records already exposed over the internet, it’s time to take a step back to assess the misconfigurations and vulnerabilities and rethink our approach to ensure that our cloud posture is secure. Now, here is the good news: most misconfigurations and application vulnerabilities can be prevented with good hygiene and detected with the proper tools. However, risk identification and remediation are generally done during the pre- and post-deployment cycle of a service or app. This is the norm and, unfortunately, the process usually detects misconfigurations during deployment stages once it’s too late. Identification of these risks is hard but identification during deployment stages is especially necessary. With the proper tools and best practices, DevOps are increasingly discovering how the concept of continuous security can serve what has been lacking in cloud security. As a way to build security checks into the CI/CD pipeline, continuous security is also a subset of continuous verification. Continuous Security gives the DevOps and SecOps teams a precise location to inject themselves into the development and deployment process without involving the developers. It provides an additional check they can analyze and act on to improve overall application and cloud security. To understand the concept of continuous security better, let’s carefully look at some risks and possible solutions. Resource Misconfiguration Risks The underlying structure of public clouds is reasonably secure, while cloud providers continue to use new technologies, such as AI, to prevent breaches, and are thus arguably more secure than private data centers are. However, unfortunately, it’s end users’ resource misconfigurations that are very often the source of breaches and data leaks. Apart from using firewall solutions, configuring other resources like Security groups (AWS) and route tables become critical. For data storage related resources like RDS, S3 or SQL, encryption and public access of these resources must be controlled. Configuration-related breaches can result in two main kinds of security threats: data breach and compute Sprawl. Data breach involves loss of critical data. An example of a data breach and how to prevent it is described in “How to Detect and Prevent Data Breaches in AWS.” Compute sprawl ( or compute jacking) involves extensive deployment of compute instances to use it for bitcoin mining or other activities without the knowledge of the account owner. To avoid these risks, we begin by validating the configuration and existing state of infrastructures for any security holes is important prior to deploying the application. Checks for specific misconfigurations, potentially leading to data breaches, should be added into a deployment state, such as a GitLab pipeline as a stage. You can verify this by deploying your resources in a staging environment and then use cloud security tool APIs to identify misconfigurations. With many projects using software packages and libraries, you need to know whether the packages you’re adding are safe. Organizations want to verify if there are any packages used within your application that can be exploited. The application analysis needs to be completed at various levels including but not limited to static code analysis, dynamic code analysis, package dependency analysis and image scanning for containers and VMs. We describe how Gitlab can help with image scanning in our post “What did your developer violate today?” All the checks above should be performed by using a security policy that looks for a set of acceptable configurations, which when violated, can be used to alert the user of a possible exposure to a breach. Designing an effective policy is usually an iterative process that is focused on providing developers the flexibility to leverage cloud infrastructure, while also allowing SecOps teams to maintain points of enforcement. By properly adding the right misconfiguration and application vulnerability checks into the CI/CD pipeline, you have begun the process to achieve continuous security. Continuous Security: A Framework Minimizing overall exposure and preventing data loss and security intrusion on the public cloud is an ongoing process. The rate of change in AWS, Azure and Google Cloud dictated a constant feedback loop from different parts of the operational pipeline. As we outlined above, it’s also important to add checks into the CI/CD process for misconfiguration risks. This “shift left” of security checks along with good hygiene of checking for application vulnerabilities significantly reduces the risk of breaches and data loss. This combination provides a truly comprehensive framework — continuous security — that serve as a solid foundation. Implementing continuous security is also a multiteam effort. It requires “policies” from security operations team that is implemented by the DevOps teams. Hopefully, continuous security and concepts outlined above will provide the baseline to facilitate risk reduction of security breaches and data loss for the industry to follow, while news reports of major breaches and vulnerabilities will become very rare, indeed. For more case study discussions on infrastructure best practices, attend GitLab Commit London Oct. 9. GitLab’s inaugural user event will showcase the power of DevOps in action through strategy and technology discussions, lessons learned, behind-the-scenes looks at the development lifecycle, and more. VMware is a sponsor of The New Stack. Feature image via Pixabay.
Center for Internet Security, an organization that runs the Department of Homeland Security’s Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center program, helps more than 19,000 state, local, tribal, and territorial governments manage their cyber security posture, and provides various services to these entities. Adnan Baykal, VP of Security Services at CIS, describes why CIS chose Cisco’s AMP Threat Grid solution to automate malware analysis and provide trends in global attack campaigns for their users. Learn more here: http://cs.co/6052fHx6. Subscribe to Cisco’s YouTube channel: http://cs.co/6054QiQr. You can watch this video also at the source.
IDREES, F. ...et al., 2017. PIndroid: A novel Android malware detection system using ensemble learning. Computers and Security, 68, pp. 36–46. The extensive usage of smartphones has been the major driving force behind a drastic increase of new security threats. The stealthy techniques used by malware make them hard to detect with signature based intrusion detection and anti-malware methods. In this paper, we present PIndroid\|a novel Permissions and Intents based framework for identifying Android malware apps. To the best of our knowledge, PIndroid is the first solution that uses a combination of permissions and intents supplemented with multiple stages of classifiers for malware detection. Ensemble techniques are applied for optimization of detection results. We apply the proposed approach on 1,745 real world applications and obtain 99.8% accuracy which is the best reported to date. Empirical results suggest that our proposed framework built on permissions and intents is effective in detecting malware applications. This paper was published in the journal Computers and Security and the definitive published version is available at http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.03.011.
Cybersecurity, ever since its beginnings, has basically been a game of “catch me if you can” between attackers and defenders. Before the advent of Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) now augmented by additional offensive security capabilities in Extended Security Posture Management (XSPM), it meant that defenders were always a step behind the attackers, condemned to wait for the attacker’s initiative and react when, hopefully, the attack was detected. Consequently, organizations looked to improve their detecting capabilities by stacking up security solutions to address big and small risks and reduce the time between a potential attack’s start and the time needed to detect and defuse it, or at least, minimize its impact. This by-default cyber defenders’ reactive approach granted the advantage to attackers. What was needed is a proactive technology that closes the gaps left by the reactive approach without relying on timely detection and immediate response. Attack is the Best Form of Defense Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) technologies were built exactly to tackle that issue and change the terms of the equation. As a prototypical form of continuous security validation, BAS technology already enabled cyber-security defenders to proactively close many security gaps by launching comprehensive sets of production-safe attack scenarios to validate their security controls’ efficacy. This initial set of capabilities is expanded upon in the Extended Security Posture Management (XSPM) Framework that uses simulated attacks scenarios and campaigns for attack surface management, outside-in attack path mapping campaigns, purple and red teaming automation, and vulnerability patching prioritization capabilities to complement BAS, creating a unified umbrella platform to: - Test absolutely everything: from overall infrastructure security to granular sub-segments, such as EDR, email gateway, DLP, etc., or resilience to end-to-end inside-in or outside-in attacks mapping out potential attack propagation paths. - Take pre-emptive corrective action: Once the security gaps have been shown through testing, cybersecurity teams can focus their efforts on plugging uncovered security gaps, and automated retesting can verify that the corrective measures applied are effective. - Combine security posture validation with threat exposure reduction: When applied comprehensively, this approach disables over 90% of the potential attacks. This means that, within a few weeks of the first testing/corrective cycle, not only is the visibility into security posture exhaustive, but threat exposure has shrunk considerably. Aside from expertly achieving its primary threat reduction goal from multiple angles, XSPM technology yields unexpected business values waterfalls: Increased Operation Efficiency Though not typically the first thing that comes to mind when talking about cybersecurity technologies, XSPM can actually boost operation efficiency in many ways: • Its ability to pinpoint exactly where security gaps are endangering the infrastructure or potentially threatening business continuity translates into the exact data necessary to optimize cybersecurity resource allocation: – People: Thanks to XSPM’s comprehensive bank of automated attack scenarios and campaigns, and the template creation wizard, blue team members can easily double up as red teamers, creating an in-house purple team that runs continuous security validation. – Technologies: As XSPM testing shines a light on which SIEM and SOAR tools are underperforming, supplying overlapping capabilities, or are missing, restructuring the tool stack and the team structure to optimize existing tool stack efficacy. – Cost-effectiveness: the breadth and depth of the security program evaluation with XSPM technology enable you to eliminate unproductive sunk costs for a fraction of your budget. For example, if a $100 investment in equipment is working at a typical 60% of its optimal capacity and XSPM can measurably raise that efficiency to a conservative 85%, you are getting an added 25% ROI. Improved Cyber Risk Exposure Management As stated last year by Anton Chuvakin, formerly Gartner Research Vice President & Distinguished Analyst and currently involved with Google Cloud Security Solution Strategy, “Intel-supported or threat-informed decisions may be about changes in defense approaches, security architecture changes, activity prioritization, etc.” XSPM comprehensive sources of threat-informed intelligence range from discovering exposed assets (with ASM) to optimizing and streamlining vulnerability patching (with ABVM). The extensive and clear data generated by XSPM assessments delineates breach achievability, assesses resiliency against immediate threats, provides instrumentalizes security drift control, and satisfies the most stringent compliance validation requirements. Clarifies Performance Evaluation with Fact-based Metrics The ability to generate security scores reflecting the security posture’s actual resilience facilitates communication between security staff and the board. Fact-based security metrics with numbers reflecting measurable resiliency help understanding the security posture. This translates into both security investments’ ROI and the organization’s factual risk exposure can be presented in a precise, exact fashion easy to align with KPIs, paving the way to interdepartmental common goal definition. This creates a common language that increases the executives’ involvement in the security sphere which as demonstrated in this survey about the impact of preparedness level on ransomware resilience, leads to fewer data breaches. Looking at the breadth of fundamental changes in the impact on security and business operability brought forth by comprehensive security validation technologies included in XSPM platforms, the fundamental shift from reactive to proactive technologies might spell a welcome downturn in the success rate of cyber-criminal across industries as XSPM technologies adoption rates increases. According to ISACA’s State of Cybersecurity 2022 report, the percentage of the 2031 cybersecurity professionals surveyed who perform security assessments monthly or more often is still capped at 9%. This leaves far too large a playground for cybercriminals skilled at evading traditional reactive cybersecurity methods. Early adopters of continuous security validation technologies are not only the advanced force in finally reversing the trend of cybercriminals’ success, but they also spell out the dawn of the proactive era and embrace the age where security investments can be measured and tracked, where security language is accessible and understandable by business execs. Finally, CISOs and board members can understand each other, stop bickering at cross purposes and hug each other. To see how Cymulate XSPM can be a game-changer for your enterprise, start a 14-day Free Trial now.
Register (domain name) Since every domain name must be a unique identifier, domain name registries have been created to assign domains to specific individuals and organizations (domain “registrants”). When a domain is registered, that domain is assigned to its registrant and is no longer available for registration by any other party. Typically, domain name registries charge an initial registration fee and subsequent renewal fees associated with the right to use a domain. These prices vary from one domain registry to another, and often vary on the basis of the top-level domain (TLD) in question – like .com, .net and .org. Some ‘sponsored’ TLDs, like the adult entertainment-specific TLD .xxx, cost significantly more than other domain types. While the development of the commercial Internet didn’t occur until several years later, domain name registration began in 1985 for names on the .com, .net, .org, .edu, .mil, .arpa and .gov TLDs. Occasionally, there are disputes concerning the proper ownership of a domain name, disputes that often arise from intellectual property rights conflicts. While registrars generally rely on the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP), such disputes are sometimes settled by the World Intellectual Property Organization, or WIPO, which is comprised of 186 member nations and administers 26 different international treaties concerning intellectual property rights.
When we think of cloud security, more often than not it is in terms of protecting our data in transit and at rest. However, sometimes it helps to broaden our view of the cloud security threatscape because when we do then all sorts of risks sitting on the periphery come into view. Risks such as those posed by cloud credential phishers. Cloud what now? Well, everyone should be well aware of those cyber criminals who seek to con victims into visiting a 'clone bank site' in order to grab the login credentials of the user and then wipe their accounts of cash. Equally, most folk know about email document attachments, which actually execute a malware installation, often with a similar credential-scraping payload. However, as more and more of us gain this awareness of the techniques used so the less effective they become. This effectiveness is further hampered by improvements in online banking security including the use of two-factor authentication for example. So the bad guys are looking for new routes to the same old credentials and new ways to get that malware installed. Which is where the cloud comes in. It is no simple roll of the dice that both cloud-based email service logins and Outlook Web Access credentials are quickly becoming the target of choice for the criminal fraternity. And it's no coincidence that cloud-based documents are equally quickly becoming weaponised by these folk. Indeed, we are increasingly accustomed, in both our business and private lives, to receiving links to cloud-based documents and it is this familiarity that the criminals seek to exploit. Researchers at Proofpoint recently studied techniques used that try to leverage the popularity of Google Apps use in the enterprise. Where the credential criminals have got clever, and are exploiting the cloud comfort factor, in this case is that they don't use an email link to take the victim directly to a login page where they hope to scrape the data. Instead, clicking the link will direct them to what appears to be a Google Docs shared document page of the type these users are very familiar with. It is a cloned page, and a very convincing one at that. The only giveaway, and that's for the more clued-up and eagle-eyed of users, would be that the page is being delivered via HTTP rather than the HTTPS that the genuine article employs. If the victim doesn't spot this they will hit the document download button, which takes them to another cloned page, this time the Google login. The expected document is then displayed, a technique designed to buy time for the attacker to make use of the harvested credentials, as the victim is less likely to realise something is amiss this way. Cloud Pro Newsletter Stay up to date with the latest news and analysis from the world of cloud computing with our twice-weekly newsletter Davey is a three-decade veteran technology journalist specialising in cybersecurity and privacy matters and has been a Contributing Editor at PC Pro magazine since the first issue was published in 1994. He's also a Senior Contributor at Forbes, and co-founder of the Forbes Straight Talking Cyber video project that won the ‘Most Educational Content’ category at the 2021 European Cybersecurity Blogger Awards. Davey has also picked up many other awards over the years, including the Security Serious ‘Cyber Writer of the Year’ title in 2020. As well as being the only three-time winner of the BT Security Journalist of the Year award (2006, 2008, 2010) Davey was also named BT Technology Journalist of the Year in 1996 for a forward-looking feature in PC Pro Magazine called ‘Threats to the Internet.’ In 2011 he was honoured with the Enigma Award for a lifetime contribution to IT security journalism which, thankfully, didn’t end his ongoing contributions - or his life for that matter. Thank you for signing up to Cloud Pro. You will receive a verification email shortly. There was a problem. Please refresh the page and try again.
So I have some time to write about what I’ve learned so far. The most basic thing to do is right-click inside a browser and there are two options there that can be useful. Viewing the source code can be a valuable resource because everything is there, warts and all. On some CTF challenges, there will simply be commented out sections with clues or even the flag password inside the code. If you’ve never seen html code, or took it 5 years ago in college, this is a great way to dive in. You can view the code on any website, and I dont think it is considered malicious to do so if thats all you do. All you are looking at is the local cached copy of the website’s code that is downloaded to your machine. Familiarizing yourself with code is a great way to figure out what good code and bad code looks like and finding vulnerabilities.
Investigation of Artifacts Left by BitTorrent Client on the Local Computer Operating under Windows 8.1 BitTorrent client application is a popular tool to download large files from Internet, but this application is quite frequently used for illegal purposes that are one of the types of cybercrimes. If order to fight against this type of cybercrime we carried out the research, during which we investigated the evidences left by BitTorrent client application in registry under Windows 8.1 operating system. The experiment was carried out in three steps: installation, download, and uninstallation. The snapshots of registry were taken and compared prior and after each step. Changes in Windows registry were collected and joined into tables. The experiment revealed that BitTorrent client application creates Windows registry artefacts that can contain information which might be used as evidence during an investigation. The evidence remains in the registry even after the removal of the application, although it can really prove the fact of usage of the application only. The investigation of file system can reveal the purpose and the contents of the BitTorrent client session.
Enhanced Multilevel Anomaly Detection for Android Malware Dr. Santhi Baskaran, G.Maheshwari, J. Pearly percy, P.Priyadharshini "Enhanced Multilevel Anomaly Detection for Android Malware", International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT), V58(3),150-157 April 2018. ISSN:2231-5381. www.ijettjournal.org. published by seventh sense research group Android device users are frequently threatened by an increasing number of malicious applications, generally called malware. Malware constitutes a serious threat to user privacy, money, devices and file integrity. We can classify malware into small number of behaviours and classes, each of which performs a limited set of misbehavior that characterize them. This misbehavior can be defined by monitoring features belonging different android levels. 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The VolserLog file records a trace of Volume Server (volserver process) operations on the local machine and describes any error conditions it encounters. If the VolserLog file does not already exist in the /var/openafs/logs directory when the Volume Server starts, the server process creates it and writes initial start-up messages to it. If there is an existing file, the Volume Server renames it to VolserLog.old, overwriting the existing VolserLog.old file if it exists. The file is in ASCII format. Administrators listed in the /usr/local/etc/openafs/server/UserList file can use the bos getlog command to display its contents. Alternatively, log onto the file server machine and use a text editor or a file display command such as the UNIX cat command. By default, the mode bits on the VolserLog file grant the required r (read) permission to all users. The Volume Server records operations only as it completes them, and so cannot recover from failures by reviewing the file. The log contents are useful for administrative evaluation of process failures and other
Chapter 12. De-obfuscation De-obfuscation is the process of turning unintelligible information into something that you can understand. De-obfuscation is an art, a science, a hobby, and an undeniable requirement for malware analysis. This chapter classifies decoding, decryption, and packing as forms of obfuscation. Although these terms differ slightly in a technical sense, they're all methods that attackers use to keep prying eyes off certain information. If you don't learn de-obfuscation techniques, your understanding of malware and its capabilities will be limited. This chapter covers everything from reversing simple XOR routines to cracking domain-generation algorithms. You'll learn how to decrypt command and control traffic and unpack binaries. As always, the best way to take your skills further after reading this chapter is to collect some malware (see Chapter 2) and practice, practice, practice! Decoding Common Algorithms
is a web application firewall that helps monitor the HTTP/HTTPS traffic and allows controlling access to the content. helps protect web applications from attacks by allowing rules configuration that allow, block, or monitor (count) web requests based on defined conditions. These conditions include IP addresses, HTTP headers, HTTP body, URI strings, SQL injection and cross-site scripting. helps define Web ACLs, which is a combination of Rules that is a combinations of Conditions and Action to block or allow integrated with CloudFront, Application Load Balancer (ALB), API Gateway services commonly used to deliver content and applications supports custom origins outside of AWS, when integrated with CloudFront is a managed service that provides protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for applications running on AWS provides protection for all AWS customers against common and most frequently occurring infrastructure (layer 3 and 4) attacks like SYN/UDP floods, reflection attacks, and others to support high availability of applications on AWS. offers threat detection that enables continuous monitoring and protects the AWS accounts and workloads. is a Regional service analyzes continuous streams of meta-data generated from AWS accounts and network activity found in AWS CloudTrail Events, EKS audit logs, VPC Flow Logs, and DNS Logs. integrated threat intelligence combines machine learning, anomaly detection, network monitoring, and malicious file discovery, utilizing both AWS-developed and industry-leading third-party sources to help protect workloads and data on AWS supports suppression rules, trusted IP lists, and thread lists. provides Malware Protection to detect malicious files on EBS volumes operates completely independently from the resources so there is no risk of performance or availability impacts on the workloads. is a vulnerability management service that continuously scans the AWS workloads for vulnerabilities automatically discovers and scans EC2 instances and container images residing in Elastic Container Registry (ECR) for software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. creates a finding, when a software vulnerability or network issue is discovered, that describes the vulnerability, rates its severity, identifies the affected resource, and provides remediation guidance. is a Regional service. requires Systems Manager (SSM) agent to be installed and enabled. helps analyze, investigate, and quickly identify the root cause of potential security issues or suspicious activities. automatically collects log data from the AWS resources and uses machine learning, statistical analysis, and graph theory to build a linked set of data to easily conduct faster and more efficient security investigations. enables customers to view summaries and analytical data associated with CloudTrail logs, EKS audit logs, VPC Flow Logs. provides detailed summaries, analysis, and visualizations of the behaviors and interactions amongst your AWS accounts, EC2 instances, AWS users, roles, and IP addresses. maintains up to a year of aggregated data is a Regional service and needs to be enabled on a region-by-region basis. is a multi-account service that aggregates data from monitored member accounts under a single administrative account within the same region. has no impact on the performance or availability of the AWS infrastructure since it retrieves the log data and findings directly from the AWS services. Macie is a data security service that discovers sensitive data by using machine learning and pattern matching, provides visibility into data security risks, and enables automated protection against those risks. provides an inventory of the S3 buckets and automatically evaluates and monitors the buckets for security and access control. automates the discovery, classification, and reporting of sensitive data. generates a finding for you to review and remediate as necessary if it detects a potential issue with the security or privacy of the data, such as a bucket that becomes publicly accessible. provides multi-account support using AWS Organizations to enable Macie across all of the accounts. is a regional service and must be enabled on a region-by-region basis and helps view findings across all the accounts within each Region. Amazon Inspector is a vulnerability management service that continuously scans the AWS workloads for vulnerabilities. automatically discovers and scans EC2 instances and container images in ECR for software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. creates a finding, when a software vulnerability or network issue is discovered, that describes the vulnerability, rates its severity, identifies the affected resource and provides remediation guidance. is a Regional service and configurations needs to be repeated across each region. uses an IAM AWSServiceRoleForAmazonInspector2 service-linked-role linked directly to Inspector with all the permissions required to call other AWS services on your behalf. has multi-account management through AWS Organizations integration, which allows delegating an administrator account for the organization. integrates with AWS Security Hub which collects and centralizes the security data from across the AWS accounts, services, and other supported products to assess the security state of the environment according to industry standards and best practices. AWS Inspector Features Continuously scan environments for vulnerabilities and network exposure automatically discovers and begins scanning the eligible resources without the need to manually schedule or configure assessment scans. Assess vulnerabilities accurately with the Inspector Risk score Inspector collects information about the environment through scans, it provides severity scores specifically tailored to the environment. Identify high-impact findings with the Inspector dashboard The dashboard offers a high-level view of findings from across your environment. Manage your findings using customizable views Inspector console offers a Findings view Users can use filters and suppression rules to generate customized finding reports Monitor and process findings with other services and systems publishes findings to EventBridge, which can then be monitored and processed in near-real time as part of the existing security and compliance workflows or routed to SNS, Lambda, etc. AWS Security Hub. Inspector Finding Types Package vulnerability findings identify software packages in the environment that are exposed to common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs). Package vulnerability findings are generated for both EC2 instances, ECR container images and Lambda functions. Network reachability findings indicate that there are allowed network paths to EC2 instances in the environment. Network reachability findings are only generated for EC2 resources. AWS Certification Exam Practice Questions Questions are collected from Internet and the answers are marked as per my knowledge and understanding (which might differ with yours). AWS services are updated everyday and both the answers and questions might be outdated soon, so research accordingly. AWS exam questions are not updated to keep up the pace with AWS updates, so even if the underlying feature has changed the question might not be updated Open to further feedback, discussion and correction. Which of the following services allows you to analyze EC2 Instances against pre-defined security templates to check for vulnerabilities? AWS Trusted Advisor Your company has a set of AWS resources which consists of EC2 Instances. The Security departments need to run vulnerability analysis on these machines to ensure that the Instances comply with the latest security standards. Which of the following would you implement for this requirement?
\|Disable or Modify Tools \|Disable Windows Event Logging \|Impair Command History Logging \|Disable or Modify System Firewall \|Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall \|Disable or Modify Cloud Logs \|Safe Mode Boot \|Spoof Security Alerting \|Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot. Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings. Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode. \|Privileged Account Management Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles, that may be abused to remotely boot a machine in safe mode. Ensure that endpoint defenses run in safe mode. Monitor newly executed processes that may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. \|Windows Registry Key Creation Monitor Registry creation for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \|Windows Registry Key Modification Monitor modifications to Registry data associated with enabling safe mode. For example, a service can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a
How can I configure Windows (10 in this case) to trust anything under the root of my DFS via GP? It seems odd that it wouldn't do so automatically. While the related SuperUser question has many solutions for this, they are mostly from the user's perspective: even the solution related to group policy uses Local Group Policy Editor and is far behind the accepted solution. Therefore, I'll just add a quick answer on how to do this for the whole network. Create a GPO and enable three settings. Related descriptions and values explained in citations. Both Computer Configuration and User Configuration has these: Policies \ Administrative Templates \ Windows Components \ Internet Explorer Internet Control Panel Intranet Zone Template > Enabled > Low This template policy setting allows you to configure policy settings in this zone consistent with a selected security level, for example, Low, Medium Low, Medium, or High. If you enable this template policy setting and select a security level, all values for individual settings in the zone will be overwritten by the standard template defaults. Site to Zone Assignment List > Enabled > Show... A host for an intranet site, or a fully qualified domain name for other sites. The valuename may also include a specific protocol. For example, if you enter http://www.contoso.comas the valuename, other protocols are not affected. If you enter just www.contoso.com, then all protocols are affected for that site, including http, https, ftp, and so on. The site may also be expressed as an IP address (e.g., 127.0.0.1) or range (e.g., 1 (Intranet zone) Show security warning for potentially unsafe files > Enabled > Enable If you enable this policy setting and set the drop-down box to Enable, these files open without a security warning. If you set the drop-down box to Prompt, a security warning appears before the files open.
As discussed previously, HTTP transactions consist of an HTTP method and a number of different HTTP headers. There are four basic types of HTTP headers: These headers, which are used by both clients and servers, contain general information such as the date, caching, and connection status. General headers include the following: Cache-control, Connection, Date, Pragma, Trailer, Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade, Via, Warning. When a client requests content, a request header contains the client's configuration and supported data formats. Request headers include the following: Accept, Accept-Charset, Accept-Encoding, Accept-Language, Authorization, Cookie, Expect, From, Host, If-Modified-Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, If-Range, If-Unmodified, Max-Forwards, Proxy-Authorization, Range, Referer, TE (transfer encoding), User-Agent. When a server sends content to a client, response headers describe the server configuration and information about the URL that was requested. Response headers include the following: Accept-Ranges, Age, ETag, Location, Proxy-Authenticate, Retry-After, Server, Set-Cookie, Vary, WWW-Authenticate. These headers contain information about the format of the content being sent back and forth. They can be used both by servers (when sending information) and clients (when submitting data, generally by a POST operation). Entity headers include the following: Allow, Content-Encoding, Content-Language, Content-Length, Content-Location, Content-Range, Content-Type, Expires, Last-Modified.
What is access control for a security guard? Access control is a security function that determines which people should have access to specific physical areas or information. There are two types of access control: physical and logical. Physical access control includes things like turnstiles, barricades, key card entry, doors and locks, and even security guards. What are the duties of access control? Access control systems perform identification authentication and authorization of users and entities by evaluating required login credentials that can include passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), biometric scans, security tokens or other authentication factors. How many types of access control are there? Three main types of access control systems are: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Role Based Access Control (RBAC), and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). What are examples of access controls? Access control is a security measure which is put in place to regulate the individuals that can view, use, or have access to a restricted environment. Various access control examples can be found in the security systems in our doors, key locks, fences, biometric systems, motion detectors, badge system, and so forth. What is access control in security guard PDF? Access control is an important duty of an Unarmed Security Guard. A security guard is hired to protect people, material (property) and data. Access control ensures that only authorised people have access to an asset, which could be a person, property or data. What is first step in access control? Identification is the first step of access control. What is the first step of access control? What is the process of access control? Access control identifies users by verifying various login credentials, which can include usernames and passwords, PINs, biometric scans, and security tokens. Many access control systems also include multifactor authentication (MFA), a method that requires multiple authentication methods to verify a user’s identity. Why do we use AAA? AAA is a crucial part of network security because it limits who has access to a system and keeps track of their activity. What is the difference between RBAC and DAC? Discretionary Access Controls (DAC) and Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) describe the permissions required to access an object in relation to other objects. Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) simply describes the grouping of identities and application of permissions to those groups. Why is access control important in security? Access control is a fundamental component of data security that dictates who’s allowed to access and use company information and resources. Through authentication and authorization, access control policies make sure users are who they say they are and that they have appropriate access to company data. What are the 3 A’s in security? Authentication, authorization, and accounting Authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) is a term for a framework for intelligently controlling access to computer resources, enforcing policies, auditing usage, and providing the information necessary to bill for services.
Scope and Goals SCION is an inter-domain routing protocol, designed to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for end-to-end communication. SCION’s main goal is to offer highly available and efficient inter-domain packet delivery, even in the presence of actively malicious entities. SCION’s aspiration is to improve inter-AS routing and to focuses on providing end-to-end connectivity. However, SCION does not solve intra-AS routing issues, nor does it provide end-to-end payload encryption, and identity authentication. These topics, which are equally important for the Internet to perform well, lie outside the scope of SCION. Isolation Domains (ISDs) SCION organizes existing ASes into groups of independent routing planes, called Isolation Domains (ISD). An AS can be a member of multiple ISDs. All ASes in an ISD agree on a set of trust roots, called the Trust Root Configuration (TRC). The ISD is governed by a set of core ASes, which provide connectivity to other ISDs and manage the trust roots. Typically, a few distinguished ASes within an ISD form the ISD’s core. Isolation domains serve the following purposes: They allow SCION to support trust heterogeneity, as each ISD can independently define its roots of trust; They provide transparency for trust relationships; They isolate the routing process within an ISD from external influences such as attacks and misconfigurations; and They improve the scalability of the routing protocol by separating it into a process within and one between ISDs. ISDs provide natural isolation of routing failures and misconfigurations, provide meaningful and enforceable trust, enable endpoints to optionally restrict traffic forwarding to trusted parts of the Internet infrastructure only, and enable scalable routing updates with high path-freshness. ISD and AS Numbering SCION decouples endpoint addressing from inter-domain routing. Routing is based on the ISD-AS tuple, agnostic of endpoint addressing. ISD numbers are 16-bit identifiers. The 48-bit AS numbers are globally unique, and use a superset of the existing BGP AS numbering scheme. Formatting rules and allocations are currently described in wiki page “ISD and AS numbering”. The endpoint local address is not used for inter-domain routing or forwarding, does not need to be globally unique, and can thus be an IPv4, IPv6, or MAC address, for example. A SCION endpoint address is the ISD-AS,local address 3-tuple. Some ASes have special roles in their ISD. The TRC of an ISD declares which AS has which designated roles. An AS can have multiple, or all, of these roles at the same time. Core ASes have a special role in routing. They are at the top of their ISD’s routing domain, and connect their customer ASes to the outside. Core ASes participate in the inter-ISD and the intra-ISD path-exploration process (see Routing below). Certification authorities (CAs) are responsible for issuing AS certificates to other ASes and/or themselves. Voting ASes and Authoritative ASes are related to the update mechanism for TRCs. Voting ASes can “vote” to accept an updated TRC. Authoritative ASes always have the latest TRCs of the ISD and start the announcement of a TRC update. SCION operates on two routing levels: intra-ISD and inter-ISD. Both levels use path-segment construction beacons (PCBs) to explore network paths. A PCB is initiated by a core AS and then disseminated either within an ISD (to explore intra-ISD paths) or among core ASes (to explore core paths across different ISDs). The PCBs accumulate cryptographically protected path and forwarding information on the AS-level, and store this information in the form of hop fields (HFs). Endpoints use information from these hop fields to create end-to-end forwarding paths for data packets, which carry this information in their packet headers. This concept is called packet-carried forwarding state. The concept also supports multi-path communication among endpoints. The process of creating an end-to-end forwarding path consists of the following steps: First, an AS discovers paths to other ASes, during the path exploration (or beaconing) phase. The AS then selects a few PCBs according to defined policies, transforms the selected PCBs into path segments, and registers these segments with its path infrastructure, thus making them available to other ASes. This happens during the path registration phase. During the path resolution phase, the actual creation of an end-to-end forwarding path to the destination takes place. For this, an endpoint performs (a) a path lookup step, to obtain path segments, and (b) a path combination step, to combine the forwarding path from the segments.
The FTC continues its focus and concern on use of technologies that integrate artificial intelligence, this time turning to potential consumer harm with voice cloning technology. Today the commission announced a challenge looking for solutions to help monitor and prevent malicious voice cloning. In the announcement, the FTC pointed to current scams where threat actors use cloned voices -created using AI tools- to conduct scams. For example, money requests from a person’s “relative.” The winner will receive a $25,000 prize, and entries will be accepted in the first weeks of January. Putting It Into Practice: The FTC has used challenges in the past for issues that are of particular concern within the agency, including one in 2017 to address security vulnerability for IoT devices. We expect to see continued focus on AI from the FTC (and others), as this challenge and its enforcement actions demonstrate.
Cloudflare proxies traffic for HTTP traffic at the application level (Layer 7) and TCP traffic at the transport level (Layer 4). Cloudflare can proxy almost all TCP ports. We support two flavors of proxy: - an application level (Layer 7) HTTP proxy, and - Spectrum, a transport level (Layer 4) TCP proxy Cloudflare can proxy traffic going over the HTTP/HTTPS ports listed below. If your traffic is on a different port, you can add it as a record in your Cloudflare DNS zone file as something we don't proxy (gray cloud = no Cloudflare proxy or caching on a record). The HTTP ports that Cloudflare support are: The HTTPs ports that Cloudflare support are: For the Pro plan and above, you can block traffic on ports other than 80 and 443 using WAF rule id 100015: "Block requests to all ports except 80 and 443". Ports 80 and 443 are the only ports: - For HTTP/HTTPS traffic within China for zones that have the China Network enabled - For Cloudflare Apps to be able to proxy on - Where Cloudflare Caching is available Cloudflare Spectrum is an Enterprise plan product that supports proxying arbitrary TCP protocols, including game server traffic, over any port. To learn more, visit the Cloudflare Spectrum documentation site. Cloudflare Access and ports Cloudflare Access does not support port numbers in URLs at this time. Any attempt to use a URL protected through Access that has a port number, the port number will be stripped from the request.
Reviewing the logic to ensure that the code implements the expected functionality as specified in the documents. Assessing and managing the mechanisms in place to regulate and restrict user access to resources, systems, or information based on predefined permissions and privileges. Evaluating the mechanisms of the smart contract for validating and verifying the integrity and correctness of the data it relies on. Handling and processing numerical values and calculations accurately and efficiently, considering potential limitations, precision issues, and rounding errors associated with different data types and arithmetic operations. Addressing vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to reenter a function or contract before the previous execution has completed, potentially leading to unintended consequences or malicious actions. Implementing secure cryptographic algorithms and protocols to protect sensitive data, ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in various applications and systems. Identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities that could lead to a Denial of Service attack, which aims to disrupt or incapacitate a system, network, or service, rendering it unavailable to legitimate users. When using the proxy pattern in upgradable contracts, there may be security risks. Ensure that appropriate security measures are taken when implementing the proxy pattern to prevent malicious attacks or contract takeover. Inconsistency focuses on identifying and resolving inconsistencies, disparities, or discrepancies between documented specifications, guidelines, or instructions and the actual implementation of a system, software, or process. Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities that allow malicious actors to exploit privileged information, typically in decentralized financial applications, to gain unfair advantages in transactions or trades. Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities that depend on the randomness of deterministic variables. Assessing and mitigating risks associated with centralization of data, control, or authority in systems or organizations, considering potential single points of failure or vulnerabilities. Managing and maintaining the configuration settings and parameters of a system or application, including customization options, environmental variables, and external dependencies, to ensure optimal performance and functionality. Using the same name for variables in different functions or inherited contracts can lead to conflicts and hidden variables, resulting in unexpected execution behavior. Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities that depend on compiler version. Implementing a system that captures and records relevant events, actions, and errors occurring within an application or system, facilitating troubleshooting, auditing, and analysis of system behavior. Suggestions for reducing gas costs. Assessing and improving the overall quality, readability, maintainability, and efficiency of the software codebase through practices like code reviews, adherence to coding standards, and the use of automated analysis tools.
Create a thesis and an outline on Survey about CWsandbox tool which used for dynamic malware analysis. Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the APA Style Guide. An abstract is required. General Sandbox Architecture: A sandbox is deployed to secure a computer system from external attacks that are attempted through malware (malicious program). According to Hoopes (2009), the approaches used are either to block the critical accessibility of a malware or to introduce a simulated environment with completely virtual computing resources like CPU, file system and the memory. This virtual environment enables the program to get executed in a completely isolated environment which is disconnected from the real execution environment within which it resides. The main idea is to monitor the accessibility of program (under observation) to system resources. This way the system can be brought back into the safe state after complete behavioral analysis of the suspected program. The fringe benefit of this approach is the usage of a lighter security protocol for the underlying system that improves its working efficiency. The behavioral analysis keeps the execution environment intact. This gives it an edge over instruction level analysis (basically done using debuggers or dis-assemblers). CWSandbox architecture and functioning: CW sandbox is one the sandbox applications that are in use. Every sandbox application has its own mechanism to secure the computer system environment. CWSandbox comprise of two executable files namely cwsandbox.exe and cwmonitor.dll. The former is the central application that initiates the malware and manages the complete process of analysis. The latter on the other hand is a DLL (Dynamic Link Library). This library is introduced into all processes in the malware that are under observation. This way the malware is actually executed and being interacted by the sandbox along with its own execution. The function of the DLL file is to catch each API critical call from malware and to inform the central application (cwsandbox.exe) about it. The sandbox (main application) then takes some time to analyze the call in order to either delegate the control to the required API (in case of safe conclusion) or to answer the call with a virtual error message (in opposite case). Along with the keeping an eye on every malware call, the DLL also makes it certain that the sandbox is kept informed about other malware activities like injecting a code into an already executing process or creating a child process. In both cases the DLL is instantiated again to be injected into the child process or the already running process. Figure 1.0 below, elaborates the described functioning. The CWSandbox uses the native execution environment unlike other sandbox schemes. This in turn reduces the delay caused by the analysis mechanism. Enormous communication exists between the main application (executable) and planted instances of DLLs. Each notification call from a DLL to sandbox contains a lot of information that requires a formal and reliable mechanism of communication between processes. In order to fulfill this requirement the sandbox is usually equipped with high efficiency IPC (Inter Process Communication) mechanism. Figure 1.0. Sandbox Instance using CWSandbox (Source: Hoopes J. 2009. Virtualization for Security) CWSandbox Malware Handling and Analysis Mechanism: The mechanisms that are performed by a sandbox can be distinguished into three parts. Why Choose Us Top Quality and Well-Researched Papers We always make sure that writers follow all your instructions precisely. You can choose your academic level: high school, college/university or professional, and we will assign a writer who has a respective degree. 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Skip to Main Content This paper describes the protocol analysis technology and its working principle combined with the encapsulation characteristic of Ipv6 packet, gives the state protocol analysis model SPAFA based on automata theory, discusses the detection algorithm of the model, and proposes a intrusion framework combined with the protocol analysis technology and sate protocol analysis model. The research indicates that the system based on the framework can effectively detect various intrusion attacks; it is high in the detection efficiency and the detection accuracy and reduces false alarm and omission report, which effectively solves the problem of IPv6 intrusion detection. Communication Systems, Networks and Applications (ICCSNA), 2010 Second International Conference on (Volume:1 ) Date of Conference: June 29 2010-July 1 2010
To stay in the point acquisition views of danger actors familiar with such kind of ransomware that uses an open-source code, a development seen with most recently, now, being acquired by the .Anubi Files Virus. Although the .Anubi Files Virus is not really the work of the same team of con artists automatically, it includes each of the file-locking and ransoming approaches that is familiar to adware and spyware experts from different editions of this .Anubi Files Virus family. The file info so far provides no signs as to the way the .Anubi Files Virus’s editors are releasing or installing it. The .Anubi Files Virus scans for data to hold up for ransom whilst excluding sensitive locations, such as the operating system’s folders. This scan can include the drives of plugged-in storage products or types accessible more than an vulnerable, unguarded, isolated, exposed, unshielded, at risk network. Ideal files, such as documents are encoded with an AES based cipher: – every single file which includes the .Anubi Files Virus encodes also has a new extension cables �. gembok� that the Computer virus appends following your original. Many variants of this ransomware work with Notepad TXT-based ransom messages, but the .Anubi Files Virus instead makes an HTML CODE file. It ask for 75, 00 sum to uncover your data, which is the threat actor or actress requests with a prepaid coupon code. Nevertheless depending on which in turn features the .Anubi Files Virus leaves, enabled from baseline the .Anubi Files Virus can also take further more actions, which include disabling several applications, stopping your computer’s desktop, or erasing any local program backups. Nevertheless , if .Anubi Files Virus resides into your system, it could potentially ruin your personal files or you may well end up shedding data stored on your PC. Research has often displayed that .Anubi Files Virus may can make your computer system vulnerable to remote attacks which may result, primarily, in decrease of money, probably identity robbery, and eventually an agonizing .Anubi Files Virus removal process. Related Searches .Anubi Files Virus .Anubi Files Virus definition, anti.Anubi Files Virus for .Anubi Files Virus removal, get rid of .Anubi Files Viruses, ransom .Anubi Files Virus 2015, clean .Anubi Files Virus off computer free, remove .Anubi Files Virus mac, best .Anubi Files Virus remover for windows 10, how to remove .Anubi Files Virus from windows pc, pop up .Anubi Files Virus, remove .Anubi Files Virus windows Delete .Anubi Files Virus From Registry Entry - Press Win + R key to open run dialog box. - In the run dialog box, type ‘regedit’. - Click OK button. - Locate all the entries related to .Anubi Files Virus. Delete .Anubi Files Virus From Task Manager - Right click on Taskbar. - Click Start Task Manager. - In the window appeared, click on processes tab. - Select all unwanted running processes. Click End Process. Delete .Anubi Files Virus From Control Panel - Goto Start menu and click Control Panel. - Click Uninstall a Program. - Choose the malicious program and click Uninstall. More Ransomware related to .Anubi Files Virus Coin Locker, Princess Locker Ransomware, Encryptile Ransomware, WickedLocker Ransomware, Police Frale Belge Ransomware, .duhust Extension Ransomware, Paycrypt Ransomware, FileLocker Ransomware, [email protected] Ransomware, [email protected] Ransomware, Negozl Ransomware, .mp3 File Extension Ransomware, Al-Namrood Ransomware Windows Error Caused by .Anubi Files Virus 0x00000093, 0x00000030, 0x8024D00B WU_E_SETUP_BLOCKED_CONFIGURATION Windows Update Agent could not be updated because the system is configured to block the update., 0x8024E006 WU_E_EE_INVALID_ATTRIBUTEDATA An expression evaluator operation could not be completed because there was an invalid attribute., 0xf0803 CBS_E_INVALID_PARAMETER invalid method argument, 0x8024002D WU_E_SOURCE_ABSENT A full-file update could not be installed because it required the source., 0x0000006C, 0x00000014, 0x0000011D
Candidates should be able to receive security alerts from various sources, install, configure and run intrusion detection systems and apply security patches and bugfixes. Tools and utilities to scan and test ports on a server Locations and organisations that report security alerts as Bugtraq, CERT, CIAC or other sources Tools and utilities to implement an intrusion detection system (IDS) Awareness of OpenVAS Snort is a network intrusion detection system capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It can perform protocol analysis, content searching/matching and can be used to detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting attempts and much more. Snort uses a flexible rules language to describe traffic that it should collect or pass, as well as a detection engine that utilizes a modular plugin architecture. Snort has a real-time alerting capability as well, incorporating alerting mechanisms for syslog, a user-specified file, a UNIX socket or WinPopup messages to Windows clients using Samba's smbclient. Snort has three primary uses. It can be used as a straight packet-sniffer like tcpdump, a packet-logger (useful for network traffic debugging, etc), or as a full blown network-intrusion detection system. Snort logs packets in either tcpdump binary format or in Snort's decoded ASCII format to logging directories that are named based on the IP address of the foreign host. Available modes are: basic port-bound TCP mode: PortSentry will check the config files and then bind to all TCP ports in the background. To check the init status, just look in the local syslog file to which messages are sent. basic port-bound UDP mode: PortSentry will check the config files and then bind to all UDP ports in the background. If you want to check the init status you, just look in the local syslog to which messages are sent. UDP/Stealth scan warnings apply (read: README.stealth). Stealth TCP scan detection: PortSentry will use a raw socket to monitor all incoming packets. If an incoming packet is destined for a monitored port it will react to block the host. This method will detect connect() scans, SYN/half-open scans and FIN scans. UDP/Stealth scan warnings apply (read: README.stealth). Advanced TCP stealth scan detection: PortSentry will start by making a list of all the ports listening in the port area under the ADVANCED_PORTS_TCP option and will then create an exclusion list based on these ports. Any host connecting to any port in this range that is not excluded (i.e., not a listening network daemon [SMTP, HTTP, etc.]) is blocked. This has some very powerful implications that you should be aware of: (1) This mode is the most sensitive and the most effective of all the protection options. It reacts to port probes with lightning speed because you don't have to wait for them to hit a tripwired port. (2) Because it reacts so abruptly, you may cut off legitimate traffic. An FTP site may send an ident request to you. If you are monitoring the ident port (113 TCP) then you have just cut off the FTP site you were going to! As a result you should put in this list all ports that fall into this situation. Advanced Logic Mode: PortSentry is intelligent about how it monitors ports. For some protocols such as FTP, the client actually opens up ports in the ephemeral range (1024-65535) and the server then connects back to you. This would normally cause the port scanner to activate. However, PortSentry will look at the incoming connection and determine if it is destined for one of these “temporary” bindings. If it is, then the connection is ignored for that one time. As soon as the connection is torn down the window closes and full protection is back again. This is, in fact, a rudimentary stateful inspection engine. UDP/Stealth scan warnings apply (read: README.stealth). “Stealth” UDP scan detection: This operates in a manner similar to the TCP stealth mode above. UDP ports need to be listed and are then monitored. This does not bind any sockets, and while not really “stealth” scan detection (doesn't usually apply to UDP), it operates in a similar manner (reacts to any UDP packet). UDP/Stealth scan warnings apply (read: README.stealth). Advanced “Stealth” UDP scan detection: This is the same as above except for the UDP protocol. This is a very advanced option and may cause false alarms. This is because PortSentry makes no distinction between broadcast and direct traffic. If you have a router on your local network putting out RIP broadcasts then there is a good chance you will block them. Use this option with extreme caution. You need to be sure to put exclusions into the ADVANCED_EXCLUDE_UDP line (e.g., 520 [RIP]) UDP/Stealth scan warnings apply (read: README.stealth). Netcat (nc) is a very versatile network tool. Netcat is a computer networking service for reading from and writing to network connections using TCP or UDP. Netcat is designed to be a dependable "back-end" device that can be used directly or easily driven by other programs and scripts. At the same time, it is a feature-rich network debugging and investigation tool. Netcat's features are numerous; Netcat can, for instance, be used as a proxy or portforwarder. It can use any local source port, or use loose source-routing. It is commonly referred to as the TCP/IP Swiss army knife. Some of the major features of netcat are: Outbound or inbound connections, TCP or UDP, to or from any ports Full DNS forward/reverse checking, with appropriate warnings Ability to use any local source port Ability to use any locally-configured network source address Built-in port-scanning capabilities, with randomizer Built-in loose source-routing capability Can read command line arguments from standard input Slow-send mode, one line every N seconds Hex dump of transmitted and received data Optional ability to let another program service establish connections Optional telnet-options responder Because netcat does not make any assumptions about the protocol used across the link, it is better suited to debug connections than telnet. With the -z option netcat will perform a portscan on the ports given on the command line. By default netcat will produce no output. When scanning only one port the exit status indicates the result of the scan, but with multiple ports the exit status will allways be "0" if one of the ports is listening. For this reason using the "verbose" option will be usefull to see the actual results: # nc -vz localhost 75-85 nc: connect to localhost port 75 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 76 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 77 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 78 (tcp) failed: Connection refused Connection to localhost 79 port [tcp/finger] succeeded! Connection to localhost 80 port [tcp/http] succeeded! nc: connect to localhost port 81 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 82 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 83 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 84 (tcp) failed: Connection refused nc: connect to localhost port 85 (tcp) failed: Connection refused The man page of netcat shows some more examples on how to use netcat. Fail2ban scans log files like /var/log/apache/error_log and bans IP that makes too many password failures. It updates firewall rules to reject the IP address. Fail2ban's main function is to block selected IP addresses that may belong to hosts that are trying to breach the system's security. It determines the hosts to be blocked by monitoring log files (e.g. /var/log/auth.log, etc.) and bans any host IP that makes too many login attempts or performs any other unwanted action within a time frame defined by the administrator. Fail2ban is typically set up to unban a blocked host within a certain period, so as to not "lock out" any genuine connections that may have been temporarily misconfigured. However, an unban time of several minutes is usually enough to stop a network connection being flooded by malicious connections, as well as reducing the likelihood of a successful dictionary attack. nmap supports a large number of scanning techniques such as: UDP, TCP connect(), TCP SYN (half open), ftp proxy (bounce attack), Reverse-ident, ICMP (ping sweep), FIN, ACK sweep, Xmas Tree, SYN sweep, IP Protocol and Null scan. Assuming we have got a host fictitious.test and we want to see what tcp ports this host is listening to, this is done as follows: # nmap -sT fictitious.test Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA30 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) Note: Host seems down. If it is really up, but blocking our ping probes, try -P0 Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (0 hosts up) scanned in 30 seconds # nmap -sT -P0 fictitious.test Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA30 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) Interesting ports on fictitious.test (ip address): (The 1545 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) Port State Service 22/tcp open ssh 137/tcp closed netbios-ns 138/tcp closed netbios-dgm 139/tcp closed netbios-ssn Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 304 seconds After this command, the ports are only tested for accessibility by means of the TCP protocol. Let's try the same command on the Microsoft web-site: # nmap -sT www.microsoft.com Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA30 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) Interesting ports on microsoft.com (184.108.40.206): (The 1544 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) Port State Service 80/tcp open http 137/tcp closed netbios-ns 138/tcp closed netbios-dgm 139/tcp closed netbios-ssn 443/tcp open https Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 383 seconds Note the difference: the machine fictitious.test is not running a webserver and Microsoft is (ports 80 and 443). The core of this SSL-secured service-oriented architecture is the OpenVAS Scanner. The scanner very efficiently executes the actual Network Vulnerability Tests (NVTs) which are served with daily updates via the OpenVAS NVT Feed or via a commercial feed service. Detailed information about OpenVAS can be found at: Openvas - Open vulnerability assessment system community site. Security alerts are warnings about vulnerabilities in certain pieces of software. Those vulnerabilities can result in a decrease of your service level because certain individuals are very good at misusing those vulnerabilities. This can result in your system being hacked or blown out of the water. Most of the time there is already a solution for the problem or someone is already working on one, as will be described in the rest of this section. BugTraq is a full disclosure moderated mailing-list at securityfocus.com for detailed discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities: what they are, how to exploit them and how to fix them. SecurityFocus there is a link to mailing lists, one of which is Bugtraq. There also is a Bugtraq FAQ. The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is a center of Internet security expertise, at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University. They study Internet security vulnerabilities, handle computer security incidents, publish security alerts, research long-term changes in networked systems and develop information and training to help you improve security at your site. CERT maintains a website called The CERT Coordination Center. See the us-cert.gov signup page to sign up for the CERT Advisory mailing list or the RSS feeds issued on diverse NCAS publications. CIAC is the U.S. Department of Energy's Computer Incident Advisory Capability. Established in 1989, shortly after the Internet Worm, CIAC provides various computer security services free of charge to employees and contractors of the DOE, such as: Incident Handling consulting, Computer Security Information, On-site Workshops, White-hat Audits. There is a CIAC Website. The mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of the mailing lists, send requests of the following form: subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName, PhoneNumber as the E-mail message body, substituting CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or SPI-NOTES for “list-name” and valid information for “LastName” “FirstName” and “PhoneNumber.” Send to: [email protected]. You will receive an acknowledgment containing address and initial PIN, and information on how to change either of them, cancel your subscription or get help. An open mail relay is a mail server that accepts SMTP connections from anywhere and will forward emails to any domain. This means that everyone can connect to port 25 on that mail server and send mail to whomever they want. A s a result your server's IP might end up on anti-spam blacklists. Testing a mail relay can be done by delivering an email for a recipient to a server that's not supposed to any relaying for the recipients domain. If the server accepts AND delivers the email it is an open relay. charon:~# telnet mail.home.nl 25 Trying 220.127.116.11... Connected to mail.home.nl. Escape character is '^]'. 220 mail2.home.nl ESMTP server (InterMail vM.4.01.03.00 201-229-121) ready Fri, 11 Jan 2002 17:19:14 +0100 HELO 250 mail2.home.nl MAIL FROM: [email protected] 250 Sender <[email protected]> Ok RCPT TO: [email protected] 250 Recipient <[email protected]> Ok DATA 354 Ok Send data ending with <CRLF>.<CRLF> FROM: [email protected] TO: [email protected] Hahaha, open mail relay test . 250 Message received: [email protected] QUIT 221 mail2.home.nl ESMTP server closing connection Connection closed by foreign host. This worked because this is my ISP and I _do_ belong to the right domain. I tried it from a wrong domain, and I got no response whatsoever. You could use IPCHAINS, IPTABLES or some other sort of firewall software to tell your firewall to only forward the SMTP protocol packets to your mail server if they are coming from a certain range of IP addresses (for instance, the dynamic ones you have reserved for your PPP users). Also, most mail servers allow configuration settings to avoid acting as an open relay. Nowadays, this is the default behaviour for most mail server implementations.
AZALIA: an A to Z Assessment of the Likelihood of Insider Attack M. Bishop, C. Gates, D. Frincke, and F. Greitzer, “AZALIA: an A to Z Assessment of the Likelihood of Insider Attack,” Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security pp. 385–392 (May 2009). - Published version web page, paper paywalled at IEEE Explore: [DOI] [URL] - Authors’ final version: The insider threat problem is increasing, both in terms of the number of incidents and their financial impact. To date, solutions have been developed to detect specific instances of insider attacks (e.g., fraud detection) and therefore use very limited information for input. In this paper we describe an architecture for an enterprise-level solution that incorporates data from multiple sources. The unique aspects of this solution include the prioritization of resources based on the business value of the protected assets, and the use of psychological indicators and language affectation analysis to predict insider attacks. The goal of this architecture is not to detect that insider abuse has occurred, but rather to determine how to prioritize monitoring activities, giving priority to scrutinizing those whose background includes access to key combinations of assets as well as those psychological/other factors that have in the past been associated with malicious insiders.
Bio-Trust nothing, trust nobody. As cybercrime risks grow, find out how Northdoor can help you protect your users and critical data with a Zero Trust approach to Cybersecurity. Organisations today face a broad range of cybersecurity threats. The critical information assets – databases, servers, networks, endpoints – must be protected against threats that originate both inside and outside of the organisation. Managing all these risks while providing responsive information services to employees, partners and customers is becoming ever more challenging. With a comprehensive zero-trust approach, organisations can protect their most important assets today and stay ahead of fast-moving threats in the future.
According to the analysis, a combination of factors will force a different approach: the rise of mobile and remote workers, greater use of outside contractors, the deployment of Web 2.0 applications, and virtualisation of systems, to name a few. "Today's more dynamic network requirements are driven in large part by a 'virtualization' of corporate employees—their location, the blurring between their work and personal life, and the technologies they use at home and in the office," the report stated. Traditional LAN switches, which work low down in the network stack, operate on limited information, such as the MAC address and access control lists. They can be moulded into supporting a more dynamic business environment, but as the research suggested, the process takes a lot of time and effort from IT operations to make it happen: "The rigid subnetting, DMZs, virtual LANs and access control lists (ACLs) used in LANs today are not flexible enough to accommodate the rapid provisioning and deprovisioning of services […] that businesses need to support ad hoc groups and other aspects of the virtualized organization,". For instance, IT may need to distinguish between a user who is accessing a Web-based ERP system and one who is just browsing the Internet. And a staff may want to detect where users are running their own applications, possibly using their own devices, and using collaborative tools like Google Apps, perhaps to bypass corporate controls. Network access, however, is usually governed by the location of the user's desk, what ports the PC is plugged into and which servers it can access on that subnet. "This topology-based construct is due in large part to existing network forwarding and routing techniques—the MAC forwarding table at Layer 2 and the IP routing table at Layer 3," according to the Yankee Group analysis. "Decisions as to where traffic can and cannot go, at what rate it moves and how long it can remain connected, all happen based on these parameters." Virtualisation of systems, which allows server images and their workloads to be moved to different parts of a network, also creates problems for static network-based server access controls, which rely on IP addresses, server names or MAC addresses. The answer, Hochmuth suggests, is to build more intelligence and context-awareness into the network, arguing that this is the logical place to enforce policy. "Most companies are running on 20-year-old switch technology, but LANs are no longer static," said Jeff Prince, chief technology of ConSentry. "We now have different ways of connecting, with guest users, offshore partners needing to access the network. Businesses need to keep up with this virtualised world." He said the network, far from being a collection of "dumb pipes," was the logical place to enforce policy and provide security. For instance, he said network access control should not be a one-off process at the network gateway, but should be enforced continuously by having the LAN ensure that all traffic complies with policy. ConSentry's own intelligent LAN switches offer these features, but Prince acknowledged that other products, such as HP's Adaptive EDGE networking technology and Cisco's PISA range, also adopt the same approach by inspecting the traffic they manage. The changing LAN environment is confirmed in new research by the London-based agency Loudhouse Research Ltd, also commissioned by ConSentry. In June 2009, the company interviewed 200 IT decision makers, half in the U.K. and the other half in the US, about the implications of what it called "LAN sprawl". The findings showed that: - 93 percent said their users are now more likely to require access to different parts of the network at different times for business reasons. - 92 percent reported an increase in the need to manage users with multiple profiles/IDs to support cross-functional needs of their organisation. - 66 percent said the proliferation of devices and applications made it harder to audit their networks. - Two-thirds believed that decisions to innovate business processes are often made without considering the impact to the network.
Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes without any centralized administration. These nodes collect the information through overhearing and store information in route caches through routing protocol. When the route cache freshness is absent, it leads to the stale route information resulting in pollution caches. If the node overhears the packet to another node, node's energy consumption occurs unnecessarily. The main goal of this paper is to reduce the effect of overhearing and avoid the stale route problems while improving the energy efficiency using the Efficient Source Routing Scheme (ESRS) algorithm. Due to the lack of route cache update, the stale route entry and overhearing is originated among the network.
UBC Theses and Dissertations Cooperative spectrum sensing for cognitive radio networks Kaligineedi, Praveen Radio spectrum is a very scarce and important resource for wireless communication systems. However, a recent study conducted by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found that most of the currently allocated radio spectrum is not efficiently utilized by the licensed primary users. Granting opportunistic access of the spectrum to unlicensed secondary users has been suggested as a possible way to improve the utilization of the radio spectrum. Cognitive Radio (CR) is an emerging technology that would allow an unlicensed (cognitive) radio to sense and efficiently use any available spectrum at a given time. Reliable detection of the primary users is an important task for CR systems. Cooperation among a few sensors can offer significant gains in the performance of the CR spectrum sensing system by countering shadow-fading effects. In this thesis, we consider a parallel fusion based cooperative sensing network, in which the sensors send their sensing information to an access point, which makes the final decision regarding presence or absence of the primary signal. We assume that energy detection is used at each sensor. Presence of few malicious users sending false sensing data can severely degrade the performance of such a cooperative sensing system. In this thesis, we investigate schemes to identify malicious users based on outlier detection techniques. We take into consideration constraints imposed by the CR scenario, such as limited information about the primary signal propagation environment and small sensing data sample size. Considering partial knowledge of the primary user activity, we propose a novel method to identify malicious users. We further propose malicious user detection schemes that take into consideration the spatial location of the sensors. We then investigate efficient sensor allocation and quantization techniques for a CR network operating in multiple primary bands. We explore different methods to assign CR sensors to various primary bands. We then study efficient single-bit quantization schemes at the sensors. We show that the optimal quantization scheme is, in general, non-convex and propose a suboptimal solution based on a convex restriction of the original problem. We compare the performance of the proposed schemes using simulations. Item Citations and Data Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Skip to Main Content A secure and efficient ID-based registration protocol with user anonymity is proposed in this paper for IP-based mobile networks. The protocol minimizes the registration delay through a minimal usage of the identity (ID)-based signature scheme that eliminates expensive pairing operations. User anonymity is achieved via a temporary identity (TID) transmitted by a mobile user, instead of its true identity. Additional replay protection from a Foreign Agent (FA) is included in the registration messages to prevent a possible replay attack. A formal correctness proof of the protocol using Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) is presented. Numerical analysis and computer simulation results demonstrate that the proposed protocol outperforms the existing ones in terms of the registration delay, the registration signaling traffic, and the computational load on a Mobile Node (MN) while improving security. For example, the proposed protocol reduces the registration delay up to 49.3 percent approximately, comparing to Yang's protocol. Date of Publication: February 2010
Introducing ‘RITA’ for Real Intelligence Threat AnalysisSANS' free, new framework can help teams hunt for attackers by extending traditional signature analysis to blacklisted IP addresses and accounts that have multiple concurrent logons to multiple systems. There is often a huge disconnect between what attackers do and what we as defenders do to detect them. There is currently a huge push to develop better and better indicators of compromise (IOC) or better threat intelligence. But if we sit back and think about these advancements in security, it becomes clear that we are still stuck in the process of trying to build better and bigger blacklists, still stuck believing we can somehow define evil away by building systems to find and neutralize it. This will not work. We continue to look for the easy button. We continue to seek out automation of our security infrastructure. This will not work. The reason these things will not work is because our defenses are static and accessible to all. All it takes is for an adversary to acquire these technologies and figure out how to bypass them before they sling a single packet at your network. This is one of the key reasons we work so hard to develop active defense approaches. But active defense will only go so far. There is a new development in security called "hunt teaming." This is when an organization puts together a team of individuals to actively look for evil on a network. It takes some big assumptions on the part of the defenders. The first is that security automation has failed somewhere. The second is that existing technologies will not be sufficient to find the bad guys. Even more critical, "hunt teaming" requires a fundamental shift in how we approach detecting attacks. Traditionally, our approach has involved a set of simple signatures. For example, one of Black Hills Information Security's (BHIS) tools, called VSagent, hides its command-and-control (C2) traffic into __VIEWSTATE parameter, which is base64 encoded. Further, it beacons every 30 seconds. Unfortunately, attackers can easily modify the backdoor to bypass any simple signature you throw at it. It also represents many of the nasty C2 techniques we have seen over the past few years. A new framework for hunt teaming How then, should we approach malware like this? The question asks us to not just look at individual TCP streams but rather look at the communication as it relates to much larger timeframes. To help with this, SANS has released a free new tool, Real Intelligence Threat Analysis or (RITA). (Note: The password for the ht user account is !templinpw! Because it is in OVA format it is portable to other VM environments.) Currently, there are a number of different frameworks for pen testing, like Metasploit, SET, and Recon-ng. The idea behind RITA is to create a framework that it is extensible; it allows people to continuously add additional modules to it. Let’s take a few moments and walk through the current modules in RITA. - First, to start RITA we just need to fire up the run.py script in the /home/ht/Documents/RITA directory. - Then, open a browser and surf to http://127.0.0.1:5000. - Next, we are going to enter an example customer where the example data is stored on this VM: The beaconing module will use Discrete Fast Fourier Transform (DFFT) to move the connections leaving your network from the time domain to a frequency domain. Why? When we think about events, we tend to think of events as a series in time. When we look at things, it’s in terms of first, second, and third. However, we can also look at time in terms of frequency. For example, if we have connections connect at regular intervals, it will show up very clearly as a DFFT. So, when we run this module it will create graphs showing likely beaconing behavior. Detecting a two-second beacon The graph below shows a two-second beacon. This means there is a detectible frequency of two-second intervals between two hosts. This type of signature analysis is very difficult on standard security devices like IDS and IPS. But we can go further. We can also look for systems connecting to blacklisted IP addresses, potential scanning behavior, long duration connections (good for data exfiltration), and accounts that have multiple concurrent logons to multiple systems. The beautiful thing about RITA is that the data can be exported to the desktop, but can also be visualized via Kibana. For example, if you run the concurrent module, this module will show all accounts which are logged in concurrently to multiple systems. This is great for detecting lateral movement. By running this module, it will run the module and load the data into Kibana for visualization. (To see the results, you’ll need to select the results tab at the top.) To load some results, you start by editing the time it reviews in the upper right hand corner. It should say “Last 15 minutes.” - Then, select “Last 5 years” - In the middle box, type “result_type=” - It will show you some autocomplete some options - Select result_type=concurrent - This will show the systems with multiple concurrent connections As you will see, the targetUserName of Fire_Phreak is logged on to multiple systems at the same time. That should give you a first start with the RITA VM. Good luck! John Strand is a senior instructor with the SANS Institute. He teaches SEC504: Hacker Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling; SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking; SEC580: Metasploit Kung Fu for Enterprise Pen Testing; and SEC464: Hacker Guard: ... View Full Bio
Securing your web applications and the sensitive data they handle Web applications play a vital role in countless business processes. They also often manage sensitive data, including personally identiﬁable information (PII), proprietary information and credit card data. Therefore, organizations should utilize web application security testing to help address detectable security ﬂaws that allow attackers to disrupt functionality or compromise sensitive data points. Additionally, many organizations have regulatory obligations to conduct web application security testing. For example, organizations that accept credit cards should ensure their applications are secure and comply with Payment Card Industry (PCI) standards. Partner’s First web application security testing assessments identify security ﬂaws that could cause debilitating compromises or disruptions to your key web applications, such as those listed within the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10. These assessments also facilitate compliance with your specific regulatory requirements, demonstrate security due diligence and help protect sensitive data. To help secure your web applications for internal employees and customers, and align with your business and compliance needs, Partners First offers three types of web applications assessments. 1. Black Box web application security assessment In the Black Box test, Partners First uses a variety of automated tools to perform an uncredentialed scan of applications to identify vulnerabilities and suggest steps for remediation. 2. Grey Box web application security assessment In the Grey Box test, Partners First uses automated and manual tools, manual reviews and user credentials to more thoroughly identify vulnerabilities, including potential business logic flaws. 3. White Box web application security assessment The most in-depth of the three assessments, the White Box test, analyzes your application’s source code to detect vulnerabilities and suggest steps for remediation.
ASEC analysis team has found a malware that is being distributed in Korea, a malware disguised as Shincheonji-related. On the surface, the filename of the distributed files appears to be .xlsx (excel) or .ppt (powerpoint) document file, but that is due to utilization of RLO (Right to Left Override) method, which makes the filename to be shown in a different format .scR. The actual extension of the malware is .scr. Distributed unicode RLO-modified malicious files - Shincheonji Church of Jesus Emergency Contacts (1).Rcs.xlsx) - Shincheonji Church of Jesus Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony Headquarter Public Relations Division Media Press Team Assistant Organization RCS.ppt) – Shincheonji Church of Jesus Emergency Contacts (1).xlsx) – Shincheonji Church of Jesus Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony Headquarter Public Relations Division Media Press Team Assistant Organization.ppt) The analysis is based on the excel file. Once the file runs, the normal excel file runs together, making it difficult for the user to recognize that the malware is running on the user PC. A normal document file is created in the same file path as the executable, and the file is run by VBS that was created in the %TEMP% directory. 3 files created in the %TEMP% directory perform each feature below: - %TEMP%\[random1].vbs: Run normal .xlsx file - %TEMP%\[random2].vbs : Delete *.scr file - %TEMP%\services.exe: Backdoor malware services.exe backdoor is added to a registry key below so that it runs even after the reboot. - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\mismyou “C:\Users\vmuser\AppData\Local\Temp\services.exe” Backdoor features include: sending process list, computer name, and OS version info, running and exiting files, downloading additional files, etc. This backdoor was confirmed to be Bisonal malware. Bisonal has been attacking Korean organizations and companies since 2011. AhnLab’s V3 products detect the malware under the following aliases: - Backdoor/Win32.Bisonal (2020.03.05.04)
Detection rules are the logic InsightIDR uses to detect threats using Rapid7’s wide array of threat intelligence. Detections occur when the conditions of a rule have been satisfied. Rules are classified into two categories: User Behavior Analytics and Attacker Behavior Analytics. The InsightIDR Detection Rules page allows you to modify ABA detection rules, modify UBA detection rules, create custom alerts, subscribe or contribute to Community Threats, and gain a deeper understanding of the detection rules InsightIDR uses to create investigations and track notable events. User Behavior Analytics (UBA) UBA detections apply insight to the millions of network events your users generate every day to detect compromised credentials, lateral movement, and other malicious behavior. View UBA detection rules under the User Behavior Analytics tab. Attacker Behavior Analytics (ABA) Attacker Behavior Analytics expose the finite ways in which attackers gain persistence on an asset, and send and receive commands to victim machines. Each ABA detection rule hunts for a unique attacker behavior. You can see all ABA detection rules and the number of detections over the last 30 days in the Attacker Behavior Analytics tab. You can also view rule logic, related Threat Groups and MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and sort, filter and search detection rules. Click into any ABA detection rule and navigate to the Rule Logic tab to see the rule logic written in our SQL-style search language, Log Entry Query Language (LEQL). The rule logic query exposes what the detection rule searches for, giving you enhanced visibility into how InsightIDR generates a detection. Threat groups are known malicious detections that appear together during specific attacks. On the Attacker Behavior Analytics tab, you can view the threat group associated with each detection rule, and group detection rules by threat. Click into each threat group for more context. The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base created by MITRE to document tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. The framework offers a blueprint for teams on where to focus their detection efforts by identifying where threats fall within the attack chain. For more information about the MITRE ATT&CK framework, visit: https://attack.mitre.org/ Each Rapid7 ABA detection rule is mapped to a MITRE ATT&CK tactic and technique, which you can view within the table on the Attacker Behavior Analytics tab. Click into a detection rule to view the associated MITRE ATT&CK mapping. You can also find a detailed view of all MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques on the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix tab. Click into a technique or subtechnique to see a description and mitigations recommended by MITRE. Techniques and sub-techniques that are covered by Rapid7 detection rules are indicated by a green bar, and expand to show associated rules. Use the Tactics & Techniques shown toggle to view the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework, or only tactics & techniques covered by Rapid7. Sort and filter ABA Detection Rules Use the filter to narrow down your ABA Detection Rules by: - Date modified - Date added - Number of exceptions - Number of detections - Rule Action - MITRE ATT&CK Coverage Sort ABA Detection Rules by using the up and down arrows in the table header. You can use the toggle to group rules by Threat, or view rules Ungrouped. You can use the search bar to search through ABA Detection Rules and threats for specific malicious actions and behaviors. For example, if you believe that you are vulnerable through SSH, you can use InsightIDR to search for attacker behavior that might be utilized against you.
Provided by: University of Mary Washington Date Added: Mar 2013 The authors present and experimentally evaluate Spread Identity (SI) - a new dynamic network address remapping mechanism that provides anonymity and DDoS defense capabilities for Internet communications. For each session between a source and destination host, the trusted source gateway dynamically and randomly assigns an IP address for the source host from the pool of all routable IP addresses allocated to the source organization (by the IANA). Similarly, in response to a name resolution query from the source gateway, the trusted authoritative DNS server (i.e., the ADNS) for the destination organization dynamically assigns an IP address for the destination host from the pool of all routable IP addresses allocated to the destination organization.
Transfer Learning Framework for Detecting New Attacks in Cloud and non-Cloud IDN Environments Machine learning based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been explored by many researchers in the recent times and resulted in considerable success in dealing with known attacks by signature formation. However, new attacks due to their behavioral variation from the known attacks are unknown to the defender and are hard to discover using the known signatures and hence, remain as a challenging issue. In this paper, the challenge of detecting new attacks is handled through IDS collaboration using transfer learning. A Transfer learning framework is proposed by the authors for detecting new attacks with minimal labelled instances in cloud and non-cloud Intrusion Detection Network (IDN) environments. Transfer learning approach is applied to handle the detection of new attacks by modeling it as target task, involving a related source domain that has sufficient number of labeled instances. The learned knowledge from the source domain can be transformed to the target domain to compensate for the scarcity of labeled instances needed for new attack detection. To allow the smooth knowledge transfer among the domains which are having disparity in feature spaces and distributions, this paper presents a methodology for extraction of domain invariant features using manifold alignment process that transforms both source and target datasets into a common latent space. Extensive experimentation on multiple bench mark datasets was conducted in this paper. From the results, it is evident that the proposed method succussfully detects new attacks in cloud and non-cloud environments with high accuracy and low false positive rates.
The DNS Activity service uses dnstap to provide visibility into the DNS queries and responses, and DDNS updates that are processed by a DNS/DHCP Server. You can use this information to analyze DNS activity, enabling you to monitor the health of your network and identify any anomalies that might indicate malicious activity. For more information on dnstap, refer to https://dnstap.info/. - You can only enable this service on DNS/DHCP Server v9.3.0. - Upon upgrading to DNS/DHCP Server v9.3.0, you must perform a full DNS deployment on the DNS/DHCP Servers that will be configured with the DNS Activity service. - Enabling the DNS Activity service can be resource intensive and might affect the performance of the DNS/DHCP Server; however, configuring filters by Queries or Responses can greatly improve the QPS performance of the DNS Activity service by up to two times. For more information on configuring filters, refer to Configuring DNS Activity. Comparing DNS Activity and Querylogging The following table outlines the differences between DNS Activity and Querylogging features on DNS/DHCP Server. For more information on Querylogging, refer to Querylogging.
Industry-wide, security teams are duplicating time and resources to complete similar investigations, workflows and threat responses. With a skilled staffing shortage of an anticipated 3.5 million security jobs by 2021, the security industry can’t afford to continue to duplicate efforts. Instead, consider an alternative: Multiple organizations have investigation teams who agree to collaborate. One does an in-depth investigation, hunt or mitigation, and they are able to share that process in real time with another organization. There are now multiple organizations and teams leveraging their skills and expertise to increase the efficacy of their collective security operations centers (SOC). They are armed with the resources to prevent breaches and hunt for other threats while bolstering the security industry as a whole. This is the future of collaborative security. At present, organizations are open and somewhat participatory in sharing some forms of information, like indicators of compromise (IOCs)—i.e. an IP address, file hash, email address, a domain or a URL. As an example, if an analyst identifies an unknown IP address trying to connect to his or her infrastructure, that analyst will decide the IP address is potentially malicious. Then, the analyst saves that into a threat intel platform or publishes it somewhere. Finally, the analyst’s peers are able to pull down the information provided and say something like, “Okay, that’s interesting. Should I look for indicators of that in my own environment? Should I add that to any of my rule sets to say that my firewall should no longer allow any type of data transfer to that IP address?” This type of sharing information currently happens in Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC).Sector-based ISACs collaborate with each other via the National Council of ISACs (NCI), allowing organizations who compete against each other in their respective industries to collaborate within their SOCs. While this kind of collaboration arms organizations with great information, it’s only focused on detection based on rudimentary, preventive capabilities. It’s time to take the next step. On October 3, 2018, I hosted a tech talk with Pedro Haworth, McAfee’s head of technology, security innovation alliance at Integrated Cyber Fall 2018. Hosted by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratoryin collaboration with the National Security Agency (NSA)and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Integrated Cyber brought together thought leaders and innovators from the Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD), Automated Indicator Sharing and Cyber Information Sharing communities. The goal of the two-day event was to “dramatically change the timeline and effectiveness of cyber defense via integration, automation and information sharing.” In the attempt to get closer to achieving Integrated Cyber’s goal, Haworth and I discussed how to move beyond the whatof a threat and instead focus on the how. Instead of simply sharing information about IOCs, we should be sharing our techniques for detecting potential malicious behavior. This degree of collaboration can empower our collective SOCs to take threat hunting to the next level, optimizing protection from breaches. Currently, security operations threat hunting consists of searching for known IOCs. Although more challenging, effective threat hunting begins with a hypothesis like “If I was going to try to break into this organization, how would I do that? What methodology would I use?” The analyst who answers those questions by searching for behaviors instead of specific data points is better equipped to stop threats because data points can change rapidly. And then once that analyst shares those answers—and the operational mechanisms in place to address the potentially malicious behavior—the game changes from many against one to many against many. No one can build perfect, impenetrable security. But working as a collective raises the barrier to entry and gives us a chance to stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated bad actors. About Cody Cornell As Swimlane’s Cofounder and CEO, Cody is responsible for the overall strategic direction of Swimlane and their Security Automation and Orchestration platform. As an advocate for the open exchange of security information and deep technology integration, he constantly strives to enable organizations to maximize the value of their investments in security technology and staff. Cody began his career in the U.S. Coast Guard and has spent 15 years in IT and security including roles with the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), American Express and IBM Global Business Services. He has also had the pleasure of presenting at information security at forums such as the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force, the DHS Security Subcommittee on Privacy, and National Public Radio. Swimlane is at the forefront of the growing market of security automation, orchestration and response (SOAR) solutions and was founded to deliver scalable and flexible security solutions to organizations struggling with alert fatigue, vendor proliferation and chronic staffing shortages. Swimlane’s solution helps organizations address all security operations (SecOps) needs, including prioritizing alerts, orchestrating tools and automating the remediation of threats—improving performance across the entire organization. Swimlane is headquartered in Denver, Colorado with operations throughout North America and Europe. For more information, visit www.Swimlane.com.
It is an open source IDS software. Network professionals use Snort as an IDS. Snort’s open source network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) has the ability to perform real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on Internet Protocol (IP) networks. Snort performs protocol analysis, content searching and matching. These basic services have many purposes including application-aware triggered quality of service, to de-prioritize bulk traffic when latency-sensitive applications are in use. Networking and security professionals or students have good knowledge of in various topics like class type, Snort installation from source, malware infection, etc. All these topics are covered in free online practice tests listed in this section. All questions are of MCQ format with every question having 4 options with one correct answer. The practice test will help you to get Vskills Certification in Snort.
In this post I’ll profile a recently spamvertised managed SMS flooding service, in the context of E-banking fraud, and just how exactly are cybercriminals using the service as a way to evade detection of their fraudulent transactions. The trend is largely driven by what Webroot is observing as an increase in underground market propositions offering managed SMS spamming services to new market entrants not interested in building and maintaining the spamming infrastructure on their own. In this post, I’ll profile a recently advertised managed service offering SMS spamming capabilities to potential customers, discuss the latest innovations in this field, their impact to mobile security, and what are some of the key factors contributing to the growth of SMS spam. We’ve all seen software grow. We watch as our favorite software adds on new features and becomes better at what it does. Malware writers are no different, they want their software to have more features as well as steal even more information. PJApps is a good example of this. PJApps is a Trojan that’s been around for a while causing havoc by being bundled in legitimate applications found in alternative Android markets, it is capable of opening a backdoor, stealing data and blocking sms behind the scenes. In one variant of PJApps it requests the following permissions to steal information: Here’s some of things the older variants of PJApps stole: Rogue Android apps are making their way into alternative markets. Yes, we’ve seen some malicious apps trickle through and they can be elusive. But we’re now seeing markets that are only hosting malware. These rogues are of the premium rate SMS variety and request the user to send a bounty if they want the app. The interesting thing is that the websites they’re hosted on are very well put together and you can see that a great deal of time was put into creating them. Click for Full Size These well-crafted websites follow a similar layout; they have device reviews, app descriptions with screenshots, QR Codes and FAQs. So far, we’ve only found these websites aimed at Russian users, with the web pages written in Russian. The descriptions are similar to those in the Android Market and the screenshots appear to be taken from the market. We are discovering that this network of SMS Trojans is fairly large. Continue reading → Once in a while, you don’t have to do anything at all and malware just drops into your lap. That happened to me the other day, when I received a buddy request from a total stranger in my decade-old ICQ instant messenger account. It’s never failed to be a rich source for malicious links, SPIM, and other fun stuff (that is, from a malware research perspective). ICQ is a multi-lingual community, and this request was written in the Cyrillic alphabet. My client didn’t render it properly, so I couldn’t read the text of the come-on. But I could read the plain-ASCII URL that was linked at the bottom. So, curious, I took a look. The page looks pretty basic, with text (badly translated to English) which reads “There is my candid photos))do you will hear me on him?” and a link to download a file. I’m a sucker for grammatically tortured social engineering, so I couldn’t resist. Yes, I thought to myself, I do will hear you on him.
Definitions: 1. (as used in the DaSy framework) The hardware, software, and other applications that enable Part C and Section 619 programs to collect data about children, families, workforce, and/or program characteristics (e.g., program quality), as well as the analysis, reporting, and data use practices associated with those data. 2. (general use) An electronic system that includes an organized collection of data and operations that enable the management and manipulation of those data. Source: DaSy-developed definitions DaSy Framework Component: Framework Overview
When setting up port forwarding using NETGEAR Genie, I can specify up to 4 different ports for each forwarding: - External Start Port - External End Port - Internal Start Port - Internal End Port If you could only specify two ports (eg. external and internal), I would assume that the router would check if the port specified in the packet matched the external port and if so, it would rewrite the packet with the internal port and send it to the specified local ip address. What do each of these mean? Which are conditions and which are rewriting rules?
The research area Network Security and Digital Twin focusses on creating a powerful scientific toolkit for studying the most pressing issues of future telecommunication networks: Security, Efficiency, Stability and Complexity Management. With the advent of the network disaggregation paradigm (most notably currently known under the acronym ORAN – Open Radio Access Networks), the resulting complexity of the networks and their management increases to such a degree that traditional deterministic engineering approaches dramatically falter. As a consequence, simulation tools that run on a high-definition digital representation of the network are needed. These are dubbed “Digital Twins”. We study how Digital Network Twins should be best set up to study different questions, ranging from radio resource optimization to aggregate energy consumption optimization. Security research in a telecommunication network context is a subject that scales with the complexity increase described above: the more complex the management of a network structure becomes, the more its attack surface is expanded. In our security research, we develop modern and automatized vulnerability scanning approaches for these complex networks. With the target picture of a powerful adaptable security analytics platform, we approach current infrastructure trends such as cloudification and disaggregation. With employing AI/ML to recognize patterns in communication patterns, log files and other data, we develop implicit threat detection mechanisms that are able to issue alerts on impending risks without deterministic analyses. Ultimately, Digital Network Twins should be able to bolster Network Security approaches that are able to render negative reaction times: potential attacks are recognized before they are devised and carried out. With this visionary aim in mind, we set up the R&D activities in our research field.
NNG Cyber Security has announced the introduction of its new cyber security technology. The NNG Cyber Security solution brings groundbreaking innovation that detects and intercepts cyber threats for vehicles immediately, before they can cause any harm to the system of the car. The newly introduced Parallel Intrusion Prevention System (PIPS) analyzes not only the content and context of the communication on the CAN bus between ECUs, but the source of it as well. This enables it to intercept malicious messages in real time, and in a highly effective and accurate manner. This technology analyzes the physical characteristics of the communication and determines its validity. As the analysis happens in real time, PIPS can stop the threats before they get to their destination, ensuring the security of the vehicle’s ECUs. The technology can accurately track the origins of the communication, thus excluding the chance of impersonation attacks. PIPS can effectively identify these situations, and also stop the attempts, therefore neutralizing the malicious intrusion. As opposed to available technologies where security systems only secure the communication flow between the segments where they were integrated, PIPS is integration agnostic. It can be connected anywhere on the CAN bus, which ensures full network coverage from one single point of integration.
Researchers have discovered a new phishing tactic utilized by cybercriminals to spread Dyre malware. Experts at PhishMe were tipped off on the new tactic thanks to reports from employees leveraging its “Reporter” tool – an email add-on that reports suspicious emails to the security firm, according to a recent blog post. All of the messages have “Voice Message” as the subject line, luring readers into thinking there is an important audio message waiting to be tended to. The email gives the reader an option to download a zip file that contains an executable, that once is executed, uploads the Upatre downloader – which then “downloads an encoded payload” that is the Dyre malware, according to experts. Dyre was discovered by PhishMe researchers in June when it was used in a phishing ruse that targeted banking credentials for specific financial institutions.
Last Updated on August 13, 2021 by Admin 2 Ryan works as a network security engineer at an organization the recently suffered an attack. As a countermeasure, Ryan would like to obtain more information about the attacker and chooses to deploy a honeypot into the organizations production environment called Kojoney. Using this honeypot, he would like to emulate the network vulnerability that was attacked previously. Which type of honeypot is he trying to implement? - High interaction honeypots - Research honeypot - Low interaction honeypots - Pure honeypots
The Architecture Reference for Cooperative & Intelligent Transportation (ARC-IT) provides a framework for planning, programming, and implementing intelligent transportation systems. As shown in the figure, ARC-IT is comprised of 4 Views: - Enterprise - Describes the relationships between organizations and the roles those organizations play within the connected vehicle environment - Functional - Describes abstract functional elements (processes) and their logical interactions (data flows) that satisfy the system requirements - Physical - Describes physical objects (systems and devices) and their functional objects as well as the high-level interfaces between those physical objects - Communications - Describes the layered sets of communications protocols that are required to support communications among the physical objects that participate in the connected vehicle environment
Posted by Virus Bulletin on Feb 5, 2015 Wei Xu and his colleagues attempt to block domains before they're used for bad purposes. Since the close of the VB2014 conference in Seattle in October, we have been sharing VB2014 conference papers as well as video recordings of the presentations. Today, we have added 'We know it before you do: predicting malicious domains' by Palo Alto Networks researchers Wei Xu, Yanxin Zhang and Kyle Sanders. Whether they're used for command and control communication, to host malware or in a phishing campaign, malicious domains play an important role in today's threats. Security firms thus try hard to detect them and add them to their blacklists. However, with domains being recycled quickly, a reactive approach might not be good enough. In their VB2014 paper, Palo Alto Networks researchers Wei Xu, Yanxin Zhang and Kyle Sanders describe how they tried to predict malicious domains. They combine four different techniques: looking at known malicious domain names that are likely to be reused; looking at the domain names themselves to detect those generated by DGAs; looking at DNS queries made to the domains; and looking at connections between the domain names, such as shared DNS infrastructure. Using these techniques and one month's data as input, they were able to predict almost 2,200 malicious domains, 83% of which were listed on VirusTotal as known malicious by at least one vendor. Passive DNS records showed that they predicted malicious domains an average of eight hours before DNS queries showed up in the PDNS feed.
DECEIVE, EXPOSE AND ELIMINATE THREATS BEFORE REAL DAMAGE OCCURS Deception technology is unique in that it is the only zero false positive cyber attack early warning system. Helping with breach protection, the technology creates multiple traps on a network with decoys disguised as data assets that alert the organisation whenever they have been triggered. Serving as an early warning system, FortiDeceptor enables companies to rapidly create fabricated deception networks through the automated deployment of deception VMs and decoys. Seamlessly integrating with existing infrastructures to trick attackers into revealing themselves and providing accurate detection of an attacker’s activity details and movement. HOW FORTIDECEPTOR WORKS FortiDeceptor creates multiple virtual machines across multiple segments of a network. The virtual machines are essentially advanced honeypots that can detect an attacker as soon as they interact with the machine’s exposed services. Luring cyber-criminals away from valuable data and exposing their presence, without their knowledge, allows forensic analysis in real time to closely monitor patterns, activities, and techniques to discover the breached devices and vulnerabilities. The intelligence gathered from the attack can automatically be applied to in-line security controls to stop attacks before there is any significant damage. In addition, Fortinet’s deception technology deploys tokens to the network’s actual endpoints – these Tokens are breadcrumbs which direct to the deception machines. Key System Features - Real-time blocking of attackers - Actionable visibility - Automated protection - Ease of deployment - Security infrastructure integration - GUI driven threat map, uncovering threat campaigns FORTIDECEPTOR OT SECURITY FortiDeceptor is now available as an industrially hardened rugged appliance – the FortiDeceptor Rugged 100G – for harsh industrial environments: - The system, both appliance and VM, also provides new OT/IoT/IT decoys to support diverse environments. - To combat emerging threats and vulnerabilities, FortiDeceptor also now enables on-demand creation of deception decoys based on newly discovered vulnerabilities, or suspicious activity, providing automated, dynamic protection across OT/IoT/IT environments. Get in Touch To find out about the benefits of decoy & deception technology, you can get in touch with one of our trusted advisors. You can also schedule a demonstration to see how FortiDeceptor works in action. Please leave a few contact details or call us to speak with someone immediately.
Inviteflood is a tool used to perform DOS attack through SIP/SDP invite message flooding over UDP/ IP.This tool targets through flood invite request message. As long the tool continues flooding the PBX it will prevent clients from making telephone calls. SIP (Session Initial Protocol) invite message are passed through the various multimedia session in an application of internet telephony for voice and video calls. It is also used for private IP telephony systems as well as instant messaging over protocols. Voice over Internet Protocol (also voice over IP, VoIP or IP telephony) is a methodology and group of technologies for the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions over Internet Protocol (IP) networks, such as the Internet VoIP telephony uses mainly two protocols in order to set up a call and to transport Audio/Video signal. Since VoIP sends calls directly through the same exact path that your network uses for internet and other traffic, your VoIP connections open your network to attack and exploitation. Step to Perform DOS attack Download the Inviteflood tool from Kali Repository. Go to terminal git clone http://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/inviteflood.git This DDoS attack is simple to execute and is successful against VoIP frameworks, it is an attack for which each administrator to have an emergency course of action. - Run only applications required to provide and maintain VoIP services. - Audit administrative and user sessions and service-related activities. - Install and maintain server firewall, antimalware, and anti-tampering measures to deter DoS attacks. - Require strong authentication for administrative and user account access. - Maintain patch currency for an operating system and VoIP applications.
We have a network that consist of the following networks Vpn clients have the following The routing table is as following when connecting ping 10.150.0.50 throw 10.247.0.2 bm 3.8 10.151.253.251 (linux firewall). Our problem is that servers on the network 10.150.0.0 are able to ping the vpn clients. These clients are not able to ping the servers on the 10.150.0.0 net unless nat is enabled on the private interface of the bm 3.8 server. The problem is that we canít access resources directly on the internet when not enabling nat on the public interface.
A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2018; you can also visit the original URL. The file type is Wireless mesh network is one the most potential application network for outdoor communication. In this presented work the security issues are investigated in WMN and a solution for security issue is designed more specifically for wormhole attack detection and prevention. The issues rise when the nodes are mobile and poor routing techniques allow a user to change or modify the information during data transmission because, during network communication the data is transmitted through thefatcat:vq4k5wo5jfh33gwdtwpv5bah7i
A hidden gem in Windows 10 security is the Security Compliance Manager (SCM), a SQL Server-driven management console IT can use to customize, store and export security configurations. Essentially, IT can use SCM to set the ground rules for Windows 10 security settings. The SCM configurations create the security baseline settings in Windows Server, and they are the first line of defense for organizations. SCM is a free Microsoft Solution Accelerator that IT can use to secure Windows. Microsoft tests and automates these tools to provide a more secure platform. Don't simply download security baselines and configure standard settings. The Security Compliance Manager enables IT to adjust security baselines through its interface. It provides specific steps for stricter security settings that may appeal to different types of organizations, such as adding sensitive privilege use and detailed tracking options.
Crisis malware aka Morcut was discovered in July and was found to infect four platforms - Mac OS X, Windows, VMware virtual machines and Windows mobile smartphones - rather that the two previously discovered. eWeek has reported that the malware has been found to cause "no real danger for virtual machines", while it does presage a possible move by criminals towards finding better methods to infect virtualised servers and infrastructure, according to security experts. "You don't have to go looking for Crisis on your data centre VMs, because it's not really targeted at that," Warren Wu, director of the data centre business unit at security software firm Trend Micro, said in an interview, according to reports. "But a future malware author could have an 'Aha!' moment and decide to use the same technique to get access to the VMs in the data center," Wu adds. TrendMicro, a cloud security blog, notes that the VMware virtual machines are no stranger to malware infections. Firstly, Crisis malware checks for the virtual machines and infects them. Second, it will infect the machine via underlying infrastructure by modifying the .vmdk file. "All the interesting aspects aside, we do not feel that there is an immediate threat from this malware. The actual rate of incidence in the wild is very low (less than 100), so it does not appear to be widespread or capable of spreading quickly," explains TrendMicro. The site claims there are two types of hypervisor deployments such as Type 1 and Type 2. In regard to Type 1 Hypervisor deployment, Wu claims that it is not the deployment Crisis malware that attacks. In Type 2 case, the hypervisor will run on top of the operating system and in turn hosts several virtual machines. Wu claims that the majority of virtual machines are Type 1 that run on data centre where an intermediate operating system is not required. "Crisis infects virtual machines like macro viruses infected Word documents," Wu said, according to eWeek. "To protect against that, companies should make sure that they restrict acces to their repositories of virtual machines."
It does not rely on any signatures database that requires frequent updates, instead uses much better heuristic method for detecting malicious codes. This method is known to be more efficient as it monitors all activity on your computer, and if a program is showing virus like behavior, it reports, remove or quarantined the file. Quttera is very simple to use, no complicated settings is required. After installation, select ‘real time monitor’ from the ‘preference’ section, for detecting threats automatically. It monitors all activities of media files and documents, for example auto saving function of word, etc for possible infection. You can also specify the suspicious files to delete, quarantine, etc from the ‘preference’ section. Quttera is quite useful to recognize shellcodes and other malware hidden in music files, movies files, picture files, computer media files, electronic documents, text files and any other types of data and multimedia files.[via]
Just when you were truly amazed at all of the control flow, event-handling, and debugging features, you find out about Package Logging. Logging enables you to record information about events you are interested in as the package runs. The logging information can be stored in a text or XML file, to a SQL Server table, to the Windows Event Log, or to a file suitable for Profiler. Logging can be enabled for all or some tasks and containers and for all or any events. Tasks and containers can inherit the settings from parent containers. Multiple logs can be set up, and a task or event can log to any or all logs configured. You also have the ability to control which pieces of information are recorded for any event. Open one of the packages you created earlier in this chapter or any package with several Control Flow tasks. From the menu, navigate to SSIS Logging to open the Configure SSIS Logs dialog box. To enable logging, you must first check the box next to Package in the left pane (see Figure 13-23). Notice that the checkboxes for the child objects in the package are grayed out. This means that they will inherit the logging properties of the package. You can click into any checkbox to uncheck an object. Clicking again to check the box will ...
Analysis, monitoring and detection of anomalies on hosts lead to active response and immediate alerts. HIDS collects, analyses and precorrelates logs of a server or client and alerts if an attack, fraudulent use or error is detected. It checks file integrity of the local system. Rootkit detection identifies hidden actions by attackers, trojans, viruses, etc. when system changes occur. HIDS leads to real-time alerts and active response. HIDS integrates smoothly with SIEM and delivers additional valuable information for central correlation. Technical details: It runs on nearly every operating system (Linux, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX, BSD, MacOS, Windows, VMware ESX) and supports to meet compliance requirements. Centralised policy deployment is done for all HIDS agents to monitor the server’s compliance.
The field of system security research has long been dominated by individual qualitative results - either demonstrations of individual system vulnerabilities or expositions on the protection provided by individual security measures (e.g., firewalls, virus detectors, IDS systems, etc). These contributions, though clearly valuable, are difficult to evaluate without a complementary quantitative context describing the prevalence and impact of various attacks, vulnerabilities, and responses. The need for empirical data of this type is critical, both for guiding future security research and to provide a well-reasoned basis for developing operational best practices. At the same time, there are tremendous challenges in collecting and analyzing network information at sufficient scale that these findings are globally meaningful. In previous work, we have demonstrated techniques for attacking these problems in the context of Internetconnected systems - particularly focusing on large-scale attacks such as denial-of-service and self-propagating network worms. Using a new technique, called 'backscatter analysis', combined with the large address space 'network telescope' we have developed at UCSD, we have been able to monitor the global prevalence of denial-of-service (DoS) activity on the Internet. Our approach allows us to quantitatively measure each individual attack, its duration, its intensity, and identify the victim and the services targeted. Our initial study demonstrated that DoS attacks occur with great frequency and target a wide-variety of sites and network infrastructure, thereby ending an ongoing debate in the security community about how widespread this phenomenon really was. In related work, we have used a similar approach to monitor the spread of Internet worms such as CodeRed and Nimda. Using this data, we identified the growth pattern of these attacks, characterized the victims to identify common traits that made them vulnerable, and analyzed the effectiveness of security personnel in repairing their systems across the Internet. Finally, we have also developed a preliminary analysis of the technical requirements for effective worm countermeasures. By combining spreading models, population data extracted from real Internet worm epidemics, and measured models of Internet topology, we have shown that any reactive worm defense will require extremely widespread deployment and very short reaction times (a few minutes or less). Using these ideas as a basis, we propose to develop a combination of network analysis techniques and network measurement infrastructure to analyze large-scale Internet security threats. In particular, we plan to investigate the following questions: how do the nature of these threats change over time, how effective are attackers at compromising services, and how well do existing security countermeasures provide a meaningful defense against these threats in practice? Using the large 'network telescope' we have developed at UCSD in combination with smaller monitoring platforms on other networks, we expect to be able to measure the vast majority of large-scale Internet attacks and capture global DoS, worm, and port scan activity on an ongoing basis. Based on this longitudinal data, we will develop analytic techniques for measuring long-term trends in the make-up and staging of these attacks. We plan to extend our backscatter algorithms and measurement infrastructure to track Internet attacks in real-time and actively probe victimized hosts to understand the impact of these attacks, the distribution of various vulnerabilities, and the efficacy of employed security measures. Finally, we will modify our monitors to redirect a subset of packets to simulated hosts (a so-called 'honeynet') to automatically identify and characterize new worms as they emerge. The potential impact of this proposal is the creation of an empirical dataset that describes large-scale attacks across the global Internet. There is no equivalent dataset available today for researchers or practitioners to engineer their systems or to model the relative importance of different threats. Moreover, the real-time nature of this dataset could be widely valuable for operationally detecting, tracking, and characterizing large-scale threats as they occur. Given ongoing requests from government, industry, and academia that we receive for our preliminary data, we believe that there is keen, widespread interest for the large-scale data that we propose to create.
Understanding Connection Filtering Applies to: Exchange Server 2010 SP3, Exchange Server 2010 SP2 Topic Last Modified: 2010-01-22 The Connection Filter agent is an anti-spam agent enabled on computers running Microsoft Exchange Server 2010 that have the Edge Transport server role installed. The Connection Filter agent relies on the IP address of the remote server that's trying to connect, to determine what action, if any, to take on an inbound message. The remote IP address is available to the Connection Filter agent as a by-product of the underlying TCP/IP connection required for the SMTP session. Because the Connection Filter agent must evaluate the IP address of the remote server that's sending the message to be effective, the Connection Filter agent is typically enabled on the Internet-facing Edge Transport server. However, you may also perform additional configuration to run the Connection Filter agent deeper in the inbound message path. When you configure anti-spam agents on an Edge Transport server, the agents act on messages cumulatively to reduce the number of unsolicited messages that enter the organization. To reduce redundancy and improve overall system performance and efficiency, you must understand the order in which the agents evaluate inbound messages. Understanding the order in which the filters evaluate inbound messages will help you optimize your configuration of the Edge Transport servers. For more information about how to plan and deploy the anti-spam agents, see Understanding Anti-Spam and Antivirus Functionality. When you enable the Connection Filter agent, the Connection Filter agent is the first anti-spam agent to run when an inbound message is evaluated. When an inbound message is submitted to an Edge Transport server on which the Connection Filter agent is enabled, the source IP address of the SMTP connection is checked against IP Allow lists and IP Block lists. If the source IP address is listed on an IP Allow list, the message is sent to the destination without additional processing by other anti-spam agents. If the source IP address is listed on an IP Block list, the SMTP connection is dropped after all RCPT TO headers in the message are processed. \|The timing of when a specific connection is dropped may depend on other anti-spam configurations. For example, you can specify which recipients always receive e-mail messages, even if the source IP address is blocked. Additionally, you may have configured other agents that rely on content from the DATA command to be parsed. The Connection Filter agent always drops blocked connections according to the overall anti-spam configuration.\| If the source IP address isn't listed on any IP Allow list or IP Block list, the message continues to flow through other anti-spam agents if other anti-spam agents are configured. Looking for management tasks related to anti-spam and antivirus functionality? See Managing Anti-Spam and Antivirus Features. The Connection Filter agent compares the IP address of the server sending a message to any of the following data stores of IP addresses: Administrator-defined IP Allow lists and IP Block lists IP Block List providers IP Allow List providers For more information about IP Block List providers, see "IP Block List Providers" later in this topic. You must configure at least one of these data stores of IP addresses for the Connection Filter agent to be operational. If the data stores of IP addresses don't contain the IP addresses on the IP Allow lists or IP Block lists, or if you don't have any IP Block List providers or IP Allow List providers configured, you should disable the Connection Filter agent. Administrators of Edge Transport servers maintain administrator-defined lists of IP addresses. You can enter and delete the IP addresses that you want to allow or block by using the Exchange Management Console (EMC) or the Exchange Management Shell. You can add IP addresses individually, by IP address range, or by IP address and subnet mask. When you add an IP address or IP address range, you must specify the IP address or IP address range as an IP Block list address or an IP Allow list address. Additionally, you can specify an expiration time for each IP Block list entry that you create. When you set the expiration time, the expiration time specifies how long the IP Block list entry is active. When the expiration time duration is reached, the IP Block list entry is disabled. By using administrator-defined IP Allow lists and IP Block lists, you can configure connection filtering to support the following scenarios: To exempt IP addresses from the IP Block lists of IP Block List providers You may have to exempt IP addresses from the IP Block lists of IP Block List providers when legitimate senders are unintentionally put on an IP Block List provider's IP Block list. For example, legitimate senders could be unintentionally put on an IP Block list when an SMTP server was unintentionally configured to act as an open relay. In this scenario, the sender will probably try to correct the misconfiguration and remove the IP address from the IP Block List provider's IP Block list. For more information about IP Block List providers, see "IP Block List Providers" later in this topic. To deny access from IP addresses that are a source of unsolicited e-mail messages but aren't found on an IP Block List provider's IP Block lists Sometimes, you may receive a large quantity of unsolicited messages from a source that wasn't yet identified by a real-time block list service to which you subscribe. IP Block List provider services can help you reduce the number of unsolicited e-mail messages that enter your organization. \|IP Block List provider services are frequently referred to as real-time block list services or RBL services. The EMC refers to real-time block list services as IP Block List provider services. The terms real-time block list services, RBL services, and IP Block List provider services are equivalent.\| IP Block List provider services compile lists of IP addresses from which spam has originated in the past. Additionally, some IP Block List providers provide lists of IP addresses for which SMTP is configured for open relay. There are also IP Block List provider services that provide lists of IP addresses that support dial-up access. Internet service providers (ISPs) that provide dial-up access services to their clients assign dynamic IP addresses for each dial-up session. Some ISPs block SMTP traffic from dial-up accounts. These ISPs and the attendant dial-up IP ranges aren't typically added to IP Block lists. However, some ISPs allow clients to send SMTP traffic from dial-up accounts. Malicious users take advantage of ISPs that allow SMTP traffic to send spam on dynamically assigned IP addresses. When the IP address is put on an IP Block list, the malicious users start another dial-up session and receive a new IP address. Frequently, a single IP Block List provider can provide a list of IP addresses that covers all these spam threats. You can configure multiple IP Block List provider configurations by using the EMC or the Shell. Each service requires a separate IP Block List provider configuration in the EMC or the Shell. When you configure the Connection Filter agent to use an IP Block List provider, the Connection Filter agent queries the IP Block List provider service to determine whether a match exists with the connecting IP addresses before the message is accepted into the organization. Before the Connection Filter agent contacts the IP Block List provider to verify an IP address, the IP address is first compared to the administrator-defined IP Allow list and IP Block list. If the IP address doesn't exist on either the administrator-defined IP Allow list or IP Block list, the Connection Filter agent queries the IP Block List provider services according to the priority rating assigned to each provider. If the IP address appears on the IP Block list of an IP Block List provider, the Edge Transport server waits for and parses the RCPT TO header, responds to the sending system with an SMTP 550 error, and closes the connection. If the IP address doesn't appear on the IP Block lists of any one of the IP Block List providers, the next agent in the anti-spam chain processes the connection. For more information about the order in which the default anti-spam and antivirus agents filter inbound messages from the Internet, see Understanding Anti-Spam and Antivirus Functionality. When you use the Connection Filter agent, it's a best practice to use one or more IP Block List providers to manage access into your organization. The use of an administrator-defined block list to maintain your own IP Block list is time-consuming and may be impossible from a human resource perspective in most organizations. Therefore, we recommend the use of an external IP Block List provider service, whose sole purpose is to maintain IP Block lists. However, there may be some disadvantages to using an IP Block List provider. Because the Connection Filter agent must query an external entity for each unknown IP address, outages or delays at the IP Block List provider service can cause delays in the processing of messages on the Edge Transport server. In extreme cases, such outages or delays could cause a mail-flow bottleneck on the Edge Transport server. The other disadvantage of using an external IP Block List provider service is that legitimate senders are sometimes added to the IP Block lists of IP Block List providers by mistake. For example, legitimate senders can be added to the IP Block lists maintained by IP Block List providers as the result of an SMTP misconfiguration, where the SMTP server was unintentionally configured to act as an open relay. For each IP Block List provider service that you configure, you can customize the SMTP 550 error returned to the sender when the sender IP address is matched to an IP Block List provider service and is subsequently blocked by the Connection Filter agent. It's a best practice to customize the SMTP 550 error to identify the IP Block List provider service that identifies the sender as a blocked IP address. This best practice enables legitimate senders to contact the IP Block List provider service so that they can be removed from the IP Block List provider service's IP Block list. Different IP Block List provider services may return different codes when the IP address of a remote server sending a message matches an IP address on an IP Block List provider service's IP Block list. Most IP Block List provider services return one of the following data types: bitmask or absolute value. Within these data types, there may be multiple values that indicate the type of list that the submitted IP address is on. This section shows an example of the status codes returned by most Block List providers. For details about the status codes that the provider returns, see the documentation from the specific provider. For bitmask data types, the IP Block List provider service returns a status code of 127.0.0.x, where the integer x is any one of the values listed in the following table. Values and status codes for bitmask data types The IP address is on an IP Block list. The SMTP server is configured to act as an open relay. The IP address supports a dial-up IP address. For absolute value types, the IP Block List provider service returns explicit responses based on the cause of the block of the IP address. The following table shows some examples of absolute values and the explicit responses. Values and status codes for absolute value data types The IP address is a direct spam source. The IP address is a bulk mailer. The remote server sending the message is known to support multistage open relays. You can also manage inbound messages by using IP Allow List provider services that provide IP Allow lists. IP Allow lists are sometimes referred to as IP safe lists or white lists elsewhere in the software industry. IP Allow List providers maintain lists of IP addresses that are definitively known not to be associated with any spam activity. When an IP Allow List provider returns an IP Allow match, which indicates that the sender's IP address is more likely to be a reputable or safe sender, the Connection Filter agent relays the message to the next agent in the anti-spam chain. In some organizations, the Edge Transport server role is installed on computers that don't process SMTP requests directly on the Internet. In this scenario, the Edge Transport server is behind another front-end SMTP server that processes inbound messages directly from the Internet. In this scenario, the Connection Filter agent must be able to extract the correct originating IP address from the message. To extract and evaluate the originating IP address, the Connection Filter agent must parse the Received headers from the message and compare those headers to the known SMTP server in the perimeter network. When an RFC-compliant SMTP server receives a message, the server updates the message's Received header with the domain name and IP address of the sender. Therefore, for each SMTP server between the originating sender and the Edge Transport server, the SMTP server adds an additional Received header entry. When you configure your perimeter network to support Exchange 2010, you must specify all the IP addresses for the SMTP servers in your perimeter network. The IP address data is replicated to Edge Transport servers by EdgeSync. When messages are received by the computer that runs the Connection Filter agent, the IP address in the Received header that doesn't match an SMTP server IP address in your perimeter network is assumed to be the originating IP address. You must specify all internal SMTP servers on the transport configuration object in the Active Directory forest before you run connection filtering. Specify the internal SMTP servers by using the InternalSMTPServers parameter on the Set-TransportConfig cmdlet. After you configure an IP Block List provider service or IP Allow List provider service, you can test to make sure that connection filtering is configured correctly for the particular service. Most IP Block List provider services or IP Allow List provider services provide test IP addresses that you can use to test their services. When you run a test against an IP Block List provider service or an IP Allow List provider service, the Connection Filter agent issues a Domain Name System (DNS) query based on the real-time block list IP address that should respond with a specific response. For more information about how to test IP addresses against an IP Block List provider service or an IP Allow List provider service, see Test-IPAllowListProvider and Test-IPBlockListProvider.
Hygienic macros are macros whose expansion is guaranteed not to cause the accidental capture of identifiers. They are a feature of programming languages such as Scheme and Dylan. The general problem of accidental capture was well known within the Lisp community prior to the introduction of hygienic macros. Macro writers would use language features that would generate unique identifiers (e.g. , gensym) or use obfuscated identifiers in order to avoid the problem. more from Wikipedia
A multi-tenant architecture accommodates separate virtual machines concurrently functioning on a shared physical server. One consequence is that multi-tenancy in a shared cloud environment becomes prey to security threats. Most of these threats stem from one tenant's ability to execute arbitrary programs and/or access physical server components that may impact other tenants. Hence, to protect multi-tenant cloud instances, it is necessary to be able to monitor and control all activities carried out by all tenants. Likewise, it's essential for individual tenants to be able to audit all the potentially harmful non-privileged execute activity. "Cloud strategies usually lag behind cloud use," says Kasey Panetta from Gartner. She also suggested that almost 90% of the organizations could find themselves regularly exposed to cyber threats by 2025 if they fail to implement a robust cloud security strategy. The risks become manifold when considering multi-tenant cloud instances because they are exposed to: With these risks looming, it's essential to be proactive in securing a multi-tenant environment. First things first, why isolate the resources? The answer lies in the ease of exploitation facilitated by the multi-tenant architecture itself. Consider this; attackers often monitor the network and practice brute force. A multi-tenant architecture only makes it easy for them to succeed in their endeavors by allowing residence in neighboring virtual machines. Such proximity paves the way for side-channel attacks. Hence, resource isolation becomes imperative to tackle the noisy neighbor problem and keep the performance intact. Following are some of the core isolation strategies as suggested by AWS. Another strategy that's highly recommended is the deployment of intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS). IDS can be used to detect possible system faults and malicious attempts. IPS, on the other hand, acts as a security guard at the entry points of a network. As such, IDS can be employed in segregation, i.e., host-based IDS can be placed for internal monitoring of the use of resources. Through such monitoring, it can notify the administrator of any erroneous thread allocations. Alternatively, network-based IDS can be employed to detect unauthorized attempts at connecting to a network. In order to monitor the entire traffic, it can be used as a universal IDS. While the employment of IDS and IPS is paramount, it doesn't imply that it's a comprehensive solution to the multi-tenant cloud security problem. Multi-tenancy isolation, as explained previously, still needs to be meticulously implemented in the deployment architecture. Overall, it's crucial to manage the ecosystem via regular practices to prevent unauthorized attacks on shared cloud instances. For instance: While multi-tenancy has multiple benefits, including cost-effectiveness, scalability, and elasticity, its inherently high risk of soundly imploding in the event of unauthorized attacks is a big concern for customers and cloud service providers alike. We at ITPN understand that the security issues in a multi-tenant cloud can be exasperatingly complex. However, we also understand that they don't have to be. We design, implement, and manage solutions that can make your cloud more secure even (and especially) while upholding its performance. For more information on securing multi-tenant cloud solutions, get in touch with us today.
By Hugo Sanchez, Founder and CEO of rThreat Just a few weeks ago, the FBI released a statement confirming that their server was hacked over the weekend, resulting in thousands of spam emails warning of a fake cyberattack that were sent to individuals and companies nationwide. In the statement released to address the incident, the bureau clarified that the attack did not compromise their system or allow an outsider to gain access to their data. The mere fact that this attack was possible, however, highlights the glaring problem with our cyber defenses: they are not impenetrable, and the gaps are not proactively identified because they are not battle tested. In a world where cyber criminals are getting smarter and our technology is becoming more advanced with every passing day, it is unthinkable that our approach to cyber defenses should remain unchanged. To combat the attacks of tomorrow and shore up our defenses to meet them, cybersecurity needs to pivot in favor of defending forward and using threat emulation – and not simulation – to determine any vulnerabilities. The concept of modern penetration testing was dreamed up in the 1960s, and in 1967, more than 15,000 computer security experts, government and business analysts gathered together at the annual Joint Computer Conference to discuss concerns that computer communication lines could be penetrated. Early penetration testing was carried out primarily by the RAND corporation and the government, and most systems immediately failed the tests, confirming the validity of the concerns. Today, penetration testing has evolved to enable ethical hackers to test a system’s vulnerabilities through simulated cyber attacks. A recent survey found that 70% of organizations perform penetration tests as a way to measure their security level and 69% do so to prevent breaches. But these tests are flawed. Simulations using threat signatures are not enough to ensure defenses are adequate, and testing the capabilities of cyber protections in this way is akin to testing a bulletproof vest by firing blanks. The biggest difference between attack simulation and attack emulation is that attack emulation showcases a threat actor’s strengths and weaknesses. In an attack simulation, it is possible to recreate the exploitation aspect, but if testers aren’t using the same tools and making the same mistakes that threat actors do, they will be unable to create defenses that detect those same mistakes. Another problem is that current methods dictate the use of customized and refined attacks to test cyber defenses, when in reality, it’s essential to replicate exactly what the system will be responding to in a real-life scenario, utilizing the same tools and the same mistakes that threat actors use during security tests. Those that rely on a machine learning or AI-based solution also have to contend with the possibility of causing the program to learn the wrong behavior during simulated attacks, because the attacks are not based on the latest threat intelligence or indicative of what threat actors are using. Additionally, because attack simulations are not real attacks, they run the risk of not being recognized by security controls as a threat, making it impossible to be sure the controls will work in a real-world scenario. Experts who weighed in on the FBI breach pointed to the possibility that the lack of malicious email attachments was simply due to the hackers finding the vulnerability without a concrete plan to exploit it. But Austin Berglas, a former assistant special agent in charge of the FBI’s New York office cyber branch, summed up the problem quite succinctly: “It could have been a lot worse.” Leaving our systems vulnerable to attack is unacceptable when there is a better way. Breach and attack emulation solutions are more dynamic in nature, can expose gaps in a company’s infrastructure, and can mimic the tactics of real-world threat actors, allowing organizations to prioritize the gaps that represent the greatest threat to their networks. We have come a long way in our understanding of cyber threats and methods of detection, but our defenses remain lightyears behind. The government wouldn’t send soldiers into combat with faulty equipment, and it’s time we take that same tack with our cybersecurity. Battle testing our defenses is a necessary next step, and until we do, we are leaving ourselves open to the kind of threats that could bring our country to its knees. About the Author Hugo Sanchez is the founder and CEO of rThreat, a breach and attack emulation software that challenges cyber defenses using real-world and custom threats in a secure environment. Learn more about Hugo and his company at www.rthreat.net.
When reviewing an intrusion detection system (IDS), an IS auditor should be MOST concerned about which of the following? Number of nonthreatening events identified as threatening Attacks not being identified by the system Reports/logs being produced by an automated tool Legitimate traffic being blocked by the system Attacks not being identified by the system present a higher risk, because they are unknown and no action will be taken to address the attack. Although the number of false-positives is a serious issue, the problem will be known and can be corrected. Often, IDS reports are first analyzed by an automated tool to eliminate known false-positives, which generally are not a problem. An IDS does not block any traffic.
DMARC, also known as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance, is a form of email authentication that builds on existing authentication protocols. These authentication protocols play an important role in protecting users from spammy or malicious email content. We’ve previously covered other email authentication protocols including DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Sender Policy Framework (SPF). … Continue reading “What Is DMARC?” Yahoo! and AOL raised some eyebrows when they changed their DMARC Validation in a super aggressive way in an attempt to block email spoofing attacks on yahoo.com and aol.com addresses. Their intent was honorable, but this policy change could end up rejecting your email campaigns, even if you’re a legitimate sender!
The CSE CybSec Z-Lab Malware Lab analyzed a couple of new malware samples, belonging to the Bladabindi family, that were discovered on a looking-good website. ZLab team detected two new threats hosted on a looking-good website www[.]camplace[.]com/live-cams. Both malware looks like a legitimate app that users have to install in order to access the media file hosted on the website. The malicious website (www[.]6th-sense[.]eu), hosts 2 different malware samples: - “6thClient.exe” can be downloaded clicking the pop-up button on the homepage inviting users to download the client indicated on the screen. - “Firefox.exe” is hosted on the path “www[.]6th-sense[.]eu/Firefox.exe” Both malware act as spyware, in particular, “Firefox.exe” seems to act as a bot, because it waits for specific commands from a C&C. Analyzing the TCP stream, we can see the communication session performed by malware with the C&C: - The first row shows the PC’s name, User’s name, and the OS’s version. - There are two recurrent words: “nyan” and “act” - the first word represents a separator among the information sent to the C2C - the second one represents the category of the information sent by the bot. in this case it is the ‘action’ performed by the host, in particular, it is the name of the window in the foreground - In the middle, we can see some strings coded in Base64. These strings represent the window’s title in the foreground. The C2C acknowledges the result sending the number Zero to the bot, probably this value indicates that there are no commands to execute on the host. Both Malware would seem to belong to the malware family Bladabindi. Bladabindi is a Trojan malware that steals confidential information from the compromised computer. Hackers also use it as a Malware downloader to deliver and execute other malware. With this malware, cybercriminals could steal - Your computer name - Your native country - OS serial numbers - Windows usernames - Operating system version - Stored passwords in chrome - Stored passwords in Firefox You can download the full ZLAB Malware Analysis Report at the following URL: (Security Affairs – Bladabindi malware, data stealer) The post Exclusive, CSE CybSec ZLAB Malware Analysis Report: The Bladabindi malware appeared first on Security Affairs.
One of the first things I like to do when setting up a web server is install the fail2ban package. If you’ve ever deployed a webserver before, you may have noticed that almost immediately you will be the target of automated scripts attempting to bruteforce your webserver’s authentication. Fail2ban helps to mitigate these attempts by blacklisting the IP address of suspected threat actors through firewall rules. In today’s interconnected world, ensuring the security of our online systems and servers has become paramount. With the constant threat of malicious attacks and unauthorized access, server administrators are always seeking robust solutions to safeguard their valuable data. Fail2Ban, an open-source software package, has emerged as a powerful tool in the fight against cyber threats. This article explores the features, benefits, and implementation of Fail2Ban in fortifying server security. What is Fail2Ban? Fail2Ban is a lightweight intrusion prevention software package designed to protect servers from brute-force attacks, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and other malicious activities. It operates by monitoring log files for patterns of repeated unsuccessful login attempts and dynamically blocks the offending IP addresses. Key Features and Benefits: - Log Monitoring: Fail2Ban scans log files (e.g., SSH, Apache, Nginx) in real-time, detecting suspicious activities based on user-defined rules. It identifies patterns like repeated login failures, excessive 404 errors, and other signs of malicious behavior. - IP Blocking: Once an offender is identified, Fail2Ban automatically adds their IP address to the firewall’s blacklist, preventing further access from that source. This proactive measure effectively mitigates the risk of brute-force attacks and unauthorized access. - Flexible Configuration: Fail2Ban offers a highly customizable configuration that allows administrators to tailor the software’s behavior to their specific needs. Parameters such as ban duration, threshold limits, and whitelisting can be adjusted according to the server’s security requirements. - Notification System: Fail2Ban provides email notifications, enabling administrators to stay informed about security incidents in real-time. These alerts can be configured to notify admins of banned IP addresses, potential threats, or other important events, ensuring prompt action can be taken. Implementation and Integration: Fail2Ban integrates seamlessly with various server applications, making it a versatile choice for system administrators. It supports a wide range of services, including SSH, FTP, SMTP, HTTP, and more. The package is compatible with popular Linux distributions, such as Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, and Fedora, simplifying its implementation across different server environments. In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, Fail2Ban serves as a robust line of defense against a multitude of threats. By effectively analyzing log files, identifying malicious patterns, and promptly blocking offending IP addresses, Fail2Ban enhances server security and safeguards valuable data. System administrators can leverage the flexibility and ease of integration provided by Fail2Ban to strengthen their server defenses and ensure uninterrupted operations. With its comprehensive feature set and active community support, Fail2Ban remains a vital tool in the battle against cyber threats.
Dynamic Address Groups in Palo Alto Firewalls: A Step-by-Step Guide As network security threats continue to evolve, it is essential for businesses to have the right security measures in place to protect their networks. One way to enhance network security is by using dynamic address groups in Palo Alto Firewalls. In this article, we will provide a step-by-step guide on how to create dynamic address groups in Palo Alto Firewalls. Palo Alto Networks firewalls allow administrators to create dynamic address groups, which are collections of IP addresses that can change dynamically based on defined criteria. Dynamic address groups simplify policy management and make it easier to update security policies without having to manually update address objects. The configuration steps outlined in the previous answer apply to Palo Alto Networks Operating System (PAN-OS) version 8.1 and later. It’s always recommended to check the compatibility of your PAN-OS version with the latest features and configurations before proceeding. What are dynamic address groups? Dynamic address groups are a feature in Palo Alto Firewalls that allow you to group IP addresses dynamically based on certain criteria. This makes it easy to apply security policies to a specific group of IP addresses without having to manually update the group each time a new IP address is added or removed. Why use dynamic address groups? Dynamic address groups provide several benefits to network security. For one, they save time and effort by automating the process of adding or removing IP addresses from a group. This means that security policies can be applied more quickly and efficiently. Additionally, dynamic address groups can be configured to update in real-time, ensuring that the latest IP addresses are always included in the group. Step 1: Log in to the Palo Alto Networks firewall To log in to your Palo Alto Networks firewall, open a web browser and enter the IP address or hostname of the firewall in the address bar. Enter your username and password to log in. Step 2: Navigate to the Objects tab In the main menu, click on the Objects tab. This will take you to the Objects page, where you can manage your firewall’s objects, including address objects, address groups, and dynamic address groups. Step 3: Create a new dynamic address group To create a new dynamic address group, click on the “Add” button in the Dynamic Address Groups section. This will open a new window where you can specify the properties of the dynamic address group. Step 4: Configure the dynamic address group properties In the Dynamic Address Group Properties window, fill in the following fields: - Name: Enter a descriptive name for the dynamic address group. - Type: Select “Dynamic” from the drop-down menu. - Tag: (Optional) You can add tags to help organize and categorize your address objects and groups. - Dynamic Update: Select the criteria that will determine the membership of the dynamic address group. This can be based on information from a user-ID agent, a Panorama management server, or a custom API. - Members: (Optional) You can add members to the dynamic address group. Members will be added to the dynamic address group if they meet the criteria specified in the Dynamic Update field. Step 5: Save the dynamic address group Once you have completed the configuration, click on the “OK” button to save the dynamic address group. The dynamic address group will now be listed in the Dynamic Address Groups section of the Objects page. Step 6: Use the dynamic address group in a security policy To use the dynamic address group in a security policy, go to the Policies tab and create or edit an existing security policy. In the Source and Destination fields, select the dynamic address group from the drop-down menus. Step 7: Commit the changes Finally, to apply the changes, click on the “Commit” button in the top right corner of the page. This will commit the changes to the firewall, and the dynamic address group will be used in the security policy. Dynamic address groups in Palo Alto Networks firewalls provide a flexible and dynamic way to manage address objects and simplify policy management. By following the steps outlined in this tutorial, you can easily create and use dynamic address groups in your Palo Alto Networks firewall.
Scramble plugin Facebook Social network sites (SNS) allow users to share information with friends, family, and other contacts. However, current SNS sites such as Facebook or Twitter assume that users trust SNS providers with the access control of their data. In this demo we propose Scramble, the implementation of a SNS-independent Firefox extension that allows users to enforce access control over their data. Scramble lets users define access control lists (ACL) of authorised users for each piece of data, based on their preferences. The definition of ACL is facilitated through the possibility of dynamically defining contact groups. In turn, the confidentiality and integrity of one data item is enforced using cryptographic techniques. When accessing a SNS that contains data encrypted using Scramble, the plugin transparently decrypts and checks integrity of the encrypted content.
Article ID: 900926 - View products that this article applies to. The MS05-019 security update modifies how the operating system validates Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) requests. This security update prevents an ICMP-based attack. However, under special circumstances, this security update may cause the computer to lose network connectivity. This article describes three methods that you can use to help prevent the computer from losing network connectivity when the MS05-019 security update is installed. This article describes the recommended TCP/IP settings for wide area network (WAN) links with a Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size of less than 576. Important This section, method, or task contains steps that tell you how to modify the registry. However, serious problems might occur if you modify the registry incorrectly. Therefore, make sure that you follow these steps carefully. For added protection, back up the registry before you modify it. Then, you can restore the registry if a problem occurs. For more information about how to back up and restore the registry, click the following article number to view the article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base: (http://support.microsoft.com/kb/322756/ )How to back up and restore the registry in Windows The MS05-019 security update modifies how the operating system validates Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) requests. This security update restricts the lowest MTU size to 576 bytes. The MTU size is restricted to prevent an ICMP-based attack. An ICMP-based attack could reduce the MTU size to very low value. A very low MTU size could cause a severe decrease in performance. However, an MTU size that is restricted to 576 bytes may affect certain WAN scenarios, such as satellite links. In these WAN scenarios, the MTU size might be less than 576. In these WAN scenarios, network connectivity may be lost. You can use tools such as Network Monitor to detect whether you are experiencing such scenarios by analyzing a network trace. If the destinations to which the network connectivity is lost has any ICMP destination unreachable message with the next hop MTU value of less than 576, you are experiencing such scenarios. Under these special circumstances, consider using one of the following recommendations. Note You should not use the following recommendations if you are not experiencing one of these scenarios. The following recommendations may reduce the network throughput. Method 1: Enable Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) black hole detectionIf you enable the Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) black hole detection feature, TCP will try to send segments that do not have the Don't Fragment bit set. TCP will try to send these segments if several retransmissions of a segment go unacknowledged. If a segment is acknowledged, the maximum segment size (MSS) will be reduced and the Don't Fragment bit will be set in future packets on the connection. This method is preferred because the packet size is lowered for only the problematic segment. Black hole detection increases the maximum number of retransmissions for a specific segment. To enable PMTU black hole detection, follow these steps: Method 2: Disable PMTU DiscoveryIf you disable PMTU Discovery, TCP will only send packets that have an MTU size of 576 and that do not have the Don't Fragment set. This enables the routers to fragment the packet and send the packet across the networks. This method affects packets sent to all destinations. Most of the time, the performance will be at acceptable levels with a packet size of 576. However, performance will be lower than if PMTU Discovery was enabled and the path supported an MTU size larger than 576. To disable PMTU Discovery, follow these steps: Method 3: Set the MTU size for the network interface manuallyIf you set the MTU size for a network interface manually, this setting overrides the default MTU for the network interface. The MTU size is the maximum packet size in bytes that the transport will transmit over the underlying network. This method affects packets sent to all destinations and may significantly affect the performance, depending on the MTU size that you set. To set the MTU size for the network interface, follow these steps: For more information, click the following article number to view the article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base: (http://support.microsoft.com/kb/898060/ )Network connectivity between clients and servers may fail after you install security update MS05-019 or Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 For more information about TCP/IP, visit the following Microsoft TechNet Web site: Overview of networking and TCP/IP Article ID: 900926 - Last Review: September 30, 2011 - Revision: 5.0 Contact us for more help Connect with Answer Desk for expert help.
16.4 Getting Users Involved In Chapter 7, we discussed the steps you can take to create and implement a security policy and security plan. When it comes to web site security, one of the steps you can take with the greatest payoff in security is to make your policies clear and available to your users. Here are some ways you can let visitors to your site know what you expect from them and what they can expect from you: Create and post a security policy screen that each user must acknowledge each time they access your site Force each user to sign an agreement to observe your security policy before they can get a logon to your site Post information about the users' rights when accessing your web site The policy you post should outline the rules you intend to enforce and the consequences to the user if the rules are broken. 16.4.1 Educating Users If you post a policy, you will need to ensure that you can enforce that policy. For example, if your intranet policy says that there are sites or newsgroups your employees are not permitted to access, you will have to be able to monitor their activities to ensure that they are not accessing those sites. If you are going to audit user actions, you have an obligation to notify your users of that fact. You should be sure that you are able to enforce any policies you post. In the case of an intranet, you should try to involve your users in helping you enforce policies. Show them what steps they can take to keep the system and their data safe. The more your site visitors know about what you expect: The better they can comply with your security requests The less likely they are to intentionally violate the rules The more they can help you to protect the system If you can show them the ramifications of having the system compromised loss of data and time loss from being unable to access the system you might gain their support to help keep the system safe. 16.4.2 Enforcing Policies As with any other form of computer security, you need to decide how you are going to enforce the policies you have defined to help ensure that your web site provides a safe place for users to conduct business with your company and a secure environment for your computers and databases. Although you need to define internally the steps you are prepared to take to enforce your web site policy, you will not want to publicize these steps to the outside community. Publicly mapping out the steps you are taking to close a security hole may actually help outside intruders compromise your system. 16.4.3 Communicating with Other Sites If you know and trust the people who administer the sites that are either physically or logically near yours, you might want to stay in contact with them to share information. For instance, if you are with the government, you might want to develop contacts with other government web site managers. Likewise, if you are with a university, staying in touch with other university web site managers might be of benefit to you. If another site suffers a break-in and the site administrator lets you know what happened and how, you will be better able to protect your own site from the same situation. However, sharing information can add an extra amount of risk. If your system is compromised, be careful just how much and what kind of information you pass on to other sites with which you are in contact. For example, using email to share information is not a good idea in this situation. \| \|\| \| Although operating system intruder detection is beyond the scope of this book, we would like to call your attention to a wonderful intruder detection checklist supplied by CERT-CC (the Computer Engineering Response Team Coordination Center). You can access this list through CERT-CC's web site at http://www.cert.org or download it from ftp:// info .cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist
WinHex is a powerful computer forensics, data recovery, and IT security tool. Vred.A is a proof-of-concept virus that is written in script language, that is used by the powerful computer forensics, data recovery, and IT security tool called WinHex. Here's a screenshot of the WinHex utility: The virus contains less than 20 commands that allows it to look for all available .WHS (WinHex script) files and to prepend itself to them. As a result all infected scripts stop working until the virus' code is removed from them. It should be noted that WinHex shows a warning before running any script, so the virus can not replicate without user's interaction:
- Why is ICMP a security risk? - What does ICMP type 3 code 13 mean? - What is ICMP redirect attack? - How do I know if ICMP is blocked? - What are 5 types of errors handled by ICMP messages? - Does Windows Firewall block ICMP? - Is ICMP secure? - What is ICMP in cyber security? - Why is ICMP needed? - Does ICMP use IP? - How do I know if Windows is running ICMP? - What happens if ICMP is disabled? - What port is ICMP? - What causes ICMP Destination Unreachable? - Which ICMP types allow? - How do I stop ICMP? - What services use ICMP? - What is the difference between ICMP and TCP? Why is ICMP a security risk? The ICMP Echo protocol (usually known as “Ping”) is mostly harmless. Its main security-related issues are: In the presence of requests with a fake source address (“spoofing”), they can make a target machine send relatively large packets to another host.. What does ICMP type 3 code 13 mean? destination unreachable administratively prohibitedExplanation: Type 3 code 13 is destination unreachable administratively prohibited. This type of message is typically returned from a device blocking a port. … An ICMP type 3, code 13 response means that the machine is down. What is ICMP redirect attack? ICMP redirects are a “feature” of IP which allows a router to inform a host that there’s a more efficient route to a destination and that the host should adjust its routing table accordingly. … These entries say to route packets to 198.168. 103.11 (the customer’s IP address, changed to protect their identity) via 10.254. How do I know if ICMP is blocked? 3 Answers. If ICMP is blocked, you can’t ping the host in the normal way, however, if it is running an exposed tcp service, you can use tcping. It sends a SYN, listens for SYN/ACK response as the ICMP Echo equivalent and measures the time required for the transaction. What are 5 types of errors handled by ICMP messages? ICMP uses the source IP address to send the error message to the source (originator) of the datagram. Five types of errors are handled: destination unreachable, source quench, time exceeded, parameter problems, and redirection (see figure1). Does Windows Firewall block ICMP? By default, Windows Firewall with Advanced Security blocks ICMP Echo Requests from the network. … (Note that, if you have an antivirus with a firewall or another type of third-party firewall program installed, you’ll need to open ports in that firewall instead of the built-in Windows Firewall.) Is ICMP secure? The Problem. Many network administrators feel that ICMP is a security risk, and should therefore always be blocked at the firewall. It is true that ICMP does have some security issues associated with it, and that a lot of ICMP should be blocked. But this is no reason to block all ICMP traffic! What is ICMP in cyber security? ICMP is a transport level protocol within TCP/IP which communicates information about network connectivity issues back to the source of the compromised transmission. It sends control messages such as destination network unreachable, source route failed, and source quench. Why is ICMP needed? Practically, ICMP offers error control and often it is employed to report errors, send management queries and operations information. Network devices like routers need to use the ICMP in order to send the error messages. That is why ICMP is considered as a supporting protocol. Does ICMP use IP? ICMP uses the basic support of IP as if it were a higher-level protocol, however, ICMP is actually an integral part of IP. … ICMP is a network-layer protocol. There is no TCP or UDP port number associated with ICMP packets as these numbers are associated with the transport layer above. How do I know if Windows is running ICMP? Windows FirewallSearch for Windows Firewall , and click to open it. Note: … Click Advanced Settings on the left.From the left pane of the resulting window, click Inbound Rules.In the right pane, find the rules titled File and Printer Sharing (Echo Request – ICMPv4-In).Right-click each rule and choose Enable Rule.Dec 28, 2020 What happens if ICMP is disabled? Disabling ICMP can cause network issues If Path MTU Discovery is unable to function, excessively large packets may be transmitted without fragmentation and will fail to reach the destination. This will lead to a retransmission loop with the same MTU only to be dropped again and again. What port is ICMP? ICMP has no ports and is neither TCP nor UDP. ICMP is IP protocol 1 (see RFC792), TCP is IP protocol 6 (described in RFC793) and UDP is IP protocol 17(see RFC768). UDP and TCP have ports, ICMP has no ports, but types and codes. What causes ICMP Destination Unreachable? The ICMP destination unreachable message is generated by a router to inform the source host that the destination unicast address is unreachable. The IP header plus the first 8 bytes of the original datagram’s data is returned to the sender. This data is used by the host to match the message to the appropriate process. Which ICMP types allow? The only essential ICMP traffic you need to allow in and out of your firewall is Type 3 and Type 4. Everything else is either optional or should be blocked. Notes: To send ping requests, allow type 8 OUT and type 0 IN. How do I stop ICMP? Expand Security Settings > Firewall and select Global Rules. Double click on the rule that says “Block ICMPv4 In From MAC Any To MAC Any Where ICMP Message Is ECHO REQUEST” and change the action from Block to Allow. What services use ICMP? The number one use of ICMP is for reporting errors. … Both traceroute and ping use ICMP. Traceroute and ping are messages sent regarding whether data was successfully transmitted. When traceroute is used, the devices that a packet of data went through to get to its destination are displayed in the report. What is the difference between ICMP and TCP? ICMP is a control protocol, meaning that it designed to not carry application data, but rather information about the status of the network itself. … The main difference between TCP and UDP is that TCP is a connection oriented protocol, it guarantees that all sent packets will reach the destination in the correct order.
The Guardian sent a number of questions to the Turkish hacker group, Turkguvenligi, who carried out the domain name server hack that affected the Telegraph, UPS, Betfair, The Register and a number of other high-profile sites. Here are those questions, and the group's responses: Q. Who did you hack? Netnames.co.uk or Ascio? Or both? It's unclear. A. In fact both of them in addition with some other ones. Q. Was this planned for a long time, or did you just find a weakness by chance? A. We usually choose some big targets and find a way to access them. sometimes it takes months. but harder makes it funnier ;) .[It was] not by chance because we are expert of all kinds of web vulnerability holes. Q Why target them? A. we target big domains. which company owns them differs. Q Did you also do the South Korea hack at zdnet.com A. Yep. in fact we attacked there in the past but forgot some domains to hack :D so reowned it [hacked it again]. you can check other korean domain mirrors here : zone-h.org Q. If so, what's so special about DNS hacking? Is it that it goes wider, or is it easier than hacking lots of sites, or ..? A. First we target site itself. if we can't find a vuln [vulnerability]. on the script of site we try accessing server or vps [virtual private server]. If none of them works we try domain company. The hardest one is reaching the domain company but if you can succeed there will be a treasure for you :D
Information filtering (IF) systems usually filter data items by correlating a vector of terms (keywords) that represent the user profile with similar vectors of terms that represent the data items (e.g. documents). The terms that represent the data items can be determined by (human) experts (e.g. authors of documents) or by automatic indexing methods. In this study we employ an artificial neural-network (ANN) as an alternative method for both filtering and term selection, and compare its effectiveness to “traditional” methods. In an earlier study we developed and examined the performance of an IF system that employed content-based and stereotypic rule-based filtering methods, in the domain of e-mail messages. In this study we train a large-scale ANN-based filter which uses meaningful terms in the same database of email messages as input, and use it to predict the relevancy of those messages. Results of the study reveal that the ANN prediction of relevancy is very good, compared to the prediction of the IF system: correlation between the ANN prediction and the users’ evaluation of message relevancy ranges between 0.76- 0.99, compared to correlation in the range of 0.41-0.77 for the IF system. Moreover, we found very low correlation between the terms in the user profile (which were selected by the users) and the positive causal-index terms of the ANN (which indicate the important terms that appear in the messages). This indicates that the users under-estimate the importance of some terms, failing to include them in their profiles. This may explain the rather low prediction accuracy of the IF system that is based on user-generated profiles. Boger, Zvi; Kuflik, Tsvi; Shapira, Bracha; and Shoval, Peretz, "Information Filtering and Automatic Keyword Identification by Artificial Neural Networks" (2000). ECIS 2000 Proceedings. 111.
What is Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] infection? In this post you will discover concerning the interpretation of Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] and also its unfavorable effect on your computer. Such ransomware are a kind of malware that is clarified by on the internet fraudulences to demand paying the ransom by a sufferer. It is better to prevent, than repair and repent! Most of the situations, Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] ransomware will certainly instruct its targets to initiate funds transfer for the function of reducing the effects of the amendments that the Trojan infection has actually presented to the sufferer’s device. Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] Summary These modifications can be as complies with: - Unconventionial language used in binary resources: Divehi; - Network activity detected but not expressed in API logs. Microsoft built an API solution right into its Windows operating system it reveals network activity for all apps and programs that ran on the computer in the past 30-days. This malware hides network activity. - Anomalous binary characteristics. This is a way of hiding virus’ code from antiviruses and virus’ analysts. - Ciphering the papers situated on the victim’s hard drive — so the target can no more utilize the data; - Preventing regular accessibility to the sufferer’s workstation; The most normal networks through which Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] Trojans are injected are: - By methods of phishing emails; - As an effect of user winding up on a resource that holds a malicious software program; As quickly as the Trojan is efficiently injected, it will certainly either cipher the data on the sufferer’s PC or prevent the device from functioning in a proper manner – while also putting a ransom note that discusses the demand for the victims to impact the repayment for the objective of decrypting the papers or bring back the data system back to the initial problem. In a lot of circumstances, the ransom money note will turn up when the client restarts the PC after the system has already been damaged. Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] circulation channels. In different corners of the world, Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] expands by jumps and also bounds. Nevertheless, the ransom notes and methods of extorting the ransom quantity might vary depending upon specific neighborhood (local) setups. The ransom notes and also tricks of obtaining the ransom quantity may vary depending on certain regional (local) setups. Faulty signals concerning unlicensed software application. In particular areas, the Trojans typically wrongfully report having actually identified some unlicensed applications made it possible for on the victim’s tool. The alert then requires the individual to pay the ransom. Faulty statements about unlawful content. In nations where software application piracy is less preferred, this method is not as efficient for the cyber scams. Additionally, the Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] popup alert may wrongly declare to be deriving from a police organization and will certainly report having situated child porn or various other illegal information on the device. Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] popup alert might falsely declare to be obtaining from a law enforcement organization and also will certainly report having located child pornography or various other prohibited information on the gadget. The alert will in a similar way contain a requirement for the individual to pay the ransom. File Info:crc32: CB6CA98Dmd5: 159180615b7e154465fc9916fc9bda1ename: 159180615B7E154465FC9916FC9BDA1E.mlwsha1: ac48ba389180fd2ca5bacddcb069ad29c94b0788sha256: 92cd5faf887a32d44ea5c819c7c4df985344efd535dea11d5b295cc41a51e511sha512: 3c5fe9aa807c952d8a8226100bfc2fdbd7671872a808b3ab3738923ad3b0c7c7a6a235f43db24e0e2ba4405141a75fda31cf87bc63e63908d0dacd28d073196assdeep: 6144:CLMhHA+gJaJUn86taUfuYdxmefIsx0aPZTqEgi9Ht:CLMV5BzUfHdxr9WaBuEDtype: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Version Info:LegalCopyright: Mobilises (C) 2015InternalName: PlanksFileDescription: PrincelingsOriginalFilename: Precognitions.exeCompanyName: Joost Technologies B.V. Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] also known as: \|K7AntiVirus\|\|Trojan ( 0055e3ef1 )\| \|Elastic\|\|malicious (high confidence)\| \|Cynet\|\|Malicious (score: 100)\| \|K7GW\|\|Trojan ( 0055e3ef1 )\| \|Sophos\|\|Mal/Generic-R + Troj/Ransom-BSA\| \|SentinelOne\|\|Static AI – Malicious PE\| \|MAX\|\|malware (ai score=100)\| How to remove Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] ransomware? Unwanted application has ofter come with other viruses and spyware. This threats can steal account credentials, or crypt your documents for ransom. Reasons why I would recommend GridinSoft1 There is no better way to recognize, remove and prevent PC threats than to use an anti-malware software from GridinSoft2. Download GridinSoft Anti-Malware. You can download GridinSoft Anti-Malware by clicking the button below: Run the setup file. When setup file has finished downloading, double-click on the setup-antimalware-fix.exe file to install GridinSoft Anti-Malware on your system. An User Account Control asking you about to allow GridinSoft Anti-Malware to make changes to your device. So, you should click “Yes” to continue with the installation. Press “Install” button. Once installed, Anti-Malware will automatically run. Wait for the Anti-Malware scan to complete. GridinSoft Anti-Malware will automatically start scanning your system for Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] files and other malicious programs. This process can take a 20-30 minutes, so I suggest you periodically check on the status of the scan process. Click on “Clean Now”. When the scan has finished, you will see the list of infections that GridinSoft Anti-Malware has detected. To remove them click on the “Clean Now” button in right corner. Are Your Protected? GridinSoft Anti-Malware will scan and clean your PC for free in the trial period. The free version offer real-time protection for first 2 days. If you want to be fully protected at all times – I can recommended you to purchase a full version: If the guide doesn’t help you to remove Win32:TeslaCrypt-AK [Trj] you can always ask me in the comments for getting help. User Review( votes)
Many IT teams today have to balance keeping their organization secure and ensuring their employees can be productive. Chrome browser has hundreds of enterprise policies to choose from to support these two priorities. These policies are available across on-prem and cloud options, and can be configured at different levels for maximum flexibility for IT teams. The methods you use to apply these policies determines their level of precedence. So in the case of a conflicting policy, it is good to know which one will win. If there is not a conflicting policy, regardless of level, the policy will still apply as expected. To help ensure policies are behaving the way admins intend, let’s break down the what, how and when these levels of precedence get set and how they affect each other. Here they are in the order of precedence from highest to lowest: - Machine policy—This level of precedence and is usually set via Group Policy on Windows or via managed preferences on a Mac. They can also be set for Linux. Policy that is set at this level will override any other policy if there is a conflict. - Cloud Machine Policy—These policies are set within Chrome Browser Cloud Management, This means that as you roll out Chrome Browser Cloud Management, it will work side-by-side with your existing policies, but local machine policy will win if conflicts occur. Note: there is a GPO policy that can be used to override this order of precedence in case you want Cloud Policy to win over any policy set including local machine policy. - OS User policy—This applies when a user signs in to their account on a corporate-managed Windows or Mac computer. - Cloud User Policy—These are also known as Chrome profile policies. If you are a Google Workspace customer, this policy is set within the Google Admin Console and applies when your users sign into Google and have a policy applied. - Chrome Default/Users Settings—These are either the default settings that come standard with Chrome or settings that are manually set by the user. These policies hold the least precedence, and in many cases administrators may choose to limit a user’s ability to make setting changes in their corporate environments. If you want to review the different levels and sources of the policies that are being applied to your devices, go to chrome://policies to see the policies that are currently in effect. Here is a link to more information on how to view policies and their sources via this method. Another important consideration is that some settings also can be applied in different ways, for example, recommended or mandatory. Policies that are mandatory force the setting and do not allow the user to change them. Recommended settings allow the user to change the settings after they have been set by the administrator. You can set this by creating a primary_preferences file on your users’ machines. The method of doing this is detailed in Use primary preferences for Chrome Browser. Note that these settings are the lowest order of precedence (level 5 in the list above) and could be overridden by any other policy above it. The number of configuration options available are ultimately meant to help IT teams customize Chrome to meet the unique needs of your environment and users. Hopefully this provides more clarity on the different methods and behaviors of Chrome Browser policies so you can make sure that the right policies get applied on your user’s machines. Understanding policy precedence is a great way to ensure that Chrome is behaving the way IT teams intend for your workforce. By: Fletcher Oliver (Chrome Browser Customer Engineer) Source: Google Cloud Blog
What is Trojan.MalPack.PNG infection? In this post you will find regarding the meaning of Trojan.MalPack.PNG as well as its negative effect on your computer. Such ransomware are a form of malware that is elaborated by on the internet fraudulences to demand paying the ransom money by a sufferer. It is better to prevent, than repair and repent! In the majority of the instances, Trojan.MalPack.PNG virus will certainly instruct its victims to initiate funds transfer for the function of reducing the effects of the modifications that the Trojan infection has actually presented to the target’s tool. These alterations can be as complies with: - The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data. In this case, encryption is a way of hiding virus’ code from antiviruses and virus’ analysts. - Network activity detected but not expressed in API logs. Microsoft built an API solution right into its Windows operating system it reveals network activity for all apps and programs that ran on the computer in the past 30-days. This malware hides network activity. - Ciphering the documents situated on the sufferer’s disk drive — so the sufferer can no longer make use of the data; - Preventing regular access to the target’s workstation. This is the typical behavior of a virus called locker. It blocks access to the computer until the victim pays the ransom. One of the most common networks whereby Trojan.MalPack.PNG Ransomware are injected are: - By means of phishing emails; - As an effect of customer ending up on a source that holds a malicious software program; As soon as the Trojan is efficiently infused, it will certainly either cipher the information on the victim’s computer or prevent the tool from working in a correct manner – while also positioning a ransom money note that mentions the requirement for the victims to effect the settlement for the function of decrypting the documents or restoring the documents system back to the preliminary condition. In the majority of circumstances, the ransom note will certainly turn up when the client reboots the PC after the system has actually currently been damaged. Trojan.MalPack.PNG distribution channels. In numerous corners of the world, Trojan.MalPack.PNG grows by leaps and also bounds. Nevertheless, the ransom notes and also tricks of extorting the ransom quantity might differ depending upon specific regional (regional) setups. The ransom notes and methods of obtaining the ransom quantity may vary depending on certain neighborhood (local) settings. As an example: Faulty notifies about unlicensed software. In particular areas, the Trojans frequently wrongfully report having identified some unlicensed applications allowed on the target’s tool. The sharp after that demands the individual to pay the ransom money. Faulty statements concerning unlawful content. In countries where software program piracy is less preferred, this approach is not as reliable for the cyber fraudulences. Additionally, the Trojan.MalPack.PNG popup alert may incorrectly declare to be stemming from a police institution and will certainly report having located kid porn or various other prohibited data on the device. Trojan.MalPack.PNG popup alert may wrongly declare to be obtaining from a regulation enforcement organization and also will report having located kid porn or various other unlawful data on the device. The alert will similarly have a need for the customer to pay the ransom money. File Info:crc32: AB2F51E0md5: 4164e11a82771a5998969d819bff9798name: 4164E11A82771A5998969D819BFF9798.mlwsha1: 0c9fe43e31a021b9d8d33eb64d147febe83f1893sha256: 37a2277d6c8bca97d490bf445449815150a065ef1b4dcaa54d39e56e77d4d4edsha512: 039514a11d2d730b4dfccc3e41e14407e7384087325c4dc54525710ed731894c8de17141a3f8cbfc4238c71e3b5297a36bf16d7c8f21f6980314ed7b37e479d9ssdeep: 12288:iUTLyuvYIbV+RRapyasOYwcv8Tt+VP6ixSym:dOEhCU0acv8Ta6ixSymtype: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows Version Info:Translation: 0x0000 0x04b0LegalCopyright: Copyright xa9 2016 - 2020Assembly Version: 188.8.131.52InternalName: Glla.exeFileVersion: 184.108.40.206CompanyName: LegalTrademarks: Comments: ProductName: Car FixerProductVersion: 220.127.116.11FileDescription: Car FixerOriginalFilename: Glla.exe Trojan.MalPack.PNG also known as: \|Elastic\|\|malicious (high confidence)\| \|K7AntiVirus\|\|Trojan ( 005723221 )\| \|K7GW\|\|Trojan ( 005723221 )\| \|MAX\|\|malware (ai score=81)\| \|Cynet\|\|Malicious (score: 100)\| \|ESET-NOD32\|\|a variant of MSIL/GenKryptik.EVNQ\| \|SentinelOne\|\|Static AI – Malicious PE\| How to remove Trojan.MalPack.PNG ransomware? Unwanted application has ofter come with other viruses and spyware. This threats can steal account credentials, or crypt your documents for ransom. Reasons why I would recommend GridinSoft1 The is an excellent way to deal with recognizing and removing threats – using Gridinsoft Anti-Malware. This program will scan your PC, find and neutralize all suspicious processes.2. Download GridinSoft Anti-Malware. You can download GridinSoft Anti-Malware by clicking the button below: Run the setup file. When setup file has finished downloading, double-click on the setup-antimalware-fix.exe file to install GridinSoft Anti-Malware on your system. An User Account Control asking you about to allow GridinSoft Anti-Malware to make changes to your device. So, you should click “Yes” to continue with the installation. Press “Install” button. Once installed, Anti-Malware will automatically run. Wait for the Anti-Malware scan to complete. GridinSoft Anti-Malware will automatically start scanning your system for Trojan.MalPack.PNG files and other malicious programs. This process can take a 20-30 minutes, so I suggest you periodically check on the status of the scan process. Click on “Clean Now”. When the scan has finished, you will see the list of infections that GridinSoft Anti-Malware has detected. To remove them click on the “Clean Now” button in right corner. Are Your Protected? GridinSoft Anti-Malware will scan and clean your PC for free in the trial period. The free version offer real-time protection for first 2 days. If you want to be fully protected at all times – I can recommended you to purchase a full version: If the guide doesn’t help you to remove Trojan.MalPack.PNG you can always ask me in the comments for getting help. User Review( votes)
My firewall continually pops up with a little message saying that an attack to some port was detected. It gives me some numbers (like that's supposed to mean something to me) that I don't understand. There's a log with long lists of these "attacks." Am I supposed to do something with this stuff? How do I find out who the As you can see, I'm not very experienced with firewalls (except for shutting them off). - RE: Strange loopback in firefox. ... described as heavy attack from outside IP addresses. ... either using the Microsoft_DS port or epmap port to connect). ... For example a connection from port 3014 to 3015 and the next ... to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. ... - Re: Security problem ... simply to use a non-standard port. ... names and passwords, on large ranges of IP addresses. ... order to perform successful brute-force attack and that's ludicrous. ... DROP incoming packets for other ports (and what internet-facing server ... - FW: Legal? Road Runner proactive scanning.[Scanned] ... You consider a port scan to be an attack? ... to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. ... Attend a course taught by an expert instructor with years of in-the-field ... - Re: SSH server under attack... ... It's highly possible that even though you changed the port, an automated script discovered the new port by probing the ports and matching version numbers, ie: ... the new machine to attack me is 220.127.116.11. ... Failed password for invalid user admin from::ffff:18.104.22.168 port ... - SSH server under attack... ... OK...within a few hours the server was being attacked again on port 2222. ... The router/firewall logs dont show any dropped packets sent to port 22 so he changed the port of the attack script. ... I scanned the machine and found that it is hosting a webserver Server at www.springs.cl) among other services. ... Invalid user admin from::ffff:22.214.171.124 Failed password for invalid user admin from::ffff:126.96.36.199 port ...
Browsing Protection blocks the access to harmful websites when it is turned on. To make sure that Browsing Protection is on: - Open the product from the Windows Start - On the Antivirus page, select Settings. - Select Secure Browsing. - Select Edit settings. - Turn on Browsing Protection. - If your browser is open, restart your browser to apply the changed settings. Note: Browsing Protection requires that the Browsing Protection extension is turned on in the web browser that you use.
Athento has traceability systems at different levels to dump system execution and deployment information. This trace is written in the form of logs that are dumped in real time in files within the file system and by subscribing to notification services. Depending on the trace level to be represented (and depending on the established environment), debugging actions, information, warnings and errors can be displayed. Location of logs and log system used The log files are written to the following path: athentose_general.log: output of the application with execution information. athentose_error.log: output with Athento error output. The log files of the third party tools used by Athento are also located in /var/log and are actively monitored by the Athento team in order to control their status. Athento relies on the Django logger service (Python Logging) where trace levels are set for each of the output files. Monitoring services for errors and other incidents Athento also uses external monitoring and notification services, which report all the trace context at a given time. One of these services is Sentry, where each and every one of the trace lines foreseen in each environment is exploited, having all the information and context of the client and the server at a given time. In addition, Athento has the Site24x7 tool that monitors in real time any defined alert that observes the content of the log files to be able to act quickly and effectively. Access control logs Network component level traces The traces collected by Athento at the network component level are established at 3 levels: Network level: where the entire network flow is traced at a low level. This type of trace is obtained from the network or infrastructure provider's data from their respective management panels. Firewall level: where the accepted and rejected communication is displayed. This trace also depends on the infrastructure providers used and can be displayed directly in the configuration of the installed software firewall. Proxy level: where the requests are displayed when they are sent to the service. The proxy trace is established directly in filesystem as we do with the Athento ones. We also exploit it using cloud services to monitor and notify in case of possible warning situations.
Web Application security testing is a targeted way of evaluating the security of web application to identify the weakness of an application. Accomplished by simulating various exploitation attempts from an external source, our expert team handles it all. Our web team is well versed in manual web application penetration testing and assessment methodology. Web Application Security testing is a fundamental test to provide a safe approach to evaluate the security of web application. Our assessment will include security assessment of the IP address hosting the website (should be hosted on a dedicated server) and validation testing once all the observations have been fixed. We are proper security controls are in place, and developers are adhering to secure development techniques Our team understands the features and behavior of an application to identify the anomalies on the behavior of the application. The tests will be conducted as per the web development document agreed with the development team and the owners of web application. Testing will include a combination of automated and manual techniques covering the OWASP Top 10 and SANS 25 web vulnerabilities. Let’s connect and allow us to ease the process of your Web Application Security.
VerSprite’s Approach to Web Application Security Starts with Web Application Penetration Testing & Identifying Exposed APIs Every VerSprite penetration test exercise begins by developing a deeper understanding of the client’s organization, which allows our security analysts to design realistic threat models that reveal an attacker’s motivation and possible targets. Then, our team of pen testers identify likely attacks that can cross technologies, people, and processes to assess the strength of the countermeasures necessary to resist attacks. This process ensures the list of vulnerability remediations is made based on business impact and realistic attack vectors. VerSprite performs an dynamic analysis and static analysis of web applications and exposed APIs that support vital client information to validate an organization’s security posture. VerSprite’s application security experts conduct manual security testing of web presence to identify application flaws around authentication, vulnerabilities from web frameworks, injection mitigation, malicious file uploads, and other types of web-based attacks.
But again. What IS the threat of network traffic to a port no one is listening on? None. What your firewall is you protecting from is NOT bad stuff from the outside. It's protecting you from the inside danger that some service suddenly opens a port which is reachable from the outside. (Hate to dig out the old Win vs. nix, but the usual suspects for this are usually Windows servers you need to lock down first, as they're usually asuming that they're in a friendly network. On nix machines you usually need to manually add those services one by one, as you would open the ports on your firewall) The firewall provides defense in depth. Yes, if nothing else goes wrong, the Firewall is unnecessary. On the other hand, if something else does go wrong, the firewall become another obstacle for the attacker.
The City of Atlanta was recently attacked by a ransomware disrupting five local government departments. The damage of the attack on the city's computer systems left city officials filling… .NET developers have the freedom of dynamically compiling fragments of their source code. In application, this may help server software have the flexibility to update its behavior or load modules without restarting. Unfortunately, a good thing may rather be abused by threat actors. Today’s malware typically decrypts a garbage looking binary data and transforms it into an executable code and runs it. Sequre ransomware is no different from the same concept. The difference is that the decrypted data is transformed into a source code that gets compiled and then executed in memory. This ransomware was reported by MalwareHunterTeam and so far, there are no similar real-world reports as of this writing. It is a Win32 PE file and is C# .NET compiled. It is not packed but a quick look at its binary shows a huge amount of unicode hexadecimal text strings. In a short period of time, it was able to modify 5,202 files with 55,104 file activities. Such behavior flags it for being suspicious. It has a few registry activities but has no network activities. It runs the csc.exe with the /noconfig parameter. The csc.exe is the Visual C# Command Line Compiler that came along with the .NET framework runtime. It seems that the registry queries were caused by the .NET framework activities. One of the first file activity was on the cmdline file passed to the csc.exe. The rest of the newly stored files are ransomware notes. Using ILSpy, an open source tool that attempts to decompile C# compiled programs, we are able to see what the source code look like. The class name and some of its function names somewhat uses garbled names. In the Main() function, the code decrypts a very long hexadecimal text string and finally passes the decrypted text (code) into a function. To get the contents of the code, using the same source, we debugged this in Visual Studio C# and write the contents to a file. The code string variable contained this: The code contents is another C# source code and is the actual ransomware code. This source is passed to the following code that dynamically compiles it The System.CodeDom.Compiler module is used to compile the code. The parameters passed to the CompilerParameters is intended to build everything in memory. GenerateInMemory = true GenerateExecutable = false This may seem that it does not touch the disk at all but looking at the logs from ThreatAnalyzer, files were created in the Windows Temporary directory. Decompiling this DLL with ILSpy shows the decompiled ransomware source: Fundamentally, the compilation process still touches the disk. These were temporary written to the disk by the CompileAssemblyFromSource function. After that, the files are gone. Finally, it uses the Invoke function to run the compiled program’s n96I4AJ3EYNVO71FC.Program->Main() function. Sequre Ransomware is also called by some security experts as a variant of HiddenTear ransomware. HiddenTear ransomware is known as an open-source ransomware coded using C# (https://github.com/goliate/hidden-tear). This has raised concerns on the generation of variants and Sequre ransomware might just be one of these variants. Others named it as a variant of CryptConsole Ransomware, Genasom, and FileCoder. The ransomware component behaves as that of a typical ransomware. Creates <40-character name>.txt file on the Desktop folder that contains Creates HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta on the Desktop folder that contains the ransomware note: Looks for files traversing each sub directory from the root directory of every available drive Skips files whose name contains these: Attempt to set file attributes to normal – this skips the file if permission to change the attributes is not allowed It creates the ransomware notification file HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta on every folder it can write on. It opens the HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta stored in the Desktop. Finally, it makes a copy of the HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta in the Startup folder. Vipre Security customers are protected from this ransomware. And to add to that, security awareness is also a best way to prevent getting compromised. You can ask Vipre Security for ways to secure your computer and your network. Luckily, this ransomware left all the information needed to restore encrypted files. The ID given in the HOW DECRIPT FILES.hta indicates the name of the text file, <ID>.txt, found in the Desktop folder. The text file contains the plain key and vector index that can be used to decrypt the AES encryption used. For advance users, the attached python script can aid to decrypt the ransom files.
Threats are only found in the file types that contain executable code. When Symantec Protection Engine receives a top-level file or a container file, it performs an analysis of the file structure to determine its true file type. You can conserve bandwidth and time by only scanning the files that might contain threats, based upon their file extensions or file types. Symantec Protection Engine is configured by default to scan all files regardless of extension or type. You can choose to scan all files except those that are in the file extension and file type exclude lists. Symantec Protection Engine scans only top-level files or the files that are embedded in the archival file formats that are not contained in either list. The default exclude lists contain the most common file extensions and the file types that are unlikely to contain threats. You can add any file extension to the File extension exclude list (file extensions must begin with a period). The file types that you can add to the File type exclude list are as follows: Although file types are formatted similarly to MIME types, they are not derived from MIME headers of the messages that are scanned. Symantec Protection Engine derives file types by an analysis of the data itself, regardless of what information is in the MIME type. As you evaluate which files to exclude from scanning, consider the trade-offs between performance and protection. An exclusion list lets some files bypass scanning. Thus, new types of threats might not always be detected. Scanning all files regardless of type or extension is the most secure setting, but it imposes the heaviest demand on resources. During outbreaks, you might want to scan all files even if you normally use the exclusion lists to control the files that are scanned. Use caution if you add .jpg or .jpeg to the File extension exclude list or image/jpg, image/jpeg, or image/* to the File type exclude list. These file types can be encoded with threats and might pose a risk to your network. To specify which files to scan In the console on the primary navigation bar, click Policies. In the sidebar under Views, click Scanning. In the content area under Files to Scan, click Scan all files except those in the extension or type exclude lists. In the File extension exclude list, do any of the following steps: To add a file extension to the exclude list Type the file extension that you want to add. Type each entry on a separate line. Each entry should begin with a period. To remove a file extension from the exclude list Highlight and delete the file extension that you want to remove. In the File type exclude list, do any of the following steps: To add a file type to the exclude list Type the file type that you want to add. Type each extension on a separate line. You must type the file type exactly as it appears in the list. Use the wildcard character /* to include all subtypes for a file type. For example, if you type audio/* you would exclude all audio subtypes from being scanned. To remove a file type from the exclude list Highlight and delete the file type that you want to remove. To restore the default exclude lists, under Tasks, click Reset Default List. This option restores the default File type exclude list and File extension exclude list. On the toolbar, select one of the following options: Saves your changes. Use this option to continue making changes in the console until you are ready to apply them. Applies your changes. Your changes are not implemented until you apply them.
To identify a mobile station (MS) and validate legal service requests, authentication functions are utilized in the location registration, call origination and call termination procedures. In GSM, the VLR requests the HLR for assistance in authenticating the visiting user. The authentication center (AuC) in the home network generates 3-tuples and sends them back to the VLR for subsequent authentications during the user’s residence. If these 3-tuples are used up before the MS’s leaving, another request is issued by the VLR. The request is expensive, because it needs to access the HLR/AuC. Traditionally, a fixed-K strategy is used. That is, K 3-tuples are sent to the VLR for each request. Lager K is preferred to reduce the number of the expensive requests for 3-tuples. However, much waste of 3-tuples is observed, especially when an inactive user is considered. Hence, K value should be determined based on the usage pattern of the user. We propose a dynamic-K (DK) strategy to reduce the waste and diminish the signaling traffic for authentication. Simulation results show that the DK strategy can effectively determine the appropriate K value. Not only the waste but also the number of requests are diminished efficiently. Lo, Chi-Chun and Sue, Kuen-Liang, "Diminishing Signaling Traffic for Authentication in Mobile Communication System" (2002). ICEB 2002 Proceedings (Taipei, Taiwan). 197.
Web application penetration testing is an important element in guaranteeing the security of web applications. By simulating real-world assaults, vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the application’s security mechanism are identified. The next step is to report and fix vulnerabilities if they have been found. We will discuss the value of reporting and remediation in web application penetration testing, the procedures involved, and how they can enhance the security of web applications in this blog article. Importance of Reporting Reporting is a critical step in web application penetration testing. It involves documenting the findings of the penetration test, including vulnerabilities identified, the severity of the vulnerabilities, and recommendations for remediation. The report should be clear, concise, and easy to understand by both technical and non-technical stakeholders. The following are some of the reasons why reporting is important: Reporting provides valuable insights into the security posture of the web application. It helps identify vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited by attackers and provides recommendations for remediation. The report can also be used as a benchmark for future testing to measure improvements in the Helps Prioritize Remediation: Reporting also helps prioritize remediation efforts. It provides information on the severity of the vulnerabilities, allowing developers to focus on the most critical issues first. This helps ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and vulnerabilities are addressed in a timely manner. Reporting can also help demonstrate compliance with industry regulations and standards. For example, organizations in the financial and healthcare sectors are required to comply with specific regulations such as PCI DSS and HIPAA. Reporting can help demonstrate that the organization is taking appropriate steps to comply with these regulations. Importance of Remediation Remediation is the process of fixing vulnerabilities identified during the penetration test. The following are some of the reasons why remediation is important: Remediation helps reduce the risk of a successful attack. By fixing vulnerabilities, organizations can prevent attackers from exploiting them and accessing sensitive data. Remediation helps increase trust in the web application. By demonstrating that vulnerabilities are being addressed and fixed, organizations can improve their reputation and instill confidence in their customers. Saves Time and Money: Remediation can also save time and money in the long run. By addressing vulnerabilities early on, organizations can prevent more significant security incidents that could result in costly damage and downtime. Steps for Reporting and Remediation The following are the essential steps involved in reporting and remediation in web application penetration testing: The first step is to document the findings of the penetration test. The report should include details on the vulnerabilities identified, severity levels, and recommendations for remediation. Once vulnerabilities are identified, it’s essential to prioritize remediation efforts. Vulnerabilities with a high severity level should be addressed first, followed by those with lower severity levels. Develop a Remediation Plan: A remediation plan should be developed that outlines how vulnerabilities will be fixed, who is responsible for fixing them, and a timeline for completion. Once vulnerabilities are fixed, they should be retested to ensure that they have been addressed and that no new vulnerabilities have been introduced. After the fixes have been tested, a re-report should be issued that documents the fixes made and verifies that the vulnerabilities have been addressed. Web application penetration testing is an ongoing process that requires regular testing to ensure the security of web applications. Organizations can improve their knowledge and skills in web application penetration testing through further study. The following are some resources that can be used to improve knowledge in web application penetration testing: The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a nonprofit organization that focuses on improving the security of software. Their website provides a wealth of information on web application security, including guidelines on penetration testing. The SANS Institute is a cybersecurity training and certification organization that offers courses on web application penetration testing. Their courses cover topics such as web application vulnerabilities, testing methodologies, and remediation strategies. The International Council of Electronic Commerce Consultants (EC-Council) is a global cybersecurity education and certification leader. They offer a Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) program, which covers web application penetration testing and other cybersecurity topics. There are also several books available on web application penetration testing, including “Web Application Penetration Testing with Burp Suite” by Sunny Wear and “The Web Application Hacker’s Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws” by Dafydd Stuttard and Marcus Pinto. Reporting and remediation are critical steps in web application penetration testing. Reporting helps identify vulnerabilities and prioritize remediation efforts, while remediation helps reduce risk, increase trust, and save time and money. Following the steps outlined above can help organizations effectively report and remediate vulnerabilities in their web applications. Ongoing study and training in web application penetration testing can help organizations stay up-to-date on emerging threats and improve their security posture.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: \|An Anomaly Based Adaptive Fuzzy Framework for Detecting Network Intrusions \|Baig, Habib Ullah Engineering & allied operations Other branches of engineering \|UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY TAXILA \|Anomaly based Intrusion detection systems have proved their worth by detecting zero age intrusions but suffers from large number of false alarms mainly because of imprecise definitions of their normal profile or detection models. Building accurate and precise normal profiles or detection models for intrusion detection is a complex process. It is because it involves highly dynamic network behavior, concept drift phenomenon and evolving intrusion patterns. To accommodate these network dynamics in intrusion de- tection models, we require extensive training data-sets. These data sets must contain a uniform distribution of theoretically possible intrusion patterns and normal network traffic instances. Deviation in training data-set with real time network data and skewed class distribution in training data set will result in a biased detection model. Concept drift phenomenon, huge network data, highly imbalance traffic distribution, addition of new applications and abstract boundaries between normal and abnormal behavior has limited the accuracy of generalized detection models or shortened their detection models useful life. Due to these limitations and complexities in building long term intrusion de- tection models, it is proposed in this thesis that instead of building a generalized profile responsible for detecting all the intrusions it is more helpful if short-term profiles are used to detect an intrusion or even a phase of an intrusion active in certain time space. These short term profiles are evolved by changing cost functions according to changed anomaly conditions, current network traffic patterns and security policies. The evolved profiles remain valid for a short period of time in which network dynamics can be as- sumed as piece-wise linear. In this thesis an anomaly based Adaptive SEmi-supervised Evolutionary Security (ASEES) fuzzy framework is proposed. It is based on adaptive distributed and cooperative fuzzy agents which use evolved short-term profiles. These profiles are evolved for different objectives to detect specific intrusions. Evolved pro- files are switched and activated according to current network and anomaly conditions, network security policies and based on forecasted attacks. The ASEES fuzzy framework is tested under two different attacks; DoS attack and viireconnaissance attack i.e. port scan. The results show good detection times and high detection rate due to similarity of the training and testing data-set. The results also shows a performance increase in using short term profiles along with generalize normal profiles for denial of service attacks. \|Appears in Collections: \|PhD Thesis of All Public / Private Sector Universities / DAIs. Files in This Item: \|Table of Contents Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Cisco+ Secure Connect - Manage DNS Policies Domain Name System (DNS) protection is your first line of defense. Nothing stops attacks earlier than DNS-layer security. DNS protection identifies where malicious domains and other dangerous internet infrastructures are staged. Secure DNS servers then block requests coming from these staging sites over any port or protocol, preventing both infiltration and exfiltration attempts. DNS-layer security stops malware earlier and prevents callbacks to attackers if infected machines connect to your network. In addition, you can use DNS protection to enforce your organization internet usage policies by blocking unwanted website categories. Cisco+ Secure Connect is integrated with Cisco Umbrella for DNS Security. Cisco Umbrella uses statistical and machine learning models to uncover new attacks staged on the internet in combination with the threat intelligence data from Cisco Talos, a team of over 300 security researchers. A more detailed guide to DNS Security and Cisco Umbrella can be found here. Plan Before You Start Before you start implementing policies, we recommend that you read through these policy sections of our documentation in full. Decide what security and access controls should be put in place by users or groups of users. You can have more than one DNS policy and your identities can be added to any number of policies, however, the order of the policies matter. Umbrella applies the first matching policy to your identity and immediately stops evaluating policies. If no matching policy is found, Umbrella applies the DNS default policy. Because of the way Umbrella evaluates identities against policies, it's important that you configure policies correctly for each of your organization's identities. An error in configuration may result in unintended results: identities being left unprotected to various threats or users accessing destinations you may want blocked. Plan and design your policies before you build them. For some helpful suggestions, see Best Practices for DNS Policies. There is always at least one policy—the Default policy. This default policy applies to all identities and cannot be deleted—you can, however, configure it to meet your organization's unique requirements. The default policy is applied to an identity when no other policy matches that identity. Thus, the Default policy is a catch-all to ensure that all identities within your organization receive at least a minimum of Umbrella protection. You create DNS policies through the Policy wizard, which is made up of two parts. In the first part of the wizard, you select the identities to which the policy applies and select which components should be enabled and configured for the policy. In the second part of the wizard, you configure each component of the policy that was selected in part one of the wizard. These components are made available as steps in the wizard. Once the new policy is saved, it may take upwards of five minutes for the policy to replicate through Umbrella’s global infrastructure and start taking effect. Presently DNS policies are being configured on the Cisco Umbrella dashboard. You will need to navigate to Umbrella dashboard from Cisco+ Secure Connect. - To get to the Umbrella DNS Policies page from the Secure Connect Dashboard click on the DNS link in the Policy count area or go to the menu and click on DNS under Policies column. - Below is the Umbrella DNS Policy page. You click on the Add button in the top right corner to add a policy. - Go to the Resources section below for more information on how to create and test web policies. The Cisco Umbrella sites has detailed information on configuring and testing policies. Below are links to the key DNS policy guides. Best Practices for DNS Policies Enforce SafeSearch for DNS Policies Group Roaming Computers with Tags

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